Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-46a
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-46a
(P.A. 73-137, S. 4; P.A. 80-332, S. 1; 80-442, S. 14, 28; P.A. 85-366, S. 1; P.A. 93-306, S. 12; P.A. 95-19, S. 1; P.A. 01-151, S. 1, 2, 5; P.A. 11-129, S. 20; P.A. 12-5, S. 5; P.A. 15-84, S. 6.)
Cited. 197 Conn. 436; 207 Conn. 374; 209 C. 225; 212 C. 258; 221 Conn. 430; 225 Conn. 559. Does not violate prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment nor infringe on rights to due process. 230 Conn. 183. Cited. 233 C. 813; 234 C. 735; 235 Conn. 206; 237 C. 332; 238 Conn. 389; 240 Conn. 743; 242 Conn. 409. Court upheld previous holding that statute does not require a capital sentencer to give mitigating force to any particular proven factor solely because that factor establishes something good about defendant; instead, statute leaves the decision as to whether a proven factor is mitigating in nature to sentencer's reasoned moral judgment; once sentencer has found an aggravating factor proven beyond a reasonable doubt, there is no requirement that it go further and make an additional determination that the presence of that factor justifies imposition of the death penalty. 264 C. 1. Statutory scheme does not contemplate right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing; once one or more jurors find that defendant has proven existence of a mitigating factor by a preponderance of the evidence, entire jury, and not just those jurors who have found the existence of that mitigating factor, proceed to the weighing process; nonunanimous decision during penalty phase of a capital trial does not result automatically in sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release; trial court improperly declined to instruct jury that, in order to sentence defendant to death, it must be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating factor or factors outweigh mitigating factor or factors and that, accordingly, it is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that death is the appropriate punishment. 272 C. 106. Death penalty does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment; holdings in 230 Conn. 183 and 238 Conn. 389 reaffirmed. 303 Conn. 71. Death penalty unconstitutional under Art. I, Secs. 8 and 9 of Connecticut Constitution. 318 Conn. 1. Cited. 9 Conn.App. 686; 32 CA 296; 36 CA 364. Subsec. (b): Term "judges" in the first sentence does not entitle defendant who elected to have a jury determine his sentence at the penalty phase hearing to have all three members of the panel before whom the guilt phase was conducted preside at such hearing. 264 Conn. 1. Provision does not preclude trial court's declaring a mistrial and impaneling new jury after original jury becomes deadlocked in penalty phase of a capital case. 271 Conn. 338. Subdiv. (3): Defendant's decision to forgo jury determination in capital felony sentencing proceeding and opt for sentencing by three-judge panel was knowing, voluntary and intelligent; formulaic canvass of defendant is not required and validity of jury waiver is determined by examination of totality of the circumstances. 303 Conn. 71. Subsec. (c): Cited. 241 C. 57. The state may present evidence to rebut mitigation at the penalty phase that would not be admissible under normal rules of evidence; under statute, the state like defendant only has to meet the relevancy standard for evidence to be allowed. 251 C. 579. Although defendant may offer any evidence relevant to any mitigating factor, trial court is vested with discretion to exclude irrelevant information. 272 Conn. 106. Subsec. (d): Mercy is a legitimate consideration only insofar as it is related to mitigating evidence; requirement for capital sentencer to consider "all the facts and circumstances of the case" is not unconstitutionally vague. 264 Conn. 1. Lack of remorse is not listed as a statutory aggravating factor, and so may not be relied upon as an aggravating factor, but because mitigating factors call upon jury to elect whether to exercise mercy, defendant's lack of remorse will be relevant generally to rebut defendant's claimed mitigating factors; jury must make its determination of whether the proposed mitigating evidence is mitigating in nature considering all facts and circumstances of the case, but statute does not require that mitigating evidence have some nexus to the offense. 266 C. 171. "Facts and circumstances" language is a constitutionally permissible method of determining how mitigating circumstances are to be established; nowhere does statute require that mitigating evidence have some nexus to the offense. 272 Conn. 106. Requiring fact finder to determine whether a particular mitigating factor established by the evidence is mitigating in nature as a prerequisite to the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors does not improperly prevent mitigating evidence offered by defendant from being given full consideration and effect; not improper for three-judge panel to find cumulative factor both factually proven and to be mitigating in nature but not find any of the individual factors to be mitigating in nature although some were factually proven. 303 Conn. 71. Court's instruction to jury that it was permitted, but not required, to cumulate the evidence to find a mitigating factor complies with previously articulated constitutional standard; instruction describing mitigating evidence as "unique factors concerning the nature of the crime or who the defendant is" did not preclude jury from considering relevant mitigating evidence; "facts and circumstances" language does not unconstitutionally preclude sentencer from considering relevant mitigating evidence and does not unconstitutionally require that mitigating factor have some nexus to the crime; addition of weighing process in 1995 does not alter the constitutionality of allocating to defendant the burden of proving that a factor is mitigating in light of the facts and circumstances of the case. 305 Conn. 101, but see 318 Conn. 1. Subsec. (e): Cited. 199 Conn. 163. Imposition of death penalty premised on two unanimous findings by trier of fact that (1) existence of aggravating factor proved beyond a reasonable doubt by state, and (2) existence of a mitigating factor not proved by defendant by a preponderance of the evidence. 207 Conn. 374. Subsec. (f): Cited. 199 Conn. 163; 208 Conn. 125; 237 C. 694. Statute requires that jury determine that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors by any amount or degree; in light of the unique nature of death penalty, of the need for reliability and consistency and the nature of rendering a verdict requiring death penalty, jury must be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors and therefore it is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that death sentence should be imposed. 266 Conn. 171. Three-judge panel could reasonably have concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant's age, troubled background and other aspects of his person were outweighed, by any amount or degree, by the cruelty, heinousness and depravity of defendant's crime. 303 Conn. 71. Subsec. (g): Cited. 199 Conn. 163; 235 Conn. 206; 238 C. 828. Although trial court should generally use language of Subdiv. (2) in instructing jury on the statutory mitigating factor, it is not possible that court's minor misstatement, involving such a tenuous semantic distinction, could have misled jury; general thrust of statute as a whole persuades us that legislature intended to recognize as mitigating, per se, only those factors that tend to reduce defendant's moral culpability for the offense and make it unlikely that threat of execution would serve as effective deterrent; "mental capacity" as used in Subdiv. (2) is not open-ended term referring to any and all types of mental function, but refers specifically to defendant's ability, at time of the offense, to understand the wrongful nature and consequences of his conduct; legislature's intent in enacting Subsec. was to specify factual circumstances under which defendant's moral culpability for committing the offense is reduced; in order to establish either prong of the mitigating factor of Subdiv. (2), defendant must show that his mental impairment had a causal nexus with the offense, thereby reducing his moral culpability. 269 C. 213. Subsec. (h): Subdiv. (4): Meaning of "especially cruel" must include intentional infliction of extreme pain or torture above and beyond that necessarily accompanying the underlying killing. 212 Conn. 258. "Same felony" means a felony that is the same in all material respects as the felony that is committed in this state during commission of the capital felony; that requirement is fully satisfied only if the two felonies share the same essential elements. 264 Conn. 1. Subsec. (i): To qualify as an aggravating factor that defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner, victim must have suffered extreme pain and torture beyond that necessary to cause death. 253 C. 1. Subdiv. (6) does not apply to a capital felony committed during the course of a robbery. 261 C. 111. In order to establish the aggravating factor defined in Subdiv. (4), state must prove that defendant murdered both victims in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner. 262 C. 537. Principles of accessorial liability may be used to prove aggravating factors in the penalty phase of a capital case. 271 Conn. 338. Subdiv. (3): In order to establish this aggravating factor, state must prove that defendant knew that in killing one person, another person would be subject to a very serious risk or danger to his or her life. Id. Subdiv. (4) requires proof that defendant engaged in intentional conduct that inflicted extreme physical or psychological pain, suffering or torture on victim above and beyond that necessarily accompanying the underlying killing, and that defendant specifically intended to inflict such extreme pain, suffering or torture or was callous or indifferent to the extreme physical or psychological pain, suffering or torture that his intentional conduct in fact inflicted on victim. 272 Conn. 106. Subdiv. (4): Court's limiting instruction on aggravating factor of committing offense in "an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner" that permits proof by callousness or indifference to the additional pain, suffering or torture that defendant's intentional conduct inflicted on the victim does not render aggravating factor unconstitutionally vague. 303 Conn. 71. Subdiv. (6): It is not a violation of the state constitution for the sole aggravating factor found by the jury, namely, murder committed for pecuniary gain, to duplicate an element of the underlying crime of capital felony by murder for hire under Sec. 53a-54b(2); statutory language does not impose any additional temporal or premeditation requirements beyond that the expectation of compensation must be created before the murder and exist at the time of the murder. 305 Conn. 101, but see 318 Conn. 1. Subdiv. (1): To ensure that prior felony conviction that is based on a constitutionally invalid guilty plea is not used as aggravant in a death penalty case, it is in the interests of justice that court hear evidence on whether the plea was voluntarily and knowingly made, and defendant bears burden of establishing the constitutional invalidity of prior plea. 48 CS 279.
See Sec. 53a-35b re definition of "life imprisonment". See Sec. 53a-35c re availability of sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of release.