N.M. Code. Jud. Cond. 21-211
N.M. Code. Jud. Cond. 21-211
Committee commentary. -
[1] Under this rule, a judge is disqualified whenever the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, regardless of whether any of the specific provisions of Subparagraphs (A)(1) through (A)(5) apply. The terms "recusal" and "disqualification" are often used interchangeably.
[2] A judge's obligation not to hear or decide matters in which disqualification is required applies regardless of whether a motion to disqualify is filed.
[3] The rule of necessity may override the rule of disqualification. For example, a judge might be required to participate in judicial review of a judicial salary statute, or might be the only judge available in a matter requiring immediate judicial action, such as a hearing on probable cause or a temporary restraining order. In matters that require immediate action, the judge must disclose on the record the basis for possible disqualification and make reasonable efforts to transfer the matter to another judge as soon as practicable.
[4] The fact that a lawyer in a proceeding is affiliated with a law firm with which a relative of the judge is affiliated does not itself disqualify the judge. If, however, the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned under Paragraph A, or the relative is known by the judge to have an interest in the law firm that could be substantially affected by the proceeding under Subparagraph (A)(2)(c), the judge's disqualification is required.
[5] The fact that an employee of the court is a party to the proceeding does not of itself disqualify the judge. The judge shall consider the specifics of the case in determining whether the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned and if a recusal is required. Specific rules of procedure, including local court rules, may dictate automatic recusal, but when no rule exists, this comment shall apply.
[6] In Caperton v. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009), the United States Supreme Court held that the failure of a state supreme court justice to recuse when a party had made extraordinary and disproportionate contributions in support of the justice's candidacy in the previous election violated the opposing party's due process rights. The Court applied an objective standard and stated "that there is a serious risk of actual bias-based on objective and reasonable perceptions-when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising or directing the judge's election campaign when the case was pending or imminent." Id. at 2263-64. The Court recognized that states may, in their codes of judicial conduct, set more stringent standards for disqualification than imposed by the due process clause. Id. at 2267. A judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned under Paragraph A of this rule as a result of campaign contributions even though they are not so extraordinary and disproportionate as to violate a person's due process rights. The intent of the Code of Judicial Conduct is to insulate judges from this type of bias; Rules 21-402(E) and 21-403 NMRA contemplate that a judge or judicial candidate not solicit or be informed of campaign contributions from attorneys and litigants. Despite these prohibitions, a judge may become aware of contributions made on behalf of the judge's campaign.
[7] Excessive contributions to a judge's campaign by a party or a party's attorney may also undermine the public's confidence in a fair and impartial judiciary. An appearance of impropriety may result when attorneys or parties appearing before a judge generate large amounts of money for a campaign, either by contributing directly to the campaign, by contributing to political action committees supporting the judge, or by organizing large fund raisers. However, contributions made by attorneys to the campaigns of judicial candidates would not require a judge's disqualification in the absence of extraordinary circumstances.
[8] Attorney-Client Relationship:
(a) A judge is disqualified if the judge has an existing attorney-client relationship with a lawyer in a proceeding before the judge.
(b) A judge may be disqualified if the judge has an existing attorney-client relationship with a lawyer of the same firm as a lawyer appearing before the judge depending on the circumstances of the relationship and representation.
(c) Relevant factors in deciding whether disqualification is required under (b) above, include, but are not limited to, the nature of the representation, its duration and the period of time that has elapsed since the relationship.
[9] "Economic interest," as set forth in the terminology section, means ownership of more than a de minimis legal or equitable interest. Except for situations in which a judge participates in the management of such a legal or equitable interest, or the interest could be substantially affected by the outcome of a proceeding before a judge, it does not include:
(a) an interest in the individual holdings within a mutual or common investment fund;
(b) an interest in securities held by an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization in which the judge or the judge's spouse, domestic partner, parent, or child serves as a director, officer, advisor, or other participant;
(c) a deposit in a financial institution or deposits or proprietary interests the judge may maintain as a member of a mutual savings association or credit union, or similar proprietary interests; or
(d) an interest in the issuer of government securities held by the judge.
[10] Remittal of disqualification. A remittal procedure provides the parties an
opportunity to proceed without delay if they wish to waive the disqualification. To assure that consideration of the question of remittal is made independently of the judge, a judge must not solicit, seek, or hear comment on possible remittal or waiver of the disqualification unless the lawyers jointly propose remittal after consultation as provided in the rule. A party may act through counsel if counsel represents on the record that the party has been consulted and gives informed consent. As a practical matter, a judge may wish to have all parties and their lawyers sign the remittal agreement.
[11] The issue of whether a judge is required to recuse for an appearance of impropriety after being threatened by a defendant is "whether an objective, disinterested observer, fully informed of the underlying facts, would entertain significant doubt that justice would be done absent recusal." State v. Riordan, 2009-NMSC-022, ¶ 11, 146 N.M. 281, 209 P.3d 773 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Threats alone do not require recusal, and deference should be given to the trial court's decision when there is a significant possibility that the defendant is attempting to manipulate the justice system. Id.
[Adopted by Supreme Court Order No. 11-8300-045, effective January 1, 2012; as amended by Supreme Court Order No. 15-8300-013, effective December 31, 2015.]
ANNOTATIONS The 2015 amendment, approved by Supreme Court Order No. 15-8300-013, effective December 31, 2015, made technical changes to the rule, and revised the committee commentary; in Paragraph C, changed "Paragraph A(1)" to "Subparagraph (A)(1)"; and in the committee commentary, added the last sentence in Paragraph [5], and made technical changes throughout. Recompilations. - Pursuant to Supreme Court Order No. 11-8300-045, the former Judicial Code of Conduct was recompiled, effective January 1, 2012. See the table of corresponding rules for former rule numbers and the corresponding new rule numbers. Threats against a presiding judge. - Where thee criminal cases pending against the defendant were assigned to the same judge; during the pendency of the three cases, the defendant was charged with conspiring to commit an assault with a deadly weapon on the judge; the judge filed a recusal in the conspiracy case, but not in the other three pending cases; and there was no showing of bias by the judge against the defendant, the judge did not abuse the judge's discretion in denying the defendant's motion requesting the recusal of the judge. State v. Riordan, 2009-NMSC-022, 146 N.M. 281, 209 P.3d 773 (decided prior to the 2011 recompilation). Denial of recusal not an abuse of discretion. - Where defendant was a child offender under the juvenile system; the court determined that defendant was not amenable to rehabilitation or treatment as a child and sentenced defendant as an adult after defendant pled guilty to second degree murder; prior to being appointed as district judge, the trial judge had been appointed as a contract public defender to represent the victim, who had been murdered by defendant, in a juvenile delinquency proceeding; the judge's former law partner actually appeared at all the hearings in the victim's case; and the judge did not personally represent the victim, engage in plea negotiations on the victim's behalf, discuss a plea with the victim or the victim's parents, appear before the court on behalf of the victim or the victim's parents, or have direct contact with the victim in the juvenile proceedings, the judge did not err in denying defendant's request for recusal. State v. Trujillo, 2009-NMCA-128, 147 N.M. 334, 222 P.3d 1040, cert. quashed, 2010-NMCERT-011, 150 N.M. 490, 262 P.3d 1143 (decided prior to the 2011 recompilation). Judge acting as mediator and as hearing officer to impose sanctions. - Where a district judge appointed another district judge as a mediator to conduct a settlement conference; the mediator judge was subsequently appointed to hear motions for sanctions against one party for alleged bad faith participation in the settlement conference; the mediator judge heard the motions, made findings of fact, concluded that the party had conducted itself in bad faith at the conference, and entered an order requiring the party to pay a sanction; and the appointing district judge independently reviewed the mediator judge's decision and came to its own independent conclusion regarding sanctions; the appointing judge did not abuse its discretion in appointing the mediator judge to hear the motions for sanctions. Carlsbad Hotel Associates, L.L.C. v. Patterson-UTI Drilling Co., 2009-NMCA-005, 145 N.M. 385, 199 P.3d 288, cert. quashed, 2010-NMCERT-001, 147 N.M. 673, 227 P.3d 1055 (decided prior to the 2011 recompilation). Extrajudicial source. - The refusal of a judge to recuse in a malicious abuse of process case was proper where the analogy the court drew between a party and a well-known literary character (Jay Gatsby) did not establish any meaningful extrajudicial source. Dawley v. La Puerta Architectural Antiques, Inc., 2003-NMCA-029,133 N.M. 389, 62 P.3d 1271 (decided prior to the 2011 recompilation). Motion to recuse after waiver. - Where the district judge disclosed the basis for the judge's disqualification and the respondent waived disqualification by agreeing to abide by the judge's decisions on all issues of the case, the judge was not required to recuse upon the motion of the petitioner after the waiver. In re Adoption Petn. of Rebecca M., 2008-NMCA-038, 143 N.M. 554, 178 P.3d 839 (decided prior to the 2011 recompilation). Request for findings of fact and conclusions of law. - Because the court had decided in the state's favor, it was reasonable for the trial court to want to see requested findings of fact and conclusions of law from the plaintiff. Its request for those findings and conclusions did not show a bias or prejudice that would necessitate recusal, despite the defendant's assertion of an apparent personal interest of the court in ensuring that the state submit its requested findings and conclusions. State ex rel. Taxation & Revenue Dep't Motor Vehicle Div. v. Van Ruiten, 1988-NMCA-059, 107 N.M. 536, 760 P.2d 1302, cert. denied, 107 N.M. 413, 759 P.2d 200 (decided prior to the 2011 recompilation). Judge's relatives having ties to the victim. - Recusal of a judge at a murder trial was not required where the judge's brother-in-law was the attorney representing the victim's family in a wrongful death action against defendant and the judge's son was employed as a law clerk by the district attorney. State v. Fero, 1987-NMSC-008, 105 N.M. 339, 732 P.2d 866, aff'd, 1988-NMSC-053, 107 N.M. 369, 758 P.2d 783 (decided prior to the 2011 recompilation). Duty to exercise judicial function. - Except in those cases where a judge's impartiality might be reasonably questioned, the judge must exercise the judge's judicial function. Gerety v. Demers, 1978-NMSC-097, 92 N.M. 396, 589 P.2d 180 (decided prior to the 2011 recompilation). Recusal rests within the discretion of the trial judge. Demers v. Gerety, 1978-NMCA-019, 92 N.M. 749, 595 P.2d 387, aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 1978-NMSC-097, 92 N.M. 396, 589 P.2d 180; Klindera v. Worley Mills, Inc.,1981-NMCA-104, 96 N.M. 743, 634 P.2d 1295 (decided prior to the 2011 recompilation). Judge has discretionary power to disqualify sua sponte whenever the existence of any semblance of judicial bias or impropriety in a proceeding in the judge's court comes to the judge's attention. Demers v. Gerety, 1978-NMCA-019, 92 N.M. 749, 595 P.2d 387, aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 1978-NMSC-097, 92 N.M. 396, 589 P.2d 180 (decided prior to the 2011 recompilation). Statement of reasons for recusal not required. - When a recusal is challenged, and the challenge is denied, a district judge does not have a duty to state in the order of denial that the judge has valid reasons for recusing. Gerety v. Demers, 1978-NMSC-097, 92 N.M. 396, 589 P.2d 180 (decided prior to the 2011 recompilation). Compelling constitutional, statutory or ethical reason for recusal required. - Although the reasons for a judge to disqualify may be personal and the judge need not state them, nonetheless a judge has a duty to perform the judge's judicial role, and the judge has no right to disqualify unless there is a compelling constitutional, statutory or ethical cause for doing so. Gerety v. Demers, 1978-NMSC-097, 92 N.M. 396, 589 P.2d 180 (decided prior to the 2011 recompilation). Grounds relied on for disqualification must be adequate, because a judge has no right to disqualify in the absence of a valid reason. Demers v. Gerety, 1978-NMCA-019, 92 N.M. 749, 595 P.2d 387, aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 1978-NMSC-097, 92 N.M. 396, 589 P.2d 180 (decided prior to the 2011 recompilation). Suspicion of bias or prejudice is not enough to disqualify a judge. Roybal v. Morris, 1983-NMCA-101, 100 N.M. 305, 669 P.2d 1100 (decided prior to the 2011 recompilation). Casual transaction cannot be basis of disqualification. - A casual transaction between people is not a negative confrontation, so as to amount to an appearance of bias requiring voluntary disqualification. Lujan v. N.M. State Police Bd., 1983-NMSC-062, 100 N.M. 149, 667 P.2d 456 (decided prior to the 2011 recompilation). Impartiality throughout a case is required. - When a judge believes that the judge will be unable to remain impartial, the judge should recuse from the case in order to avoid a hint of impropriety. Gerety v. Demers, 1978-NMSC-097, 92 N.M. 396, 589 P.2d 180 (decided prior to the 2011 recompilation). Bias or prejudice as grounds for disqualification. - Bias or prejudice towards an attorney on each matter raised in the trial court is insufficient to disqualify a judge. This rule, however, is not absolute. If the bias or prejudice toward an attorney is of such a degree as to adversely affect the interest of the client, bias and prejudice toward an attorney is sufficient. Martinez v. Carmona, 1980-NMCA-139, 95 N.M. 545, 624 P.2d 54, cert. quashed, 95 N.M. 593, 624 P.2d 535 (1981) (decided prior to the 2011 recompilation). When a district judge believes that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned with reference to bias and prejudice concerning a party, the judge must not exercise the judge's judicial function. Martinez v. Carmona, 1980-NMCA-139, 95 N.M. 545, 624 P.2d 54, cert. quashed, 95 N.M. 593, 624 P.2d 535 (1981); Klindera v. Worley Mills, Inc., 1981-NMCA-104, 96 N.M. 743, 634 P.2d 1295 (decided prior to the 2011 recompilation). Recusal not required for prior judicial encounters. - The defendant's arguments that the trial judge was biased, based on the judge's previous contempt charges and sanctions or dislike toward the defendant, were without merit, since bias requiring recusal must arise from a personal, extra-judicial source, not a judicial source. Purpura v. Purpura, 1993-NMCA-001, 115 N.M. 80, 847 P.2d 314 (decided prior to the 2011 recompilation). Review of decision not to recuse. - A decision contrary to recusal is reviewable on appeal only if it amounts to an abuse of sound judicial discretion. Martinez v. Carmona, 1980-NMCA-139, 95 N.M. 545, 624 P.2d 54, cert. quashed, 95 N.M. 593, 624 P.2d 535 (1981) (decided prior to the 2011 recompilation). When a movant has failed to meet its burden of establishing that the judge has a personal or extrajudicial bias or prejudice against it, the judge's refusal to disqualify is proper. United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 1980-NMSC-094, 96 N.M. 155, 629 P.2d 231, appeal dismissed, 451 U.S. 901, 101 S.Ct. 1966, 68 L. Ed 2d 289 (1981) (decided prior to the 2011 recompilation). Comment reflecting feelings about violent crimes after conviction was obtained. - A comment reflecting the judge's feelings about violent crime once a conviction was obtained did not suggest that the judge had a personal bias or prejudice against defendant during trial. State v. Swafford, 1989-NMCA-069, 109 N.M. 132, 782 P.2d 385, cert. denied, 109 N.M. 54, 781 P.2d 782 (decided prior to the 2011 recompilation). Imposition of the maximum sentence. - A claim of judicial bias cannot be based upon the imposition of the maximum legal sentence. State v. Swafford, 1989-NMCA-069, 109 N.M. 132, 782 P.2d 385, cert. denied, 109 N.M. 54, 781 P.2d 782 (decided prior to the 2011 recompilation). Judge's refusal to accept a tendered plea agreement did not demonstrate judicial bias or prejudice, where, when the plea and disposition agreement was tendered, the judge reserved ruling on it until the judge could consider a presentence report, information or treatment programs, and written statements from the victim of the crime and the victim's sibling regarding their feelings and views on the proposed disposition. State v. Swafford, 1989-NMCA-069, 109 N.M. 132, 782 P.2d 385, cert. denied, 109 N.M. 54, 781 P.2d 782 (decided prior to the 2011 recompilation). JUDICIAL REPRIMANDS Potential witness in a criminal case. - Where a magistrate judge released the defendant on the defendant's own recognizance; the defendant had been arrested for driving while intoxicated after a baseball tournament; the judge was not the designated on-call judge on the day the defendant was arrested; the judge knew the defendant and had been at the tournament with the defendant earlier in the day; and the judge knew that there were people drinking alcoholic beverages at the tournament, the judge's conduct constituted willful misconduct in office because the judge was a potential witness in the defendant's criminal case. In re Wingenroth, S.Ct. No. 33,228 (Filed October 19, 2011), Inquiry Concerning a Judge No. 2011-020 (decided prior to the 2011 recompilation). Personal acquaintance with the defendant in a criminal case. - Where the defendant had been arrested for driving while intoxicated after a baseball tournament; the defendant's spouse telephoned the magistrate judge's spouse at the judge's home to discuss the defendant's arrest; the defendant and the defendant's spouse knew the judge's family well enough to call the judge's spouse in an attempt to influence the judge; and the judge agreed to release the defendant on the defendant's own recognizance even though the judge was not on-call or assigned to handle the matter, the judge's conduct constituted willful misconduct in office because the judge took judicial action based on the telephone calls from the defendant's family to the judge's home. In re Wingenroth, S.Ct. No. 33,228 (Filed October 19, 2011), Inquiry Concerning a Judge No. 2011-020 (decided prior to the 2011 recompilation). Failure to recuse after appearance of impropriety occurs. - Where a district judge developed a romantic relationship with an attorney who had cases pending before the judge; the judge told the attorney that the judge would enter a blanket recusal in the attorney's cases, but failed to do so; and when the attorney's cases came before the judge, the judge entered a recusal, made dishonest statements from the bench concerning the judge's reasons for entering a recusal, and notwithstanding the entry of a recusal, entered rulings in the cases, the judge committed willful misconduct in office. In re Schwartz, 2011-NMSC-019, 149 N.M. 721, 255 P.3d 299 (decided prior to the 2011 recompilation). Abusing prestige of judicial office. - Where a municipal judge had private conversations with a contractor about the contractor's personal financial dispute with landowners who allegedly owed the contractor money for cleaning up the landowners' property; the judge called the landowners and left a message on the landowners' answering machine in which the judge identified himself as a judge and stated that the judge was calling about the financial dispute between them and the contractor and that the judge wanted the matter cleared up; the judge subsequently wrote the landowners a letter on municipal stationery, using the judge's title and court name discussing the contractor's claim and indicating that a lawsuit would be filed if the contractor was not paid; two weeks later, the judge was assigned to preside over a nuisance action by the municipality concerning the land that the contractor had supposedly cleaned; and the judge accepted the case and issued a summons to the landowners that did not conform with the rules of procedure, the judge's conduct constituted willful misconduct in office. In re Ramirez, S.Ct. No. 31,664 (Filed June 26, 2009) (decided prior to the 2011 recompilation). Giving advice to a witness in a case pending before the judge. - Where the judge had an ex parte conversation with the complaining witness in a domestic violence case that was pending before the judge; the witness had been subpoenaed by the state to appear and testify at the witness' spouse's trial; the judge advised the witness that if the witness did not want to testify, there would be no adverse consequences; the witness did not appeal at the trial; the assistant district attorney informed the judge that the district attorney's office has been informed of the ex parte communication with the witness; the judge began drafting a recusal; when the witness appeared, the judge recalled the case and dismissed it; and the judge subsequently produced a recusal that was different from the document that had been reviewed by the assistant district attorney, the judge's conduct constituted willful misconduct in office. In re Rodella, 2008-NMSC-050, 144 N.M. 617, 190 P.3d 338 (decided prior to the 2011 recompilation). Making campaign promise to provide assistance if elected. - Where, during the time a judge was a candidate for magistrate court judge, the judge told a landlord that the judge would help if the landlord had a problem in court; when the judge learned that the landlord was having trouble with a tenant, the judge reviewed the lease and advised the landlord to file suit after the judge was elected; the judge also explained how the landlord could excuse the other magistrate court judges to make sure the judge heard the case; after the judge was elected, the landlord filed suit and excused the other magistrate court judges; and at a hearing on the case, the judge became impatient with the landlord and filed a recusal, the judge violated the Code of Judicial Conduct, subjecting the judge to removal from office. In re Rodella, 2008-NMSC-050, 144 N.M. 617, 190 P.3d 338 (decided prior to the 2011 recompilation). Insufficient evidence of willful misconduct in office. - Where a judge called the jail and set bond for a defendant who was the parent of the judge's friend and who had been arrested for DWI; when no one was available to accept the bond, the judge changed the release order to release the defendant to the custody of the defendant's spouse and hand-delivered the release order late at night to the jail in another town; the judge presided over the arraignment of the defendant; and the judge filed a recusal when a newspaper reported on the matter, there was no clear and convincing evidence that the judge committed willful misconduct in office. In re Rodella, 2008-NMSC-050, 144 N.M. 617, 190 P.3d 338 (decided prior to the 2011 recompilation). Adjudicating traffic cases for family members and friends. - Where a judge adjudicated more than twenty cases involving family members, friends, and family members of friends and staff, ex parte without hearings or taking evidence; the judge was not the assigned judge and adjudicated the cases before their scheduled arraignment dates, either deferring or continuing the cases with the requirement that no further traffic violations occur within ninety days; and where defendants had failed to appear, the judge cancelled bench warrants and dismissed charges for failure to appear, the judge's conduct constituted willful misconduct in office. In re Griego, 2008-NMSC-020, 143 N.M. 698, 181 P.3d 690 (decided prior to the 2011 recompilation). Insufficient evidence of willful misconduct. - Where a municipal judge accepted an uncounseled guilty plea and sentenced the defendant; the defendant's attorney appealed to the district court; the municipal judge believed that the municipal attorney and the defendant's attorney had misrepresented the municipal proceedings to the district court judge and charged the municipal attorney and the defendant's attorney with contempt; the municipal judge did not file a recusal; a pretrial hearing and a trial were automatically scheduled by the clerk's office; and when the municipal judge reviewed the district court proceedings and discovered that the municipal proceedings had not been misrepresented to the district court, the municipal judge dismissed the contempt charges, the evidence did not clearly and convincingly demonstrate that, by acting in a case in which the municipal judge should have filed a recusal, the municipal judge's actions constituted willful misconduct in office. In re Locatelli, 2007-NMSC-029, 141 N.M. 755, 161 P.3d 252 (decided prior to the 2011 recompilation). Allowing relationship to influence judicial conduct. - Where a judge was assigned a criminal case in which the defendant was charged with multiple counts of trafficking cocaine and distribution of methamphetamine; during the proceedings, the judge stipulated that the judge knew that by presiding over defendant's case the judge would not appear to be impartial, because the judge had a personal relationship with the attorney for and fiancé of the defendant who subsequently became the spouse of the defendant; the judge did not recuse from the case; the defendant pled no contest; the pre-sentence report stated that the defendant was a drug dealer and recommended prison sentences; at the sentencing hearing, the judge considered assigning the defendant to a new drug court program in lieu of incarceration; the judge agreed with the chief judge to recuse from the case; at a sentencing hearing before the new judge, the defendant stated that the original judge wanted to revoke the recusal; the new judge recused; and the original judge revoked the recusal and accepted jurisdiction over sentencing, the judge's conduct constituted willful misconduct in office. In re McBee, 2006-NMSC-024, 138 N.M. 482, 134 P.3d 769 (decided prior to the 2011 recompilation). Personal involvement with and harassment of trial counsel. - Where a judge presided over and took judicial action in cases in which the assistant district attorney appeared on behalf of the State during the time the judge was engaged in a personal relationship with the assistant district attorney; the judge failed to inform all counsel or parties of record of the judge's relationship with the assistant district attorney in cases where the assistant district attorney appeared before the judge; the judge failed to be patient, dignified and courteous to counsel by making inappropriate remarks to assistant district attorneys about the judge's rulings in front of defendants, defense counsel and co-counsel; and in one case, the judge suppressed evidence of a breath test, refused to allow the assistant district attorney to call the officer who administered the breath test to testify, and then taunted the assistant district attorney about not being able to prove the state's case, the judge committed willful misconduct in office. In re Galvan, S.Ct. No. 28,609 (Filed May 17, 2004) (decided prior to the 2011 recompilation). Involvement in friend's criminal case. - Where a judge became involved in the pending criminal case of a friend by speaking with the arresting state police officer by cellular telephone during the traffic stop and arrest; personally going to the adult detention center and ordered the friend's release and taking the friend to the judge's house, and speaking to a registered nurse and asking the nurse to draw an independent blood sample from the friend; and the judge had an alcoholic drink before going to the jail to release the friend and may have had the odor of alcohol on the judge's breath, the judge's conduct constituted willful misconduct in office. In re Sanchez, S.Ct. No. 25,821 (Filed March 14, 2001) (decided before the 2011 recompilation). Ex parte communications with a relative about sentencing defendant. - Where a magistrate judge had ex parte communications with the former court administrator of the district court concerning the sentencing and disposition of a defendant who was a relative of the former court administrator and the desire of the defendant's family was that the defendant be ordered to obtain alcohol/drug counseling, the judge's conduct constituted willful misconduct in office. In re Perea, S.Ct. No. 25,822 (Filed August 17, 1999) (decided prior to the 2011 recompilation). Intentional denial of right to appeal. - Where a judge ruled in favor of the defendant, refused to enter a judgment in the case to prevent the plaintiff from appealing in order to force the plaintiff to settle with the defendant; when the Supreme Court ordered the judge to enter a judgment, the judge expanded the issues litigated in the case; and after being reversed, the judge refused to award costs to the plaintiff, precipitating another appeal, the judge's conduct constituted willful misconduct in office. In re Castellano, 1995-NMSC-007, 119 N.M. 140, 889 P.2d 175 (decided prior to the 2011 recompilation). Adjudicating cases in which the judge has a personal interest. - Where a judge filed a criminal complaint for criminal trespass against the defendant who had disregarded the judge's direction by visiting the premises rented by the judge's tenant; scheduled an arraignment in the judge's court, and later filed a recusal in the case; and in a second case, the judge filed a criminal complaint for criminal damage to property against the defendant, who was a former tenant of the judge, arraigned the defendant, committed the defendant to jail, and dismissed the charges without prejudice when the defendant agreed to repair the damages to the premises, which the defendant had rented from the judge, the judge's conduct constituted willful misconduct in office. In re Lucero, 1985-NMSC-053, 102 N.M. 745, 700 P.2d 648 (decided prior to the 2011 recompilation).