R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 29

As amended through June 7, 2024

Rule 29 - Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and Motion to Dismiss.

(a)Motion for judgment of acquittal.

(1)Motion Before Submission to Jury. The court on motion for a judgment of acquittal of a defendant or on the court's own motion shall order the entry of judgment of acquittal of one (1) or more offenses charged in the indictment, information, or complaint, after the evidence on either side is closed, if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses. If a defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the evidence offered by the State is not granted, the defendant may offer evidence without having reserved the right.

(2)Reservation of Decision on Motion. If a motion for judgment of acquittal is made at the close of all the evidence, the court may reserve decision on the motion, submit the case to the jury, and decide the motion either before the jury returns a verdict or after returns a verdict of guilty or is discharged without having returned a verdict.

(b)Motion to dismiss. In a case tried without a jury, a motion to dismiss may be filed at the close of the State's case to challenge the legal sufficiency of the State's trial evidence.

R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 29

As amended by the court on July 1, 2002; last amended by Order dated June 22, 2017, effective 9/5/2017.

2002 Committee Notes

The proposed amendments expand the rule to apply to motions used to challenge the legal sufficiency of the state's trial evidence in cases tried without a jury. The former version of the rule applied only to jury trials. In order to furnish guidance to the bar and the trial justices, the difference in procedures and review of the two motions was elaborated in State v. McKone, 673 A.2d 1068, 1071-73 (R.I. 1996). The amendments are intended to clarify the procedures currently followed in the trial courts.

In a jury setting, the motion for judgment of acquittal requires the trial justice to evaluate the state's evidence in a light most favorable to the state and against the defendant. The trial justice is not permitted to weigh the trial evidence or to pass on the credibility of witnesses, and draws from the trial evidence all inferences favoring the state and against the defendant. The trial justice is then only required to determine whether reasonable minds in a jury might conclude and decide the case issues in favor of the state. If the jury might so find, the trial justice is then required to deny the motion for judgment of acquittal and permit the case to go to the jury.

In a case tried without a jury, a motion to dismiss is the appropriate procedure to test the state's case. The trial justice acts as a factfinder and is required to weigh and evaluate the trial evidence and pass on the credibility of the trial witnesses, and is not required to draw inferences in favor of the state and against the defendant. If the trial justice concludes that the trial evidence is sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant's motion to dismiss is denied, and, if both sides have rested, the trial justice enters decision and judgment of conviction thereon. If the evidence is not so sufficient, the trial justice grants the motion and dismisses the case.

The additions required renumbering of some subsections.

1972 Notes

Rule 29 differs from its federal counterpart in one major respect--it does not authorize motions for acquittal to be made after a jury renders a guilty verdict or is discharged without having rendered a verdict. This reflects current criminal procedure in Rhode Island (e.g., State v. Mantia, 101 R.I. 367, 371-72, 223 A.2d 843, 846 (1966); State v. Ruggiero, 93 R.I. 241, 247-48, 174 A.2d 555, 558-59(1961) ), as well as being consistent with the decision not to permit judgments NOV under the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 29 alters existing Rhode Island procedure in a number of respects. Initially, it changes the nomenclature of this motion from directed verdict to motion for acquittal. More significantly, however, it alters present practice under which a motion for directed verdict made at the conclusion of the State's case by a defendant who has not rested, "can be considered as no more than a motion for a non-suit in a civil case and as such it is addressed to the trial justice's discretion...." State v. Kozukonis, 71 R.I. 456, 460-1, 46 A.2d 865, 867-68(1946). Under this rule, if the prosecution's evidence is insufficient the trial court is bound to grant the motion, whether or not the defendant has rested. Moreover, the rule eliminates the trial court's discretion to grant a non-suit (which presumably permits the prosecution to retry the case) where a defendant has moved for a judgment of acquittal without resting. The grant of a non-suit in such a circumstance suggests serious questions with respect to a defendant's federally protected rights of double jeopardy. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969).

The rule is not intended to change existing Rhode Island law under which the denial of a motion for a directed verdict made at the conclusion of the prosecution's case is not reviewable on appeal if the defendant has not rested at the time he makes the motion. If he offers any evidence after his motion is denied, he is deemed to have waived appellate review of the trial court's ruling. See, e.g., State v. Franklin, 103 R.I. 715, 729, 241 A.2d 219, 227 (1968); State v. Bruni, 79 R.I. 311, 317, 88 A.2d 162, 165 (1952). The waiver doctrine is applied by the federal courts as well. See discussion in 2 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, pp. 245-48(1969). This conforms as well to the directed verdict practice under Rule 50, R.I.Super.R.Civ.P. See Kent, Rhode Island Practice 367-68(1969).

Under subdivision (a), the court is to order acquittal "if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction." The standard to be applied in ruling upon a motion of acquittal is the same standard that has been applied by the Rhode Island courts in deciding motions for directed verdicts--viz: "... if the evidence adduced by the state and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, even though viewed in the light most favorable to the state do not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, there is nothing for a jury to consider and the trial Justice is bound to grant defendant's motion for a directed verdict." State v. Saulnier, 109 R.I. 11, 280 A.2d 85, 88 (1971). See also State v. Cohen, 93 R.I. 215, 218, 172 A.2d 737, 739 (1961); State v. Montella, 88 R.I. 469, 474, 149 A.2d 919, 921 (1959). Cf. State v. Main, 94 R.I. 338, 344-47, 180 A.2d 814, 817-19(1962).

The grant of a motion of acquittal prior to submission to the jury, does not terminate the case if the court finds the prosecution's evidence sufficient to go to the jury on a lesser included offense. See 8 Moore, Federal Practice pp. 29-33 through 29-35 (Cipes ed. 1969); cf. G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment), § 12-17-14.

Subdivision (a) expressly authorizes the trial court to grant judgment of acquittal on its own motion. There are no authorities in Rhode Island either recognizing or denying a trial judge's right to act sua sponte.

Subdivision (b), which is similar to Rule 50(b), R.I.Super.R.Civ.P., permitting the trial court to reserve decision on a motion made at the close of all the evidence and rule after the jury renders a verdict of guilty or is unable to reach a verdict, is an addition to the existing powers of trial judges. At present, there is no express authority for reserving decision on a motion for a directed verdict in criminal cases and dictum of the Rhode Island Supreme Court suggests that it is not customary to do so. See State v. Ruggiero, 93 R.I. 241, 248, 174 A.2d 555, 558 (1961).