R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 12
2002 Committee Notes
The time period in paragraph (b)(3) of the rule, in which to file a motion raising defenses and objections, is enlarged from twenty-one (21) days to thirty (30) days following the entry of a plea or the disposition of a motion to dismiss an information based on lack of probably cause. Defense counsel sometimes needs the additional time to investigate, research, prepare, and file the motion.
Paragraph (c)(2) of the rule is amended to make it clear that, if notice of the intent to rely on the defense of insanity is not filed within thirty (30) days following the entry of a plea, the court may, among other options, extend the time period within which to file the notice. It is sometimes difficult to adequately investigate a possible insanity defense within the thirty (30) day time period.
Other changes in the rule are technical in nature and not intended to change the substance of the rule.
1983 Notes
The addition of (d) and (e) to the Rule requires defense counsel to send copies of these Motions to the Criminal Scheduling Office, and the placing of these Motions by that office on the Daily Criminal Calendar. The Court will thus be made aware of the filing of such Motions and the action taken thereon.
1975 Notes
Rule 12 has been amended to add the term "information" where appropriate in subdivision (a) and (b). In addition, subdivision (b)(3) has been amended to provide that if a defendant moves to dismiss an information for lack of probable cause, his time to make his motion under Rule 12 (raising defenses and objections) shall commence with the determination of the motion to dismiss.
See also 1975 Notes to Rule 7.
1972 Notes
This rule, which is fashioned in large part upon its federal counterpart, differs significantly from both Federal Rule 12 and existing Rhode Island practice.
Subdivision (a), which is essentially the same as the federal rule, abolishes the complicated special pleas, demurrers and motions of common law procedure and replaces them with the pre-trial motion to dismiss or to grant particular relief. This is designed to eliminate the hazardous, and frequently mystifying, choices attorneys have been required to make in order to raise various legal objections. See Advisory Committee Notes, 4 F.R.D. 405, 413 (1945).
Subdivision (b) is the same as its federal counterpart except for the requirement contained in paragraph (2) that the defense of double jeopardy be raised by pre-trial motion. The requirements of this subdivision are in accord with existing Rhode Island practice which requires that the defense of former jeopardy, as well as objections to defects in the institution of the prosecution and in the indictment or complaint, be raised prior to entry of a general plea. See, e.g., State v. Pearson, 49 R.I. 386, 391, 143 A. 413, ___ (1928); State v. Maloney, 12 R.I. 251 (1879); State v. Cucca, 102 R.I. 95, 228 A.2d 572 (1967).
Subdivision (b)(3), which departs from the federal rule by requiring that motions under this rule be made no later than twenty-one days after the plea is entered rather than prior to entry of plea, accords with customary Rhode Island practice under which defense lawyers typically request and are granted permission to make their pre-trial motions after the plea is entered. See State v. Douglas, 78 R.I. 60, 63, 78 A.2d 850, 852 (1951). The proposed rule recognizes the practical difficulties in making these motions at the time of pleading and thus, with few exceptions, should eliminate applications for extensions of time to make pre-trial motions.
Subdivision (b)(4) and (b)(5) are generally in accord with existing Rhode Island practice. Paragraph (4) differs from its federal counterpart by the deletion of the two concluding sentences of this portion of the federal rule which deal with the question of who is to try issues of fact raised by pre-trial motions. That provision, which merely reflects the requirements imposed by Constitution and statute, was deemed to be superfluous and therefore has been deleted. The final sentence of paragraph (5), under which a defendant who has successfully moved to dismiss an indictment or complaint because of a defect in the institution of the prosecution can be continued in custody or on bail pending a new indictment or complaint, will be an innovation in Rhode Island practice.
Subdivision (c) of the proposed rule is not contained in the federal rule and is an innovation in Rhode Island practice. Under paragraph (1) a defendant who intends to rely upon the defense of insanity is required prior to trial to give written notice of this defense to the court and the prosecution. The notice must provide the names and addresses of the witnesses the defendant intends to call to sustain the defense; thereupon, the prosecution is placed under a concomitant duty to disclose its witnesses on this issue. The United States Supreme Court has upheld as not violative of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments a requirement that defendants give advance notice of certain affirmative defenses. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 80-86, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 1895-1899, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970). The principle established in that case clearly supports this provision.
The sanction, provided in paragraph (2), of excluding evidence at the trial in support of or in opposition to this defense for failure to comply with the rule has not as yet been approved by the Supreme Court. In Williams, the Court pointed out that the case did not involve and, therefore, it was not passing upon any Sixth Amendment issues possibly arising out of exclusion of a defendant's evidence where he fails to comply with this type of notice requirement. 399 U.S. at 83, note 14.