N.M. R. Evid. 11-608
By testifying on another matter, a witness does not waive any privilege against self-incrimination for testimony that relates only to the witness's character for truthfulness.
N.M. R. Evid. 11-608
Committee commentary. - The language of Rule 11-608 NMRA was amended in 2012 to be consistent with the restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence, effective December 1, 2011, to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. New Mexico's rule, however, unlike the federal rule, retains the phrase "by opinion or reputation or otherwise" at the end of Paragraph A. These changes are intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on admissibility.
[As amended by Supreme Court Order No. 12-8300-015, effective for all cases pending or filed on or after June 16, 2012.]
ANNOTATIONS The 2012 amendment, approved by Supreme Court Order No. 12-8300-015, effective for all cases pending or filed on or after June 16, 2012, rewrote the title of the rule and the rule to make stylistic changes. The 2007 amendment, approved by Supreme Court Order No. 07-8300-035, effective February 1, 2008, amended Paragraph B in two places to change "credibility" to "character for truthfulness". The 1993 amendment, effective December 1, 1993, substituted "the witness's" for "his" in Paragraph B and Subparagraph B(1), and substituted "the accused's or the witness's" for "his" near the end of the rule. Compiler's notes. - This rule is similar to Rule 608 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
For rules regarding the admissibility of character evidence and methods of proving it, see Rules 11-404 and 11-405 NMRA. Many of the following cases were decided pursuant to 20-2-4, 1953 Comp. (repealed by Laws 1973, ch. 223, § 2 ), which was similar to this rule. I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION. Trial court is vested with broad discretion in allowing cross-examination to test the credibility of a witness. State v. Biswell, 1971-NMCA-111, 83 N.M. 65, 488 P.2d 115, cert. denied, 83 N.M. 57, 488 P.2d 107. Nothing in this rule requires the prosecutor to announce its intention to use evidence so that the trial court may make a prior determination of whether the use of the evidence would violate any self-incrimination rights. State v. Clark, 1986-NMCA-095, 105 N.M. 10, 727 P.2d 949. Evidence admissible for one purpose is not excluded because inadmissible for another purpose. State v. Wyman, 1981-NMCA-087, 96 N.M. 558, 632 P.2d 1196. Evidence offered for other purposes such as "intent" does not fall within the prohibitions of this rule. However, the determination must be made whether the danger of undue prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence in view of the availability of other means of proof. State v. Marquez, 1974-NMCA-129, 87 N.M. 57, 529 P.2d 283, cert. denied, 87 N.M. 47, 529 P.2d 273. No question of relevancy when character an element of defense. - Where character is an element of the crime, claim or defense, there is no question as to relevancy; character evidence of this type is not covered by Rule 11-404 NMRA and is admissible under Rule 11-402 NMRA, which relates to the admission of relevant evidence. Such character evidence may be proved by evidence of reputation, opinion evidence or by specific instances of conduct. State v. Bazan, 1977-NMCA-011, 90 N.M. 209, 561 P.2d 482, cert. denied, 90 N.M. 254, 561 P.2d 1347. Victim's character evidence properly excluded when proof deficient. - Where defendant failed to pose any questions to any witness concerning any character trait of the victim and merely claimed that a certain witness could testify concerning his reputation for aggressiveness and recklessness, without revealing the substance of the evidence either as to such character traits or his reputation in connection with those traits, the offer of proof as to reputation or opinion evidence was deficient, and there was no error in exclusion of this evidence. State v. Bazan, 1977-NMCA-011, 90 N.M. 209, 561 P.2d 482, cert. denied, 90 N.M. 254, 561 P.2d 1347. When rule governs admissibility of motive evidence. - If motive evidence is no more than evidence of character and conduct attacking the credibility of a witness, its admissibility would be governed by this rule. State v. Lovato, 1978-NMCA-030, 91 N.M. 712, 580 P.2d 138, cert. denied, 91 N.M. 751, 580 P.2d 972. Cannot frame questions to infer false denials of guilt. - Question concerning a witness's conduct or bad moral character may not be so framed and repeated as to plant in the minds of the jury a distrust of the witness through inferences that he had falsely denied his guilt relating to collateral matters. State v. Hargrove, 1970-NMCA-006, 81 N.M. 145, 464 P.2d 564. Prosecutor cannot multiply negative-response misconduct questions unfairly. - While denials of bad moral character or misconduct are binding upon the cross-examiner and extraneous evidence is inadmissible to contradict such denials, the jury is not bound to accept the word of the witness. Hence, the prosecutor may not in fairness multiply the questions or so frame them as to amount to a charge of misconduct rather than an interrogation. State v. Hargrove, 1970-NMCA-006, 81 N.M. 145, 464 P.2d 564. Prosecutor cannot unduly prejudice accused with suggestions of bad character. - All reasonable care and the utmost good faith must be exercised by the prosecutor, when questioning an accused, to the end that an accused is not unduly prejudiced by suggestions tending to prove his bad character. State v. Hargrove, 1970-NMCA-006, 81 N.M. 145, 464 P.2d 564. It was an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court to permit the cross-examination of a witness concerning witness's bad moral character or misconduct to be conducted to the extent and in the manner disclosed by the record with the result that a fair trial was denied defendant. State v. Hargrove, 1970-NMCA-006, 81 N.M. 145, 464 P.2d 564. Vices at time of trial immaterial. - Since the tendered testimony did not purport to cover appellee's drinking habits, particularly of whiskey, at the time of the assault, the attempted impeachment was on a collateral issue. What his drinking habits were at the time of trial was immaterial. Mead v. O'Connor, 1959-NMSC-077, 66 N.M. 170, 344 P.2d 478. Absent any claim of self-defense victim's asserted character traits were not essential elements of the defense in a prosecution for assault with intent to commit a violent felony and were not provable by specific acts of conduct, but were only of one circumstantial type provable by reputation or opinion evidence. State v. Bazan, 1977-NMCA-011, 90 N.M. 209, 561 P.2d 482, cert. denied, 90 N.M. 254, 561 P.2d 1347. Cautionary instruction on informer's credibility unnecessary when testimony corroborated. - Refusal of defendant's requested cautionary instruction on the credibility of informer is not error when informer's testimony is adequately corroborated. State v. Tapia, 1970-NMCA-037, 81 N.M. 365, 467 P.2d 31. Impeachment entitles court to ignore uncontradicted evidence. - A court may not disregard uncontradicted evidence on a material issue and find to the contrary thereof, but certain circumstances may be considered as relieving a characterization of it as arbitrary. These are: (1) that the witness is impeached by direct evidence of his lack of veracity or of his bad moral character, or by some other legal method of impeachment; (2) that the testimony is equivocal or contains inherent improbabilities; (3) that there are suspicious circumstances surrounding the transactions testified to; and (4) that legitimate inferences may be drawn from the facts and circumstances of the case that contradict or cast reasonable doubt upon the truth or accuracy of the oral testimony. Bank of N.M. v. Rice, 1967-NMSC-109, 78 N.M. 170, 429 P.2d 368; Galvan v. Miller, 1968-NMSC-139, 79 N.M. 540, 445 P.2d 961; Gallegos v. Wilkerson, 1968-NMSC-156, 79 N.M. 549, 445 P.2d 970. Appellate issue is abuse of discretion. - Whether evidence is admissible for purposes of cross-examination under this rule, or whether its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value, is a discretionary ruling; the appellate issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v. Cervantes, 1979-NMCA-029, 92 N.M. 643, 593 P.2d 478, cert. denied, 92 N.M. 621, 593 P.2d 62. II. OPINION AND REPUTATION EVIDENCE. Admission of testimony as to child's truthfulness was not plain error. - Where defendant was charged with criminal sexual penetration of a child under thirteen; at defendant's trial, witnesses were allowed to testify as to the truthfulness of the child; and defendant cross-examined the witnesses and advanced the theory that the child's testimony was not credible, the error in admitting the testimony that the child was truthful was not plain error. State v. Dylan J., 2009-NMCA-027, 145 N.M. 719, 204 P.3d 44. This rule allows attack upon credibility of a witness only by reference to evidence of truthfulness or untruthfulness and is inapplicable, without the proper foundation, where the character of the defendant for truthfulness had not been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise. State v. Ross, 1975-NMCA-056, 88 N.M. 1, 536 P.2d 265. Pursuant to Paragraph A, the credibility of a witness may be attacked by evidence in the form of an opinion or as to reputation, but only as it relates to the witness's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness and only after a proper foundation is laid. Construction Contracting & Mgt. v. McConnell, 1991-NMSC-066, 112 N.M. 371, 815 P.2d 1161. Credibility of witness may be impeached by general evidence of bad moral character. Mead v. O'Conner, 1959-NMSC-077, 66 N.M. 170, 344 P.2d 478. But cannot use extrinsic evidence to attack credibility. - Although this rule allows evidence of specific instances of conduct to attack a witness's credibility, such evidence may not be extrinsic. State v. Ross, 1975-NMCA-056, 88 N.M. 1, 536 P.2d 265. State may rebut sweeping denial of any wrongdoing. - Where witness goes beyond a mere denial of crime of which he is charged and makes sweeping claim that he has never been in trouble of any kind previously, the state may introduce rebuttal evidence not otherwise available to it to attack the credibility of the witness. State v. Moultrie, 1954-NMSC-056, 58 N.M. 486, 272 P.2d 686. Evidence of acting consistently with character proved only by reputation. - Where character evidence is used to suggest that a person acted consistently with his character, the evidence is circumstantial and problems of relevancy exist; this evidence may be proved only by evidence of reputation or opinion evidence, and the offering party may not prove character evidence of this type by specific instances of conduct. State v. Bazan, 1977-NMCA-011, 90 N.M. 209, 561 P.2d 482, cert. denied, 90 N.M. 254, 561 P.2d 1347. Witness may be impeached by general reputation evidence. - Section 20-2-4, 1953 Comp. (now repealed) permits impeachment of a witness by general evidence that his general reputation for truth and veracity or his moral character is bad. State v. Anderson, 1918-NMSC-051, 24 N.M. 360, 174 P. 215. Bad reputation could impeach person's dying declarations. - A person whose dying declarations are admitted in evidence is subject to impeachment in the same manner as other witnesses under this rule; he may be impeached by evidence that he bore a bad reputation for morality. State v. Gallegos, 1923-NMSC-027, 28 N.M. 403, 213 P. 1030. Court may allow expert witnesses to impeach credibility of other witnesses. State v. Tafoya, 1980-NMSC-099, 94 N.M. 762, 617 P.2d 151. Laying of foundation for evidence. - Although both opinion and reputation testimony are admissible under this rule, they require different factual foundations. Construction Contracting & Mgt. v. McConnell, 1991-NMSC-066, 112 N.M. 371, 815 P.2d 1161. Trial court erred in admitting an amalgam of opinion and reputation testimony without a proper foundation where, although a foundation was laid for a witness to testify as to his opinion of defendant's veracity (based upon his own repeated dealings with him and his impressions from other people), no foundation was laid for any reputation testimony. Construction Contracting & Mgt. v. McConnell, 1991-NMSC-066, 112 N.M. 371, 815 P.2d 1161. Juvenile probation officer's rebuttal testimony is prejudicial. - The admission of a juvenile probation officer's rebuttal testimony regarding the officer's opinion of the defendant's reputation for truthfulness is impermissibly prejudicial. State v. Guess, 1982-NMCA-114, 98 N.M. 438, 649 P.2d 506. Formerly permissible to show bad moral character. - It was proper, for the purpose of impeachment under former Section 20-2-4, 1953 Comp. (similar to this rule), to show bad moral character by eliciting from the witness's testimony as to specific acts of misconduct. State v. Sharpe, 1970-NMCA-078, 81 N.M. 637, 471 P.2d 671. Formerly error to limit impeaching testimony to truthfulness reputation. - It was error for the court to limit impeaching testimony to the reputation of a witness for truth and veracity. State v. Perkins, 1915-NMSC-094, 21 N.M. 135, 153 P. 258. Improper cross-examination by defendant. - In the cross-examination of a detective, defendant could not ask him whether he had written in his notes that witnesses he interviewed appeared to be exaggerating. State v. La Madrid, 1997-NMCA-057, 123 N.M. 463, 943 P.2d 110. III. SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF CONDUCT. A. IN GENERAL. Conduct not excluded because adjudication based on conduct excluded. - Specific conduct, admissible on cross-examination to attack credibility, is not to be excluded because an adjudication based on that conduct is excluded. State v. Wyman, 1981-NMCA-087, 96 N.M. 558, 632 P.2d 1196. But questioning concerning prior juvenile adjudications permitted. - Although Rule 11-609 NMRA generally excludes evidence of juvenile adjudications from the permitted questioning concerning prior convictions, this exclusion does not prohibit questioning permitted by Paragraph B of this rule. State v. Wyman, 1981-NMCA-087, 96 N.M. 558, 632 P.2d 1196. Limited waiver of privilege against self- incrimination. - Under the last paragraph of this rule waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination is limited. State v. Archunde, 1978-NMCA-050, 91 N.M. 682, 579 P.2d 808. Privilege against self-incrimination regarding credibility matters. - Paragraph B provides that a witness, including the accused, may invoke the privilege against self-incrimination when questioned solely on matters of credibility. State v. Delgado, 1991-NMCA-064, 112 N.M. 335, 815 P.2d 631. Requirement that evidence be probative of truthfulness is safeguard. - Particular instances of conduct, though not the subject of criminal conviction, may be inquired into on cross-examination of the principle witness himself. Effective cross-examination demands that some allowance be made for going into matters of this kind, but the possibilities of abuse are substantial. Consequently, safeguards are erected in the form of specific requirements that the instances inquired into be probative of truthfulness or its opposite and not remote in time. State v. Marquez, 1974-NMCA-129, 87 N.M. 57, 529 P.2d 283, cert. denied, 87 N.M. 47, 529 P.2d 273. Accusations of theft on part of witness. - In ruling that defense counsel could not inquire about accusations of theft on the part of the witness to attack the witness's credibility, the remoteness in time of the alleged conduct is one of the factors the trial court should consider in deciding whether or not to permit inquiry into the conduct. State v. Lente, 2005-NMCA-111, 138 N.M. 312, 119 P.3d 737, cert. denied, 2005-NMCERT-008. Within court's discretion to permit or limit cross-examination misconduct questioning. - In view of the fact that the questions related to specific acts of misconduct, the court was well within its exercise of sound discretion in permitting or limiting the extent of cross-examination of prosecutrix in indecent exposure case on grounds it was attack on credibility. State v. McKinzie, 1963-NMSC-060, 72 N.M. 23, 380 P.2d 177. The court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit evidence of a witness' prior convictions, where the convictions were 25 and 29 years old and were not relevant to behavior at the time of the defendant's crime. State v. Litteral, 1990-NMSC-059, 110 N.M. 138, 793 P.2d 268, appeal dismissed, 203 F.3d 835 (10th Cir. 2000). Admissibility is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. - Where defendant was charged with first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder, and where, at trial, the district court excluded evidence that the officer that conducted the crime scene investigation was accused of stealing a work computer and had been dismissed from the Clovis Police Department, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it did not allow defendant to cross-examine the officer regarding the specific prior dishonest act, because the officer's credibility was not probative of any important issue in the case, his testimony provided very little, if any, incriminating evidence against defendant, and under Rule 11-608 NMRA, its admissibility is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Torres, 2018-NMSC-013. Extent of misconduct evidence controllable through judicial discretion. - Although proof of a witness's misconduct is permissible for the purpose of attacking credibility, the extent of such showing is controllable through the exercise of judicial discretion. State v. Hargrove, 1970-NMCA-006, 81 N.M. 145, 464 P.2d 564. The exercise of judicial discretion concerning the admissibility of proof of witness's misconduct is not reviewable. State v. Hargrove, 1970-NMCA-006, 81 N.M. 145, 464 P.2d 564. Impeachment by insinuations based on unsubstantiated allegations of prior misconduct irrelevant and prejudicial. - The impeachment of a witness by insinuations based on unsubstantiated allegations of prior misconduct provides the trier of fact with no information relevant to the witness' credibility and carries a great potential for prejudice. State v. Robinson, 1983-NMSC-040, 99 N.M. 674, 662 P.2d 1341, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 851, 104 S. Ct. 161, 78 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1983). The trial court did not err in prohibiting testimony on the allegations of forgery against a state's witness where no charges had been brought against the witness for the alleged forgeries. State v. Lucero, 1999-NMCA-102, 127 N.M. 672, 986 P.2d 468, cert. denied, 128 N.M. 149, 990 P.2d 823 (1999). Prior to enactment of rules of evidence, court of appeals held that the bad moral character of a witness, including the accused, when a witness in his own behalf, could be shown for the purpose of attacking the credibility through securing from the witness on cross-examination admissions of specific acts of misconduct. State v. Sluder, 1971-NMCA-095, 82 N.M. 755, 487 P.2d 183. Credibility may be impeached by extracting admissions of specific misconduct. - The credibility of a witness may be impeached by extracting from him on cross-examination admission of specific acts of misconduct or wrongdoing if admissions can be secured in such manner. State v. Moultrie, 1954-NMSC-056, 58 N.M. 486, 272 P.2d 686. This rule allows impeachment by questioning the witness concerning evidence of instances of specific conduct. State v. Griego, 2004-NMCA-107, 136 N.M. 272, 96 P.3d 1192. Impeachment regarding specific acts of misconduct by cross-examination. - A witness may not be impeached regarding specific acts of misconduct by the testimony of other witnesses, but only by cross-examination. State v. McKinzie, 1963-NMSC-060, 72 N.M. 23, 380 P.2d 177. Defendant may be questioned as to specific acts of misconduct, on cross-examination, even if defendant has not opened up the matter. State v. Madrid, 1972-NMSC-016, 83 N.M. 603, 495 P.2d 383. Bad moral character of a witness, including accused when witness in his own behalf, may be shown for the purpose of attacking credibility through securing from the witness on cross-examination admissions of specific acts of misconduct. State v. Hargrove, 1970-NMCA-006, 81 N.M. 145, 464 P.2d 564. Bad moral character of witness may be shown by eliciting from the witness specific acts of misconduct. In such case, the answer of the witness is conclusive of the matter under inquiry. Mead v. O'Connor, 1959-NMSC-077, 66 N.M. 170, 344 P.2d 478. Facts tending to disgrace witness are relevant. - Tendency is to regard all facts as relevant which will enable the jurors to decide to what extent the testimony of the witness can be relied on, which includes specific facts, not too remote in time, that may tend to disgrace him, and counsel will be bound by his answers. Borrego v. Territory, 1896-NMSC-011, 8 N.M. 446, 46 P. 349. Where prosecutor knew that nondefendant witnesses would invoke their constitutional privilege when questioned as to their misconduct, and where the trial court in its discretion decided that the legitimate effect of such questioning - the attack on credibility - was not outweighed by prejudice to the defendant, the prosecutor's questioning was not improper and defendant was not denied due process. State v. McFerran, 1969-NMCA-084, 80 N.M. 622, 459 P.2d 148, cert. denied, 80 N.M. 731, 460 P.2d 261. Entrapment defense does not require evidence of accuser's past behavior. - While, once defendant raised the defense of entrapment, he automatically placed his own past behavior at issue (in order for the state to show preexisting disposition to commit the offense), it does not follow that once this happens the undercover agent's prior behavior, except for activities which led up to the entrapment, would likewise become relevant. State v. Mordecai, 1971-NMCA-139, 83 N.M. 208, 490 P.2d 466. B. EXAMPLES. Employment records showing dishonesty. - Where the defendant was a witness in the defendant's case, it was permissible for the prosecution to attack the defendant's credibility by questioning the defendant regarding disciplinary action taken by the defendant's employer against the defendant for cash register shortages, but the prosecution was not permitted to introduce any extrinsic evidence, such as documents showing that the defendant was disciplined for a cash shortage, to prove that the alleged acts had occurred. State v. Casillas, 2009-NMCA-034, 145 N.M. 783, 205 P.3d 830. Improper questions as to defendant's character for truthfulness. - Questions involving hiring a person to kill or threaten people are not questions concerning defendant's character for truthfulness and are not proper questions under this rule. State v. Miller, 1979-NMCA-014, 92 N.M. 520, 590 P.2d 1175. Conduct probative of the witness's character for truthfulness admissible. - In defendant's trial for shoplifting and conspiracy to commit shoplifting, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to exclude reference to a case in which defendant pleaded guilty to larceny and criminal damage to property and was granted a conditional discharge, because the conduct relating to defendant's conditional discharge was probative of defendant's character for truthfulness. State v. Gallegos, 2016-NMCA-076, cert. denied. Cross-examination regarding prior act of misrepresentation in a police report erroneously denied. - Where defendant was charged with trafficking oxycodone by distribution, and where, at trial, defendant sought to cross-examine the undercover officer regarding a purported prior act of misrepresentation in a police report in another case, the district court abused its discretion in preventing defendant from questioning the undercover officer about the police report, because Rule 11-608(B)(1) NMRA permits cross-examination of a witness about a specific incident or act that is probative of his or her character for truthfulness, and testimony about a purported recent admission under oath by the undercover officer of an untruthful or inaccurate police report he authored is probative of his character for truthfulness, and the undercover officer's credibility and character for truthfulness was crucial to the case. State v. Patterson, 2017-NMCA-045. Proper questions involving dishonesty. - Questions concerning the buying or selling of stolen property, an arrangement to sell illegal drugs, and failing to account for the proceeds of the sale of a diamond ring involve dishonesty and are proper questions under this rule. State v. Miller, 1979-NMCA-014, 92 N.M. 520, 590 P.2d 1175. Prosecutor's questioning of defendant on cross-examination regarding his use of an altered driver's license to carry out forgeries for which he had been convicted was proper to show a specific instance of conduct which was probative of his truthfulness. State v. Clark, 1986-NMCA-095, 105 N.M. 10, 727 P.2d 949. Cross-examination concerning embezzlement, burglary, theft and larceny proper. - Questions concerning embezzlement, burglary, auto theft and larceny involve dishonesty, are probative as to truthfulness and are proper under cross-examination under this rule. State v. Wyman, 1981-NMCA-087, 96 N.M. 558, 632 P.2d 1196. Cross-examination of defendant's wife. - In a prosecution for embezzlement, the trial court did not err in allowing the prosecutor to suggest that defendant's wife had been fired from a job because she took money. State v. Brooks, 1993-NMCA-078, 116 N.M. 309, 862 P.2d 57, rev'd on other grounds, 1994-NMSC-062, 117 N.M. 751, 877 P.2d 557. Subsequent brawling not probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness. - In a negligence suit against a restaurant owner for injuries sustained in a barroom brawl, specific subsequent instances involving plaintiff's drunken and abusive conduct, resisting arrest, a municipal court battery conviction and an instance where plaintiff shot a third person with a pistol were held not probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, and hence, the trial court did not err in excluding such evidence on the question of plaintiff's truthfulness or untruthfulness. De La O v. Bimbo's Restaurant, Inc., 1976-NMCA-115, 89 N.M. 800, 558 P.2d 69, cert. denied, 90 N.M. 7, 558 P.2d 619. Prior shooting incident not admissible under this rule. - A carnival shooting incident two days before the crimes in question bore upon the intent of the defendant when he shot the decedent and his friend showing the state of mind of the defendant, and his characteristic conduct in the use of a gun, and though not admissible under this rule, because not probative of credibility or lack thereof was properly admitted under Rule 11-404 NMRA. State v. Marquez, 1974-NMCA-129, 87 N.M. 57, 529 P.2d 283, cert. denied, 87 N.M. 47, 529 P.2d 273. Defendant offering to testify is subject to cross-examination the same as any other witness; and she may be asked if she has not for some time sustained illicit relations with one to whom she was not married. Territory v. de Gutman, 1895-NMSC-015, 8 N.M. 92, 42 P. 68. Evidence that victim gave truthful answers during polygraph examination is admissible under this rule when the defendant attacks the credibility of the victim by questioning his ability to perceive. State v. Gallegos, 1978-NMCA-114, 92 N.M. 370, 588 P.2d 1045, cert. denied, 92 N.M. 353, 588 P.2d 554. When truthfulness of answers in polygraph exam not extrinsic evidence. - Testimony that a witness was truthful during a polygraph examination, relevant to issues in a trial for aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, is not extrinsic evidence of the conduct of the witness. State v. Gallegos, 1978-NMCA-114, 92 N.M. 370, 588 P.2d 1045, cert. denied, 92 N.M. 353, 588 P.2d 554. In assault prosecution defense may ask wife of illicit affair. - In a prosecution of a husband for assault with intent to murder his wife, defendant's counsel may ask the wife on cross-examination if she was not at the time pregnant by a man other than her husband. Territory v. Garcia, 1910-NMSC-045, 15 N.M. 538, 110 P. 838. Defendant has right to cross-examine rape prosecutrix on prior misconduct. - While the extent to which a witness may be cross-examined rests largely in the discretion of the court, it is reversible error to refuse defendant the right to cross-examine the prosecutrix in a rape case as to prior acts of misconduct for the purpose of impeaching her. State v. Cruz, 1930-NMSC-011, 34 N.M. 507, 285 P. 500. Extrinsic evidence of prior accusations of victim inadmissible. - In a prosecution for sexual misconduct, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's request to call the victim's stepfather and the defendant's wife to testify that the victim had previously falsely accused the stepfather of sexual misconduct. Paragraph B prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence of specific instances of the conduct of a witness for the purpose of attacking the witness' credibility. State v. Scott, 1991-NMCA-081, 113 N.M. 525, 828 P.2d 958, cert. quashed, 113 N.M. 524, 828 P.2d 957 (1992). For testimony offered for fabrication defense in prosecution for kidnapping, criminal sexual prosecution, and aggravated assault, see Manlove v. Tansy, 981 F.2d 473 (10th Cir. 1992). Introduction of extrinsic evidence of crimes not charged violated Paragraph B. State v. Vigil, 1985-NMCA-103, 103 N.M. 583, 711 P.2d 28 (prosecution for criminal sexual contact of a minor). Professor's testimony on probable cause question deemed extrinsic. - Tendered testimony of a law professor that a police officer had probable cause to obtain a search warrant but did not, offered for the purpose of attacking the credibility of the officer, is extrinsic evidence and is not admissible under this rule. State v. Barela, 1978-NMCA-034, 91 N.M. 634, 578 P.2d 335, cert. denied, 91 N.M. 610, 577 P.2d 1256. Testimony of informant's former attorney inadmissible. - The testimony of an informant's former attorney offered for the purpose of impeaching the informant's reputation for truthfulness violates the attorney-client privilege and is inadmissible under the Rules of Evidence. State v. Hinojos, 1980-NMCA-079, 95 N.M. 659, 625 P.2d 588. Showing of probative value necessary. - When the question is under Paragraph B, a prosecutor, who seeks to have a defendant make an admission concerning a felony when there has been no conviction, hazards a reversal absent a showing of probative value on the question of the defendant's credibility because of the prejudicial nature of the question. State v. Miller, 1979-NMCA-014, 92 N.M. 520, 590 P.2d 1175. No error in refusing expert testimony where probative value slight. - The trial court does not err in refusing to admit the testimony of an expert as to the credibility of the victims of a sexual offense where the probative value of the testimony was slight, based upon the lack of personal observation by the expert. State v. Tafoya, 1980-NMSC-099, 94 N.M. 762, 617 P.2d 151. Being arrested, charged, or being suspect is not prior act of misconduct to be inquired into on cross-examination. State v. Herrera, 1985-NMSC-005, 102 N.M. 254, 694 P.2d 510, cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1103, 105 S. Ct. 2332, 85 L. Ed. 2d 848 (1985). Impeachment inquiry based on "rap sheets" improper. - Impeachment inquiry charges of misconduct was improper because it was based only upon the "rap sheets" and therefore was not in good faith. State v. Herrera, 1985-NMSC-005, 102 N.M. 254, 694 P.2d 510, cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1103, 105 S. Ct. 2332, 85 L. Ed. 2d 848 (1985). Officer's prior bad acts. - Defendants were not permitted to impeach a police officer with evidence that he had been charged with criminal sexual penetration committed under color of authority as a police officer and, as a result, had been suspended from duty. Although the defendants had wanted to show the officer was untruthful and that he misused his position to plant the gun in the patrol car, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in restricting cross-examination, and the officer's pending charge was not admissible as a prior bad act. State v. Padilla, 1994-NMCA-067, 118 N.M. 189, 879 P.2d 1208. Evidence of officer's alleged prior untruthfulness. - Where police officer denied saying a prior complaint of excessive use of force was valid, party would have had to call another witness to prove the untruthfulness, but Paragraph B prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence to prove specific instances of conduct, and the trial court did not commit error in refusing to admit this evidence. Baum v. Orosco, 1987-NMCA-102, 106 N.M. 265, 742 P.2d 1. Cross-examination regarding prior complaints properly refused. - There was no abuse of discretion in refusing to allow the defense to cross-examine the complainant regarding prior complaints in order to impeach her credibility where the defendant offered no proof that the accusations were false, since the probative value of the fact that the victim made prior complaints is nonexistent, while its prejudicial effect is great. State v. Johnson, 1984-NMCA-094, 102 N.M. 110, 692 P.2d 35. Evidence of alibi witness' motive to testify falsely admissible. - Evidence that alibi witness had previously committed criminal sexual penetration is admissible to show motive of the alibi witness to testify falsely, where the defendant is charged with the same offense. State v. Worley, 1984-NMSC-013, 100 N.M. 720, 676 P.2d 247. Whether state's witness had previously lied to police in connection with being a paid informant or committed crimes is certainly within the ambit of this rule. State v. Griego, 2004-NMCA-107, 136 N.M. 272, 96 P.3d 1192. Cross-examination of state's witness on witness' prior drug addiction held inadmissible. State v. Blea, 1984-NMSC-055, 101 N.M. 323, 681 P.2d 1100. Residence with drug rehabilitation organization shows nothing concerning witness's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness; questions on cross-examination concerning such residence were not admissible. State v. Mills, 1980-NMCA-005, 94 N.M. 17, 606 P.2d 1111, cert. denied, 94 N.M. 628, 614 P.2d 545. Cross-examination on violation of regulation not probative of truthfulness. - In a prosecution for false imprisonment of a school bus driver, the trial court had the discretion to deny cross-examination of the victim concerning whether she violated a school regulation which prohibited drivers from giving rides to individuals who are not enrolled school children, since such inquiry was not probative of the victim's truthfulness or untruthfulness. State v. Muise, 1985-NMCA-090, 103 N.M. 382, 707 P.2d 1192, overruled on other grounds, State v. Laguna, 1999-NMCA-152, 128 N.M. 345, 992 P.2d 896. Violation of city ordinance can show specific act of wrongdoing. - Where the court ruled that the violation of a city ordinance was admissible to show a specific act of wrongdoing by the defendant and the court specified the kind of ordinance conviction about which it would permit defendant to be cross-examined, it cannot be said that the court permitted questions that were not limited in extent, range and form. State v. Biswell, 1971-NMCA-111, 83 N.M. 65, 488 P.2d 115, cert. denied, 83 N.M. 57, 488 P.2d 107. Termination of employment. - Although the rule would not preclude inquiry into the circumstances of the witness's termination in order to show the witness's character for untruthfulness; its admissibility was left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Segura v. K-Mart Corp., 2003-NMCA-013, 133 N.M. 192, 62 P.3d 283. Law reviews. - For article, "Impeachment of a Witness's Character in New Mexico," see 2 Nat. Resources J. 575 (1962). For article, "Rape Law: The Need for Reform," see 5 N.M.L. Rev. 279 (1975). For survey, "Evidence: Prior Crimes and Prior Bad Acts Evidence," see 6 N.M.L. Rev. 405 (1976). For article, "Survey of New Mexico Law, 1979-80: Evidence," see 11 N.M.L. Rev. 159 (1981). For article, "Evidence," see 12 N.M.L. Rev. 379 (1982). For article, "Evidence I," see 13 N.M.L. Rev. 407 (1983). Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. - 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 371 et seq.; 81 Am. Jur. 2d Witnesses §§ 895, 896, 901 to 903. Admissibility and effect of evidence or comment on party's military service or lack thereof, 9 A.L.R.2d 606. Impeachment of witness by evidence or inquiry as to arrest, accusation or prosecution, 20 A.L.R.2d 1421. Prejudicial effect of admission of evidence as to communist or other subversive affiliation or association of accused, 30 A.L.R.2d 589. Admissibility of evidence as to other's character or reputation for turbulence on question of self-defense by one charged with assault or homicide, 1 A.L.R.3d 571. Impeachment of witness with respect to intoxication, 8 A.L.R.3d 749. Necessity and admissibility of expert testimony as to credibility of witness, 20 A.L.R.3d 684. Admissibility, in disputed paternity proceedings, of evidence to rebut mother's claim of prior chastity, 59 A.L.R.3d 659. Cross-examination of character witness for accused with reference to particular acts or crimes - modern state rules, 13 A.L.R.4th 796. Propriety of using otherwise inadmissible statement, taken in violation of Miranda rule, to impeach criminal defendant's credibility - state cases, 14 A.L.R.4th 676. Impeachment of defense witness in criminal case by showing witness' prior silence or failure or refusal to testify, 20 A.L.R.4th 245. Right to impeach witness in criminal case by inquiry or evidence as to witness' criminal activity not having resulted in arrest or charge - modern state cases, 24 A.L.R.4th 333. Right to impeach witness in criminal case by inquiry or evidence as to witness' criminal activity for which witness was arrested or charged, but not convicted - modern state cases, 28 A.L.R.4th 505. Permissibility of impeaching credibility of witness by showing verdict of guilty without judgment or sentence thereon, 28 A.L.R.4th 647. Impeachment of defendant in criminal case by showing defendant's prearrest silence -state cases, 35 A.L.R.4th 731. Admissibility of impeached witness' prior consistent statement - modern state criminal cases, 58 A.L.R.4th 1014. Use of plea bargain or grant of immunity as improper vouching for credibility of witness -state cases, 58 A.L.R.4th 1229. Admissibility of impeached witness' prior consistent statement - modern state civil cases, 59 A.L.R.4th 1000. Impeachment or cross-examination of prosecuting witness in sexual offense trial by showing that prosecuting witness threatened to make similar charges against other persons, 71 A.L.R.4th 448. Impeachment or cross-examination of prosecuting witness in sexual offense trial by showing that similar charges were made against other persons, 71 A.L.R.4th 469. Propriety of questioning expert witness regarding specific incidents or allegations of expert's unprofessional conduct or professional negligence, 11 A.L.R.5th 1. Propriety of using prior conviction for drug dealing to impeach witness in criminal trial, 37 A.L.R.5th 319. Attacking or supporting credibility of witness by evidence in form of opinion or reputation, under Rule 608(a) of Federal Rules of Evidence, 52 A.L.R. Fed. 440. Propriety, in federal court action, of attack on witness' credibility by rebuttal evidence pertaining to cross-examination testimony on collateral matters, 60 A.L.R. Fed. 8 Propriety and prejudicial effect of comments by counsel vouching for credibility of witnesses - federal cases, 78 A.L.R. Fed. 23. Impeachment of federal trial witness with respect to intoxication, 106 A.L.R. Fed. 371. 98 C.J.S. Witnesses §§ 491 to 496, 502 to 513.