As amended through June 18, 2024
Divorce

Property Division (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20)

In General

"Upon application of a party for an equitable distribution, the trial court 'shall determine what is the marital property and shall provide for an equitable distribution of the marital property . . . in accordance with the provisions of .' In so doing, the court must conduct a three-step analysis. First, the court must identify and classify all property as marital or separate based upon the evidence presented regarding the nature of the asset. Second, the court must determine the net value of the marital property as of the date of the parties' separation, with net value being market value, if any, less the amount of any encumbrances. Third, the court must distribute the marital property in an equitable manner. Smith v. Smith, 111 N.C. App. 460, 470, 433 S.E.2d 196, 202-03 (1993) (citations omitted) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20 (Cum. Supp. 1992)), rev'd in part on other grounds, 336 N.C. 575, 444 S.E.2d 420 (1994).

Standard of Review

"Equitable distribution is vested in the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of that discretion. Only a finding that the judgment was unsupported by reason and could not have been a result of competent inquiry, or a finding that the trial judge failed to comply with the statute, will establish an abuse of discretion. Wiencek-Adams v. Adams, 331 N.C. 688, 691, 417 S.E.2d 449, 451 (1992) (citations omitted).

Sanctions for Delay (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-21)

"[W]hether to impose sanctions and which sanctions to impose under G.S. § 50-21(e) are decisions vested in the trial court and reviewable on appeal for abuse of discretion. In applying an abuse of discretion standard, this Court will uphold a trial court's order of sanctions under section 50-21(e) unless it is 'manifestly unsupported by reason.' Crutchfield v. Crutchfield, 132 N.C. App. 193, 195, 511 S.E.2d 31, 34 (1999) (quoting White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985)).

Alimony (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-16.3A)

In General

"In determining the amount of alimony the trial judge must follow the requirements of the applicable statutes. Consideration must be given to the needs of the dependent spouse, but the estates and earnings of both spouses must be considered. 'It is a question of fairness and justice to all parties.' Unless the supporting spouse is deliberately depressing his or her income or indulging in excessive spending because of a disregard of the marital obligation to provide support for the dependent spouse, the ability of the supporting spouse to pay is ordinarily determined by his or her income at the time the award is made. If the supporting spouse is deliberately depressing income or engaged in excessive spending, then capacity to earn, instead of actual income, may be the basis of the award. Quick v. Quick, 305 N.C. 446, 453, 290 S.E.2d 653, 658 (1982) (quoting Beall v. Beall, 290 N.C. 669, 674, 228 S.E.2d 407, 410 (1976)).

"A trial court's award of alimony is addressed in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-16.3A . . ., which provides in pertinent part that in 'determining the amount, duration, and manner of payment of alimony, the court shall consider all relevant factors' including, inter alia, the following: marital misconduct of either spouse; the relative earnings and earning capacities of the spouses; the ages of the spouses; the amount and sources of earned and unearned income of both spouses; the duration of the marriage; the extent to which the earning power, expenses, or financial obligations of a spouse are affected by the spouse's serving as custodian of a minor child; the standard of living of the spouses during the marriage; the assets, liabilities, and debt service requirements of the spouses, including legal obligations of support; and the relative needs of the spouses. Hartsell v. Hartsell, 189 N.C. App. 65, 69, 657 S.E.2d 724, 727 (2008) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-16.3A (2007)).

Standard of Review

"The amount of alimony is determined by the trial judge in the exercise of his sound discretion and is not reviewable on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Quick v. Quick, 305 N.C. 446, 453, 290 S.E.2d 653, 658 (1982) (citing Sayland v. Sayland, 267 N.C. 378, 148 S.E.2d 218 (1966)).

Modification/Changed Circumstances

"[T]he trial court, on a modification hearing, does not retry the issues tried at the original hearing. What is properly considered at a modification hearing is whether there has been a material change in the parties' circumstances which justifies a modification or termination of the alimony order. Cunningham v. Cunningham, 345 N.C. 430, 435, 480 S.E.2d 403, 406 (1997) (citations omitted).

"'To determine whether a change of circumstances under G.S. 50-16.9 has occurred, it is necessary to refer to the circumstances or factors used in the original determination of the amount of alimony awarded ....' The reference to these circumstances or factors at the modification hearing is not to redetermine the statuses of dependent spouse and supporting spouse or to determine whether the original determination was proper. Rather, the reference to the circumstances or factors used in the original determination is for the purpose of comparing the present circumstances with the circumstances as they existed at the time of the original determination in order to ascertain whether a material change of circumstances has occurred. Cunningham v. Cunningham, 345 N.C. 430, 435, 480 S.E.2d 403, 406 (1997) (quoting Rowe v. Rowe, 305 N.C. 177, 187, 287 S.E.2d 840, 846 (1982)).

"Where the original alimony order is pursuant to , the trial judge will usually have made findings of fact and conclusions of law in reference to the circumstances or factors . . . . Where, on the other hand, the alimony order originates from a private agreement between the parties, there may be few, if any, findings of fact as to these circumstances or factors set out in the court decree awarding alimony. In the latter case, determining whether there has been a material change in the parties' circumstances sufficient to justify a modification of the alimony order may require the trial court to make findings of fact as to what the original circumstances or factors were in addition to what the current circumstances or factors are. Cunningham v. Cunningham, 345 N.C. 430, 436, 480 S.E.2d 403, 406 (1997) (quoting Rowe v. Rowe, 305 N.C. 177, 187, 287 S.E.2d 840, 846 (1982)).

"Upon a showing of changed circumstances, the trial court must consider the current circumstances with regard to the factors . . . and determine whether the original alimony order should be modified. 'As a general rule, the changed circumstances necessary for modification of an alimony order must relate to the financial needs of the dependent spouse or the supporting spouse's ability to pay.' The power of the court to modify an alimony order is not power to grant a new trial or to retry the issues of the original hearing, but only to adapt the decree to some distinct and definite change in the financial circumstances of the parties. Cunningham v. Cunningham, 345 N.C. 430, 436, 480 S.E.2d 403, 406 (1997) (quoting Rowe v. Rowe, 305 N.C. 177, 187, 287 S.E.2d 840, 846 (1982)).

Revised July 26, 2016.