S.C. Code § 17-27-20

Current through 2024 Act No. 120.

Section 17-27-20 - Persons who may institute proceeding; exclusiveness of remedy

(A) Any person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime and who claims:

(1) That the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of this State;

(2) That the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence;

(3) That the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law;

(4) That there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice;

(5) That his sentence has expired, his probation, parole or conditional release unlawfully revoked, or he is otherwise unlawfully held in custody or other restraint; or

(6) That the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon any ground of alleged error heretofore available under any common law, statutory or other writ, motion, petition, proceeding or remedy; may institute, without paying a filing fee, a proceeding under this chapter to secure relief. Provided, however, that this section shall not be construed to permit collateral attack on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction.

(B) This remedy is not a substitute for nor does it affect any remedy incident to the proceedings in the trial court, or of direct review of the sentence or conviction. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, it comprehends and takes the place of all other common law, statutory or other remedies heretofore available for challenging the validity of the conviction or sentence. It shall be used exclusively in place of them.

S.C. Code § 17-27-20

1969 (56) 158; 1962 Code Section 17-601.

Code Commissioner's Note

A scrivener's error in (A) was made in 1970, when the 1969 Uniform Post-Conviction Relief Procedure Act was first published as part of the Code. A line break was inadvertently omitted preceding "may institute...a proceeding" and thus that text was combined with the rest of (A)(6). See Brown v. State, 423 S.C. 56, 814 S.E.2d 146 (2018).