N.M. R. Civ. P. Dist. Ct. 1-009
N.M. R. Civ. P. Dist. Ct. 1-009
Committee commentary. - Paragraph J of this rule was added in 2016 to provide additional protections to consumers in consumer debt collection cases. Rules 1-017(E), 1-055(B), and 1-060(B)(6) NMRA were also amended, and Form 4-226 NMRA created, for the same purpose. After consulting with the New Mexico Attorney General's Office Consumer Protection Division and creditor and debtor rights representatives, and researching concerns identified by the Federal Trade Commission in its report issued in July of 2010, "Repairing a Broken System: Protecting Consumers in Debt Collection Litigation and Arbitration," the Committee concluded, and the Court agreed, that amendments to the rules are necessary to alleviate systemic problems and abuses that currently exist in the litigation of consumer debt cases. These include pleadings and judgments based on insufficient or unreliable evidence, "robo-signing" of affidavits by those with no personal knowledge of the debt at issue, creditors suing and obtaining judgments on time-barred debts, and an alarmingly high percentage of default judgments (often caused in part by a lack of sufficient detail in the complaint for a self-represented defendant to determine the nature of the claim and its validity).
For an interpretation of the phrase, "acting in the ordinary course of business," see Wilson v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2004 -NMCA-051, ¶ 32, 135 N.M. 506, 90 P.3d 525, overruled on other grounds by Schultz ex rel. Schultz v. Pojoaque Tribal Police Dep't, 2010-NMSC-034, 148 N.M. 692, 242 P.3d 259 (interpreting course of business as "business practice that is routine, regular, usual, or normally done"). Medical bills, subject to relevant Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) regulations, and student loans, are considered consumer debt claims for the purposes of this rule; foreclosure actions are not.
[Adopted by Supreme Court Order No. 16-8300-031, effective for all cases pending or filed on or after July 1, 2017.]
ANNOTATIONS The 2016 amendment, approved by Supreme Court Order No. 16-8300-031, effective July 1, 2017, provided new procedures for consumer debt claims, made certain stylistic changes, and added the committee commentary; in Paragraph A, after "representative capacity", deleted "he" and added "that party"; in Paragraph H, after "party to allege", deleted "therein", after "authority of", deleted "such" and added "the", after "contrary to the provisions", deleted "thereof" and added "of the statute", and after "the subject matter", deleted "such" and added "the"; in Paragraph I, after "of writing", deleted "upon" and added "on", after "original or a copy", deleted "thereof" and added "of the instrument", and after "A copy of", deleted "such" and added "the"; and added Paragraph J. Compiler's notes. - Paragraphs C and E together are deemed to have superseded 105-529, C.S. 1929, which was substantially the same. Paragraph H is deemed to have superseded 105-529, C.S. 1929, which was substantially the same. Paragraph H, together with Rule 1-044 NMRA, is deemed to have superseded 105-527, C.S. 1929, which related to pleading a right derived from a private statute. The defense that a foreign corporation lacks capacity to sue because it has failed to comply with Section 53-17-20 NMSA 1978 is waived if it is not raised as an affirmative defense by motion or answer. Capco Acquiscub, Inc. v. Greka Energy Corp., 2008-NMCA-153, 145 N.M. 328, 198 P.3d 354. Pleading special matters prerequisite to relying on same. - Those matters constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense not pled as required by the rules are not available as a defense. McLean v. Paddock, 1967-NMSC-165, 78 N.M. 234, 430 P.2d 392, overruled on other grounds, Duke City Lumber Co. v. Terrel, 1975-NMSC-041, 88 N.M. 299, 540 P.2d 229. Rule does not excuse plaintiff who lacks capacity; once capacity is challenged, a plaintiff must show capacity. Mackey v. Burke, 1984-NMCA-028, 102 N.M. 294, 694 P.2d 1359, overruled on other grounds, Chavez v. Regents of Univ. of N.M., 1985-NMSC-114, 103 N.M. 606, 711 P.2d 883. Mere denial of capacity not specific negative averment. - The denial in an answer of sufficient information on which to base a conclusion is not a "specific negative averment" which places in issue the capacity of a plaintiff to sue in its capacity as a corporation. Consolidated Placers, Inc. v. Grant, 1944-NMSC-040, 48 N.M. 340, 151 P.2d 48. Allegation of agency sufficient to withstand dismissal. - Where the amended complaint alleges that the acts complained of were done by the defendants and by their agents, the pleading was sufficient to give defendants a fair idea of what the plaintiff is complaining. No distinct forms are necessary to state a claim and the allegations of agency are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Gonzales v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, 1966-NMSC-211, 77 N.M. 61, 419 P.2d 257. Fraud allegation prerequisite to considering the issue. - As no fraud is alleged as is required by this rule, the issue is not before the court for consideration. In re 1971 Assessment of Trinchera Ranch, 1973-NMSC-094, 85 N.M. 557, 514 P.2d 608. Circumstances constituting fraud must be alleged with particularity. Romero v. Sanchez, 1971-NMSC-129, 83 N.M. 358, 492 P.2d 140. Action for fraud against opponents of a shopping center was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim because the circumstances constituting the fraud were not stated with particularity. Saylor v. Valles, 2003-NMCA-037, 133 N.M. 432, 63 P.3d 1152. Although Section 37-1-7 NMSA 1978 is applicable to both actual fraud and constructive fraud and may be grounds for equitable estoppel for purpose of tolling the statute of limitations, plaintiff has not made a case of fraudulent concealment. FDIC v. Schuchmann, 319 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2003). Same particularity as required for pleading affirmative defenses. - This rule requires the same particularity respecting the assertion of actionable fraud in a complaint as Rule 8(c) (see now Rule 1-008 NMRA), respecting pleading affirmatively to a preceding pleading. McLean v. Paddock, 1967-NMSC-165, 78 N.M. 234, 430 P.2d 392, overruled on other grounds, Duke City Lumber Co. v. Terrel, 1975-NMSC-041, 88 N.M. 299, 540 P.2d 229. Particularity sufficient if fraud implied from facts alleged. - To plead a claim of fraud the evidentiary details of the claim need not be alleged. There is sufficient particularity in the pleading if the facts alleged are facts from which fraud will be necessarily implied. The allegations should leave no doubt in the defendants' minds as to the claim asserted against them. Steadman v. Turner, 1973-NMCA-033, 84 N.M. 738, 507 P.2d 799; Delgado v. Costello, 1978-NMCA-058, 91 N.M. 732, 580 P.2d 500. Where the facts pled do not limit the allegations of fraud and, in the complaints of both buyer and seller, the general and specific allegations of ongoing false representations by real estate brokers regarding cessation of negotiations are of sufficient particularity to apprise the broker of the claims asserted against him, there is sufficient particularity in the pleading from which fraud will be necessarily implied and the claim asserted is clear. Robertson v. Carmel Builders Real Estate, 2004 NMCA-056, 135 N.M. 641, 92 P.3d 653, cert. denied, 2004-NMCERT-004. Allegations of misrepresentation, fraud and mistake were sufficient. - Where, in an action to determine defendants' right to use a road on plaintiff's property to access oil and gas wells, plaintiffs alleged that defendants falsely represented their right to cross plaintiffs' property, knowingly made false representations to deceive and mislead plaintiffs regarding defendants' production and purchase of gas from wells located on plaintiffs' property; refused to provide information requested by plaintiffs concerning defendants' claim of access; were using roads located on one production unit to gain access to wells located on other units; and breached the duty of good faith and fair dealings by using dilatory tactics and refusing to share information with plaintiffs about unitization agreements and oil and gas leases, plaintiffs' allegations were sufficient to allege issues of misrepresentation, fraud and mistake. Kysar v. BP America Production Co., 2012-NMCA-036, 273 P.3d 867. Particularity sufficient if allegations leave no doubt as to claim asserted. - The complaint alleged fraud with sufficient particularity when the allegations left no doubt in the defendants' minds as to the claim asserted against them and the facts alleged are facts from which fraud would be necessarily implied; it is therefore unnecessary to use words such as "fraud" or "fraudulent". Maxey v. Quintana, 1972-NMCA-069, 84 N.M. 38, 499 P.2d 356, cert. denied, 84 N.M. 37, 499 P.2d 355. Allegation that insurance agent to effect sale knowingly failed to disclose meaning of coinsurance clause is sufficient allegation of the inducement element of fraud; it leaves no doubt as to the basis for the fraud claim. Delgado v. Costello, 1978-NMCA-058, 91 N.M. 732, 580 P.2d 500. Specific words not required in pleading. - It is unnecessary even to use words such as "fraud" or "fraudulent", provided that the facts alleged are such as constitute fraud in themselves, or are facts from which fraud will be necessarily implied. Romero v. Sanchez, 1971-NMSC-129, 83 N.M. 358, 492 P.2d 140. Allegation of confidential relation insufficiently particular. - An alleged confidential relation arising between appellant and the decedent because of their being coadventurers does not excuse appellant from averring fraud with particularity. Fullerton v. Kaune, 1963-NMSC-078, 72 N.M. 201, 382 P.2d 529. Allegation that agent sells two policies with "other insurance" clauses insufficiently particular. - Plaintiff's claim that the conduct of defendant insurer's agent in selling two policies, each of which contained an "other insurance" provision, amounts to fraud is insufficient to state a basis for relief, since fraud will not necessarily be implied from such an allegation and the allegation does not inform defendants of the claim asserted against them. Bell v. Weinacker, 1975-NMCA-134, 88 N.M. 557, 543 P.2d 1185. Sufficiently particular facts alleged to charge fraudulent concealment. - Where plaintiff's malpractice suit, against doctor who performed an incomplete tubal ligation on her, relied on doctor's fraudulent concealment of that fact after having learned of it in a pathology report to toll the statute of limitations, and plaintiff in her pleadings specified the date of the report, its contents, and where it could be found, coupled with the specific charge that the defendant failed to tell the plaintiff that said tubal ligation was incomplete after having had knowledge of same, it was held that she adequately provided the degree of specificity required for compliance with this rule. Hardin v. Farris, 1974-NMCA-146, 87 N.M. 143, 530 P.2d 407. Reasonably concise pleading required. - When fraud is alleged, it must be particularized as required by this rule, but it still must be as short, plain, simple, concise and direct as is reasonable under the circumstances, and as Rules 8(a) and (e) (see now Rule 1-008 NMRA) require. Maxey v. Quintana, 1972-NMCA-069, 84 N.M. 38, 499 P.2d 356, cert. denied, 84 N.M. 37, 499 P.2d 355. Malice may be averred generally. Stewart v. Ging, 1958-NMSC-082, 64 N.M. 270, 327 P.2d 333. Unaffected by requirement of proof of actual malice. - Even though the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686, 95 A.L.R.2d 1412 (1964), case requires proof of "actual malice", it does not require specific pleading in terms of the knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth. Ramsey v. Zeigner, 1968-NMSC-145, 79 N.M. 457, 444 P.2d 968. Substantial compliance sufficient to plead conditions precedent. - Although insurer's amendment was entitled an affirmative defense, alleging failure to give notice of loss and file proofs thereof, it satisfies the requirements of the rule. Were it otherwise, the true spirit of the rule would be nullified. The purpose of the amendment is to raise the issue of failure to comply with a condition precedent and to enable insured to meet that issue. Gillum v. Southland Life Ins. Co., 1961 -NMSC-150, 70 N.M. 293, 373 P.2d 536. Rule inapplicable where contract is indefinite or alternative performance is specified. Arnold v. Wells, 1916-NMSC-014, 21 N.M. 445, 155 P. 724 (decided under former law). Special damages must be pleaded as well as proved in a suit for slander of title. Garver v. Public Serv. Co., 1966 -NMSC-261, 77 N.M. 262, 421 P.2d 788. Award of special damages unjustified absent plea of same. - Where the complaint does not reveal any pleading requesting special damages, nor is the complaint amended and, although a motion to amend is made, but never accepted by the court, the court's allowance of $1,088.86 as special damages is improper. Hays v. Hudson, 1973-NMSC-086, 85 N.M. 512, 514 P.2d 31, overruled on other grounds, Maulsby v. Magnuson, 1988-NMSC-046, 107 N.M. 223, 755 P.2d 67. Special damages naturally but not necessarily flow from wrongful act. - Even if the term "pain and agony" is not understood to refer to the mental conditions described by the witness, there is no necessity to specially plead these conditions. The test for whether these damages must be specially pleaded is derived from the necessity to alert the defendant as to what he must defend against. Thus general damages are such as naturally and necessarily flow from the wrongful act, while special damages are such as naturally, but do not necessarily, flow from it. Higgins v. Hermes, 1976-NMCA-066, 89 N.M. 379, 552 P.2d 1227, cert. denied, 90 N.M. 8, 558 P.2d 620. Ordinances must be pleaded and proved. - An appellate court which is not trying the case de novo on appeal from a municipal court may not take judicial notice of municipal ordinances and such ordinances are matters of fact which must be pleaded and proved the same as any other fact. Coe v. City of Albuquerque, 1970-NMSC-041, 81 N.M. 361, 467 P.2d 27. Pleading alleging acts contrary to statute may refer generally to statute. - Pleading stating that defendants prevented the plaintiffs from pursuing their employment and interfered with their use of the public roads, contrary to 50-2-1 and 50-2-2 NMSA 1978, is sufficient to allege a statutory violation. Gonzales v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, 1966-NMSC-211, 77 N.M. 61, 419 P.2d 257. No denial admits signature. - Failure to deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of a written instrument, mentioned in and attached to complaint, admits that it has been signed as it purports to be, notwithstanding sworn answer denying each and every allegation of the complaint. Puritan Mfg. Co. v. Toti & Gradi, 1908-NMSC-016, 14 N.M. 425, 94 P. 1022 (decided under former law). Denial must be specifically addressed to signature. - If an action is brought upon a promissory note purported to be signed by the defendant, a denial under oath of the genuineness and due execution does not replace the requirement that the signature be denied under oath. Oak Grove & Sierra Verde Cattle Co. v. Foster, 1895-NMSC-003, 7 N.M. 650, 41 P. 522 (decided under former law). Corporation estopped to deny signature of president. - In suit by payee of note which was signed by president in presence of his brother who is treasurer, the corporation is estopped to deny its signature or the authority of the president to sign for the corporation, the payee having no knowledge of any limitation of authority, especially in view of fact that similar transactions and similar notes had been acknowledged and paid. Timberlake v. Cox Bros., 1935-NMSC-037, 39 N.M. 183, 43 P.2d 924 (decided under former law). Corporation may deny signature through plea, affidavit of president. - Where defendant corporation, through plea and affidavit of its president, denied that it executed or authorized any person to execute promissory note in its behalf, it constituted a denial under oath, and the trial court erred in sustaining a motion to strike it out. Oak Grove & Sierra Verde Cattle Co. v. Foster, 1895-NMSC-003, 7 N.M. 650, 41 P. 522 (decided under former law). Denial under this rule not affirmative defense. - A denial by the alleged maker of a promissory note, under oath, of the signature thereto, charging also that the signature is a forgery, places in issue the genuineness and due execution of the same, and does not constitute an affirmative defense. Wight v. Citizens' Bank, 1912-NMSC-008, 17 N.M. 71, 124 P. 478 (decided under former law). Absent denial under oath, genuineness of writing not in issue. - Where defendants have admitted execution of a note, and no denial under oath of the genuineness of the note attached as an exhibit was made, the terms of the note are self-explanatory and no material issue remaining to be determined except the unpaid balance, court properly enters summary judgment against defendants. General Acceptance Corp. v. Hollis, 1965-NMSC-135, 75 N.M. 553, 408 P.2d 53 (decided under former law). Writing of corporation denied by affidavit of president. - In a suit against a corporation in assumpsit on a promissory note, purporting on its face to be the obligation of the company executed by its treasurer, where the defendant pleads that it has neither executed the note nor authorized anyone to execute it in its behalf, which was verified by the affidavit of its president, such plea so verified constitutes a denial under oath. Oak Grove & Sierra Verde Cattle Co. v. Foster, 1895-NMSC-003, 7 N.M. 650, 41 P. 522 (decided under former law). Rule construed to allow determination on merits. - Rule 15(b) (see now Rule 1-015 NMRA) requires that the court may and should permit the pleadings to be freely amended in order to aid in the presentation of the merits of the controversy, as long as the opposing party is not actually prejudiced, and as this rule is now integrated with the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure, it should be construed to conform with the general tenor of the rules, i.e., to reach the merits of the controversy and not determine the case on a mere technicality. Kleeman v. Fogerson, 1964-NMSC-246, 74 N.M. 688, 397 P.2d 716. Original writing not required for evidence. - Where original lease was fully set out in the complaint, made a part of it, and its genuineness admitted by the pleadings, the original lease does not have to be formally offered in evidence. City of Hot Springs v. Hot Springs Fair & Racing Ass'n, 1952-NMSC-039, 56 N.M. 317, 243 P.2d 619. Attached writing not evidence until admitted. - The affidavit is an instrument upon which the action is founded and cannot be admitted in evidence unless attached to the complaint; but unless and until offered in evidence, it remains as it is - merely a part of the pleadings. Wagner v. Hunton, 1966-NMSC-071, 76 N.M. 194, 413 P.2d 474. Attachment not required where writing not basis of claim. - Where writing is merely an item of evidence in a party's claim, a copy thereof need not be attached to the complaint. Underwood v. Sapir, 1954-NMSC-078, 58 N.M. 539, 273 P.2d 741. Escrow agreement admissible in suit for contract damages. - In a suit not based on an escrow agreement, but instead on damages under a contract, this rule in no way operates as a bar to admission of the escrow agreement, to aid the court in ascertaining the intention of the parties as to whether the escrow provision is meant to be the exclusive remedy in case of breach. Foster v. Colorado Radio Corp., 381 F.2d 222 (10th Cir. 1967). Instrument of assignment admissible in action for accounting. - Where cross-complaint is not based on the instrument of assignment, the assignment, when offered in evidence, is not objectionable for failure to file such instrument, or a copy thereof, in compliance with this section. Lohman v. Reymond, 1913-NMSC-069, 18 N.M. 225, 137 P. 375 (decided under former law). Conditional sales contract admissible in action for default. - In action by conditional vendor to recover, for default, property sold under conditional sales contract, the contract is not basis of the action within the meaning of this rule, and is admissible, though no copy thereof is attached to the complaint, as evidence of ownership. Beebe v. Fouse, 1921-NMSC-045, 27 N.M. 194, 199 P. 364 (decided under former law). Notice of filing mechanic's lien admissible in foreclosure action. - In action to foreclose a mechanic's lien, a copy of the notice of lien need not be attached to the complaint, the action not being founded on the notice. Weggs v. Kreugel, 1922-NMSC-021, 28 N.M. 24, 205 P. 730 (decided under former law). Power of attorney admissible in action preliminary to foreclosing mortgage. - Where the action is in replevin, preliminary to foreclosure of chattel mortgage, to secure possession of a herd of cattle, and power of attorney has been given under which the mortgage was executed for mortgagor, the action is founded on the chattel mortgage and there is no necessity of attaching the power of attorney to the pleading. Laws v. Pyeatt, 1935-NMSC-091, 40 N.M. 7, 52 P.2d 127 (decided under former law). Orders, contracts admissible for defense of failure of consideration. - In suit on note, where defense is partial failure of consideration in that refrigerator and light plant for which note was given was destroyed by fire and was uninsured although represented to purchaser to have been insured, written orders and contracts for refrigerator and light plant are admissible in evidence, although copies were not attached to answer, since they were not the foundation of the defense. Nixon-Foster Serv. Co. v. Morrow, 1936-NMSC-068, 41 N.M. 67, 64 P.2d 92 (decided under former law). Written notice required as condition precedent need not be attached to plead performance. - While the giving of written notice of default as provided for in a lease is a condition precedent, in pleading performance it is sufficient to aver generally that all such conditions have been performed and it is not necessary to attach the notice or a copy thereof to the complaint. City of Hot Springs v. Hot Springs Fair & Racing Ass'n, 1952-NMSC-039, 56 N.M. 317, 243 P.2d 619. Inadvertent omission to attach not fatal absent prejudice. - Where plaintiffs' complaint pleads the contract and recites a copy of it is attached as an exhibit, but no copy is attached, and the same is true of the first amended complaint, such omission apparently being inadvertent, as the answer does not deny the allegation of such attachment and in fact makes reference to the contract's having been so attached, and, moreover, defendant in his counterclaim pleads the contract and attaches a copy of it as an exhibit, then court's overruling defendant's objection to introduction of contract into evidence on the basis of this rule, if error, is harmless. Chavez v. Gribble, 1972-NMSC-026, 83 N.M. 688, 496 P.2d 1084. Inapplicable to statutory quiet title action. - One who, in an action to quiet title, files a complaint in statutory form need not attach thereto the instruments upon which he relies to prove his claim of title. Brown v. Gurley, 1954-NMSC-025, 58 N.M. 153, 267 P.2d 134. Nonattachment cured where opponent relies on same writing. - Where, in action of ejectment to recover real estate, plaintiff fails to plead either an original or copy of the contract on which his title was founded, such failure is cured by the fact that defendant claimed the same contract to be the source of his own title, and thus recognizes it as properly in evidence. Lopez v. Lucero, 1935-NMSC-068, 39 N.M. 432, 48 P.2d 1031 (decided under former law). Inapplicable to oral agreements, letters, agreements derived from correspondence. - This rule applies to written instruments upon which action or defense is founded and which are referred to in the pleadings, and not to a contract founded upon oral agreements, and letters, and agreements deduced from correspondence. Daughtry v. B.F. Collins Inv. Co., 1922 -NMSC-044, 28 N.M. 151, 207 P. 575 (decided under former law). Substantial compliance sufficient. - A substantial compliance with this rule occurs where the signed note is copied in the amended complaint, pleading that note is payable to order of maker and endorsed in blank, even though the pleadings fail to show endorsements. Romero v. Hopewell, 1922-NMSC-037, 28 N.M. 259, 210 P. 231; Miller v. Preston, 1888-NMSC-008, 4 N.M. (Gild.) 396, 17 P. 565 (decided under former law). Citing repealed statute not fatal to complaint. - A complaint which used the words "inverse condemnation," but cited a repealed statute, was sufficiently specific to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Landavazo v. Sanchez, 1990-NMSC-114, 111 N.M. 137, 802 P.2d 1283. Nondenial admits execution of writing. - In a suit on interest coupons, where there is no plea denying under oath the execution of the coupons, they are admissible in evidence under the common-money counts, without further proof of their execution. Coler v. Board of Cnty. Comm'rs, 1891-NMSC-024, 6 N.M. 88, 27 P. 619 (decided under former law). Genuineness admitted absent denial under oath. - After an answer to a verified complaint on a promissory note had been stricken out as "sham and unverified," and defendant has elected not to amend, but to stand on his answer, it is not error to adjudge him in default and to render judgment against him. Pilant v. S. Hirsch & Co., 1907-NMSC-003, 14 N.M. 11, 88 P. 1129 (decided under former law). Writing in control of opponent admissible regardless of attachment. - Where a highway contractor's bond remains in the possession and control of the state and its agencies, and subcontractor suing thereon cannot include it in his pleading, it is not error to receive the bond in evidence. Silver v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 1935-NMSC-098, 40 N.M. 33, 53 P.2d 459 (decided under former law). Law reviews. - For survey, "Civil Procedure in New Mexico in 1975," see 6 N.M.L. Rev. 367 (1976). Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. - 6 Am. Jur. 2d Associations and Clubs §59; 19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations §§2220, 2225; 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages §26 et seq.; 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud and Deceit §§424 to 427; 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitations of Actions §459; 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading §§12, 19, 31, 32, 51, 52, 69 to 79, 127, 128, 141, 144 to 149, 168 to 173, 177, 183, 204. Necessity and sufficiency of reply to answer pleading statute of limitations, 115 A.L.R. 755. Pleading res judicata, 120 A.L.R. 8 Manner of pleading foreign statute, 134 A.L.R. 570. Pleading or attempting to prove by way of setoff, counterclaim, or recoupment, related claim barred by statute of limitations, as waiver of defendant's plea of limitation against plaintiff's claim, 137 A.L.R. 324. Amendment of pleading with respect to parties or their capacity as ground for a continuance, 67 A.L.R.2d 477. Necessity and manner, in personal injury or death action, of pleading special damages in nature of medical, nursing, and hospital expenses, 98 A.L.R.2d 746. Punitive damages: relationship to defendant's wealth as factor in determining propriety of award, 87 A.L.R.4th 141. 7 C.J.S. Associations §§ 40 to 44; 25 C.J.S. Damages § 131; 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions §282; 71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 9 to 14, 21, 22, 25, 27, 33, 53, 54, 76, 80, 86 to 88, 372, 375.