The provisions of Civ.R. 65(A) shall not apply in divorce, annulment, or legal separation actions.
When it is made to appear to the court by affidavit of a party sworn to absolutely that a party is about to dispose of or encumber property, or any part thereof of property, so as to defeat another party in obtaining an equitable division of marital property, a distributive award, or spousal or other support, or that a party to the action or a child of any party is about to suffer physical abuse, annoyance, or bodily injury by the other party, the court may allow a temporary restraining order, with or without bond, to prevent that action. A temporary restraining order may be issued without notice and shall remain in force during the pendency of the action unless the court or magistrate otherwise orders.
The continuing jurisdiction of the court shall be invoked by motion filed in the original action, notice of which shall be served in the manner provided for the service of process under Civ.R. 4 to 4.6. When the continuing jurisdiction of the court is invoked pursuant to this division, the discovery procedures set forth in Civ.R. 26 to 37 shall apply.
No action for divorce, annulment, or legal separation may be heard and decided until the expiration of forty-two days after the service of process or twenty-eight days after the last publication of notice of the complaint, and no action for divorce, annulment, or legal separation shall be heard and decided earlier than twenty-eight days after the service of a counterclaim, which under this rule may be designated a cross-complaint, unless the plaintiff files a written waiver of the twenty-eight day period.
In all cases where there is no counsel of record for the adverse party, the court shall give the adverse party notice of the trial upon the merits. The notice shall be made by regular mail to the party's last known address, and shall be mailed at least seven days prior to the commencement of trial.
Judgment for divorce, annulment, or legal separation shall not be granted upon the testimony or admission of a party not supported by other credible evidence. No admission shall be received that the court has reason to believe was obtained by fraud, connivance, coercion, or other improper means. The parties, notwithstanding their marital relations, shall be competent to testify in the proceeding to the same extent as other witnesses.
When a party who is entitled to a decree of divorce or annulment is ordered to pay spousal support or child support for a child not in his or her custody, or to deliver a child to the party to whom parental rights and responsibilities for the care of the child are allocated, the court may delay entering a decree for divorce or annulment until the party, to the satisfaction of the court, secures the payment of the spousal support or the child support for the child, or delivers custody of the child to the party to whom parental rights and responsibilities are allocated.
Notwithstanding Civ.R. 41, any dismissal of a divorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal separation action by a court or party, other than a denial on the merits, shall not operate as an adjudication of the merits or a bar to a subsequent filing of the action.
Ohio. Civ.R. 75
Staff Note (July 1, 1996 Amendment)
Rule 75 Divorce, Annulment, and Legal Separation Actions
The amendment changed the rule's reference from "referee" to "magistrate" in divisions (C), (H)(2), and (M) in order to harmonize the rule with the language adopted in the 1995 amendments to Civ.R. 53. Also, in divisions (B), (C), (F), (H)(1), and (I) the style used for citations to other rules was amended. The amendment is technical only and no substantive change is intended.
Staff Note (July 1, 1997 Amendment)
Rule 75(G) Relief pending appeal
The amendment clarifies the procedure to be followed when parental rights, spousal support, and similar issues are sought to be modified while an appeal is pending. The rule prior to the amendment was unclear on which court or courts had authority to entertain motions to modify such orders, leading to a split of authority among Ohio courts. Compare Rahm v. Rahm (1974), 39 Ohio App.2d 74, 315 N.E. 2d 495 (trial court could only grant such relief prior to the filing of an appeal) with Buckles v. Buckles (1988), 46 Ohio App.3d 118, 546 N.E.2d 950 (declines to follow Rahm, holds that trial court retains jurisdiction to grant relief pending appeal as long as the exercise of that jurisdiction did not interfere with appellate review).
The amendment follows the Buckles case by requiring a motion to modify to be made in the first instance to the trial court, with that court's decision subject to review and modification, if appropriate, in the appellate court. The trial court is the most appropriate forum to consider such a motion in the first instance, given that the trial judge is already familiar with the issues, and the likelihood that further factual presentations and inquiry will be necessary for the court to dispose of the motion.
Staff Note (July 1, 1998 Amendment)
Rule 75(F) Judgment
Division (F) was amended to require that the final judgment in a domestic relations case include all relevant claims except the domestic violence protection order: divorce, property settlement, and parental rights and responsibilities. The amendment was suggested by the Ohio State Bar Association Family Law Committee and the Ohio Gender Fairness Task Force. The amendment also changed the title of this division from "Default." Division (G) was added and the remainder of the divisions were relettered accordingly.
Staff Note (July 1, 2001 Amendment)
Civil Rule 75(B) Joinder of parties
Civ.R. 75(B) provides that Civ.R. 14 (third-party practice), Civ.R. 19 (joinder of parties needed for just adjudication), Civ.R. 19.1 (compulsory joinder), and Civ.R. 24 (intervention) are generally inapplicable in divorce, annulment, or legal separation actions. Division (1) of Rule 75(B), however, permits a corporation or person to be made a party defendant to such an action if that corporation or person has possession or control of or claims an interest in property out of which another seeks an award. Civ.R. 75(B)(1) thus permits the court to protect both the person seeking an award and the corporation or person who has possession or control of or claims an interest in property. See Huener v. Huener, 110 Ohio App. 3d 322, 327, 674 N.E. 2d 389, 393 (1996) (trial court abused its discretion by attempting to divest parents of party of legal title to property without joining them as parties; purpose of Civ.R. 75(B)(1) joinder "is to allow individuals to join whose interests need to be protected").
Division (B)(1) was amended effective July 1, 2001 to track more precisely the language of R.C. 3105.171, which provides for division of marital property and, in appropriate circumstances, a distributive award, and R.C. 3105.18, which provides for spousal support. The amendment is intended to make clear that the joinder of a corporation or person is proper whether a division of marital property, a distributive award, or an award of spousal support is the underlying issue. The reference to "other support" is retained in order to avoid foreclosing the use of Civ.R. 75(B)(1) when, e.g., child support is the underlying issue.
Rule 75(I) Temporary restraining orders
Civ.R. 75(I)(1) provides that Civ.R. 65(A), which prescribes general conditions for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, is inapplicable to divorce, annulment, or legal separation actions. Civ.R. 75(I)(2), however, permits a court to issue a temporary restraining order in such an action without notice, which order may remain in effect during the pendency of the action, so as to protect a party from action by another party who is about to dispose of or encumber property so as to defeat the other party in obtaining a fair award. See Addy v. Addy, 97 Ohio App. 3d 204, 210, 646 N.E. 2d 513, 517 (1994) ("Rule 75(H) [now 75(I)] is intended to protect the interests of the parties and preserve the authority of the court to make meaningful final orders for support"); see also Civ.R. 53(C)(3) (power of magistrate to enter orders; Civ.R. 75(I) incorporated by reference).
Civ.R. 75(I)(2) was amended effective July 1, 2001 to track more precisely the language of R.C. 3105.171, which provides for division of marital property and, in appropriate circumstances, a distributive award, and R.C. 3105.18, which provides for spousal support. Though courts appear properly to have rejected an overly-literal reading of Civ.R. 75(I)(2), see Sherban v. Sherban, 1985 WL 4710, Nos. CA-6688, CA-6695, CA-6696, and CA-6683 (5th Dist. Ct. App., Stark, 12-23-85) (restraining order under Civ.R. 75(H) [now 75(I)] proper in support of division of property), the amendment is intended to make clear that a temporary restraining order may properly be entered if necessary to prevent a party from defeating another party's right to an equitable division of marital property, a distributive award, or an award of spousal support. The reference to "other support" is retained in order to avoid foreclosing the use of Civ.R. 75(I)(2) to prevent a party from defeating the right of another party to, e.g., child support.
Staff Note (July 1, 2014 Amendment)
The rule is amended by inserting a new Civ.R. 75(B)(3) and renumbering the following provision. The new provision expressly grants courts the authority and discretion to join persons or agencies claiming to have an interest in or rights with respect to a child. This would include agencies such as child support enforcement and children services boards. This would also include third parties seeking the designation of residential parent or being granted parenting time rights.
Staff Note (July 1, 2018 Amendment)
Division (N) Temporary orders
Reflecting contemporary terminology, the former term "pendente lite" is replaced with the term "temporary."