A copy of the order or decision of the agency appealed from, showing the date of the order or decision, shall be attached to the notice of appeal filed in the district court.
Any party desiring a copy of the transcript of the proceedings shall be responsible for paying the cost, if any, of preparing such copy. The agency shall give prompt notice to all parties of the filing of the record on appeal with the court.
A motion filed pursuant to this paragraph shall not stay further proceedings unless the court orders otherwise.
Upon the request of a party or on the court's own motion, the court may allow oral argument on the issue of certification. After receipt of the completed record, the district court shall notify the parties of its decision concerning certification as provided by Rule 12-608 NMRA.
N.M. R. Civ. P. Dist. Ct. 1-074
Committee commentary. -
(re related actions)
There may be instances when other actions arising out of the same facts and circumstances are brought simultaneously in district court by one of the parties to an appeal under this rule. Such actions could include complaints for declaratory judgment, petitions for writs of mandamus, civil rights actions, and other actions to enforce various statutes or other rights. This rule does not address the district court's options for consolidating or otherwise addressing such actions in a manner that promotes judicial economy and compliance with these rules and substantive law.
(re transcripts)
If a written transcription is made of an audio or video transcript, and all the parties agree to its accuracy, the written transcription should be made a part of the record on appeal. In the event of any discrepancies between the official audio or video transcript and the written transcription, the audio or video transcript shall control.
(re citations to administrative rules)
Any references to administrative rules should be made by citation to the specific page in the record where the rule appears rather than to any other codification of the rule that may exist outside of the record on appeal.
(re applicability of Rule 1-007.1 NMRA)
Any motions filed pursuant to this rule are subject to the general rules governing motions in Rule 1-007.1 NMRA.
(re stays)
Consistent with the broad applicability of Section 39-3-1.1 NMSA 1978 and the overall approach of Rule 1-074 NMRA, paragraph Q of the rule is intended to apply in any case in which a party appealing to the district court from the action of an administrative agency seeks a stay of the action under review. The court has power, during the pendency of an appeal, to stay the agency action in appropriate circumstances. See Tenneco Oil Co. v. N.M. Water Quality Control Comm'n, 105 N.M. 708, 736 P.2d 986 (Ct. App. 1986). Whether to grant a stay rests in the sound discretion of the district court. Id.; cf. 5 U.S.C. § 705 (reviewing court may, "[o]n such conditions as may be required and to the extent necessary to prevent irreparable injury, . . . issue all necessary and appropriate process to postpone the effective date of an agency action or to preserve status or rights pending conclusion of the review proceedings"). An appellant may move for a stay at any time after filing the notice of appeal. Cf. Rule 1-062(D) NMRA (appellant in civil action may obtain stay of money judgment "at or after the time of filing the notice of appeal"). The motion is governed by the district court's regular procedures for motion practice.
Under the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies, a party seeking a stay ordinarily would be expected to apply first to the agency involved. Tenneco Oil Co., 105 N.M. at 710, 736 P.2d at 988. Application may be made initially to the district court if prior recourse to the agency would be impracticable. Initial resort to the agency might be impracticable, for instance, if the agency had no procedure for granting a stay. A motion for a stay of agency action pending appeal must state that the agency previously had denied a request for a stay or must explain why requesting a stay from the agency initially would be impracticable. See Fed. R. App. P. 18(a)(2)(A).
The factors that a court must consider in deciding whether to stay agency action pending appeal are set forth in Tenneco Oil Co. See 105 N.M. at 710, 736 P.2d at 988. These factors have been widely accepted judicially. See 16A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure §3964, at 401-02 n.13 (1999); Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 689 (1965). The court may weigh the factors, giving greater weight to one or another of them as the circumstances require. See Ohio ex rel. Celebrezze v. Nuclear Reg. Comm'n, 812 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1987). However, some showing as to each factor must be made before a stay can be granted. Tenneco Oil Co., 105 N.M. at 710, 736 P.2d at 988. Some courts hold that where a strong showing has been made as to the other three factors, a likelihood of success on the merits is sufficiently established if the appellant can show "serious questions" going to the merits. See, e.g., Celebrezze, 812 F.2d at 290 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The administrative record may not be available to the district court when a motion for stay is made. The motion should concisely and accurately summarize the administrative proceedings to the extent they are relevant to the district court's consideration of the motion. If the agency's findings on disputed factual matters are at issue, the summary should include the substance of all the evidence presented to the agency relating to the disputed matters. See Nat'l Council on Compensation Ins. v. N.M. State Corp. Comm'n, 107 N.M. 278, 282, 756 P.2d 558, 562 (1988) (under "whole record" review of agency factfinding, court views evidence in light most favorable to agency decision but also considers any contravening evidence); Martinez v. S.W. Landfills, Inc., 115 N.M. 181, 184-85, 848 P.2d 1108, 1111-12 (Ct. App. 1993) (party challenging sufficiency of evidence to support agency action must set forth substance of all relevant evidence in brief and explain why evidence, viewed favorably to agency, on balance fails to support agency's decision).
The appellant may attach as exhibits to the motion any available, relevant parts of the agency record that would help inform the court with respect to the motion. Cf. Pincheira v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2004 -NMCA-030, & 8, 135 N.M. 220, 86 P.3d 645 (party seeking writ of error to review district court ruling may attach to petition any relevant portions of record before district court); Fed. R. App. P. 18(a)(2)(B)(iii). If the agency has provided a statement of reasons why a prior request to the agency for a stay was denied, the agency's statement must be included as an attachment. Cf. Fed. R. App. P. 18(a)(2)(A)(ii). Any party may include affidavits or other admissible evidence to establish the factors relevant to a stay. Material submitted in support of or in opposition to a stay should not be deemed part of the record on appeal.
The court may condition relief on the posting of a bond or other security to protect the interests that might be adversely affected by a stay. Cf. Rule 1-062(C) NMRA (on appeal from injunction, appellate court may grant stay "upon such terms as to bond or otherwise as it considers proper for the security of the rights of the adverse party"); Rule 1-062(D) NMRA (supersedeas bond for stay of money judgment); Fed. R. App. P. 18(b).
Under New Mexico law an aggrieved party may, in some circumstances, bring an independent declaratory judgment action against an agency to challenge a disputed agency action as an alternative to pursuing an administrative appeal. See Smith v. City of Santa Fe, 2007-NMSC-055, 142 N.M. 786, 171 P.3d 300. New Mexico courts have applied the same factors in deciding whether to grant preliminary injunctive relief as apply to the question of granting a stay of administrative action under Tenneco Oil Co. See LaBalbo v. Hymes, 115 N.M. 314, 317-18, 850 P.2d 1017, 1020-21 (Ct. App. 1993).
(re certification)
Section 39-3-1.1(F) NMSA 1978 allows a district court to certify a final decision appealed to the district court from an administrative agency directly to the court of appeals if it involves an issue of substantial public interest that should be decided by the court of appeals. In drafting the proposed amendment providing standards for certification, the drafters considered Section 39-3-1.1 NMSA 1978, Rule 1-074 NMRA, Rule 12-608 NMRA, Wyoming's Rules of Appellate Procedures, Rule 12 -Judicial Review of Administrative Action, specifically, W.R.A.P. Rule 12.09 Extent of Review, and its enabling legislation.
The drafters found that the criteria set out in the Wyoming rule to be very helpful and believe that the same complements current New Mexico case law. The drafters also incorporated specific language the court of appeals has utilized in defining "substantial public interest." See Jicarilla Apache Nation v. Rio Arriba County Assessor, 2004-NMCA-055, 135 N.M. 630, 92 P.3d 642 (case law suggests that an issue is one of "substantial public interest" when it raises a question of first impression that is likely to recur, and when the need for uniformity is great). Although the drafters initially discussed including "complex factual record" as one of the objective criteria a district court should consider in addressing "substantial public interest," they ultimately concluded this is an argument to be made in the context of requesting certification, and not a separate objective criterion. For example, in support of a motion for certification, one could argue that an interest of judicial economy will be served where the record is voluminous and complex. Such an argument would be made in requesting relief pursuant to subparagraph S(6), i.e., "whether an appeal from any district court determination is highly likely such that certification in the first instance would serve the interests of judicial economy and reduce the litigation expenses to the parties." Finally, the drafters also reviewed a New Mexico Law Review Article, Seth D. Montgomery & Andrew S. Montgomery, Jurisdiction As May Be Provided by Law: Some Issues of Appellate Jurisdiction in New Mexico, 36 N.M. L. Rev. 215 (2006). The drafters felt that the article raised some interesting issues concerning statutory authorization. However, they ultimately concluded that the proposed amendment reflects objective criteria that the district court may utilize in assessing "substantial public interest," and therefore the concerns raised in the article were not an issue.
(re submission for decision)
Upon completion of oral argument, or upon the notification of the district court that no party requests for oral argument, the case should be considered submitted for purposes of Rule 1-054.1 NMRA.
[Adopted by Supreme Court Order No. 08-8300-041, effective December 15, 2008; as amended by Supreme Court Order No. 13-8300-017, effective for all cases pending or filed on or after December 31, 2013.]
ANNOTATIONS The 2013 amendment, approved by Supreme Court Order No. 13-8300-017, effective December 31, 2013, specified that the rule applies to further review of orders and judgments of the district court, and in Paragraph V, in the title, changed "Appeal" to "Further review", after "may seek" added "further", and after "in accordance with", added "Rule 12-505 NMRA of". The 2008 amendment, approved by Supreme Court Order No. 08-8300-41, effective December 15, 2008, changed the title of Paragraph B from "Constitutional review by writ of certiorari" to "Rule inapplicable"; added Subparagraph (4) of Paragraph B; in Subparagraph (1) of Paragraph C, after "filing with the", deleted "clerk of the" and after "proof of service" added the remainder of the sentence; in the title of Paragraph F, added "and arranging preparation of the record"; deleted former Subparagraph (2) of Paragraph F, which provided for the filing of proof of service that a copy of the notice of appeal had been served in accordance with Rule 1-005 NMRA; in Subparagraph (2) of Paragraph F, after "preparation of and payment", added "if required" and after "if required, for the", deleted "transcript" and added "record"; in Paragraph H, in the first sentence, after "Paragraph C of this rule, the agency shall" changed "file with the clerk of the district court the record" to "number consecutively and bind the pages of the record", and after "appeal taken in the proceedings", added the remainder of the sentence, and in the second sentence, added the language between "For purposes of this rule" and "the record on appeal shall consist of:"; in Subparagraph (2) of Paragraph H, after "a copy of all papers, pleadings", added "and exhibits" and after "filed in the pleadings of the agency", added the remainder of the sentence; deleted former Subparagraph (4) of Paragraph H, which listed "any exhibits"; in relettered Subparagraph (4) of Paragraph H, in the first sentence, after "district court a duplicate of the", changed "tape" to "recording"; in Paragraph I, after "supplemental record transmitted to the district court", added the remainder of the sentence; in Subparagraph (2) of Paragraph K, in the first sentence, after "summary of the proceedings", deleted "which shall indicate" and added "describing" and after "presented for review, with" deleted "appropriate" and added "specific", and added the second sentence; in Subparagraph (3) of Paragraph K, in the first sentence, after "citations to the authorities, statutes and" deleted "parts of", after "record on appeal relied upon", added the remainder of the sentence, and added the third and the last sentences; in the title of Paragraph L, after "Appellee's", deleted "statement of appellate issues"; in the title of Paragraph M, after "appellate issues", added "and response"; changed Paragraph M from "References in the statement of appellate issues shall be to the pages of the record on appeal or, if the reference is to tape recording, the approximate counter numbers of the tape as shown on the index log shall be used" to the current language; in Paragraph M, deleted the former second sentence, which provided that reference to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy shall be to the place in the record at which the evidence was identified, offered and received and rejected; in Paragraph H, in the first sentence, after "Except by permission of the court, the", deleted "argument portion of the" and in the first and second sentences, changed the page limitations from 15 pages to 25 pages; deleted former Paragraph O, which provided that briefs may be filed only by leave of the district court upon conditions specified by the court; in relettered Paragraph O, in the first sentence after "Upon", changed "motion of a" to "the filing of a request for hearing either" and added the second and third sentences; added Paragraphs P and Q; changed the title of Paragraph R from "Scope of review" to "Standard of review", in Paragraph R, changed the first sentence from "The district court may reverse the decision of the agency if" to "The district court shall apply the following standards of review"; added Paragraphs S and T; in Paragraph U, after "A motion for", changed "reconsideration" to "rehearing"; deleted former Paragraph S, which provided criteria and conditions for granting a stay of enforcement of the agency's decision or order; and added Paragraph X. The 2002 amendment, effective October 1, 2002, substituted "of an order or judgment of the district court" for "by filing a petition for writ of certiorari" in Paragraph T. The 2001 amendment, effective May 1, 2001, in H(5), deleted "either stenographically recorded or tape recorded" following "if any" at the end of the first sentence, substituted "an audio or audio-video" for "a tape" in the second sentence, and added the third sentence; added J(3); substituted "fifteen (15) pages" for "eight (8) pages" in two places and added the last sentence in N; and rewrote T which formerly read, "An aggrieved party may appeal an order or judgment of the district court in accordance with the Rules of Appellate Procedure".
For the definition of "stenographic recording" or "stenographically recorded", see Rule 1-030.1 NMRA. Compiler's notes. - For scope of review of the district court, see Zamora v. Village of Ruidoso Downs, 1995-NMSC-072, 120 N.M. 778, 907 P.2d 182. Application of rule. - This rule, by its very terms, applies specifically to the review of administrative decisions in the district courts. Paule v. Santa Fe Cnty., 2005-NMSC-021, 138 N.M. 82, 117 P.3d 240. Motion denied by operation of law. - There is no provision within this rule which provides that a motion for reconsideration not acted upon by the district court within a certain amount of time is deemed denied by operation of law. Paule v. Santa Fe Cnty., 2005-NMSC-021, 138 N.M. 82, 117 P.3d 240. Writ of certiorari. - Review under this rule should be pursued in light of Rule 12-505 NMRA via a petition for writ of certiorari. Dixon v. State Taxation & Revenue Dep't MVD, 2004-NMCA-044, 135 N.M. 431, 89 P.3d 680. Review of Medicaid recoupment action. - Where petitioner, a nursing home, appealed the district court's decision upholding the decision of the Director of the New Mexico Human Services Department, Medical Assistance Division, (HSD/MAD) to recoup Medicaid payments made to petitioner on the basis that petitioner was not entitled to Medicaid payments for services to a certain resident because petitioner did not comply with New Mexico Department of Health (DOH) nursing home preadmission screening regulations before it admitted the resident, the district court erred in determining that petitioner improperly performed or otherwise failed to complete the screening process, because petitioner's admission coordinator correctly completed the screening form provided by DOH and, because the screening form and instructions provided by DOH were not promulgated according to the New Mexico Administrative Procedures Act, they do not have the force and effect of law and cannot serve as the basis for a HSD/MAD enforcement action. Princeton Place v. N.M. Human Servs. Dep't, 2018-NMCA-036, cert. granted. Claims litigated in administrative proceedings barred by res judicata. - Where a municipal personnel board determined that the municipality had just cause to terminate plaintiff, because plaintiff failed to abide by the municipality's personnel rules and regulations and failed to provide valid documentation to support plaintiff's leave under the Family Medical Leave Act; plaintiff filed a civil complaint in district court that appealed the decision of the personnel board and alleged a claim for breach of implied employment contract; plaintiff based the breach of contract claim solely on the municipality's merit system ordinance, personnel rules and regulations, and collective bargaining agreement governing employment with the municipality; and the personnel board had jurisdiction over the breach of contract claim, res judicata prevented plaintiff from raising the breach of contract claim in the civil complaint. Mascarenas v. City of Albuquerque, 2012-NMCA-031, 274 P.3d 781. Claims litigated in administrative proceedings precluded by collateral estoppel. - Where a municipal personnel board determined that the municipality had just cause to terminate plaintiff, because plaintiff failed to abide by the municipality's personnel rules and regulations and failed to provide valid documentation to support plaintiff's leave under the Family Medical Leave Act; plaintiff filed a civil complaint in district court that appealed the decision of the municipal personnel board and alleged violations of due process and abridgment of plaintiff's FMLA rights; the personnel board found that the municipality held an adequate pre-termination hearing and that plaintiff failed to provide valid documentation for FMLA leave to support plaintiff's absence from work; and the district court found that the hearing officer for the personnel board considered all the evidence presented; and during the personnel board hearing, both parties were represented by counsel, submitted exhibits and presented witness testimony, were entitled to subpoena witnesses and compel production of document, and submitted written briefs, collateral estoppel precluded litigation of the factual predicates of plaintiff's due process and FLMA claims in district court. Mascarenas v. City of Albuquerque, 2012-NMCA-031, 274 P.3d 781. Claim preclusion barred subsequent action. - Where plaintiff appealed an adverse decision from a grievance board hearing officer upholding the City of Española's decision to terminate his employment, and where plaintiff also filed a separate action in the district court against the City for, among other things, breach of implied contract, the district court erred in entering judgment in favor of plaintiff on the breach of contract claim and dismissing the administrative appeal, because claim preclusion barred the district court action, and plaintiff should have brought the claim in the former proceeding when plaintiff's contract claim was based on his assertions that the City failed to follow the polices and procedures set forth in its personnel handbook, the issues raised in an administrative appeal and in the contract claim arose from the same transaction, and plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his contract claim in the grievance proceeding. Armijo v. City of Española, 2016-NMCA-086, cert. denied. Special use permit. - Where plaintiff properly sought a special use permit, it was reasonable for plaintiff to attempt an administrative resolution before proceeding to court and a review pursuant to Section 39-3-1.1 NMSA 1978 and this rule would have been limited to the narrow matter of the special use permit. Takhar v. Town of Taos, 2004-NMCA-072, 135 N.M. 741, 93 P.3d 762, cert. denied, 2004-NMCERT-006. Review of County Board's interpretation of its own zoning ordinance. - Where the Board of County Commissioners of Torrance County (Board) determined that petitioner did not need a conditional use permit under Torrance County's zoning ordinance to grow medical cannabis on property it owned in a rural section of the county, and where the district court overturned the Board's decision and held that petitioner's proposed use of the property was a commercial use for which a conditional use permit was required, the district court erred in determining that an owner of property must apply to the Board for a use permit when permissive uses are commercial in nature and require building any structures, because the ordinance specifically provides that accessory uses and structures necessary to carry out the listed permissive uses are themselves permissive uses in a conservation district. The Board's decision that the cultivation of medical cannabis is a permissive use under the zoning ordinance that did not require a conditional use permit was a reasonable interpretation of its own ordinance. Filippi v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Torrance Cty., 2018-NMCA-050, cert. granted. Correction or modification of record. - Paragraph I does not allow the addition of material to the record that was never presented to the administrative agency in the first instance. Martinez v. State Eng'r Office, 2000-NMCA-074, 129 N.M. 413, 9 P.3d 657, cert. denied, 129 N.M. 385, 9 P.3d 68. Motion for rehearing. - Rule 1-006 A NMRA does apply to filing motions under Paragraph R of this rule. Garza v. State Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 2004-NMCA-061, 135 N.M. 673, 92 P.3d 685. Motion was timely filed where excluding intermediate weekends and legal holidays, the tenth day after the order was entered on December 18, 2001, was January 3, 2002. Garza v. State Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 2004-NMCA-061, 135 N.M. 673, 92 P.3d 685. Equity jurisdiction. - This rule did not deprive the district court of equitable jurisdiction to hear and issue an injunction in the context of an annexation appeal. State v. City of Sunland Park, 2000-NMCA-044, 129 N.M. 151, 3 P.3d 128, cert. denied, 129 N.M. 207, 4 P.3d 35. Where district court considered case as appellate court, under this rule, it is appropriate to remand the appeal for the district court to consider the other issues in the first instance. Cerrillos Gravel Products, Inc. v. Board of Cnty. Comm'rs of Santa Fe, 2004-NMCA-096, 136 N.M. 247, 96 P.3d 1167, cert. granted, 2004-NMCERT-008. Review under this rule in license revocation and denial of limited license cases is authorized by 39-3-1.1 NMSA 1978. Dixon v. State Taxation & Revenue Dep't MVD, 2004-NMCA-044, 135 N.M. 431, 89 P.3d 680. Petition timely. - With regard to plaintiff private museum's appeal from the district court's order affirming the denial of a property tax protest appeal, because review of the district court's decision was by writ of certiorari under 39-3-1.1(E) NMSA 1978 and this rule, the appellate court treated the museum's docketing statement as a petition for writ of certiorari and accepted the petition as timely under Rule 12-505(C) NMRA. Georgia O'Keeffe Museum v. County of Santa Fe, 2003-NMCA-003, 133 N.M. 297, 62 P.3d 754. Scope of appeal. - If a driver appeals issues that are within the statutory limits of a motor vehicles division hearing, and the driver also states claims that are beyond the scope of such a hearing, the district court should consider each claim according to its appropriate standard of review and maintain the distinction between the court's appellate and original jurisdiction in rendering its decision. Maso v. State Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 2004-NMCA-025, 135 N.M. 152, 85 P.3d 276, cert. granted, 2004-NMCERT-002. Standard of review on administrative appeal to district court. - District court acted outside its capacity as an appellate court by engaging in fact-finding when it determined, contrary to the determination of the county board of commissioners, that the administrative record supported a conclusion that a landfill was in a critical area as defined in the county ground water policy. Cadena v. Bernalillo Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 2006-NMCA-036, 139 N.M. 300, 131 P.3d 687.