Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-14

Current with legislation from the 2023 Regular and Special Sessions.
Section 53a-14 - Duress as defense

In any prosecution for an offense, it shall be a defense that the defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was coerced by the use or threatened imminent use of physical force upon him or a third person, which force or threatened force a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist. The defense of duress as defined in this section shall not be available to a person who intentionally or recklessly places himself in a situation in which it is probable that he will be subjected to duress.

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-14

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 14.)

Defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction as matter of law when evidence under section is before jury. 178 Conn. 704. Duress as defense discussed. 184 C. 157. Instruction to jury that it was the state's burden to prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt did not adequately inform jury that it was the state's burden to disprove duress beyond a reasonable doubt. 199 Conn. 273. Cited. 201 C. 211; 204 Conn. 240; 209 Conn. 75. Trial court did not err in refusing to provide a jury instruction that would have allowed jury to factor defendant's age into his defense of duress, independent and regardless of how defendant's age relates to age of his coercers, so as to account for the differences in how adolescents evaluate risk; duress defense has both subjective and objective components; subjective component is that defendant actually must have been coerced into the criminal action; objective component requires that defendant have been coerced in circumstances under which a reasonable person in his situation would have been likewise unable to resist. 282 Conn. 281. Cited. 15 CA 34; 26 CA 367; 46 Conn.App. 486. Court did not err in charging jury re statutory exception to defense of duress by failing to define the term "situation"; because "situation" is not defined in section, it is taken that the jury, as a matter of common knowledge, comprehends the term and, therefore, the trial court was not obligated to define it. 125 CA 125. Cited. 34 Conn.Supp. 612.