N.M. R. Evid. 11-302
N.M. R. Evid. 11-302
Committee commentary. - There is no federal equivalent to this rule, but the committee amended the language of the rule in 2012 to be consistent with the restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence, effective December 1, 2011, to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on admissibility.
[Adopted by Supreme Court Order No. 12-8300-015, effective for all cases pending or filed on or after June 16, 2012.]
ANNOTATIONS The 2012 amendment, approved by Supreme Court Order No. 12-8300-015, effective for all cases pending or filed on or after June 16, 2012, rewrote the rule to make stylistic changes. The 1993 amendment, effective December 1, 1993, substituted "court" for "judge" throughout the rule.
For presumption of knowledge or belief that property has been stolen, see Section 30-16-11 NMSA 1978. For uniform jury instruction on statutory presumptions in criminal cases, see UJI 14-5061 NMRA. A statutory presumption does not change the burden of proof. - An evidentiary presumption does not change the state's burden to establish the essential elements of the crime without reference to the presumption itself. When the legislature has directed that one or more basic facts may be considered prima facie evidence of a presumed fact, the trial court must test the sufficiency of the evidence of the presumed fact before the jury may be instructed that the presumed fact may be inferred from the basic fact or facts. State v. Trossman, 2009-NMSC-034, 146 N.M. 462, 212 P.3d 350, overruling In re Shaneace L., 2001-NMCA-005, 130 N.M. 89, 18 P.3d 330. Statutory presumption of child abuse by endangerment. - Where the defendant was convicted of negligently permitting child abuse by endangerment under Section 30-6-1 NMSA 1978 after the defendant was arrested in a house where chemicals and equipment involved with methamphetamine production were found, the trial court had to be satisfied that sufficient evidence had been presented to prove endangerment before the trial court could give an instruction in accordance with UJI 14-5061 NMRA based on the presumption of endangerment created by Section 30-6-1 NMSA 1978. State v. Trossman, 2009-NMSC-034, 146 N.M. 462, 212 P.3d 350, overruling In re Shaneace L., 2001-NMCA-005, 130 N.M. 89, 18 P.3d 330. Instruction based on the statutory presumption of child abuse by endangerment. - Where the defendant was convicted of negligently permitting child abuse by endangerment after the defendant was arrested in a house where chemicals and equipment involved with methamphetamine production were found and where the trial court, in addition to an instruction on the essential elements of child abuse by endangerment, instructed the jury, based on the presumption created by Section 30-6-1 NMSA 1978, that "Evidence that demonstrates that a child has been knowingly, intentionally or negligently allowed to enter or remain in a motor vehicle, building or any other premises that contains chemicals and equipment used or intended for use in the manufacture of a controlled substance may be deemed evidence of abuse of the child", the instruction was erroneous because a reasonable juror could have concluded that he or she was not required to find the essential element of endangerment beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Trossman, 2009-NMSC-034, 146 N.M. 462, 212 P.3d 350, overruling In re Shaneace L., 2001-NMCA-005, 130 N.M. 89, 18 P.3d 330. Existence or nonexistence of general criminal intent not presumed. - There was clearly no merit in defendant's argument that (1) since voluntary intoxication is not a defense to existence of a general criminal intent, said intent is always conclusively presumed from the doing of the prohibited act, (2) conclusive presumptions are unconstitutional and therefore, (3) refusal of requested instructions on the effect of intoxication on ability to form a general criminal intent denied defendant the right to put on a defense. Existence or nonexistence of general criminal intent is question of fact for the jury, and the general intent instruction so submitted the issue to the jury; no presumption was involved in the instruction given. State v. Kendall, 1977-NMCA-002, 90 N.M. 236, 561 P.2d 935, reversal of conviction on other grounds held improper, 1977-NMSC-015, 90 N.M. 191, 561 P.2d 464. Basic facts supporting guilt beyond reasonable doubt. - Where defendant entered a store, which had just opened for the day, with a blanket wrapped around him, went to the rack where expensive rugs were kept and, when asked if he needed help, turned around and started towards the door; where storekeeper waited until defendant got to the door and then asked defendant to give back rug which she had noticed missing, which rug defendant had under his blanket, hidden and folded up; and where defendant, who was the only one who had been near the rack when the rug disappeared, did not approach the cash register at any time, evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to find each of the inferred facts in Section 30-16-22 NMSA 1978 (creating presumption of shoplifting from concealment of merchandise) beyond a reasonable doubt, and furthermore showed willful concealment. State v. Matamoros, 1976-NMCA-028, 89 N.M. 125, 547 P.2d 1167. Rule incorporates constitutional requirement that presumptions not be conclusive in criminal cases even if unrebutted. State v. Matamoros, 1976-NMCA-028, 89 N.M. 125, 547 P.2d 1167. Paragraph C abolishes "true" presumptions in criminal cases and puts presumptions found in Section 30-16-11B NMSA 1978 (relating to knowledge or belief that property was stolen), into the category of permissible inference, so that statute must be read to say that requisite knowledge or belief that property has been stolen "may be," rather than "is," presumed to exist upon proof of the basic facts. State v. Jones, 1975-NMCA-078, 88 N.M. 110, 537 P.2d 1006, cert. denied, 88 N.M. 318, 540 P.2d 248. See also State v. Matamoros, 1976-NMCA-028, 89 N.M. 125, 547 P.2d 1167, regarding presumption of shoplifting from concealment of merchandise, created by 30-16-22 NMSA 1978. Defendant held to have waived error. - Where trial court instructed jury that ultimate fact "must" be presumed upon proof of basic facts, but instruction requiring that presumption was not objected to, such error was waived and did not constitute fundamental error. State v. Jones, 1975-NMCA-078, 88 N.M. 110, 537 P.2d 1006, cert. denied, 88 N.M. 318, 540 P.2d 248. Instructions embodying the language of Section 30-16-22 NMSA 1978 (creating presumption of shoplifting from concealment of merchandise), violated this rule, but since defendant objected only with a general claim that the instructions created an unconstitutional presumption and did not alert the trial court to the issue under the rule, error would not be considered further. State v. Matamoros, 1976-NMCA-028, 89 N.M. 125, 547 P.2d 1167. Where defendant failed to ask for an instruction pursuant to Paragraph C (that existence of a presumed fact which establishes guilt, negatives a defense or is an element of offense must, on all the evidence, be proved beyond a reasonable doubt), the error was not before appeals court for review. State v. Matamoros, 1976-NMCA-028, 89 N.M. 125, 547 P.2d 1167. Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. - 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 236 et seq.; 75B Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 1293 et seq. Statutory presumption of possession of weapon by occupants of place or vehicle where it was found, 87 A.L.R.3d 949. Burden of proof as to entrapment defense - state cases, 52 A.L.R.4th 775. Adverse presumption or inference based on failure to produce or examine codefendant or accomplice who is not on trial - modern criminal cases, 76 A.L.R.4th 812. Adverse presumption or inference based on party's failure to produce or examine that party's attorney - modern cases, 78 A.L.R.4th 571. Adverse presumption or inference based on party's failure to produce or examine spouse - modern cases, 79 A.L.R.4th 694. Adverse presumption or inference based on party's failure to produce or examine friend - modern cases, 79 A.L.R.4th 779. Adverse presumption or inference based on party's failure to produce or examine family member other than spouse - modern cases, 80 A.L.R.4th 337. Adverse presumption or inference based on party's failure to produce or examine witness with employment relationship to party - modern cases, 80 A.L.R.4th 405. Adverse presumption or inference based on state's failure to produce or examine informant in criminal prosecution - modern cases, 80 A.L.R.4th 547. Adverse presumption or inference based on state's failure to produce or examine law enforcement personnel - modern cases, 81 A.L.R.4th 872. Adverse presumption or inference based on party's failure to produce or examine transferor, transferee, broker, or other person allegedly involved in transaction at issue -modern cases, 81 A.L.R.4th 939. 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 695 et seq.; 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1325 et seq.