Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-196
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-196
(1957, P.A. 436, S. 3; September, 1957, P.A. 14, S. 3; 1959, P.A. 194; 1963, P.A. 584, S. 2; P.A. 75-567, S. 31, 80; P.A. 82-472, S. 136, 183; P.A. 97-37; P.A. 03-129, S. 2; P.A. 17-99, S. 8.)
A convicted person is afforded an opportunity for what is, in effect, a limited appeal for a reconsideration of the sentence; the jeopardy, so far as the sentence is concerned, is a single continuing one, and any change in the sentence results from the sentenced person's own voluntary act; there is no double jeopardy. 149 Conn. 692. Denial of due process and defendant placed in double jeopardy when board increased sentence after defendant served the sentence imposed by the trial court. 152 C. 426. Cited. Id., 628, 630. Petitioner has constitutional right to counsel at hearing before sentence review division. 153 Conn. 673, 677. Resentencing did not involve double jeopardy where review division erroneously increased defendant's sentence when he was not represented before division by counsel. 156 Conn. 598. Cited. 168 Conn. 623; 187 Conn. 109; 192 Conn. 471; 214 Conn. 195; 224 Conn. 347. Determination by review division re its jurisdiction to consider an application for review is a question of law rather than an exercise of discretion and is not otherwise appealable, but may be reviewable under a writ of error; legislature did not intend for review division to conduct proportionality review re similar offenders. 293 C. 489. Cited. 1 Conn.App. 724; 19 Conn.App. 48; 46 Conn.App. 486. Decision by review division that defendant is not entitled to the review procedure is a non-appealable final judgment, but is reviewable under a writ of error, and a writ of habeas corpus may not be substituted for a writ of error. 57 CA 145. Grievance relating to guilt of accused is not within power of division to review. 21 CS 381. In sentencing under uniform state narcotic drug act, court must follow rigorous penalty provisions set forth therein. Id., 388, 392. Proof of variation from sentences given in comparable cases does not necessarily mean that sentence in issue is improper. Id., 388, 434. Enumeration of factors to be considered in setting a sentence. Id., 384, 412. Division cannot evaluate other cases where it is claimed that lesser sentences were imposed unless it has before it the facts of such cases. Id., 415. In determining a proper sentence, trial court owes duty to public as much as it does to accused. Id., 418. Maximum sentences given to defendants who were first offenders under uniform state narcotic drug act reduced from 10 to 7 years as both had used drugs for a short time only and neither sold narcotics. Id., 421. It is function of board of parole, not sentence review division, to determine when a person should be released from prison. Id., 423. Sentence of narcotics offender reduced where background showed prior voluntary submission to arrest in an effort to break narcotic habit. Id., 426. Defendant sentenced to reformatory and then to prison, terms to be served consecutively; prison sentence suspended for presumably he would be reformed while serving reformatory sentence. Id., 431. Relatively more severe sentences may be justified in crimes involving injury or risk of injury to children. Id., 434. Purpose of division is to achieve more rational sentences and greater equality of treatment for offenders; considerations of clemency and postprison reform are matters outside its scope. Id., 448. In sentencing, deterrence of such conduct on the part of others is a desired goal since public has right to be protected against crimes threatening high social and personal injury. Id., 452. Defendant received a higher penalty than his codefendant though tried on a lesser charge, sentence held proper. Id., 455. Defendant charged as second offender; fact that all who might have been presented as second offenders have not been so presented cannot aid defendant. Id., 457. Defendant convicted of manslaughter; in view of circumstances of the killing, defendant's inclination to violence as shown by his criminal record and his knowledge, when he pleaded guilty, of what sentence would be recommended, his sentence held proper. Id., 461. Under uniform state narcotic drug act, conviction of defendant as second offender made compulsory minimum imprisonment term of 10 years, once court deemed confinement was required, and defendant's claim that this amounts to a life sentence because of his age is a request based on considerations of clemency and more properly addressed to the board of pardons. Id., 463. Court's objective to impose a maximum sentence which would ensure that defendant would be under jurisdiction of parole board for the rest of his life could be accomplished with a lesser sentence, so sentence modified accordingly. Id., 468. Mere fact that defendant received a higher sentence than his codefendant affords no sound basis of comparison without the consideration of other pertinent surrounding circumstances. Id., 468, 474. The stress is not alone upon the criminal act but upon make-up of the offender and chances of his reform. Id., 474. Because the trial judge has opportunity to weigh and consider factors personal to defendant in connection with evidence, his opinion as to appropriateness of a sentence deserves great weight. Id., 477. Sentence increased where defendant was second offender and his sentence was less than that given for first offense. Id., 480. Matters which are administrative in nature are not reviewable by review division. 22 CS 208. Trial court's refusal to appoint new counsel in place of public defender was not matter with which review division could concern itself; function limited to harshness of sentence. 25 CS 3. Sentence of 3 to 7 years for blackmail found proper in view of heinous nature of crime and defendant's poor juvenile record. Id., 5. Division not empowered to comply with request of person convicted of violating narcotics act to send him to Kentucky hospital. Id., 7. Defendant's war record, being recited in presentence report, was before court at time of sentencing and cannot now be used to mitigate sentence. Id., 55. All factors must be weighed in reviewing sentences, not just those favorable to defendant. Id., 57. Sentence increased where robberies were vicious and no consideration for victims was shown. Id., 68. Sentence reduction denied where defendant had some knowledge of what is proper in law and order and chose to assume control on his own. Id., 73. Division not empowered to transfer prisoner from jail to a place where he could receive psychiatric help. Id., 145. Cited. Id., 149; Id., 473, 474, 484; 26 CS 176. Where defendant sentenced as second offender asked review division to reduce his maximum term on ground that parole board had denied him parole, held it is not function of division thus to pass on actions of parole board. Id., 196. Where minor defendant was committed to reformatory for indefinite term for crime for which adult could be confined only 30 days, sentence too severe. Id., 506. Where maximum sentence that could have been imposed would be aggregate of 120 days except for reformatory commitment, sentence of not more than 2 years without possibility of parole for 9 months too severe. 27 CS 81. Where, if court had imposed maximum penalty on all charges, result would be substantial fine and sentence in excess of 2 years and in view of defendant's presentence behavior, commitment to reformatory for not more than 2 years with basic minimum of 9 months on good behavior fair and should stand. Id., 89. Where minor defendant committed to reformatory to be detained not more than 2 years was witness for state and helped state obtain a conviction and had been unable to post bond, being jailed over 3 months prior to conviction, sentence too severe. Id., 100. Evidence of reform after conviction outside scope of division's consideration. Id., 221. Unnecessary for division to find facts and interpret statutes to determine its jurisdiction to modify sentence to comply with law limiting commitments to reformatory to males between 16 and 21 when matter not raised before division. Id., 239. Different sentences were ordered where trial court had failed to comply with Sec. 54-121, by fixing minimum and maximum sentences on all counts of a concurrent sentence. Id., 330. Cited. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 416.