R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 34
The court on motion of a defendant shall arrest judgment if the indictment, information, or complaint does not charge an offense or if the court was without jurisdiction of the offense charged. The motion in arrest of judgment shall be made within ten (10) days after verdict or finding of guilty, or after plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or within such further time as the court may fix during the ten day period.
R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 34
1972 Notes
This rule is essentially the same as its federal counterpart except that the time for making a motion in arrest of judgment has been changed from seven to ten days. This conforms to the time period for new trial motions under Rule 33.
Until its repeal in 1965, G.L.1956, § 9-6-7 provided for a motion in arrest of judgment on the ground of "want of jurisdiction" of the court over the subject matter of the action. Section 9-6-7 was repealed at the time the Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted, presumably because a motion in arrest of judgment would no longer be proper in civil proceedings. See Kent, Rhode Island Practice, Appendix C, at 646 (1969). The repeal of this provision apparently was not intended to affect the availability of motions in arrest of judgment in criminal cases.
Rule 34 will change the practice that prevailed under G.L.1956, § 9-6-7 in two ways. First, the motion must be made within ten days after verdict or plea or within such time as the court fixes during the ten day period. No such express limitation was contained in the former provision. Second, the rule differs from the earlier practice by permitting an additional ground for the motion--namely, that the indictment or complaint does not charge an offense. As noted above, in the past the motion has been limited to jurisdictional grounds only. In an early case construing a predecessor of G.L.1956, § 9-6-7, the Supreme Court held that questions concerning the sufficiency of the indictment or complaint were to be raised by demurrer and not by motion in arrest. State v. Smith, 29 R.I. 513, 519-20, 72 A. 710, 713-14(1909). Since demurrers and special pleas are abolished under these rules, and since under Rule 12(b)(2) the defense of failure of the indictment or complaint to charge an offense is not waived by failure to move on that ground prior to trial, this ground of attack is available on a motion in arrest of judgment.
See also 1975 Notes to Rule 7.