R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 42

As amended through June 7, 2024

Rule 42 - Criminal Contempt.

(a)Summary Disposition. A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the judicial officer certifies that judicial officer saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that the conduct was committed in the actual presence of the court. The order of contempt shall recite the adjudication and sentence and shall be signed by the judicial officer and entered of record.

(b)Disposition Upon Notice and Hearing. A criminal contempt except as provided in subdivision (a) of this rule shall be prosecuted on notice. The notice shall state the time and place of hearing, allowing a reasonable time for the preparation of the defense, and shall state the essential facts constituting the criminal contempt charged and describe it as such. The notice shall be given orally by the judicial officer in open court in the presence of the defendant or, on application of an attorney for the State or of an attorney appointed by the court for that purpose, by an order to show cause or an order of arrest. The defendant is entitled to admission to bail as provided in these rules. In a proceeding under this subdivision, if the contempt charged involves disrespect to or criticism of a judicial officer, that judicial officer is disqualified from presiding at the trial or hearing except with the defendant's consent. Upon a verdict or finding of guilt the court shall enter an order fixing the punishment.

Last amended by Order dated June 22, 2017, effective 9/5/2017.

The proposed rule 1972 Notes

This rule is, with slight modification, the same as its federal counterpart. Subdivision (a) has been modified to require that the order of contempt recite the adjudication and sentence rather than merely the "facts."

The requirement under this subdivision that the justice "certify" that he witnessed the contemptuous conduct can be satisfied either by a written certificate or by stating the facts orally and having them recorded in the stenographic record of the proceeding.

The Superior Court has been specifically empowered to punish by fine or imprisonment all contempts of its authority. G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment),s 8-6-1. The distinction contained in the rule between proceeding by summary disposition or proceeding upon notice and hearing accords with established Rhode Island practice. In Noble v. Siwicki, 97 R.I. 288, 293, 197 A.2d 298, 301 (1964), the Supreme Court placed the responsibility on the court to "consider whether the nature of the conduct and the conditions under which it was committed are such as clearly to establish that, absent summary action on the part of the court in punishment thereof, its prestige and authority will be impaired or that the public interest in the prompt administration of justice will be thwarted."

does not deal with the distinction between criminal and civil contempt. Although in some instances a "contempt may partake of both criminal and civil aspects" (Nelson v. Progressive Realty Corp., 81 R.I. 445, 448, 104 A.2d 241, 242 (1954)), the distinction ordinarily drawn is that criminal contempt is used to vindicate the dignity and authority of the court, while civil contempt is used to coerce a person into compliance with an order of the court as well as to compensate a party for whatever losses may have resulted from another's failure to comply with an order. See 3 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 704 (1969); Nelson v. Progressive Realty Corp., 81 R.I. 445, 448-49, 104 A.2d 241, 242-43(1954); R.I. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Serv. Assoc., 55 R.I. 122, 128-29, 179 A. 139, 141-42(1935).

The provision contained in subdivision (b) for disqualification of a justice when the contempt charged involves disrespect or criticism of that justice does not apply to summary contempt proceedings under subdivision (a), where typically the essence of the contempt is disrespect directed at the court, requiring an immediate response to be effective. However, if the contempt proceeding is delayed until a later time, the justice at whom the disrespect is directed ordinarily is required to disqualify himself and refer the matter to another justice of the court for disposition. See Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 91 S.Ct. 499, 27 L.Ed.2d 532 (1971).

The question of when a person is entitled to a jury trial is not treated by the rule. In Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 1481, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968), the Supreme Court held that "criminal contempt is a crime in the ordinary sense" and, therefore, the jury trial requirements of the Sixth Amendment apply to the same extent as in prosecutions of all other "serious crimes." The distinction between those criminal contempts that are subject to jury trial and those that can be disposed of summarily apparently rests upon the punishment imposed. If the punishment meted out is not more than the maximum permissible for a petty offense (which under federal law is a maximum of six months imprisonment or $500 fine, or both) then no right to jury trial exists. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 208-211, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 1485-88, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968); Wright, supra § 712; cf. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968).

Finally, the rule does not in any manner affect the authority of the Superior Court to exercise contempt powers where specifically authorized by statute. See e.g., G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment), § 9-10-10 (failure of juror to attend); G.L.1956, § 10-1-10 (failure to comply with order abating a nuisance); G.L.1956, § 10-9-23 (failure to comply with writ of habeas corpus).