N.M. R. Gov. Disc. 17-207

As amended through May 8, 2024
Rule 17-207 - Summary suspension
A.Summary suspension.
(1)Petition for summary suspension. Upon recommendation by the Disciplinary Board, an attorney may be summarily suspended from the practice of law by the Supreme Court
(a) upon the filing with the Supreme Court of a certified copy of a judgment finding an attorney guilty of a felony or other serious crime, as provided in Rule 16-804 NMRA of the Rules of Professional Conduct;
(b) upon the Disciplinary Board demonstrating by certificate or otherwise that an attorney has been convicted of or has pleaded guilty or no contest to a felony or serious crime;
(c) upon the filing with the Supreme Court of an order or judgment declaring the attorney to be incompetent or incapacitated;
(d) upon the Disciplinary Board demonstrating by certificate or otherwise that an attorney is incapacitated from continuing to practice law or to defend himself or herself; or
(e) upon the filing in the Supreme Court and service upon an attorney by chief disciplinary counsel of a petition which sets forth facts demonstrating that the continued practice of law by an attorney will result in a substantial probability of harm, loss, or damage to the public and that
(i) the attorney is under investigation by disciplinary counsel for an alleged violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or a violation of a court rule, statute, or other law;
(ii) formal disciplinary charges have been filed against the attorney; or
(iii) a criminal complaint, information, or indictment has been filed against the attorney.

Prior to suspending an attorney pursuant to this Subparagraph (A)(1)(e), the Supreme Court shall cause to be served on the attorney an order to show cause why the petition of chief disciplinary counsel should not be granted and requiring the attorney to appear before the Supreme Court to respond to the allegations set forth in the petition. The petition shall be served on the attorney at least ten (10) days prior to the date set for the hearing unless a shorter time is ordered by the Supreme Court. At any time prior to the hearing, an attorney may file an answer to the petition. A copy of the answer shall be served on chief disciplinary counsel.

(2)Suspension order. Upon a showing made pursuant to Subparagraph (A)(1) of this rule, the Supreme Court may enter an order immediately suspending the attorney pending the conclusion of a disciplinary proceeding, regardless of the pendency of an appeal from the conviction of a felony or serious crime or order or judgment declaring the attorney to be incompetent or incapacitated.
(3)Evidence of commission of crime. A judgment or plea of guilty or no contest by an attorney for any crime shall be conclusive evidence of the commission of that crime in any disciplinary proceeding instituted against the attorney based upon the conviction.
(4)Reinstatement. An attorney suspended under the provisions of Subparagraph (A)(1) of this rule shall be reinstated immediately upon the filing of a certificate by the Disciplinary Board demonstrating that,
(a) if the suspension was for conviction of a crime, the underlying conviction for the felony or other serious crime has been reversed and no further proceedings have been ordered by the reviewing court;
(b) if the suspension was imposed because of incompetency or incapacity, the Disciplinary Board certifies that such incapacity or incompetency no longer exists; or
(c) if the suspension was imposed on a showing that the continued practice of law by the attorney would result in a substantial probability of harm, loss, or damage to the public, the Disciplinary Board certifies that such a probability no longer exists.
(5)Effect of reinstatement. Reinstatement after a summary suspension ordered under the provisions of Subparagraph (A)(1) of this rule shall not terminate any formal disciplinary proceeding then pending against the attorney, the disposition of which shall be determined by the hearing committee and the Disciplinary Board as provided in these rules.
(6)Duty of clerk or judge. Any clerk or judge of any court within this state who has knowledge that a member of the bar of this state has been convicted of a felony or other serious crime shall, within ten (10) days of said conviction, transmit a certificate thereof to the Disciplinary Board.
(7)Failure to forward certificate. Upon being advised that an attorney has been convicted of a felony or other serious crime within this state, disciplinary counsel shall determine whether the court in which the conviction occurred has forwarded a judgment of conviction to the Disciplinary Board in accordance with the provisions of this rule. If the judgment has not been forwarded to the Disciplinary Board, or if the conviction occurred in another jurisdiction, it shall be the responsibility of disciplinary counsel to obtain a copy of the judgment of the conviction.
B.Administrative suspension for failure to cooperate.
(1)Application. The provisions of this paragraph shall apply in all cases where there is a request for investigation or a specification of charges pending against an attorney under these rules. If the respondent-attorney fails to cooperate by
(a) failing to respond to requests for information;
(b) failing to respond to requests for investigation;
(c) failing to appear for a scheduled deposition or hearing;
(d) failing to answer the specification of charges; or
(e) failing to produce information or records requested by disciplinary counsel absent a good-faith objection, then disciplinary counsel may file a petition for suspension of the attorney's license to practice law. Proceedings commenced against an attorney under the provisions of this paragraph are administrative suspension proceedings. Suspension of an attorney's license to practice law under the provisions of this paragraph is not a form of discipline and shall not necessarily bar disciplinary action.
(2)Petition for suspension. Disciplinary counsel may file a petition for suspension with the Supreme Court alleging that the attorney has not responded to requests for information, has not responded to the request for investigation, has not appeared for a scheduled deposition or hearing, has not timely answered the specification of charges, or has not produced records or documents requested by disciplinary counsel and has not interposed a good-faith objection to producing the records or documents. The petition shall be supported by an affidavit setting forth sufficient facts to demonstrate the efforts undertaken by disciplinary counsel to obtain the attorney's cooperation and compliance. A copy of the petition shall be served on the respondent-attorney pursuant to Rule 17-301(C) NMRA.
(3)Response to the petition. If the respondent-attorney fails to file a response in opposition to the petition within fourteen (14) days after service of the petition, the Supreme Court may enter an order suspending the attorney's license to practice law until further order of the Supreme Court. The attorney's response shall set forth facts showing that the attorney has complied with the requests or the reasons why the attorney has not complied, and the attorney may request a hearing.
(4)Supreme Court action. Upon consideration of a petition for suspension and the attorney's response, if any, the Supreme Court may suspend the attorney's license to practice law for an indefinite period pending further order of the Supreme Court, deny the petition, or issue any other appropriate orders. If a response to the petition is filed and the attorney requests a hearing on the petition, the Supreme Court may conduct a hearing or it may refer the matter to the Disciplinary Board for an expedited evidentiary hearing pursuant to Rule 17-314(E) NMRA. The board's findings of fact and recommendations shall be sent directly to the Supreme Court within seven (7) days after receipt of the parties' proposed findings and conclusions if requested by the board.
(5)Reinstatement. An attorney suspended under Paragraph B of this rule may apply to the Supreme Court for reinstatement upon proof of compliance with the requests of disciplinary counsel as alleged in the petition, or as otherwise ordered by the Court. A copy of the application must be delivered to disciplinary counsel, who may file a response to the application within two (2) business days after being served with a copy of the application. The Supreme Court may summarily reinstate an attorney suspended under the provisions of this paragraph upon proof of compliance with the requests of disciplinary counsel.

N.M. R. Gov. Disc. 17-207

As amended by Supreme Court Order No. 13-8300-045, effective 12/31/2013.

ANNOTATIONS The 2013 amendment, approved by Supreme Court Order No. 13-8300-045, effective December 31, 2013, provided for administrative suspension for failure to cooperate; in Subparagraph (1) of Paragraph A, added the title of the subparagraph; in Paragraph B, in the first unnumbered paragraph, in the first sentence, after "Subparagraph", deleted the parenthesis and number "(5)", added the letters and number "(A)(1)(e)", and in the second sentence, after "is ordered by the", deleted "court" and added "Supreme Court"; in Subparagraph (2) of Paragraph A, after "made pursuant to", deleted "Paragraph A" and added "Subparagraph (A)(1)"; in Subparagraph (4) of Paragraph A, after "the provisions of", deleted "Paragraph A" and added "Subparagraph (A)(1)"; in Subparagraph (5) of Paragraph A, after "a summary suspension", added "ordered under the provisions of Subparagraph (A)(1) of this rule"; and added Paragraph B. Moral turpitude is not necessary element to support discipline, nor is it synonymous with "conduct contrary to honesty, justice or good morals". In re Morris, 1964-NMSC-235, 74 N.M. 679, 397 P.2d 475 (decided under former disciplinary rules 21-2-1(3), div. 3 (2.04) to (2.06), 1953 Comp., of the former "Supreme Court Rules"). Question in disbarment is whether act contrary to good morals. - Whether the misconduct with which a person is charged is a crime involving moral turpitude or, if a crime, whether it is malum prohibitum or malum in se or, for that matter, if the act is neither a felony or misdemeanor is not the issue. The true question in considering disbarment is: was the act to which respondent pleaded guilty "contrary to honesty, justice or good morals"? In re Morris, 1964-NMSC-235, 74 N.M. 679, 397 P.2d 475 (decided under former disciplinary rules, 21-2-1(3), div. 3 (2.04) to (2.06), 1953 Comp., of the former "Supreme Court Rules"). Attorneys should not be allowed to practice law while on probation under a criminal sentence and the court may disbar such an attorney until he is no longer on probation. In re Norrid, 1983-NMSC-076, 100 N.M. 326, 670 P.2d 580. Second-degree murder conviction justifies disbarment. - Since there was a judgment of conviction of second-degree murder preceded by a plea of nolo contendere, it amounted to conclusive proof of a crime involving moral turpitude and disbarment was justified. In re Noble, 1967-NMSC-038, 77 N.M. 461, 423 P.2d 984 (decided under former disciplinary rules, 21-2-1(3), div. 3 (2.04) to (2.06), 1953 Comp., of the former "Supreme Court Rules"). False statement and attempted tax evasion justify suspension. - An attorney convicted of false statement and attempted tax evasion, in relation to his legal obligations under the New Mexico gross receipts tax laws, was suspended from the practice of law in all courts in the state for a period of 13 months, with the last six months of the suspension lifted and deferred on condition of his compliance with the terms of his probation. In re Martin, 1977-NMSC-012, 90 N.M. 226, 561 P.2d 925. Involuntary manslaughter sufficient to support suspension. - When a member of the bar is guilty of the crime of involuntary manslaughter resulting from driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, such offense is an act contrary to honesty, justice or good morals sufficient to support a suspension from practice. In re Morris, 1964-NMSC-235, 74 N.M. 679, 397 P.2d 475 (decided under former disciplinary rules, 21-2-1(3), div. 3 (2.04) to (2.05), 1953 Comp., of the former "Supreme Court Rules"). Although the first offense of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor when considered with the penalty provided is a petty offense, it does not follow that the offense of involuntary manslaughter, which requires a much greater penalty, is likewise a petty offense as under our law it is clearly a felony. In re Morris, 1964-NMSC-235, 74 N.M. 679, 397 P.2d 475 (decided under former disciplinary rules, 21-2-1(3), div. 3 (2.04) to (2.06), 1953 Comp., of the former "Supreme Court Rules"). Six-month suspension and other penalties warranted since attorney accepted one-half of fee and failed to represent client, allowing default to be entered against client. In re Trujillo, 1990-NMSC-062, 110 N.M. 180, 793 P.2d 862. Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. - 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at Law §§ 74 to 83. Federal income tax conviction as involving moral turpitude warranting disciplinary action against attorney, 63 A.L.R.3d 476. Federal income tax conviction as constituting nonprofessional misconduct warranting disciplinary action against attorney, 63 A.L.R.3d 512. Disciplinary action against attorney prior to exhaustion of appellate review of conviction, 76 A.L.R.3d 1061. 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client §§ 71 to 75.