N.M. R. Evid. 11-803
The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness.
If admitted, the record may be read into evidence but may be received as an exhibit only if offered by an adverse party.
This exception does not apply if the opponent shows that the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.
This exception does not apply if the opponent shows that the possible source of the information or other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness.
This exception does not apply if the opponent shows that the source of information or other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness.
If admitted, the statement may be read into evidence but not received as an exhibit.
The pendency of an appeal may be shown but does not affect admissibility.
N.M. R. Evid. 11-803
Committee commentary. - Effective December 31, 2016, Rule 11-803(10) NMRA was amended to add a notice-and-demand requirement to the hearsay exception for the absence of a public record, which is similar to a change made in 2013 to Rule 803(10) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The notice-and-demand procedure was added to the federal rule in response to Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009), which specifically approved the procedure as a means of satisfying the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The New Mexico rule differs from its federal counterpart by requiring the notice and objection to be "filed and served" within the appropriate time limits, whereas the federal rule merely requires that the notice be "provided."
Rule 11-803 NMRA was amended in 2012 to be consistent with the restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence, effective December 1, 2011, to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on admissibility. The internal numbering of the rule was also changed to conform to the numbering of the federal rule.
In 2007, the committee added language to former Paragraph F, now renumbered as Paragraph 6, taken from a similar change made in 2000 to Rule 803(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment provides that the foundation requirements of Rule 803(6) can be satisfied under certain circumstances without the expense and inconvenience of producing time-consuming but non-substantive foundation witnesses. Corresponding changes have been made to Rule 11-902 NMRA.
Eliminating the identical "catch-all" exception in former Paragraph X of this rule and former Rule 11-804(B)(5) NMRA (2006) and combining them in Rule 11-807 NMRA, adopted in 2007, with no intended change in meaning, tracks the 2000 amendments to the corresponding federal rules.
[As amended by Supreme Court Order No. 12-8300-015, effective for all cases pending or filed on or after June 16, 2012; as amended by Supreme Court Order No. 16-8300-013, effective for all cases pending or filed on or after December 31, 2016; as amended by Supreme Court Order No. 22-8300-028, effective for all cases pending or filed on or after December 31, 2022.]
.ANNOTATIONS The 2016 amendment, approved by Supreme Court Order No. 16-8300-013, effective December 31, 2016, added a notice and demand requirement to the hearsay exception for the absence of a public record, made technical changes, and revised the committee commentary; in Paragraph (10), added the new subparagraph designation "(a)", and changed former subparagraph designations "(a)" and "(b)" to "(i)" and "(ii)", and added new Subparagraph (10)(b); and in the committee commentary, added the first paragraph. The 2015 amendment, approved by Supreme Court Order No. 15-8300-012, effective December 31, 2015, made stylistic changes throughout; in Subparagraph (6)(d), after "complies with", changed "Paragraph 11 of Rule 11-902 NMRA or Paragraph 12 of Rule 11-902 NMRA" to "Rule 11-902(11) or (12) NMRA", and after "This exception does not apply if", added "the opponent shows that"; in Subparagraph (7)(b), after "apply if the", added "opponent shows that the"; in Subparagraph (8), deleted the Item designation "(a)", redesignated Items (i), (ii) and (iii) as Items (a), (b) and (c), respectively, and after "does not apply if", added "the opponent shows that"; and in Subparagraph (15), in the heading, after "that affect", deleted "and" and added "an". The 2012 amendment, approved by Supreme Court Order No. 12-8300-015, effective for all cases pending or filed on or after June 16, 2012, rewrote the title of the rule and the rule to make stylistic changes. The 1993 amendment, effective December 1, 1993, substituted "exceptions" for "evidence" in the rule heading, substituted "the witness's" for "his" in Paragraph E, substituted "member of the clergy" for "clergyman" in Paragraph L, deleted "by him" preceding "in direct" in Paragraph R, substituted "a person's" for "his" in two places in Paragraph S, deleted "his" following "among" in Paragraph U, inserted "after a trial or" and added the last sentence in Paragraph V, and substituted "the proponent's" for "his" in Subparagraph X(3).
For rules relating to authentication and identification of documents, see Rules 11-901 to 11-903 NMRA. For rules relating to admissibility, explanation and contradiction of abstracts of title, see Section 38-7-3 NMSA 1978. I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION. Categorical exclusion of statements made during a SANE examination was error. - Where a nine-year old child was examined by a SANE nurse who suspected that the child had been sexually abused, and in response to a direct question by the SANE nurse the child named defendant as the child's abuser, the trial court erred when it applied the primary-purpose-of-the-encounter approach to determine the admissibility of the child's statements and categorically excluded all statements made during the SANE examination on the ground that the primary purpose of a SANE examination is to gather evidence. State v. Mendez, 2010-NMSC-044, 148 N.M. 761, 242 P.3d 328, rev'g 2009-NMCA-060, 146 N.M. 409, 211 P.3d 206, and overruling in part State v. Ortega, 2008-NMCA-001, 143 N.M. 261, 175 P.3d 929. Statements made during a SANE examination can be admissible. - Statements made to a SANE nurse may be admissible for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment, but trial courts must carefully parse each statement made to a SANE nurse to determine whether the statement is sufficiently trustworthy, focusing on the declarant's motivation to seek medical care and whether a medical provider could have reasonably relied on the statement for diagnosing or treating the declarant. State v. Mendez, 2010-NMSC-044, 148 N.M. 761, 242 P.3d 328, rev'g 2009-NMCA-060, 146 N.M. 409, 211 P.3d 206 and overruling in part State v. Ortega, 2008-NMCA-001, 143 N.M. 261, 175 P.3d 929. SANE examination. - When the primary purpose of a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner examination is to prepare, collect, evaluate and dispose of evidence relevant to later criminal prosecution and not for the diagnosis and treatment of the child, statements made by a child victim of criminal sexual penetration to a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner are testimonial in nature. State v. Ortega, 2008-NMCA-001, 143 N.M. 261, 175 P.3d 929. Statements that meet requirements of hearsay exceptions are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness. State v. Frank G., 2005-NMCA-026, 137 N.M. 137, 108 P.3d 534, cert. granted, 2005-NMCERT-002. Admissibility subject to trial court's discretion. - The determination of the admissibility of statements under the exceptions to the hearsay rule rest within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Maestas, 1978-NMCA-084, 92 N.M. 135, 584 P.2d 182; State v. Johnson, 1983-NMSC-043, 99 N.M. 682, 662 P.2d 1349. Court's decision admitting evidence upheld where admissible under any theory. - Where evidence is admissible under any theory, the trial court's decision to admit it will be upheld. The same ruling will apply even more forcefully to evidence presented to the grand jury. State v. Ballinger, 1983-NMCA-034, 99 N.M. 707, 663 P.2d 366. Defendant's right of confrontation may be violated by admissible evidence. - The fact that evidence may have qualified for admission under an exception to the hearsay rule does not necessarily mean that a defendant's constitutional right of confrontation was not violated. Whether there has been a sixth amendment violation depends upon the facts of each case. State v. Martinez, 1982-NMCA-137, 99 N.M. 48, 653 P.2d 879. Burden is on state to establish unavailability of prosecution witness whose hearsay statements are sought to be admitted into evidence. Mere absence of a witness from the jurisdiction is not sufficient grounds for dispensing with the defendant's right of confrontation. State v. Martinez, 1982-NMCA-137, 99 N.M. 48, 653 P.2d 879. When a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, a showing that he or she is unavailable is required, and, even then, the declarant's statement is admissible only if it bears adequate indicia of reliability. State v. Lopez, 1996-NMCA-101, 122 N.M. 459, 926 P.2d 784. Finding of violation of right to confrontation does not automatically require reversal of the defendant's conviction and where other properly admitted evidence independently establishes guilt, the admission of the challenged hearsay evidence is harmless error. State v. Martinez, 1982-NMCA-137, 99 N.M. 48, 653 P.2d 879. The Rules of Evidence do not apply to proceedings to revoke probation and, for the proper usage of hearsay in such proceedings, a court looks to the law not involving these rules. State v. Vigil, 1982-NMCA-058, 97 N.M. 749, 643 P.2d 618. Foundation for testimony of child sexual abuse victim. - The state established that the identity of the perpetrator was "reasonably pertinent" to a pediatrician for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and the pediatrician's testimony was, therefore, admissible under Paragraph D but the state failed to establish such a foundation for the admission of hearsay testimony by a psychologist and a social worker. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Esperanza M., 1998-NMCA-039, 124 N.M. 735, 955 P.2d 204. Where the licensed program therapist testified to the importance of the identity of the perpetrator, and stated that the purpose of her therapy sessions with the child was for diagnosis and treatment and that, in order to properly treat a child abuse victim, it was essential to know the identity of the abuser, and the child's statements about the sexual abuse were of the type upon which medical personnel reasonably rely in treatment or diagnosis and meet the standards for admission set forth in Paragraph D of this rule, the children's court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the child's statements to the program therapist. State v. Frank G., 2005-NMCA-026, 137 N.M. 137, 108 P.3d 534, cert. granted, 2005-NMCERT-002. Parol evidence rule is fully applicable to written listing agreements, together with all the exceptions recognized in connection with any other writing. Parol evidence may not be received when its purpose and effect is to contradict, vary, modify or add to a written agreement, but is generally admissible to supply terms not in the written contract, to explain ambiguities in the written agreement, or to show fraud, misrepresentations or mistake. Maine v. Garvin, 1966-NMSC-140, 76 N.M. 546, 417 P.2d 40. Highly prejudicial hearsay admitted when no objection thereto. - Although testimony was not only hearsay, but made at a time when defendant was not present and was highly prejudicial, this did not deny it admissibility, nor the jury a right to consider it, if there was no objection to its admissibility by defendant and there was none. State v. Trujillo, 1955-NMSC-094, 60 N.M. 277, 291 P.2d 315. Highly prejudicial hearsay admitted when objection fails to call court's attention to defect. - Even if the question is objectionable as calling for hearsay evidence, a ruling by the court will be sustained where the objection is not properly stated and the court's attention not directed to the defect relied upon. Sturgeon v. Clark, 1961-NMSC-125, 69 N.M. 132, 364 P.2d 757. Expert's opinion still valid even though partially based upon hearsay. - In forming an expert opinion it may be necessary to rely upon information - hearsay though it be -which in part is derived from persons charged with the supervision of the one whose conduct is involved. The information is winnowed through the mental processes of the expert, and is by him either accepted or rejected. If such information is accepted as useable by the doctor it is not so liable to be untrustworthy as to require the court to rule that his opinion is unworthy of consideration by the jury. State v. Chambers, 1972-NMSC-069, 84 N.M. 309, 502 P.2d 999. Statements made to psychological expert. - Even though possibly admissible under paragraph D, allowing expert during direct examination to repeat to the jury the complainant's statements, made to the expert during her evaluation, was too prejudicial since it amounted to an indirect comment on the alleged victim's credibility. State v. Lucero, 1993-NMSC-064, 116 N.M. 450, 863 P.2d 1071. Records of vital statistics. - The statement of the cause of death is a factual finding, similar in nature to the factual findings of the identity of the deceased, the time and the date of death, and thus it is admissible under the vital statistics exception to the hearsay rule. Corlett v. Smith, 1988-NMCA-067, 107 N.M. 707, 763 P.2d 1172. Paragraph D does not require inquiry into the motive of the declarant. State v. Altgilbers, 1989-NMCA-106, 109 N.M. 453, 786 P.2d 680. Hearsay statements made by child sexual abuse victims to a pediatrician and psychologist were properly admitted pursuant to Paragraph D, as statements made for purpose of diagnosis or treatment. State v. Altgilbers, 1989-NMCA-106, 109 N.M. 453, 786 P.2d 680. Victim's history. - Where the history physician obtained from victim had been obtained for the purposes of diagnosis or treatment, such testimony is admissible under Paragraph D of this rule. State v. Lente, 2005-NMCA-111, 138 N.M. 312, 119 P.3d 737, cert. denied, 2005-NMCERT-008. Admission of civil judgment in criminal action. - It is a long-standing rule that a judgment in a civil action ordinarily cannot be admitted in a criminal action as proof of the facts determined by the judgment. State v. Hoeffel, 1991-NMCA-070, 112 N.M. 358, 815 P.2d 654. II. PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSION OR EXCITED UTTERANCE. Statements about past events and present thoughts were not admissible. - Where defendant was charged with first-degree murder; defendant claimed the defendant was acting in self-defense; and to support its theory of deliberate murder, the state introduced the victim's diary into evidence to show that defendant was increasingly violent and controlling towards the victim, including specific acts of domestic violence against the victim, diary entries such as "my boyfriend hit me cuz we were argueing so he gave me a fat lip and a black eye an a big bruzed on my check bone", "da 17th was the scaryest day of my life", and "I still don't know if I should be wit him Im scared 2 even see him" were not admissible to show the victim's present sense impression because the entries described past events and not the victim's present thoughts and feelings. State v. Leyba, 2012-NMSC-037, 289 P.3d 1215. Excited utterance. - Where the victim was shot multiple times at close range outside a friend's home; immediately after being shot, the victim told a police officer that defendant was the shooter; and at defendant's trial, the victim testified that defendant did not shoot the victim, the statement to the police officer was admissible as substantive evidence under the excited utterance exception, not just as a prior inconsistent statement. State v. Fuentes, 2010-NMCA-027, 147 N.M. 761, 228 P.3d 1181. Victim's spontaneous declaration. - Where defendant was charged with the first degree murder of the victim; defendant was embittered by the victim's rejection of defendant and the breakup of the troubled relationship between defendant and the victim; the victim moved from Nevada to the victim's home town in New Mexico; several days before defendant murdered the victim, the victim's mother was driving the victim to work, defendant pulled up alongside the victim's car, the victim looked at the person who was driving the adjacent car and spontaneously stated "There's Joseph" while appearing to be very agitated and scared; the victim's mother looked at the person in the adjacent car; and the victim's mother later identified defendant in court as the person whom the victim's mother had seen driving the adjacent car, the victim's declaration identifying defendant was admissible under the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule. State v. Flores, 2010-NMSC-002, 147 N.M. 542, 226 P.3d 641. Statements made in a telephone call between witnesses. - Where the prosecutor distributed a transcript to the jury and played the recording of a telephone call between a witness and a friend of the defendant; the telephone call contained statements by the friend incriminating the defendant in the murder of the victim; the telephone call occurred on the day following the murder; and the state did not contend that neither the witness nor the friend were involved in the shooting of the victim, the statements of the friend were not present sense impressions or excited utterances. State v. Macias, 2009-NMSC-028, 146 N.M. 378, 210 P.3d 804. Doctrine of res gestae requires spontaneity of utterances. - Prior to enactment of rules of evidence the principle involved in the doctrine of res gestae was that an utterance made impulsively and under the immediate influence of a terrifying occurrence could be so inherently truthful that the ordinary sanctions and tests applied to assure verity could be dispensed with. Spontaneity was generally considered an essential factor governing the admissibility of utterances sought to be admitted in evidence as part of res gestae. State v. Gunthorpe, 1970-NMCA-027, 81 N.M. 515, 469 P.2d 160, cert. denied, 81 N.M. 588, 470 P.2d 309, 401 U.S. 941 , 91 S. Ct. 943, 28 L. Ed. 2d 221 (1971). Declarations which are spontaneously and instinctively made are considered by the courts as part of the res gestae and admissible under Paragraph A or B. State v. Maestas, 1978-NMCA-084, 92 N.M. 135, 584 P.2d 182. Excited utterance not result of deliberation. - If the tension resulting from the incident did not provoke the statement but, rather, the statement was the result of deliberation, then it is not admissible as part of the res gestae. State v. Cozzens, 1979-NMCA-123, 93 N.M. 559, 603 P.2d 298. Assumption underlying the exception in Paragraph B is that a person under the sway of excitement, precipitated by an external startling event, will be bereft of the reflective capacity essential for fabrication, and that, consequently, any utterance he makes will be spontaneous and trustworthy. State v. Maestas, 1978-NMCA-084, 92 N.M. 135, 584 P.2d 182. The rationale for the excited utterance exception is that the exciting event induced the declarant's surprise, shock or nervous excitement which temporarily stills capacity for conscious fabrication and makes it unlikely that the speaker would relate other than the truth. State v. Martinez, 1982-NMCA-137, 99 N.M. 48, 653 P.2d 879. Test for the admissibility of utterances under Paragraph B is: (1) there must be some shock, startling enough to produce nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) the utterance must have been before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance; and (3) the utterance must relate to the circumstances of the occurrence preceding it. State v. Maestas, 1978-NMCA-084, 92 N.M. 135, 584 P.2d 182. A statement qualifies as an excited utterance if: (1) a startling event has occurred, (2) the statement was made while the declarant was under the stress or excitement caused by that event, and (3) the statement relates to the startling event. Cole v. Tansy, 926 F.2d 955 (10th Cir. 1991). A trial court must consider a variety of factors in determining whether a statement is an excited utterance so as to fall within the hearsay exception of Subsection B; these factors include, but are not limited to, the amount of time passed since the event, the opportunity for reflection or fabrication, the degree of pain, nervousness or other emotional stress on the part of declarant, whether the statement was self-serving, and whether it was made spontaneously or in response to an inquiry. State v. Bonham, 1998-NMCA-178, 126 N.M. 382, 970 P.2d 154, cert. denied, 126 N.M. 532, 972 P.2d 351. Theory underlying the excited utterance exception. - The theory underlying the excited utterance exception is that the exciting event induced the declarant's surprise, shock, or nervous excitement which temporarily stills capacity for conscious fabrication and makes it unlikely that the speaker would relate anything other than the truth. State v. Suazo, 2017-NMSC-011. Length of time and defendant's intervening actions are factors to consider in order to assess the degree of reflection and spontaneity underlying the statement. - In defendant's trial for second-degree murder, where defendant claimed that he did not know that the shotgun was loaded prior to shooting his friend, and where defendant sought to elicit testimony from two witnesses at trial regarding statements defendant made approximately an hour after the shooting and away from the crime scene that he did not know that the shotgun was loaded and that he did not mean to kill his friend, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony as an excited utterance or present sense impression hearsay exception, because the statements were not made under the stress of the moment or sufficiently spontaneous so as to assure their reliability. State v. Suazo, 2017-NMSC-011. Spontaneity product of stress. - Spontaneity, stated to be the most influential factor in determining admissibility under the doctrine of res gestae, is a product of stress; absent stress, spontaneity is questioned. State v. Cozzens, 1979-NMCA-123, 93 N.M. 559, 603 P.2d 298. Spontaneity, stated to be most influential factor in determining admissibility under the doctrine of res gestae, is a product of stress and absent stress an appellate court will question its "spontaneity" as the law uses that term and emphasize the self-serving nature of the statement. Clinard v. Southern Pac. Co., 1970 -NMSC-093, 82 N.M. 55, 475 P.2d 321. Under excited utterance doctrine, there is no definite or fixed time limit: admissibility depends more on circumstances than on time and each case must depend upon its own circumstances. State v. Robinson, 1980-NMSC-049, 94 N.M. 693, 616 P.2d 406. Under the "excited utterance" doctrine of Paragraph B, the time sequence continues as long as the witness is under the stress and strain of the excitement caused by an event. There is no definite or fixed limit of time. State v. Maestas, 1978-NMCA-084, 92 N.M. 135, 584 P.2d 182. Under this rule, the declaration should be spontaneous, made before there is time for fabrication, and made under the stress of the moment; however, no particular amount of time lapse will render a statement admissible or inadmissible, as long as the statement is produced by the stress of the moment, it is admissible. State v. Martinez, 1984-NMCA-106, 102 N.M. 94, 691 P.2d 887. Although time definitely is a factor to be considered, admissibility under the excited utterance exception depends more on circumstances than on time, and each case must depend on its own circumstances; since the four-year old's statements were being offered by the mother in a criminal sexual contact case and it was difficult to determine the exact date of the alleged touching, but it was clear that it preceded the declaration by the victim identifying respondent as the wrongdoer, this in itself did not preclude the victim's near-hysterical recitation from being within the excited utterance exception. In re Troy P., 1992-NMCA-120, 114 N.M. 525, 842 P.2d 742. Fact that event occurred contemporaneously or shortly thereafter is factor to be considered in determining the trustworthiness of the statement. State v. Perry, 1980-NMCA-156, 95 N.M. 179, 619 P.2d 855. Witness' statements told to 911 operator were present sense impressions. - Where the victim was shot when the victim and a friend went outside the victim's house to see who was sitting in a car in front of the house; within five minutes of the shooting, the victim's spouse called 911 and in response to questions asked by the 911 operator, the spouse told the 911 operator what the friend had told the spouse about the description of the shooter, the car in which the shooter left the scene, and the direction the shooter fled; defendant was subsequently apprehended and convicted of the murder of the victim; at trial, the friend's statements were introduced through the testimony of the spouse; and the friend, who was incarcerated in another state, did not testify and was not previously subject to cross-examination, the friend's statement's were admissible under the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule. State v. Sisneros, 2013-NMSC-049. Greater relation to emotional state than to timing. - The court did not err in admitting hearsay evidence through the victim's recount of the criminal incident to her friend, several hours after the incident. The victim was in an obvious state of severe distress when she made her declaration. The excited utterance doctrine is not so much limited in time as it is to the emotional state of the declarant when making the out-of-court declaration. State v. Mares, 1991-NMCA-052, 112 N.M. 193, 812 P.2d 1341. Spontaneous, emotional statement. - Where the declarant, who was sixteen years of age, witnessed defendant murder the victim; shortly after the murder, without prompting, the declarant told the state's witnesses that the declarant saw defendant shoot the victim; and the declarant was scared, nervous, upset, and talked quickly while standing and walking, the declarant's statement was admissible as an excited utterance. State v. Telles, 2011-NMCA-083, 150 N.M. 465, 261 P.3d 1097, cert. denied, 2011-NMCERT-007. While time alone may not be the sole test, where it is questionable that the claimed statement is so linked with the later accident in such continuity of action as to be a part of the accident or that the statement was made under circumstances of stress as would remove it from the doubtful character generally present in self-serving statements, then it may not be admissible. Clinard v. Southern Pac. Co., 1970 -NMSC-093, 82 N.M. 55, 475 P.2d 321. Trial court is allowed discretion determining whether declarant still under influence of the startling event when a statement is made. State v. Robinson, 1980-NMSC-049, 94 N.M. 693, 616 P.2d 406. The determination of the admissibility of statements as excited utterances is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned in the absence of clear abuse. State v. Martinez, 1982-NMCA-137, 99 N.M. 48, 653 P.2d 879. There must be sufficient factual predicate to admit victim's statement into evidence as an excited utterance. State v. Balderama, 2004-NMSC-008, 135 N.M. 329, 88 P.3d 845. Statement's self-serving character is factor bearing on spontaneous exclamation's trustworthiness. - That a statement may be self-serving is not controlling if the statement falls within the guidelines of res gestae; however, its self-serving character is a factor which bears on, and is to be considered in determining the trustworthiness attributed to spontaneous exclamations. Clinard v. Southern Pac. Co., 1970 -NMSC-093, 82 N.M. 55, 475 P.2d 321. Witness' accuracy considered in determining whether utterance is spontaneous exclamation. - Any reasonable doubt about the accuracy of the testimony of the witness, as to the words of such statement or declaration of another, other than a mere doubt as to the veracity of such witness, may also be considered by the trial judge in determining whether such statement or declaration should be admitted under the exception to the hearsay rule for spontaneous exclamations; and that, even though the reviewing court, if sitting as trial judges, would have held such statement or declaration admissible in evidence under the exception to the hearsay rule for spontaneous exclamations, a decision of the trial judge rejecting such statement or declaration will not ordinarily justify a reversal where such decision appears to have been a reasonable decision. Garrett v. Howden, 1963-NMSC-222, 73 N.M. 307, 387 P.2d 874. Paragraph A of this rule permits admission of remarks of an unidentified bystander. State v. Perry, 1980-NMCA-156, 95 N.M. 179, 619 P.2d 855. Error to admit supervisor's statement made before leaving. - The admission of the testimony that supervisory employee told his two men to watch out for the train before his leaving as part of the res gestae was prejudicial error and in itself sufficient basis for granting a new trial. Clinard v. Southern Pac. Co., 1970 -NMSC-093, 82 N.M. 55, 475 P.2d 321. Statements by child made upon awakening after sexual assault admissible. - The evidence showed that upon awakening the child was crying and "looked scared" and that her statements were made while in this condition. Thus, the trial court could rule that the statements were contemporaneous with the shocked condition and were spontaneous. The fact that the statements were not contemporaneous with the actual assault did not bar testimony as to what the child said. State v. Apodaca, 1969-NMCA-038, 80 N.M. 244, 453 P.2d 764. Statements made by victim of domestic violence and a witness to a police officer were properly admitted as excited utterances. State v. Lopez, 1996-NMCA-101, 122 N.M. 459, 926 P.2d 784. The trial court did not err in permitting police officers to testify about what the victim told them when they questioned her 20 to 30 minutes after her 911 call. State v. Hernandez, 1999-NMCA-105, 127 N.M. 769, 987 P.2d 1156, cert. denied, 128 N.M. 149, 990 P.2d 823. Wife's statement not spontaneous exclamation. - In a proceeding in which the defendant was accused of possession of marijuana, a statement by the defendant's wife to a police officer that she had been very concerned about the defendant's growing marijuana could best be described as a narrative of a past occurrence rather than spontaneous exclamation produced by the stress of the moment; therefore, the trial court erred in allowing the officer to testify about this statement, which was inadmissible as hearsay. State v. Cozzens, 1979-NMCA-123, 93 N.M. 559, 603 P.2d 298. Error harmless where evidence merely cumulative. - Where the state failed to show due diligence, as required by the constitutional right to confrontation, in attempting to procure attendance of a witness whose statements were admitted under the excited utterances exception, the trial court's admission of the testimony was nonetheless sustained on the ground that the statements were merely cumulative of other evidence, including admissions of the defendant himself. State v. Martinez, 1982-NMCA-137, 99 N.M. 48, 653 P.2d 879. Statement properly admitted as present sense impression. State v. Zinn, 1987-NMSC-115, 106 N.M. 544, 746 P.2d 650. Victim's words of greeting to defendant uttered just prior to shooting were admissible under the present sense impression exception. State v. Salgado, 1999-NMSC-008, 126 N.M. 691, 974 P.2d 661. Shooting victim's statement, "[defendant] shot me," offered through the testimony of a police officer and another witness, was admissible as an excited utterance. State v. Salgado, 1999-NMSC-008, 126 N.M. 691, 974 P.2d 661. Statement admissible under Paragraphs B and C. State v. Martinez, 1984-NMCA-106, 102 N.M. 94, 691 P.2d 887; State v. Woodward, 1995-NMSC-074, 121 N.M. 1, 908 P.2d 231. III. EXISTING EMOTIONAL OR PHYSICAL CONDITION. Statements about past events were not admissible. - Where defendant was charged with first-degree murder; defendant claimed the defendant was acting in self-defense; and to support its theory of deliberate murder, the state introduced the victim's diary into evidence to show that defendant was increasingly violent and controlling towards the victim, including specific acts of domestic violence against the victim, diary entries such as "Im scared", "Im so mad an sad an confused", and "my boyfriend hit me cuz we were argueing so he gave me a fat lip and a black eye an a big bruzed on my check bone", were not admissible to show the victim's then-existing mental state because the entries described past events, not the victim's present state of mind. State v. Leyba, 2012-NMSC-037, 289 P.3d 1215. Statement addressed victim's state of mind. - Where police officer testified that he was dispatched on a domestic violence call to defendant's residence nearly two months prior to the present incident, and because it was defendant's home and defendant indicated he wanted the victim to leave, officer escorted the victim off the premises, and as she was leaving, the victim stated "next time you guys see me you're going to find me dead", the statement addressed the victim's state of mind and was allowed under Paragraph C of this rule. State v. Torres, 2005-NMCA-070, 137 N.M. 607, 113 P.3d 877, cert. denied, 2005-NMCERT-005. State of mind exception in Paragraph C does not include a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed. State v. Gallegos, 1978-NMCA-114, 92 N.M. 370, 588 P.2d 1045, cert. denied, 92 N.M. 353, 588 P.2d 554. Evidence of the victim's state of mind that preceded and informed the conduct at issue was admissible. - In defendant's trial for the second-degree murder of his girlfriend, where defendant claimed that the shooting was an accident, and where the State presented evidence from one witness that the night before the shooting, the victim told the witness that the victim was upset because she and defendant had been fighting and that the victim intended to break off her relationship with defendant and testimony from a second witness that the victim told her to bring her gas for her vehicle because the victim needed to leave as soon as possible, that she was leaving Artesia and never returning, the victim's statements, except her statement that she was upset because she and defendant had been fighting, were properly admitted because the evidence demonstrated the victim's state of mind and future intent, that she was upset, that she wished to end her relationship with defendant, and that she intended to return home to Texas as soon as possible. Evidence of the victim's state of mind was relevant because it preceded and informed the conduct at issue, provided a possible motive for the shooting, defendant's anger over the victim's plan to break up with him, and rebutted defendant's claim that he shot the victim by accident. When a victim's projected conduct permits an inference that the defendant may have been motivated by that conduct to act in the manner alleged by the prosecution, the statement satisfies the threshold for relevance. State v. Hnulik, 2018-NMCA-026, cert. denied. Evidence that explains the cause of the declarant's state of mind is inadmissible. - In defendant's trial for the second-degree murder of his girlfriend, where defendant claimed that the shooting was an accident, and where the State presented evidence from one witness that the night before the shooting, the victim told the witness that the victim was upset because she and defendant had been fighting and that the victim intended to break off her relationship with defendant, the victim's statement that she was upset because she and defendant had been fighting was inadmissible as evidence of the victim's state of mind, because New Mexico law is that the state-of-mind exception does not include any statement which explains the cause of the declarant's state of mind, and the statement was not admissible as an excited utterance, because the State did not present evidence about the factors used to determine the spontaneity of the statement. State v. Hnulik, 2018-NMCA-026, cert. denied. Evidence explaining why declarant held particular state of mind not admissible. - The statement of the victim of attempted murder, made in relation to her fear of dogs because a dog allegedly bit her "at the house where they killed me," was inadmissible because, although Paragraph C allows hearsay statements that show the declarant's the existing mental condition, it does not permit evidence explaining why the declarant held a particular state of mind. State v. Baca, 1995-NMSC-045, 120 N.M. 383, 902 P.2d 65. Statement explaining cause of mental state not admissible. - Where defendant, in support of his claim of self-defense, sought to admit, through the testimony of the arresting officer, defendant's out-of-court statement that the victim "came at him with a sword," the district court properly rejected defendant's statement under 11-803(3) NMRA, because the exception is limited to statements showing the declarant's mental state, not its cause; defendant's statement does not show his then-existing mental state, only its cause, and the rule does not permit evidence explaining why the declarant held a particular state of mind. Moreover, defendant's out-of-court statement did not show his state of mind at the time he made the statement, only his previous state of mind at the time of the alleged incident. State v. King, 2015-NMSC-030. Defendant's references to prior crime admissible to show mental condition. - Testimony by a witness mentioning defendant's references to a prior armed robbery, made in conversations shortly after the shooting, was admissible as an admission by the defendant that he had just participated in an armed robbery, an offense relevant to the murder and aggravated battery charges, or as a statement of the defendant's then existing mental condition which was relevant to the defendant's state of mind at the time of the shooting a short time before the conversations; however, it would have been improper for the state to have introduced separately evidence of this prior armed robbery. State v. Ortiz, 1975-NMCA-112, 88 N.M. 370, 540 P.2d 850). Statements of murder victim during psychological treatment. - In a prosecution of the defendant for the murder of his wife, testimony of a psychologist as to statements made by the victim which were essential to treatment of the victim for situational depression were admissible since it was limited to evidence of abuse, threats, and spying. State v. Woodward, 1995-NMSC-074, 121 N.M. 1, 908 P.2d 231. Defendant's written documents admissible to show motive. - Written documents found in trunk of defendant, which tended to show a wicked and depraved mind, directed toward son of prosecuting witness, if not the whole family, were admissible to show motive in prosecution for poisoning with intent to kill or injure under Laws 1854-1855, p. 94. State v. Holden, 1941-NMSC-017, 45 N.M. 147, 113 P.2d 171. Lawyer's statements on terms of will expressly admissible. - A lawyer's statements of memory or belief relating to terms of a decedent's will are expressly admissible. Spencer v. Gutierrez, 1983-NMCA-035, 99 N.M. 712, 663 P.2d 371. Self-serving declarations of intent or motive. - Statements made which were self-serving declarations relating to questions of intent or motive were properly excluded from evidence under rule excluding self-serving declarations. State v. Snow, 1972-NMCA-138, 84 N.M. 399, 503 P.2d 1177, cert. denied, 84 N.M. 390, 503 P.2d 1168. Evidence of state of mind must be relevant. - The statement of fear of her father (the defendant) made by the victim of attempted murder was inadmissible under Paragraph C either because it was irrelevant as an attempt to demonstrate a fact of consequence other than the declarant's state of mind, or because it was unfairly prejudicial. State v. Baca, 1995-NMSC-045, 120 N.M. 383, 902 P.2d 65. IV. RECORDED RECOLLECTION. Statements made in a telephone call between witnesses. - Where the prosecutor distributed a transcript to the jury and played the recording of a telephone call placed at the county jail by the witness to a friend of the defendant; the telephone call was recorded by the county jail; the telephone call contained statements by the friend incriminating the defendant in the murder of the victim; the telephone call occurred on the day following the murder; and neither the witness nor the friend testified that they had made the recording when the matter was fresh in their memory or that the recording correctly reflected their knowledge, the recorded telephone call was not a recorded recollection. State v. Macias, 2009-NMSC-028, 146 N.M. 378, 210 P.3d 804. Indicia of reliability. - The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the audio tape and transcript of the statement of a witness to a shooting under Paragraph E and, under Paragraph X, based on its finding "that the circumstances of the original statement, the proximity in time to the shooting itself, all are indicia of reliability in that statement." State v. Allison, 2000-NMSC-027, 129 N.M. 566, 11 P.3d 141. No means of arousing recollection may be used until witness has satisfied the trial judge that he lacks effective present recollection. State v. Bazan, 1977-NMCA-011, 90 N.M. 209, 561 P.2d 482, cert. denied, 90 N.M. 254, 561 P.2d 1347. Memorandum read into evidence if recollection not revived. - After a witness consults the particular writing or object offered as a stimulus so that his testimony relates to a present recollection, if his recollection is not revived, a memorandum may be read into evidence and admitted if it meets the test of recorded recollection set forth in Subparagraph E of this rule. State v. Bazan, 1977-NMCA-011, 90 N.M. 209, 561 P.2d 482, cert. denied, 90 N.M. 254, 561 P.2d 1347. Police report may be read into evidence. - Rule 11-803(8)(a)(ii) NMRA does not bar an officer from reading aloud at trial the recorded recollection contained in a police report provided that a proper foundation is laid pursuant to Rule 11-803(5) NMRA. State v. Vigil, 2014-NMCA-096, cert. granted, 2014-NMCERT-009. Where defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated, first offense; at defendant's trial, the investigating officer could not recall portions of the officer's DWI investigation; the metropolitan court judge allowed the officer to read from the officer's police report what the officer had recorded concerning those portions of the field sobriety test the officer could not recall; the officer's testimony provided a sufficient foundation to allow the officer to read from the police report; and defendant claimed that the police report should have been excluded under the public record exception of Rule 11-803(8)(a)(ii) NMRA, the metropolitan court did not err in allowing the officer to read portions of the police report into the record pursuant to Rule 11-803(5) NMRA. State v. Vigil, 2014-NMCA-096, cert. granted, 2014-NMCERT-009. Reading of witnesses' statements. - After witnesses testified that they once had knowledge they no longer possessed but which they had accurately conveyed to the officer at the time of the incident, and the officer testified how the statements given to him were transcribed verbatim and how he attested to them, the officer was then permitted to read from and testify regarding parts of the statements which he took from the witnesses. State v. Padilla, 1994-NMCA-067, 118 N.M. 189, 879 P.2d 1208. V. PUBLIC AND REGULARLY CONDUCTED ACTIVITY RECORDS. A. IN GENERAL. Business records exception requires documentation. - The business records exception requires that a physical document, record, or report be admitted into evidence. Testimony about the contents of a record that has not been admitted into evidence is not admissible under the business records exception. State v. Cofer, 2011-NMCA-085, 150 N.M. 483, 261 P.3d 1115, cert. denied, 2011-NMCERT-007. Where defendant was charged with shoplifting over $500 for taking a television; the manager of the store testified as to the value of the television based on the manager's research of inventory reports on the store's intranet database; the manager had no independent knowledge of the value of the television; and the reports that formed the basis of the manager's testimony were not admitted into evidence, the witness's testimony was hearsay that did not qualify under the business records exception. State v. Cofer, 2011-NMCA-085, 150 N.M. 483, 261 P.3d 1115, cert. denied, 2011-NMCERT-007. Factors determining trustworthiness. - Four factors that help determine trustworthiness in an investigative report: (1) the timeliness of the investigation; (2) the investigator's skill or experience; (3) whether a hearing was held; and (4) possible bias when reports are prepared with a view to possible litigation. Gonzales v. Surgidev Corp., 1995-NMSC-036, 120 N.M. 133, 899 P.2d 576. Court still best judge of trustworthiness of records. - The trial court is still the best judge whether evidence tendered as a public record or compiled in regular course meets the standard of trustworthiness and reliability which will entitle the record to stand as evidence of issuable facts. State v. Ramirez, 1976-NMCA-101, 89 N.M. 635, 556 P.2d 43, overruled on other grounds, City of Albuquerque v. Haywood, 1998-NMCA-029, 124 N.M. 661, 954 P.2d 93, cert. denied, 124 N.M. 589, 953 P.2d 1087. Paragraph H of this rule appears to overlap rather than to diminish Paragraph F of this rule, and thus the discretion embodied in the concept of trustworthiness which the courts have read into Paragraph F is the same requirement of trustworthiness called for in Subparagraph (3) of Paragraph H. But these subdivisions are not completely coextensive, since Paragraph F has a clearly stated foundation requirement that the document be shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness whereas Paragraph H does not have such a requirement. State v. Ramirez, 1976-NMCA-101, 89 N.M. 635, 556 P.2d 43, overruled on other grounds, City of Albuquerque v. Haywood, 1998-NMCA-029, 124 N.M. 661, 954 P.2d 93, cert. denied, 124 N.M. 589, 953 P.2d 1087. Records admissible when information sources and preparation method indicate trustworthiness. - The rationale of the doctrine behind this rule is that records should be admissible despite the hearsay rule where the sources of information and the method of preparation indicate trustworthiness. State v. Ramirez, 1976-NMCA-101, 89 N.M. 635, 556 P.2d 43, overruled on other grounds, City of Albuquerque v. Haywood, 1998-NMCA-029, 124 N.M. 661, 954 P.2d 93, cert. denied, 124 N.M. 589, 953 P.2d 1087. Trustworthiness of statement not shown. - Statement in a report by the youth diagnostic development center from the commitment of a minor to the New Mexico boys school, offered to prove character of the victim through opinion evidence, lacked trustworthiness because of the unreliability of the source of information contained therein. Therefore, the statement was inadmissible. State v. Coffin, 1999-NMSC-038, 128 N.M. 192, 991 P.2d 477. Investigatory reports. - Portions of investigatory reports otherwise admissible under this rule are not inadmissible merely because they state a conclusion or opinion; as long as the conclusion is based on a factual investigation and satisfies the requirement of trustworthiness, it should be admissible. Gonzales v. Surgidev Corp., 1995-NMSC-036, 120 N.M. 133, 899 P.2d 576. Computer data as business records. - Computer data compilations may be construed as business records themselves, and they should be treated as any other record of regularly conducted activity. State ex rel. Electric Supply Co. v. Kitchens Constr., Inc., 1988-NMSC-013, 106 N.M. 753, 750 P.2d 114. Admissibility of computer printout. - Although a computer printout ordinarily is made after completion of all regular dealings with a party, the printout is admissible if its contents were stored and compiled at the time of the underlying transactions. State ex rel. Electric Supply Co. v. Kitchens Constr., Inc., 1988-NMSC-013, 106 N.M. 753, 750 P.2d 114. Appraisals inadmissible when no circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness are present. - Written appraisals prepared for use in condemnation proceedings by third parties whom the city's urban renewal agency did not supervise, the accuracy of which the agency would not vouch for, and one of which was based on an erroneous assumption about the age of the building, presented none of the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness which are normally required to justify an exception to the hearsay rule and were inadmissible hearsay. Owen v. Burn Constr. Co., 1977 -NMSC-029, 90 N.M. 297, 563 P.2d 91. Records inadmissible without proper foundation. - In an action by a bank's successor to recover on a promissory note, since there was no testimony at all about the origin of the bank's record of the debt, except that it came from the bank, and an employee of the successor admitted that she had no personal knowledge of the procedures used by the bank in creating and maintaining its records and did not know if the successor received all of the bank's records, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence of the records. Cadle Co. v. Phillips, 1995-NMCA-101, 120 N.M. 748, 906 P.2d 739. Foundation for admitting blood alcohol test results. - Rule 7-607A(2) NMRA of the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the Metropolitan Courts establish the proper foundation for calibration of blood alcohol testing devices; its requirements may be met through live testimony, affidavit or certification, or calibration testing records. Bransford v. State Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 1998-NMCA-077, 125 N.M. 285, 960 P.2d 827. Calibration logs of breath-alcohol device. - Calibration logs and a printout from a breath-alcohol device were admissible as business records in a prosecution for careless driving and driving while intoxicated. State v. Ruiz, 1995-NMCA-098, 120 N.M. 534, 903 P.2d 845. B. COURSE OF BUSINESS. Testimony concerning a forensic laboratory report. - Where the court admitted a forensic laboratory report that a substance was cocaine; the report was admitted into evidence through the testimony of a forensic chemist who did not conduct the tests underlying the report; the witness's testimony was an explanation regarding how the test was performed and the witness's approval of the testing chemist's results; there was nothing in the witness's testimony indicating that the witness relied on the witness's own analysis to arrive at the witness's own conclusions; the only other evidence that the substance was cocaine was the testimony of a police officer who performed a field test on the substance; and the state failed to prove the scientific reliability of the field test, the admission of the laboratory report and the witness's testimony regarding the testing chemist's opinion was error, the error was not harmless, and the error violated defendant's right of confrontation. State v. Delgado, 2010-NMCA-078, 148 N.M. 870, 242 P.3d 437, cert. denied, 2010-NMCERT-007, on remand 2009-NMCA-061, 146 N.M. 402, 210 P.3d 828, 2009-NMCERT-006. Blood draw results. - Where the State Laboratory Department toxicologist who testified at trial was not the analyst who performed the analysis of a blood sample and did not prepare the blood analysis report but who testified that the report was used and kept in the ordinary course of the Laboratory's business and testified about the procedure used in preparing the report, the report could be admitted into evidence as a business record without violating the Confrontation Clause because, even though the report was a testimonial statement, the testimony of the analyst who performed the test was not required given that the analyst was a mere scrivner who was not required to interpret the results of the test, exercise independent judgment, or employ any particular methodology in transcribing the results from the testing machine to the lab report. State v. Bullcoming, 2010-NMSC-007, 147 N.M. 487, 226 P.3d 1, overruling State v. Dedman, 2004-NMSC-037, 136 N.M. 561, 102 P.3d 628. Statements made in a telephone call between witnesses. - Where the prosecutor distributed a transcript to the jury and played the recording of a telephone call placed at the county jail by the witness to a friend of the defendant; telephone call was recorded by the county jail; the telephone call contained statements by the friend incriminating the defendant in the murder of the victim; the telephone call occurred on the day following the murder; and the state did not contend that neither the witness nor the friend witnessed or were involved in the shooting of the victim, the recorded call was not a business record. State v. Macias, 2009-NMSC-028, 146 N.M. 378, 210 P.3d 804. Foundation for admission of computer record. - The admission of a computer-generated record of defendant's mailing of insurance cancellation notices into evidence was not an abuse of discretion where defendant's witness, who was the person who created the record, testified that he had personal knowledge about the workings of the computer system used by defendant and that the record was the result of defendant's regularly conducted business activity. Roark v. Farmers Group, Inc., 2007-NMCA-074, 142 N.M. 59, 162 P.3d 896, cert. denied, 2007-NMCERT-006. A computer generated record is admissible as a business record. Roark v. Farmers Group, Inc., 2007-NMCA-074, 142 N.M. 59, 162 P.3d 896, cert. denied, 2007-NMCERT-006. Recorded data related to retail transactions fall within business records exception. - Where defendant was charged with forgery and identity theft based on allegations of check fraud at Wal-Mart, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting exhibits containing instantaneously recorded data related to retail transactions at Wal-Mart, because the data contained in the exhibits was recorded in real time, satisfying the requirement of 11-803(6)(a) NMRA, and was kept for every Wal-Mart money center transaction in the regular course of business, satisfying the requirement of Rule 11-803(6)(b) and (c) . State v. Imperial, 2017-NMCA-040, cert. denied. Records inadmissible when not proved made in course of business. - Where there was a failure of proof that the hospital records were made in the regular course of business of the institution and that it was the regular course of business of the hospital to make such record, although it appeared the services rendered were reasonably required, the hospital bills were not admissible as business records. Sapp v. Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co., 1957 -NMSC-021, 62 N.M. 239, 308 P.2d 213. Customer did not lay a foundation for admitting medical bills as records of regularly conducted activity; as such, the amounts billed by the medical treatment providers were offered for their truth and therefore constituted hearsay because the customer relied on them in establishing his damages. Segura v. K-Mart Corp., 2003-NMCA-013, 133 N.M. 192, 62 P.3d 283. Custodian of records must identify and testify as to preparation. - Although modern rules have relaxed the common-law requirement of calling or accounting for all participants in the making of a record, so that for regularly conducted activities foundational testimony may be provided by any qualified witness, nevertheless, for admissibility under Paragraph F of this rule, the custodian of the records or some other qualified witness, not necessarily the original entrant, must appear in court, identify the records, and testify as to the mode of their preparation and their safekeeping. State v. Ramirez, 1976-NMCA-101, 89 N.M. 635, 556 P.2d 43, overruled on other grounds, City of Albuquerque v. Haywood, 1998-NMCA-029, 124 N.M. 661, 954 P.2d 93, cert. denied, 124 N.M. 589, 953 P.2d 1087. Qualified witness to authenticate records. - There is no violation of the confrontation clause by the admission of business records where a qualified witness other than the maker is present at trial and where the record contains other indicia of reliability of the records. State v. Wynne, 1988-NMCA-106, 108 N.M. 134, 767 P.2d 373. Store employee was qualified to authenticate receipts as records kept in the regular course of business. State v. Wynne, 1988-NMCA-106, 108 N.M. 134, 767 P.2d 373. Witness is "qualified" under Paragraph F if able to testify to foundation requirements. State v. Ruiz, 1980-NMCA-123, 94 N.M. 771, 617 P.2d 160. Cell phone-related records properly admitted through records custodian. - In defendant's murder trial, where the state's witness testified regarding two cellphone-related records, namely a call detail report record and cell tower report listing the location of all cell towers in the city where the murder occurred, the trial court did not err in admitting the witness's testimony despite defendant's claim that the interpretation of the records required an expert witness, because the witness's testimony regarding the call detail report record and the cell tower report was testimony about contents and meaning of business records created and kept in the usual course of regular business activity, for which the witness was qualified as a custodian. State v. Carrillo, 2017-NMSC-023. Payroll and time sheets recorded in regular course of business admissible. - In a workmen's compensation case, payroll and time sheets showing periods when decedent worked were not erroneously admitted, because 20-2-12, 1953 Comp. (since repealed), makes a record of an act admissible to establish the same upon showing that the record was made in the regular course of a business, and that it was the regular course of business to make the record at the time or within a reasonable time thereafter. Callaway v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 1962 -NMSC-094, 70 N.M. 337, 373 P.2d 827. Ledger book held to be best evidence of business revenues. Central Sec. & Alarm Co. v. Mehler, 1996-NMCA-060, 121 N.M. 840, 918 P.2d 1340. Records kept under direction and with knowledge of defendant admissible. - Record containing bank deposits and expenditures, which was taken in part from the checkbook which was kept by the defendant and in part from the deposit slips which had been prepared by him was properly admitted into evidence, since, even though the books were not kept under the immediate supervision of the defendant, they were kept under his direction and with his knowledge and actual assent or cooperation. State v. Peke, 1962-NMSC-033, 70 N.M. 108, 371 P.2d 226, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 924 , 83 S. Ct. 293, 9 L. Ed. 2d 232 (1962). Computer printout admissible. - If the entries in a computer printout were made in the regular course of business for business purposes, there is no need to produce the original files. As long as the custodian of the records or any other qualified person testifies about the foundational requirements, the records are admissible. State ex rel. Electric Supply Co. v. Kitchens Constr., Inc., 1988-NMSC-013, 106 N.M. 753, 750 P.2d 114. Price lists kept in computerized database admissible. - In defendant's trial for shoplifting and conspiracy to commit shoplifting, price lists, kept in the store's computerized database for the purpose of pricing merchandise, were admissible as a business record of the store prices of scanned merchandise to prove the value of the merchandise taken by defendant. State v. Gallegos, 2016-NMCA-076, cert. denied. Constitutional right of confrontation denied. - Defendant was denied her constitutional right of confrontation at her trial for embezzlement, where the only evidence of shortages attributable to her was obtained by an unexplained comparison of computer printouts with her own records and there was no evidence that the state's only witness understood how the printouts were prepared. State v. Austin, 1985-NMCA-118, 104 N.M. 573, 725 P.2d 252. Business document admitted though not through business record exception. - A document prepared by a business which is relevant and material, the best evidence of its contents, and properly authenticated, may be admitted into evidence, notwithstanding it does not fall into the business record exception of this rule. Sun Vineyards, Inc. v. Luna Cnty. Wine Dev. Corp., 1988 -NMSC-075, 107 N.M. 524, 760 P.2d 1290. Traveler's check paraphernalia admissible. - A traveler's check purchase agreement, refund application, and refund processing form were admissible in a check forgery case as exceptions to the hearsay rule under Paragraph F. State v. Young, 1985-NMCA-079, 103 N.M. 313, 706 P.2d 855. Sales receipt admissible. - Court did not err in admitting sales receipt concerning defendant's gun. State v. Mata y Rivera, 1993-NMCA-011, 115 N.M. 424, 853 P.2d 126. Seller's memo not admissible where buyer had no opportunity to confront writer. - Handwritten notation and typewritten memo by seller's credit manager of his conversations with defendant buyer were damaging to defendant and should not have been admitted into evidence where defendant did not have opportunity to confront and cross-examine credit manager regarding potential for misrepresenting defendant's statements. Kirk Co. v. Ashcraft, 1984-NMSC-065, 101 N.M. 462, 684 P.2d 1127. Sales manager qualified to testify on note made in regular course of seller's business. - Sales manager's inability to verify dates or identity of person who made handwritten notation on credit file exhibit was not fatal, and manager who testified that exhibits were kept as a regular business practice and that notations were made regularly in course of conducting business was a "qualified witness" whose testimony was admissible under Paragraph F. Kirk Co. v. Ashcraft, 1984-NMSC-065, 101 N.M. 462, 684 P.2d 1127. Trustworthiness of exhibit cannot be attacked by one who uses it for his benefit during the course of trial. Kirk Co. v. Ashcraft, 1984-NMSC-065, 101 N.M. 462, 684 P.2d 1127. Error in admitting nonbusiness communication held not harmful. - Defendant was not harmed by any error in admission of telex communications not made in the ordinary course of business but at request of prosecutor, even if the communications did not fall within business records exception. State v. Griscom, 1984-NMCA-059, 101 N.M. 377, 683 P.2d 59. Medical bills were hearsay when offered to prove the expenses reflected by them and were properly excluded since the plaintiff did not create a predicate to argue their admissibility as business records nor give notice of intent to argue the catch-all exception to the hearsay rule. Padilla v. Hay, 1995-NMCA-067, 120 N.M. 220, 900 P.2d 969. C. PUBLIC. Breath test results. - Where the officer who administered a breath test to the defendant testified that "the certification for the machine was adhered to it", the State satisfied the foundational requirement for admission of the breath test. State v. Granillo-Marcias, 2008-NMCA-021, 143 N.M 455, 176 P.3d 1187. Computer printout of driving record. - Where defendant admitted that his driver's license was revoked at the time of his arrest and the arresting officer testified that the computer check he ran at the time of arrest indicated that the defendant's license was revoked, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a computer printout of the defendant's driving record for the limited purpose of showing the date the revocation or suspension of the defendant's driver's license began. State v. Soto, 2007-NMCA-077, 142 N.M. 32, 162 P.3d 187, cert. denied, 2007-NMCERT-006. Blood alcohol report, prepared by scientific laboratory division, qualifies as a "public record". State v. Dedman, 2004-NMSC-037, 136 N.M. 561, 102 P.3d 628. Not applicable to jury verdicts in criminal case. - Subparagraph (3) of Paragraph H does not apply to evidence offered by the state in a criminal case. As for Subparagraphs (1) and (2), Subparagraph (1) would apply only to the jury's report of its own activities and Subparagraph (2) would apply only to matters directly observed by the jury. Indeed, the fact that Subparagraph (3) specifically addresses findings made through investigations shows that Subparagraphs (1) and (2) do not cover that topic; that is, they do not apply to matters determined only through inquiries. State v. O'Kelley, 1994-NMCA-033, 118 N.M. 52, 878 P.2d 1001. As for public records exception to hearsay, assumption is that a public official will perform his duty properly. State v. Ramirez, 1976-NMCA-101, 89 N.M. 635, 556 P.2d 43, overruled on other grounds, City of Albuquerque v. Haywood, 1998-NMCA-029, 124 N.M. 661, 954 P.2d 93, cert. denied, 124 N.M. 589, 953 P.2d 1087. Public record is admissible after authentication and proof of admissibility under hearsay exceptions. State v. Ellis, 1980-NMCA-187, 95 N.M. 427, 622 P.2d 1047. Records must be authenticated unless self-authenticating. - Unless records fall within the narrow exception for self-authenticating documents, the records must be authenticated. Two letter reports from the state police crime laboratory could not be self-authenticating for two reasons, because they were not under seal, and they were not offered in their original form. The defendant had sought to introduce altered reports which eliminated references to a revolver which was suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful search, and because counsel declined the trial court's invitation to lay a foundation for them, the trial court was within its discretion in not allowing their introduction. State v. Ramirez, 1976-NMCA-101, 89 N.M. 635, 556 P.2d 43, overruled on other grounds, City of Albuquerque v. Haywood, 1998-NMCA-029, 124 N.M. 661, 954 P.2d 93, cert. denied, 124 N.M. 589, 953 P.2d 1087. Foundation requirements for Subparagraph H(3) exception have been relaxed to the point that in some cases they are omitted, but there is a requirement of trustworthiness, which means that it continues to be for the court to decide whether the record or report to be introduced is sufficiently trustworthy in and of itself, regardless of any testimony which the entrant might give, and furthermore, the record or report must be authenticated. State v. Ramirez, 1976-NMCA-101, 89 N.M. 635, 556 P.2d 43, overruled on other grounds, City of Albuquerque v. Haywood, 1998-NMCA-029, 124 N.M. 661, 954 P.2d 93, cert. denied, 124 N.M. 589, 953 P.2d 1087. Testimony of custodian of records not required. - Admissibility under Paragraph H does not require the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness because of the assurance of accuracy for public records. State v. Padilla, 1978-NMCA-060, 92 N.M. 19, 582 P.2d 396, cert. denied, 92 N.M. 180, 585 P.2d 324. Foundation testimony not required. - Under Paragraph H, records can be admitted as proof of the facts which they relate without foundation testimony and the sole criteria is whether the record is that of a public body. State v. Padilla, 1978-NMCA-060, 92 N.M. 19, 582 P.2d 396, cert. denied, 92 N.M. 180, 585 P.2d 324. Occasions may arise when public records have to meet foundation requirements. - Paragraph H considerably expands the type of record that may be admitted, and since the assurances of accuracy are usually even greater for public records than for regular entries, this paragraph omits foundation requirements, thereby making it more advantageous to qualify under it than under Paragraph F. However, there may be instances when questions will be raised about the manner in which the record was made or kept which must be satisfactorily explained by a custodian or other qualified witness, if the judge is not to exclude it for lack of trustworthiness. State v. Ramirez, 1976-NMCA-101, 89 N.M. 635, 556 P.2d 43, overruled on other grounds, City of Albuquerque v. Haywood, 1998-NMCA-029, 124 N.M. 661, 954 P.2d 93, cert. denied, 124 N.M. 589, 953 P.2d 1087. Identification records not hearsay. - Photographic and fingerprint identification records, properly authenticated by their custodian, are admissible under the hearsay rule and their admission does not violate a defendant's right to confront witnesses against him. State v. Linam, 1979-NMSC-004, 93 N.M. 307, 600 P.2d 253, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864 , 100 S. Ct. 91, 62 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1979). Evidence of "activity," as referred to in Subparagraph (1) of Paragraph H was necessarily implied from certifications by the warden and records manager stating that photographs and fingerprint cards are part of original records of a person committed to the penitentiary. State v. Padilla, 1978-NMCA-060, 92 N.M. 19, 582 P.2d 396, cert. denied, 92 N.M. 180, 585 P.2d 324. Evidence which showed fingerprint records were activities of penitentiary was admissible concerning foundation testimony for admission under this section. State v. Gallegos, 1977-NMCA-113, 91 N.M. 107, 570 P.2d 938. Letter from an investigator for the state's department of insurance finding an insurance agency negligent and in violation of unfair claims settlement practices was not a trustworthy factual finding and constituted inadmissible hearsay. Gallegos v. Citizens Ins. Agency, 1989-NMSC-055, 108 N.M. 722, 779 P.2d 99. Irrelevant that signature of attestation not same as typed name on form. - Where a document bears the seal of a state agency and a signature of attestation, it is irrelevant that the signature does not match a typed name on the form. State v. Stout, 1981-NMSC-045, 96 N.M. 29, 627 P.2d 871. Exclusion of hospital records involves two questions of double hearsay: the first hearsay question goes to the records; the second hearsay question goes to the patient's statements contained in the records. State v. Ruiz, 1980-NMCA-123, 94 N.M. 771, 617 P.2d 160. VI. INTERESTS IN LAND. Heirship recitals in deed are mere hearsay. - See same catchline in notes to Rule 11-801 NMRA. Except admissible when deed ancient and accompanied by possession. - See same catchline in notes to Rule 11-801 NMRA. And become competent evidence when admitted by stipulation. - See same catchline in notes to Rule 11-801 NMRA. VII. MARKET REPORTS, COMMERCIAL PUBLICATIONS. Market reports and quotations admissible with proper foundation. - The introduction of market reports and quotations as contained in newspapers and trade journals is generally permitted under an exception to the hearsay rule. A foundation for introduction should be laid indicating that the publication is trustworthy "and is relied upon by the trade in general in dealings and negotiations." Johnson v. Nickels, 1959-NMSC-079, 66 N.M. 181, 344 P.2d 697. Where evidence of contents of a publication must be admitted if the relevant and material information contained therein is to be made available to the trier of the facts, and the publication is one which reasonable minds would agree is trustworty, there appears to be no sound reason why such evidence should be excluded and the purpose of the hearsay rule is not offended by the introduction of such evidence. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Miller Metal Co., 1971-NMCA-177, 83 N.M. 516, 494 P.2d 178, cert. quashed, 83 N.M. 740, 497 P.2d 742 (1972). VIII. LEARNED TREATISES. Admissibility of testimony based on qualifications of witness. - A biomechanical engineer who qualified as an expert witness could discuss a medical article related to his testimony on the causation of temporomandibular injuries. Baerwald v. Flores, 1997-NMCA-002, 122 N.M. 679, 930 P.2d 816. IX. JUDGMENT OF PREVIOUS CONVICTION. Final judgment on guilty plea required. - A judgment in a criminal case falls within the exception only if it was entered upon a plea of guilty and following a "final judgment." Since no judgment was entered on the jury verdict in the first trial until the defendant's second trial was concluded, the exception did not apply. State v. O'Kelley, 1994-NMCA-033, 118 N.M. 52, 878 P.2d 1001 (decided prior to 1993 amendment). Absent a plea of guilty, proof of conviction of criminal charges is inadmissible in the trial of a subsequent civil action for tort arising out of the same act. Gray v. Grayson, 1966-NMSC-087, 76 N.M. 255, 414 P.2d 228 (decided prior to 1993 amendment). Copies of verdicts and judgments admissible in habitual offender proceeding. - Copies of verdicts, copies of "judgment, sentence and commitment" in prior criminal cases involving defendant, where each document was authenticated under Rule 11-902(A) and (D) NMRA, were admissible under this rule in an habitual offender proceeding. State v. Gallegos, 1977-NMCA-113, 91 N.M. 107, 570 P.2d 938. Fact that co-defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to commit murder, presented to the jury in a case involving the defendant's conspiracy, does not come within Paragraph V of this rule and is hearsay; informing the jury of this guilty plea is error. State v. Urioste, 1980-NMCA-103, 94 N.M. 767, 617 P.2d 156. X. OTHER EXCEPTIONS. Medical diagnosis. - Where defendant was charged with criminal sexual penetration of a minor; the child was taken to a doctor because the child was experiencing vaginal pain; a doctor performed a SANE examination of the child to diagnose the child and treat the child's physical complaints; during the examination, the child told the doctor that defendant had inserted defendant's fingers into the child's vagina and anus, performed cunnilingus on the child, and made the child perform fellatio; and the doctor performed a physical examination of the child which revealed injuries to the child's vagina that were consistent with penetration by a finger or other object, the doctor's testimony about the child's statements concerning the nature and scope of the abuse were admissible pursuant to Paragraph D. State v. Skinner, 2011-NMCA-070, 150 N.M. 6, 256 P.3d 969, cert. denied, 2011-NMCERT-005. Where defendant was charged with criminal sexual penetration of a minor who was defendant's six year old granddaughter; defendant served as a caregiver for the child; the child was taken to a doctor because the child was experiencing vaginal pain; a doctor performed a SANE examination of the child; the doctor testified that the child identified defendant as the perpetrator who had inserted defendant's fingers into the child's vagina; and the treatment of the child involved separating the child from defendant to prevent further harm, the doctor's testimony that the child identified defendant as the perpetrator was admissible pursuant to Paragraph D. State v. Skinner, 2011-NMCA-070, 150 N.M. 6, 256 P.3d 969, cert. denied, 2011-NMCERT-005. Where defendant was convicted of first degree criminal sexual penetration of a minor and third degree criminal sexual contact of a minor; a nurse who examined the victim testified that the victim told the nurse that defendant touched the victim with defendant's private, that defendant touched the victim's butt with defendant's private, and that defendant made the victim touch defendants' private with the victim's hands; the nurse was a family nurse practitioner who did mostly what a primary care doctor does; the nurse was trained to assess, diagnose and treat acute and chronic illnesses; the nurse worked at a pediatric specialty clinic which saw children and adolescents who were brought in because of concerns about sexual abuse; and there was no evidence that the victim had already had a pediatric examination prior to the victim's examination by the nurse, that law enforcement was involved in the victim's examination, that the nurse performed a rape kit, or that the nurse provided evidence to the police, the nurse's testimony about the victim's statements was admissible under the medical diagnosis exception to the hearsay rule. State v. Tafoya, 2010-NMCA-010, 147 N.M. 602, 227 P.3d 92. Evidence not relevant to medical diagnosis. - Where defendant was charged with criminal sexual penetration of a minor; the doctor who performed a SANE examination of the child testified that during the examination, the child asked to draw a drawing which the child stated was a drawing of defendant's penis; there was nothing in the record to show how the child's assertion with regard to the drawing might assist the doctor diagnose or treat the child's injuries; there was substantial evidence other than the doctor's statement regarding the drawing to support defendant's conviction; the doctor's testimony regarding the drawing was minuscule and insignificant in comparison to admissible evidence; and there was no conflicting evidence to discredit the testimony presented by the state, there was no reasonable probability that the admission of the doctor's testimony regarding the child's statement about the drawing affected the verdict and the admission of the drawing into evidence was harmless error. State v. Skinner, 2011-NMCA-070, 150 N.M. 6, 256 P.3d 969, cert. denied, 2011-NMCERT-005. Admission of child's hearsay statements identifying defendant as the perpetrator of sexual abuse was not plain error. - Where defendant was charged with criminal sexual penetration of a child under thirteen; a counselor for sexually abused children testified once on direct examination that the victim stated to the counselor that defendant told the victim to hold defendant's penis, that the victim was made to perform oral sex with defendant, and that defendant made the victim promise to keep the abuse secret; and the statements were made at the end of the victim's treatment and were not necessary for the counselor's diagnosis or to explain the basis of the counselor's expert opinion, the error in admitting the victim's statements that defendant was the perpetrator of the sexual abuse was not plain error. State v. Dylan J., 2009-NMCA-027, 145 N.M. 719, 204 P.3d 44. Notice required. - Paragraph X of this rule and Rule 11-804B(5) NMRA, the two catchall exceptions to the hearsay rule, require prior notice to an adverse party. State v. Frank G., 2005-NMCA-026, 137 N.M. 137, 108 P.3d 534, cert. granted, 2005-NMCERT-002. Admission of child's hearsay statements proper. - The children's court admission of the child's hearsay statements under Paragraph X of this rule regarding sexual abuse were proper where in admitting the statements, the children's court considered the content of the statements and the circumstances in which they were made, and the court found that the statements were inherently reliable, noting in particular the age of the child, the manner in which the issue was raised, the nature of the utterances, and the consistency of her statements. State v. Frank G., 2005-NMCA-026, 137 N.M. 137, 108 P.3d 534, cert. granted, 2005-NMCERT-002. Where the child's hearsay statements under Paragraph X of this rule regarding sexual abuse are supported by guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to those which sustain the other enumerated exceptions to the hearsay rule, the children's court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the child's hearsay statements through the testimony of the foster mother, the children, youth & families department social worker, a clinical forensic interviewer, and a licensed program therapist. State v. Frank G., 2005-NMCA-026, 137 N.M. 137, 108 P.3d 534, cert. granted, 2005-NMCERT-002. Admission of child's hearsay statements in abuse and neglect proceeding. - Where child's statements were spontaneous, consistent and unambiguous in both the description of the abuse and the identity of the abuser, the terms used by the child to describe the abuse were consistent with her age, the child's behavior was consistent with sexual abuse, and the child's therapist testified that it would be hurtful, not helpful, to have child testify, trial court properly determined that circumstances surrounding the child's statements made them trustworthy. In re Pamela A.G., 2006 -NMSC-019, 139 N.M. 459, 134 P.3d 745. Construction of "other exceptions" provision. - Paragraph X of this rule and Rule 11-804 NMRA, cannot be read to mean that hearsay which almost, but not quite, fits another specific exception may be admitted under the "other exceptions" subdivision of either rule. State v. Barela, 1982-NMCA-054, 97 N.M. 723, 643 P.2d 287. In criminal cases. - The "other" hearsay exceptions of Rules 11-803 and 11-804 NMRA must be far more stringently employed in criminal cases, particularly because of the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment, than in civil matters. State v. Barela, 1982-NMCA-054, 97 N.M. 723, 643 P.2d 287; State v. Taylor, 1985-NMCA-063, 103 N.M. 189, 704 P.2d 443. Evidence admissible because probative of defendant's state of mind. - The trial court improperly excluded a taperecording of a phone conversation between the defendant in a securities' fraud case and a person who assured him that the defendant could indeed deliver on his representations of the ability to effect swaps between prospective condo buyers and the owners of condos in other areas. However, such error was not reversible because it was otherwise proven that the defendant's representations concerning the possibility of "condo-swaps" were true (even if without the consenting participation of exchange services) and were thus not misrepresentations. The tape was admissible because probative of defendant's state of mind, even though defendant had failed to comply with the pretrial procedures required by this rule. State v. Shade, 1986-NMCA-072, 104 N.M. 710, 726 P.2d 864, overruled on other grounds, State v. Olguin, 1994-NMCA-050, 118 N.M. 91, 879 P.2d 92. Evidence admissible because of reliability and importance. - Taped statement was admissible where it was reliable and important for the jury to consider, as it went to the identity of the shooters in the defendant's murder trial. State v. Trujillo, 2002-NMSC-005, 131 N.M. 709, 42 P.3d 814. In a prosecution of defendant for criminal sexual penetration of a child, because the child victim's statements to her parents were sufficiently trustworthy in light of the particular circumstances of the case, the admission of these statements into evidence under the catch-all exception to the hearsay rule did not violate defendant's constitutional rights under the Confrontation Clause. State v. Massengill, 2003-NMCA-024, 133 N.M. 263, 62 P.3d 354, cert. denied, 133 N.M. 126, 61 P.3d 835. Hearsay testimony of child-victim of criminal sexual contact properly admitted under Paragraph X. State v. Doe, 1980-NMCA-091, 94 N.M. 637, 614 P.2d 1086. The best interests of a child do not subsume the safeguards of the rules of evidence and hearsay testimony may not be admitted by the children's court unless the guarantees of trustworthiness and reliability are shown. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Esperanza M., 1998-NMCA-039, 124 N.M. 735, 955 P.2d 204. Medical diagnosis. - Trial court must determine whether the medical diagnosis or treatment hearsay exception requires an inquiry into the patient's treatment-seeking motive, as well as the physician's reliance, in order to be considered a firmly-rooted hearsay exception for Confrontation Clause purposes. State v. Massengill, 2003-NMCA-024, 133 N.M. 263, 62 P.3d 354, cert. denied, 133 N.M. 126, 61 P.3d 835. Law reviews. - For survey, "Evidence: Prior Crimes and Prior Bad Acts Evidence," see 6 N.M.L. Rev. 405 (1976). For article, "Survey of New Mexico Law, 1979-80: Evidence," see 11 N.M.L. Rev. 159 (1981). For annual survey of New Mexico law relating to evidence, see 12 N.M.L. Rev. 379 (1982). For annual survey of criminal procedure in New Mexico, see 18 N.M.L. Rev. 345 (1988). For annual survey of New Mexico law of evidence, 19 N.M.L. Rev. 679 (1990). Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. - 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 679 et seq.; 29A Am. Jur. 2d Evidence §§ 754 et seq., 860 et seq.; 31A Am. Jur. 2d Expert and Opinion Evidence §§ 123 to 127 , 228 et seq., 323. Testimony of children as to grounds of divorce of their parents, 2 A.L.R.2d 1329. Admissibility in divorce action for adultery of wife's statement that husband was not father of her child, 4 A.L.R.2d 567. Inability of person making utterance to recollect and narrate facts to which it relates as affecting its admissibility as part of res gestae, 7 A.L.R.2d 1324. Admissibility of declaration of persons other than members of family as to pedigree, 15 A.L.R.2d 1412. What constitutes books of original entry within rule as to admissibility of books of account, 17 A.L.R.2d 235. Verification and authentication of slips, tickets, bills, invoices, etc., made in regular course of business, under the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act, or under similar "model acts," 21 A.L.R.2d 773. Constitutionality, construction, and effect of legislation forbidding or limiting the use, as evidence, of statement secured from an injured person, 22 A.L.R.2d 1269. Remarriage tables, 25 A.L.R.2d 1464. Introduction of decedent's books of account by his personal representative as waiver of "dead man's statute," 26 A.L.R.2d 1009. Insurance: coroner's verdict or report as evidence on issue of suicide, 28 A.L.R.2d 352. Mutilations, alterations, and deletions as affecting admissibility in evidence of public record, 28 A.L.R.2d 1443. Admissibility, on issue of child's legitimacy or parentage, of declarations of parents, relatives, or the child, deceased or unavailable, 31 A.L.R.2d 989. Admissibility of declarations of grantor on issue of delivery of deed, 34 A.L.R.2d 588. Reputation as to ownership or claim as admissible on question of adverse possession, 40 A.L.R.2d 770. Admissibility of records or report of welfare department or agency relating to payment to or financial condition of particular person, 42 A.L.R.2d 752. Admissibility, in Federal Employers' Liability Act action, of rules, practices, precautions, safety devices, etc., used by other railroads, 43 A.L.R.2d 618. Admissibility of hospital record relating to cause or circumstances of accident or incident in which patient sustained injury, 44 A.L.R.2d 553. Admissibility in evidence of ancient maps and the like, 46 A.L.R.2d 1318. What are official records within purview of 28 U.S.C. § 1733, making such records or books admissible in evidence, 50 A.L.R.2d 1197. Admissibility as res gestae of statements or exclamations relating to cause of, or responsibility for, motor vehicle accident, 53 A.L.R.2d 1245. Admissibility of hospital record relating to physician's opinion as to whether patient is malingering or feigning injury, 55 A.L.R.2d 1031. Spontaneity of declaration sought to be admitted as part of res gestae as question for court or ultimately for jury, 56 A.L.R.2d 372. Admissibility of evidence of reputation or declaration as to matter of public interest, 58 A.L.R.2d 615. Admissibility in civil action of electroencephalogram, electrocardiogram, or other record made by instrument used in medical test, or of report based upon such test, 66 A.L.R.2d 536. Admissibility of report of police or other public officer or employee, or portions of report, as to cause of or responsibility for accident, injury to person, or damage to property, 69 A.L.R.2d 1148. Admissibility in criminal case, as part of the res gestae, of statements or utterances of bystanders made at time of arrest, 78 A.L.R.2d 300. Refreshment of recollection by use of memoranda or other writings, 82 A.L.R.2d 473. Declarant's age as affecting admissibility as res gestae, 83 A.L.R.2d 1368, 15 A.L.R.4th 1043. Medical books or treatises as independent evidence, 84 A.L.R.2d 1338. Admissibility, as part of res gestae, of accusatory utterances made by homicide victim after act, 4 A.L.R.3d 149. Admissibility of party's book accounts to prove loans or payments by person by or for whom they are kept, 13 A.L.R.3d 284. Admissibility, as res gestae, of statements relating to origin or cause of, or responsibility for, fire, 13 A.L.R.3d 1114. Admissibility of physician's testimony as to patient's statements or declarations, other than res gestae, during medical examinations, 37 A.L.R.3d 778. Admissibility, as part of res gestae of spontaneous utterances of unidentified bystander testified to by an interested party, 50 A.L.R.3d 716. Admissibility of newspaper article as evidence of the truth of the facts stated therein, 55 A.L.R.3d 663. Weather reports and records as evidence, 57 A.L.R.3d 713. Admissibility in evidence, on issue of negligence, of codes or standards of safety issued or sponsored by governmental body or by voluntary association, 58 A.L.R.3d 148. Admissibility, in action against notary public, of evidence as to usual business practice of notary public of identifying person seeking certificate of acknowledgment, 59 A.L.R.3d 1327. Admissibility under state law of hospital record relating to intoxication or sobriety of patient, 80 A.L.R.3d 456. Time element as affecting admissibility of statement or complaint made by victim of sex crime as res gestae, spontaneous exclamation or excited utterance, 89 A.L.R.3d 102. Admissibility of former testimony of nonparty witness, present in jurisdiction, who refuses to testify at subsequent trial without making claim of privilege, 92 A.L.R.3d 1138. Business records: authentication and verification of bills and invoices under Rule 803(6) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 1 A.L.R.4th 316. Admissibility of computerized private business records, 7 A.L.R.4th 8. Admissibility in evidence of professional directories, 7 A.L.R.4th 638. Admissibility of hearsay evidence in probation revocation hearings, 11 A.L.R.4th 999. Admissibility of testimony concerning extrajudicial statements made to, or in presence of, witness through an interpreter, 12 A.L.R.4th 1016. Admissibility of testimony regarding spontaneous declarations made by one incompetent to testify at trial, 15 A.L.R.4th 1043. Admissibility in state court proceedings of police reports under official record exception to hearsay rule, 31 A.L.R.4th 913. Necessity, in criminal prosecution, of independent evidence of principal act to allow admission, under res gestae or excited utterance exception to hearsay rule, of statement made at time of, or subsequent to, principal act, 38 A.L.R.4th 1237. Uniform evidence Rule 803(24) : the residual hearsay exception, 51 A.L.R.4th 999. Admissibility of school records under hearsay exceptions, 57 A.L.R.4th 1111. Admissibility of evidence of reputation as to land boundaries or customs affecting land, under Rule 803(20) of Uniform Rules of Evidence and similar formulations, 79 A.L.R.4th 1044. Admissibility of tape recording or transcript of "911" emergency telephone call, 3 A.L.R.5th 784. Admissibility of government factfinding in products liability actions, 29 A.L.R.5th 534. Admissibility of statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment as hearsay exception under Rule 803(4) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 38 A.L.R.5th 433. Admissibility of evidence of declarant's then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condition, under rule 803(3) of uniform rules of evidence and similar formulations, 57 A.L.R.5th 141. Admissibility of ancient documents as hearsay exception under Rule 803(16) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 63 A.L.R.5th 331. Admissibility in state court proceedings of police reports as business records, 111 A.L.R.5th 1. Admissibility in state court proceedings of police reports under official record exception to hearsay rule, 112 A.L.R.5th 621. Admissibility of hospital records under Federal Business Records Act (28 USC § 1732(a)), 9 A.L.R. Fed. 457. Construction and application of provision of Rule 803(8)(B) , Federal Rules of Evidence, excluding from exception to hearsay rule in criminal cases matters observed by law enforcement officers, 37 A.L.R. Fed. 831. Admissibility, under Rule 803(8)(C) of Federal Rules of Evidence, of "factual findings resulting from investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law," 47 A.L.R. Fed. 321. When is hearsay statement an "excited utterance" admissible under Rule 803(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 48 A.L.R. Fed. 451. Admissibility of statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment as hearsay exception under Rule 803(4) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 689. Admissibility, over hearsay objection, of police observations and investigative findings offered by government in criminal prosecution, excluded from public records exception to hearsay rule under Rule 803(8)(B) or (C) , Federal Rules of Evidence, 56 A.L.R. Fed. 168. When is hearsay statement a "present sense impression" admissible under Rule 803(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 60 A.L.R. Fed. 524. Admissibility of records other than police reports, under Rule 803(6) , Federal Rules of Evidence, providing for business records exception to hearsay rule, 61 A.L.R. Fed. 359. Treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets as exception to hearsay rule under Rule 803(18) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 64 A.L.R. Fed. 971. Admissibility of evidence of absence of public record or entry under Rule 803(10) of Federal Rules of Evidence, 70 A.L.R. Fed. 198. Exception to hearsay rule, under Rule 803(3) of Federal Rules of Evidence, with respect to statement of declarant's mental, emotional, or physical condition, 75 A.L.R. Fed. 170. Exception to hearsay rule, under Rule 803(11) or 803(12) of Federal Rules of Evidence, with respect to information contained in records of religious organization, 78 A.L.R. Fed. 361. Requirements, under Federal Rule of Evidence 807 (Fed. Rules Evid. Rule 807, 28 USCA), of notice to adverse party for admission of evidence under residual exception to hearsay rule, where availability of declarant is immaterial, 155 A.L.R. Fed. 409. When is hearsay statement 'excited utterance' admissible under Rule 803(2) of Federal Rules of Evidence, 155 A.L.R. Fed. 583. When is hearsay statement "present sense impression" admissible under Rule 803(1) of Federal Rules of Evidence, 165 A.L.R. Fed. 491. Admissibility, under Rule 803(8)(c) of Federal Rules of Evidence, of "factual findings resulting from investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law", 180 A.L.R. Fed. 61. 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 856 et seq.; 31A C.J.S. Evidence §§ 259 et seq., 282; 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 495 et seq.; 32A C.J.S. Evidence §§ 834 et seq., 859, 860, 869, 920, 931, 932, 968, 1005 et seq., 1010, 1012 et seq., 1025.