A motion filed pursuant to Subparagraph (1) or (2) of this paragraph shall be filed not more than one (1) year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this paragraph does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.
An order granting or denying relief from a final judgment under this rule may be appealed to the district court in the same manner as other appeals from final judgments of the metropolitan court are taken.
N.M. R. Civ. P. Metro. Ct. 3-704
Committee commentary. - In 2016, the New Mexico Supreme Court approved amendments to Rules 1-009, 1-017, 1-055, and 1-060 NMRA, and created a new civil complaint form for consumer debt claims, Form 4-226 NMRA, for use in the district courts.
Paragraph B of this rule was amended in 2020 to provide additional protections to consumers in consumer debt collection cases. See Rule 3-201 NMRA, Committee commentary. In addition, Rules 2-201, 2-401, 2-702, 2-703, 3-201, 3-401, and 3-702 NMRA, as well as Form 4-226 NMRA, were amended in 2020 to align the metropolitan and magistrate court rules for consumer debt claims with the district court rules.
Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Johnston, 2016-NMSC-013, ¶ 34, 369 P.3d 1046, provides that a judgment "is not voidable under Rule 1-060(B) [NMRA] due to a lack of prudential standing." (Emphasis added). Rule 1-060(B)(4) NMRA is equivalent to Rule 3-704(B)(3) NMRA in providing grounds for relief of a void judgment. The 2020 amendment to Rule 3-704 NMRA (adding Subparagraph (B)(5)) provides a ground for relief in consumer debt litigation separate from the relief from voidable judgments under Rule 3 - 704(B)(3) NMRA.
Rule 3-704(B)(5) NMRA now provides that noncompliance with the requirements of Rule 3-201(E)(2) NMRA or Rule 3-401(D) NMRA, or the failure to substantially comply with Form 4-226 NMRA, can provide a basis for granting relief from a judgment entered in a case controlled by Rule 3-201(E) NMRA. The addition of this language provides a ground for relief, but does not compel the metropolitan court to grant relief in every case in which the movant shows noncompliance with these consumer debt provisions. The movant must also demonstrate that it has a meritorious defense. See Rodriguez v. Conant, 1987-NMSC-040, ¶ 18, 105 N.M. 746, 737 P.2d 527. When the movant meets this requirement, the court may exercise discretion to determine whether intervening equities or other considerations outweigh the desire "that the ultimate result will address the true merits and substantial justice will be done." Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Guerra, 1978-NMSC-053, ¶¶ 15, 20, 21, 92 N.M. 47, 582 P.2d 819.
In contrast, a motion to void the judgment under Rule 3-704(B)(3) NMRA does not permit the trial court to exercise discretion to deny the motion, Classen v. Classen, 1995-NMCA-022, ¶¶ 10, 13, 119 N.M. 582, 893 P.2d 478, and does not require proof of a meritorious defense. Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 86-87 (1988).
[As amended by Supreme Court Order No. 20-8300-005, effective for all cases filed on or after December 31, 2020.]
ANNOTATIONS The 1997 amendment, effective January 1, 1997, substituted "judgment creditor" for "defendant" near the end of Subparagraph C(1)(b). The 1990 amendment, effective for cases filed in the metropolitan courts on or after July 1, 1990, in Subsection B substituted the present second sentence for the former second sentence, which read "The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1) and (2) not more than one (1) year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken.", and added the last paragraph; and added Paragraph C.