Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-294c
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-294c
( P.A. 91-32 , S. 11 , 41 ; 91-339 , S. 47 , 55 ; P.A. 93-228 , S. 8 , 35 ; 93-419 , S. 8 , 9 ; P.A. 05-230 , S. 2 ; P.A. 16-112 , S. 1 ; P.A. 17-141 , S. 1 .)
Cited. 228 C. 1 ; 231 C. 529 ; 232 C. 780 ; 237 Conn. 1 ; 239 Conn. 19 . Workers' compensation legislation is remedial and should be broadly construed to accomplish its humanitarian purpose; where workers' compensation appeal involves issue of statutory construction that has not been subjected to judicial scrutiny, Supreme Court has plenary power to review the administrative decision. 252 C. 596 . HIV is an occupational disease for correction officers who are members of emergency response units which are special teams of correction officers that respond to major disturbances and riots, and, therefore plaintiff's notice of claim was timely filed under statute; HIV is peculiar to and distinctively associated with decedent's occupation as a correction officer in an emergency response unit because of the direct causal connection between the specific duties of his employment, which required him to interact with inmates with a high HIV infection rate and in a manner that greatly increased the risk of contracting HIV and the AIDS the decedent contracted. 268 C. 753 . Fact that an occupational disease cannot be qualified as such until a causal connection with exposure at employee's workplace can be established compels the conclusion that such a connection is a prerequisite to commencement of the statute of limitations for making a claim for an occupational disease. 280 C. 723 . For purposes of section, commissioner administrative law judge must determine whether plaintiff's repetitive trauma injury more closely resembles "an accidental injury" or "occupational disease". 296 C. 463 . For purposes of determining limitation period, claim brought pursuant to Sec. 7-433c was properly treated as one for accidental injury definitely located in time and place, rather than a repetitive trauma injury, because plaintiff failed to present evidence that hypertension was causally connected to employment; formal diagnosis of hypertension or heart disease, communicated to an employee by his or her physician, constitutes the "injury" that triggers the running of the limitation period. 299 C. 265 . Evidence that claimant had elevated blood pressure readings, or had been advised by physician to monitor blood pressure, is insufficient to trigger one year filing period under section, rather there must be evidence that claimant knew he or she suffered from hypertension, ordinarily shown by proof claimant was informed of diagnosis by a medical professional. 302 C. 755 . Hypertension diagnosis is sufficient to trigger 1-year filing period and prescription of hypertension medication is not required. Id., 767. Board's imposition of 1-year statute of limitations for filing of survivor's benefits improper when a valid claim has previously been filed by either the employee or a representative; plaintiff was not required to file a separate timely notice of claim for survivor's benefits when decedent, during his lifetime, had filed a timely notice of claims for benefits that was accepted and paid. 320 C. 299 . An estate is not a legal representative capable of bringing a claim under this section or any other under this chapter. 323 C. 26 . Cited. 38 Conn.App. 1 ; Id., 73; 44 CA 465 . Employer's first report of injury form and an attorney's letter taken together meet statutory requirement of written notice of claim. 5 2 Conn.App. 1 94. Workers' compensation review board properly concluded that, under the totality of the circumstances, completion of accident investigation form by defendant's fire department indicating that plaintiff had been transported to the hospital for high blood pressure, plaintiff's filing of first report of injury for high blood pressure with defendant's workers' compensation division and the employer's investigative report prepared by defendant's workers' compensation division for defendant's controller's office constituted "substantial compliance" with notice requirements. 63 CA 570 . Does not require that notice of injury by employee include statutory reference. 70 CA 321 . Partially completed form 30C, which was not signed by employee and did not include a description of employee's injury, delivered to supervisor was sufficient to trigger employer's responsibility to file form 43; rule of strict compliance is not supported by either the plain language or legislative history. 127 CA 619 . Subsec. (a): Cited. 239 C. 408 ; 240 C. 788 ; 242 Conn. 570 . Notice of claim for repetitive trauma injury is sufficient to support a motion to preclude if it provides adequate information as to period of time over which the injury is alleged to have occurred sufficient to allow employer to make timely investigation of the claim. 252 Conn. 596 . Service on employer of amended complaint in third party action and employer's acknowledgment that it "may" become obligated to pay benefits to plaintiff are not sufficient to establish that employer had actual notice of plaintiff's intent to seek survivor's benefits as a result of decedent's death. 265 C. 525 . Statute of limitations in Subsec. applies to all potential claims of employee's estate or his dependents and requires that a compensable claim be filed within the applicable limitations period, irrespective of whether initial claim is filed by the employee, the employee's estate after his death, or the decedent employee's dependents; proviso is not a condition precedent for commencement of dependents' claims, but rather a modified limitations period for commencement of such claims. 283 C. 813 . Statute of limitations implicates commissioner's administrative law judge's subject matter jurisdiction, and a subject matter jurisdictional statute of limitations may not be waived and court may address it sua sponte. 299 C. 800 . Cited. 40 CA 446 ; 42 Conn.App. 803 ; 44 Conn.App. 465 ; 45 Conn.App. 707 . "Accident" and "occupational disease" must be read broadly enough so that even an injury that is defined as stemming from repetitive trauma under Sec. 31-275(8) may be deemed to fall into one of the two categories. 56 CA 90 . Without timely written notice of claim, commissioner administrative law judge lacks subject matter jurisdiction over such claim. 68 CA 590 . Separate notice of claim not required when dependent pursues derivative claim for death benefit. 71 CA 140 . If the employee dies within 2 years of the accident or the first manifestation of symptoms of an occupational disease and the employee's dependent is filing a claim for benefits, the dependent has 2 years to file a claim for benefits or has 1 year from the date of the employee's death, whichever is longer. 137 CA 665 . Because it was reasonable for workers' compensation commissioner administrative law judge to determine that form 30c was filed on behalf of decedent's widow and sufficiently put defendants on notice of plaintiff's claim for survivor benefits, and because the savings provision of section cautions against arbitrary dismissal of plaintiff's claim, the claim was timely filed and the commissioner administrative law judge had subject matter jurisdiction over it. 150 CA 699 . With respect to the notice of claim requirement, the proper inquiry is not whether defendant had notice of plaintiff's injuries and intent to pursue a claim, but rather whether plaintiff met the statutory requirements to give commission jurisdiction over his claim. 156 CA 700 . Subsec. (b): Cited. 241 Conn. 692 . Notice to contest liability must state both date of alleged injury and specific reasons for contesting compensation. 252 Conn. 596 . Compensability, in terms of whether a type of injury falls within scope of act, is a jurisdictional fact that would allow employer to contest liability beyond the time frame allotted by Subsec.; hence, because emotional impairment claimed by plaintiff does not fall within scope of act, commissioner administrative law judge and board initially properly denied plaintiff's motion to preclude defendants from contesting liability. 270 C. 532 . P.A. 93-228 did not alter status quo that if employer neither timely pays nor timely contests liability, conclusive presumption of compensability attaches and employer is barred from contesting employee's right to receive compensation on any ground or extent of employee's disability. 286 C. 102 . Where payment for claim is not commenced or liability is not contested within the period required by statute, employer cannot challenge proof of claim but commissioner administrative law judge is not barred from further inquiry. 291 C. 537 . Cited. 30 CA 295 ; 40 Conn.App. 446 . Employer not precluded from challenging commissioner's administrative law judge's subject matter jurisdiction; issue of compensability of an injury does not implicate commissioner's administrative law judge's subject matter jurisdiction and, accordingly, statutory presumption of liability cannot be circumvented. 64 CA 1 . Does not implicate insurer's right to raise defense of lack of coverage against an employer. 67 CA 361 . Conclusive presumption of compensability for a workers' compensation claim under Subsec. is not an unconstitutional denial of employer's right to due process. 127 Conn.App. 619 . Employer who was making payments for plaintiff's prior injury was precluded from contesting liability on subsequent claim when it failed to file notice to contest liability or commence making payments on subsequent claim for alleged new and separate injury, with a reported date and type of injury different from the earlier claimed injury, and any claim by employer that payment on new claim would result in plaintiff's double recovery should have been raised in a notice to contest liability. 137 CA 324 . Sending notice to contest liability to employee by certified mail meets requirements, despite employee's failure to claim it; notice to contest liability stating employee did not suffer an injury which arose out of or in the course of employment is not a general denial and therefore meets requirements for valid notice to contest liability; notice to contest liability form stating date of employee's injury differently than stated by employee on claim form did not render notice insufficient because date of injury stated by employer fell within the time period of claimed repetitive injury stated by employee. 138 CA 826 . Employer not deemed conclusively precluded from contesting extent of disability under Subsec. when it was impossible to commence payment of compensation within statutory time period. 145 CA 261 . Employer's disclaimer citing "lack of medical evidence" to support causal connection between injury and employment met specific notice requirement. 159 CA 180 . The equitable doctrine of laches does not apply to a motion to preclude filed under section and, in the absence of legislative action, there is no recognized time limitation within which an employee must file a motion to preclude. 168 CA 92 . Subsec. (c): Medical care exception does not apply to toll statute of limitations under Sec. 7-433c because plaintiff failed to establish, in keeping with board's time-tested interpretation of Subsec., that employer previously furnished medical care for specific condition or later claimed condition was causally related to timely reported incident for which employer furnished medical care. 304 C. 571 . Employer's insurer's payment of medical bills during 1-year period constituted the furnishing of medical treatment. 47 CA 530 . Employee's claim was not time barred because he failed to file notice of claim that specifically referenced all of his injuries. 48 CA 357 . Subsec. (d): Trial court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction in concluding that Subsec. constitutes a public emolument in violation of Sec. 1. of state constitution. 299 Conn. 800 .