Tenn. R. Crim. P. 5
Tenn. R. Crim. P. 5
Advisory Commission Comments.
As far as the actions before a magistrate exercising the jurisdiction of a general sessions court are concerned, Rule 5 substantially embodies existing law as to jurisdiction and procedure. This rule is intended to provide comprehensive guidance for those exercising this jurisdiction. Small offenses are those which carry a maximum fine of fifty dollars and for which no imprisonment may be inflicted. T.C.A. §40-408 [now repealed]. It should be noted in connection with subdivision (b), dealing with small offenses triable by a magistrate, that there is no appeal from the judgment in a case in which a guilty plea is entered. Where trial is held for a small offense upon a plea of not guilty and a conviction results, there is a right to a trial de novo upon appeal, but there is no right to a jury upon the new trial (there being no such right as to small offenses in the first instance). Further, where the defendant in serious misdemeanor cases waives the right to a jury trial, that waiver before the magistrate carries over into the criminal or circuit court and attaches to the trial de novo on appeal unless the defendant demands a jury as part of the appeal notice as required by § 27-5-108. See State v. Jarnigan, 958 S.W.2d 135 (Tenn. 1998). The rights in all (except small) offenses to be proceeded against only by indictment or presentment and to a trial by jury are grounded upon the provisions of Art. 1, Secs. 6 and 14, Constitution of Tennessee.
The preliminary hearing referred to in this rule is the proceeding formerly called a preliminary examination. It must be scheduled within ten days if the accused is in custody, and within thirty days if the accused is on bond. See Rule 45(a), dealing with the computation of time.
It is important to note that while the Constitution and the Rules vest the right to trial by jury in the accused, this right cannot be waived under this rule in the face of an objection by the district attorney general or his or her representative. This provision acts as a safeguard against the possibility that an accused might be permitted to enter a guilty plea to a lesser included offense and effectively bar prosecution for a more serious crime. Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 (1970); Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970). Hence, in effect the state now has a right to a trial by jury, if the district attorney general or his or her representative asserts the right by objecting to the waiver by the defendant. Note that the rule does not require an affirmative act on behalf of the state before an accused can effectively waive the right, but simply provides that it cannot be done in the face of an objection. This wording by the commission was deliberate, because it is recognized that many general sessions courts must sometimes operate without the presence of the district attorney general or his or her representative. Nevertheless, in order to exercise an objection and thus protect the state's position, the district attorney general personally or by representative will need to know of the proceeding and to enter an objection. The court should construe the words "or the district attorney general's representative" to include anyone connected with law enforcement who reports to the court that the district attorney general or one of his or her assistants has requested that the objection be made.
Under Rule 5(d), covering a felony charge, it is extremely important that the magistrate inform the accused in substantial compliance with this rule.
Rule 5(e) simply carries over into the Rules the same conditional right to a preliminary hearing now embodied in T.C.A. §40-1131 [repealed]. It was not the intention of the commission to enlarge or diminish that conditional right; therefore, the body of case law which has been developed in connection with the statute retains its precedential value. Waugh v. State, 564 S.W.2d 654 (Tenn. 1978).
The commission's rationale, which was presented to the Supreme Court prior to the approval of these rules, is that the court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment calling for a fine in excess of fifty dollars, where provided by law and set by a jury. If the accused waives the right to have a jury set the fine and agrees that the judge set it, this act confers upon the court jurisdiction to set such a fine. An analogous situation arises each time a defendant waives a jury and permits a trial before a judge. In either instance the judge can exercise the full jurisdiction of the court because there has been a valid waiver of the right to have jury participation. Thus, under these rules, a judge can set a fine to the full limit of the appropriate penal statute, when a jury has been waived.
Rule 5(c)(1) and (2) conform the rule to T.C.A. § 40-4-112, which allows an appeal of the sentence even upon a plea of guilty.
This rule allows a de novo appeal "as provided by law" which contemplates a jury trial as provided by T.C.A. Section 27-3-131(a). Attorneys should be aware, however, that T.C.A. § 27-3-131(b) requires that the demand for a jury must be made at the time of filing an appeal.
These rules permit general sessions courts to use audio-visual technology to conduct initial appearances where a plea of not guilty is entered by the defendant. Nothing in paragraph (d) prohibits the prosecutor or defense counsel from being present and heard. In addition, paragraph (d) does not apply to preliminary hearings pursuant to Rule 5.1 nor misdemeanor trials. These amendments are substantially similar to Rule 5-303 of the New Mexico Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rule 10 of Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure and reflect the growing need for the use of technology to expedite the processing of initial criminal proceedings and reduce the cost of such processing. The purposes for the Rules, which these amendments are intended to achieve, are set forth in Rule 2: "...to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay."
Advisory Commission Comments [2007].
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-1-109 requires a written guilty plea for misdemeanors. The amendment to subsection (c) conforms the rule to the statute.
Advisory Commission Comments [2010].
Rule 5(e) has been amended in its entirety so as to clarify when the defendant is entitled to a preliminary hearing. Rule 5(e)(1) and (4) make clear that the defendant enjoys the right to a preliminary hearing following arrest on a warrant or an appearance by a criminal summons which cannot be defeated by either an indictment or presentment. The former rule omitted the presentment, apparently by oversight, and this has been corrected. The amendment retains the former procedure of requiring a motion to dismiss if there is a premature indictment or presentment but the time for the motion is no longer measured from the "arrest," but rather from the date of the arraignment on the indictment or presentment in circuit or criminal court.
Rule 5(e)(2) provides that a defendant waives the preliminary hearing by failing to appear. There is a relief from waiver provision if the defendant promptly establishes that the defendant's absence was beyond the defendant's control. The State has the right to seek an indictment or presentment during the intervening fourteen days, which is subject to a dismissal if the defendant makes the required showing.
Rules 5(c)(1)(B) and 5(d)(3) set forth the minimum time within which preliminary hearings must be held. Rule 5(e)(3) addresses the reverse issue: the pernicious problem of preliminary hearings being routinely continued for so long that witnesses, parties, and the Court are prejudiced. While there may be sound reasons for continuing the hearing, such as a mental examination, the hearing should not ordinarily be delayed unless it is essential for the interests of justice.
Rule 5 by its terms does not apply to an arrest upon a capias pursuant to indictment or presentment. Rule 5(a)(1). These amendments are in no way intended to change the rule that, when there is no arrest warrant or criminal summons issued on an affidavit of complaint (where the State commences the prosecution by indictment or presentment), there is no right to a preliminary hearing. See Moore v. State, 578 S.W.2d 78 (Tenn. 1979).
Advisory Commission Comments [2016].
Consistent with simultaneous amendments to Tenn. R. Crim. P. 5.1, Tenn. R. Crim. P. 5 and its Advisory Commission Comments are amended to substitute the term "preliminary hearing" for the obsolete term "preliminary examination." No substantive changes are made to the Rule.
Advisory Commission Comment [2018 Amendment]
The amendment effective July 1, 2018 extends the time within which a preliminary hearing must occur to fourteen days from ten days when a defendant remains in custody and confirms that the time period within which the preliminary hearing must be held shall be computed from the date of the initial appearance before the magistrate. Experience has shown frequent difficulty in scheduling preliminary hearings within a 10-day period. First, unlike in federal courts, where hearsay is admissible in preliminary hearings and federal law enforcement often can provide all testimony required, Tennessee's rules require witnesses to testify in person, and the attendance of witnesses often must be obtained by subpoena. Second, in some rural counties, general sessions courts convene only 2-3 times a month; therefore, longer than ten days may routinely pass between court sessions. The 2018 amendment tracks the current version of the federal analogue to this rule with respect to the in-custody time period, and, after review of other states' practices and data from Tennessee courts, the Advisory Commission determined that fourteen days represents a correct balance for the time period within which the preliminary hearing must occur after an initial appearance and when a defendant remains in custody.