R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 46
1972 Notes
This rule, which is patterned upon Federal Rule 46, is in substantial accord with existing Rhode Island bail procedures.
Subdivision (a) differs significantly from the federal rule. Paragraph (1) establishes a defendant's right to bail "in accordance with the Constitution and Laws" of Rhode Island both prior to and after conviction. The details of bail procedures are contained in the General Laws. See G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment), §§ 12-13-1 through 12-13-7 (bail pending trial); 12-22-3 through 12-22-6 (bail pending appeal from District Court to Superior Court); 12-19-1 and 12-22-12 (bail pending appeal from Superior Court to Supreme Court). Paragraph (2), which governs bail in extradition proceedings, is based on G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment), § 12-9-19; the federal rule does not contain a similar provision for extradition cases. Under long established Rhode Island practice, once a Governor's warrant of arrest has issued, it is customary not to bail the arrestee except in extraordinary circumstances. Rule 46 is not intended to alter that practice.
Subdivision (b), which is essentially the same as its federal counterpart, is in accord with current Rhode Island procedures. See G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment), § 12-13-1 5; § 12-13-14 (Supp.1970); Quince v. Langlois, 88 R.I. 438, 149 A.2d 349 (1959).
Subdivision (c) is essentially the same as its federal counterpart and reflects existing Rhode Island constitutional standards for setting terms of bail. See Benoit v. Langlois, 96 R.I. 129, 189 A.2d 805 (1963) (bail prior to conviction should be no greater than is necessary to secure the defendant's appearance for the trial and to commence sentence in the event of conviction). Under the Constitution an accused has a right to release on bail prior to conviction and the burden is upon the State to show the circumstances under which the right has been lost. Taglianetti v. Fontaine, 105 R.I. 596, 253 A.2d 609 (1969). The right to bail guaranteed by the Constitution does not exist pending appeal from conviction in the Superior Court, although bail may be granted in the discretion of the court. Quattrocchi v. Langlois, 100 R.I. 741, 219 A.2d 570 (1966); G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment), §§ 12-19-1 and 12-22-12.
Subdivision (d) is essentially the same as its federal counterpart. Under the rule the term "recognizance" is substituted for the term "bond." Also, the final sentence of the federal rule, prescribing the place where bail is to be deposited, is not contained in the Rhode Island rule. This subdivision is basically in accord with existing Rhode Island procedure (see G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment), § 12-13-8 ) except that under the rule the court will be authorized to accept security in an amount less than the face amount of the recognizance.
Subdivision (e), which has no counterpart in the federal rule, was included to provide the Court with an additional and effective means of enforcing the terms of a recognizance. Cf. 3 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, pp. 297-98(1969).
Subdivision (f) is in accord with current Rhode Island practice and is essentially the same as the federal rule, except that a surety will be permitted to justify by oral testimony as well as by affidavit.
Subdivision (g) is patterned upon its federal counterpart but contains two significant differences which bring it into accord with existing Rhode Island practice under G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment), §§ 12-13-16 and 12-13-17. Paragraph (1) authorizes the court to declare a forfeiture of bail for breach of a recognizance only upon motion of the prosecutor. In addition, paragraph 5 of the rule continues the practice of permitting the Attorney General to settle with obligors where a recognizance has been forfeited.
Subdivision (h) is essentially the same as its federal counterpart. The only Rhode Island statutory provision dealing with this question is G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment), § 12-13-19 which provides for discharge of a surety upon surrender of the defendant prior to default. See State v. McGuire, 16 R.I. 519, 17 A. 918 (1889).
Subdivision (i), which is patterned upon the federal rule, has no counterpart in the General Laws. This provision is believed a valuable addition to the Superior Court's supervisory powers over pending criminal proceedings; it will also aid in preventing unnecessary detention of defendants and witnesses and the hardships resulting therefrom. See, e.g., Quince v. Langlois, 88 R.I. 438, 149 A.2d 349 (1959).
See also 1975 Notes to Rule 7.