Miss. R. App. P. 4
ADVISORY COMMITTEE HISTORICAL NOTE
Effective April 29, 1998, Rules 4(d) and (e) were amended to provide that a notice of appeal filed before disposition of specified post trial motions becomes effective on disposition thereof and is effective to appeal said disposition. In addition, the list of specified motions was enlarged to include M.R.C.P. 60 motions filed within 10 days. 706-708 So.2d XLIV (West Miss.Cases 1998).
Effective July 1, 1997, a new Rule 4(h) was added to provide for reopening of time for appeal in the event that a notice of entry of judgment is not received. The former Rule 4(h) was redesignated 4(i). 689-692 So. 2d LXII (West Miss. Cases 1997).
Effective January 1, 1995, Miss.R.App.P. 4 replaced Miss.Sup.Ct.R. 4, embracing proceedings in the Court of Appeals. 644-647 So.2d XXVII-XXX (West Miss.Cases 1994).
Effective July 1, 1994, the Comment to Miss.Sup.Ct.R. 4 was amended to delete references to repealed statutes and material concerning the transition from statutory procedures to Rule practice. 632-635 So. 2d V (West Miss.Cases 1994).
Effective July 1, 1994, the Comment to Miss.Sup.Ct.R. 4 was amended to provide that the date of the entry of the judgment is the date the judgment is entered in the general docket of the clerk of court, and to delete an outdated case citation. 632-635 So.2d XLIV-XLV (West Miss.Cases 1994).
[Adopted August 21, 1996; amended effective July 1, 1997; July 1, 1998.]
Comment
Rule 4 applies to appeals and cross-appeals in all civil and criminal cases. The date of entry of judgment is the date the judgment is entered in the general docket of the clerk of the court. M.R.C.P. 58.
The notice of appeal requirement applies to all forms of appeal, including cross-appeals. Rule 4(c) requires that a notice of appeal for a cross-appeal be filed within 14 days after the date on which the first notice of appeal was filed, unless a longer period is prescribed by another provision of Rule 4.
Previously, Rule 4(d) specified certain post-trial motions that had to await disposition before a valid notice of appeal could be filed. Any notice of appeal filed before such disposition had no force or effect. Rule 4(e) had the same provisions for specified post-trial motions in criminal cases. Those provisions of Rules 4(d) and 4(e), however, created a trap for an unsuspecting litigant who filed a notice of appeal before a post trial motion, or while a post trial motion was pending. Because the Rules required a party to file a new notice of appeal after the motion's disposition, unless a new notice was filed the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. See In re Kimbrough, 680 So.2d 799 (Miss.1996). Many litigants, especially pro se litigants, failed to file the second notice of appeal, and the Court expressed dissatisfaction with the rule. See id. (Banks, J., dissenting) and (McRae, J., dissenting).
Rules 4(d) and 4(e) now provide that a notice of appeal filed before the disposition of a specified post trial motion will become effective upon disposition of the motion. A notice filed before the filing of one of the specified motions or after the filing of a motion but before its disposition is, in effect, suspended until the motions disposition, whereupon the previously filed notice effectively places jurisdiction in the Supreme Court. Still, ordinarily, the filing of a notice of appeal should come after the disposition of these motions. An appeal should not be noticed and docketed in the Supreme Court while it is still possible that the appealing party may obtain relief in the trial court.
Because a notice of appeal will ripen into an effective appeal upon disposition of a post trial motion, in some instances there will be an appeal from a judgment that has been altered substantially because the motion was granted in whole or in part. Many such appeals will be dismissed for want of prosecution when the appellant fails to meet the briefing schedule. But, the appellee may also move to strike the appeal. When responding to such a motion, the appellant would have an opportunity to state that, even though some relief sought in a post trial motion was granted, the appellant still plans to pursue the appeal. Because the appellant's response would provide the appellee with sufficient notice of the appellant's intentions, an additional notice of appeal is unnecessary.
While Rule 4 is patterned after its Federal counterpart, Rule 4(d) departs from Federal practice by providing that a valid notice of appeal is effective to appeal from an order disposing of a post trial tolling motion. Under FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4), if a party wishes to appeal from the disposition of a post trial tolling motion, the party must amend the notice to so indicate. However, requiring amendment of the notice of appeal would create a new, albeit less severe, trap for unsuspecting litigants, without serving a substantial purpose.
Rule 4(d) is also amended to include, among motions that extend the time for filing a notice of appeal, a Rule 60 motion that is filed within 10 days after entry of judgment. This eliminates the difficulty of determining whether a post trial motion made within 10 days after entry of a judgment is a Rule 59 motion, which tolls the time for filing an appeal, or a Rule 60 motion, which historically has not tolled the time. See Michael v. Michael, 650 So.2d 469 (Miss. 1995).
Rule 4(f) continues to recognize an extension for parties under a legal disability. See Parks v. Knight, 491 So. 2d 217 (Miss. 1986). Rule 4(g) is based on Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5). A motion filed before expiration of the 30 day period may be ex parte and may be granted for any "good cause." This standard is identical to that found in Rule 26. The extension may not go beyond 30 days after the time prescribed in Rule 4(a).
If the motion is not filed until the extension period has begun to run, the burden rests on the appellant to show the failure to file a timely notice was a result of "excusable neglect." Mere failure to learn of entry of the judgment is generally not a ground for showing excusable neglect. Counsel in a case taken under advisement has a duty to check the docket regularly. But see City of Gulfport v. Saxon, 437 So. 2d 1215, 1217 (Miss. 1983) (when trial court sits as an appellate court, parties may reasonably expect notification from the court or clerk when a ruling is made). Filing a notice is a simple act, and a party must do all it could reasonably be expected to do to perfect the appeal in a timely fashion. Counsel's failure to read published rules of court and counsel's reliance on mistaken legal advice from a trial court clerk will not show excusable neglect. Campbell v. Bowlin, 724 F. 2d 484, 488 (5th Cir. 1984); Reed v. Kroger Co., 478 F. 2d 1268 (T.E.C.A. 1973). Excusable neglect will not be shown by counsel's busy trial schedule. Pinero Schroeder v. Fed. Nat'l Mtg. Ass'n, 574 F. 2d 1117 (1st Cir. 1978).
On the other hand, a party misled by actions of the court can establish excusable neglect. See Chipser v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 600 F. 2d 1061, 1063 (5th Cir. 1979); In re Morrow, 502 F. 2d 520, 522 (5th Cir. 1974) (dictum). Excusable neglect may be shown where a timely mailed notice was late because of unanticipated and uncontrollable delays in the mail. Fallen v. United States, 378 U.S. 139, 84 S. Ct. 1689, 12 L. Ed. 2d 760 (1964). See generally, 20 W. Moore, Federal Practice§ 304-13.
An excusable neglect motion must be filed within the 30 day extension period. The extension will be limited to that period, or to a period ending 10 days after the entry of an order granting the motion, whichever occurs later.
In criminal cases, the Court may suspend Rule 4 to permit out of time appeals. Post-conviction relief proceedings are governed by the rules controlling criminal appeals. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-25(1)(1994). No such suspension, however, is permitted in a civil case. See Rules 2(c); 26(b).
Rule 4(h) is patterned after FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(6), which was added to the Federal Rules in 1991. Rule 4(h) provides a limited opportunity for relief, independent of and in addition to that available under Rule 4(g), in circumstances where the notice of entry of a judgment or order, required to be mailed by the clerk of the trial court pursuant to Rule 77(d) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, is either not received by a party or is received so late as to impair the opportunity to file a timely notice of appeal. Rule 4(h) allows a trial court to reopen for a brief period the time for appeal upon a finding that notice of entry of a judgment or order was not received from the clerk or a party within 21 days of its entry and that no party would be prejudiced. While the party seeking relief under Rule 4(h) bears the burden of persuading the trial court of lack of timely notice, a specific factual denial of receipt of notice rebuts and terminates the presumption that mailed notice was received. See Nunley v. City of Los Angeles, 52 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir. 1995). "Prejudice" means some adverse consequence other than the cost of having to oppose the appeal and encounter the risk of reversal, consequences that are present in every appeal. Prejudice might arise, for example, if the appellee had taken some action in reliance on the expiration of the normal time period for filing a notice of appeal.
While the trial court retains some discretion to refuse to reopen the time for appeal even when the requirements of Rule (4)(h) are met, the concept of excusable neglect embodied in Rule 4(g) simply has no place in the application of Rule 4(h). See Avolio v. Suffolk, 29 F.3d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 1994). "To hold otherwise would negate the addition of Rule 4 [h], which provides an avenue of relief separate and apart from Rule 4 [g]." Nunley v. City of Los Angeles, 52 F.3d 792, 797 (9th Cir. 1995). Thus, "where non-receipt has been proven and no other party would be prejudiced, the denial of relief cannot rest on [a lack of excusable neglect, such as] a party's failure to learn independently of the entry of judgment during the thirty-day period for filing notices of appeal." Id. at 798.
Reopening may be ordered only upon a motion filed within 180 days of the entry of a judgment or order or within 7 days of receipt of notice of such entry, whichever is earlier. This provision establishes an outer time limit of 180 days for a party who fails to receive timely notice of entry of a judgment or order to seek additional time to appeal and enables any winning party to shorten the 180-day period by sending (and establishing proof of receipt of) its own notice of entry of a judgment or order, as authorized by Miss. R. Civ. P. 77(d). Winning parties are encouraged to send their own notice in order to lessen the chance that a judge will accept a claim of non-receipt in the face of evidence that notices were sent by both the clerk and the winning party. Receipt of a winning party's notice will shorten only the time for reopening the time for appeal under this subdivision, leaving the normal time periods for appeal unaffected.
If the motion is granted, the trial court may reopen the time for filing a notice of appeal only for a period of 14 days from the date of entry of the order reopening the time for appeal.
The taxpayer who prosecutes an appeal under Rule 4(i) must comply with these rules and file a timely notice of appeal under 4(a), or 4(c), if applicable.
[Amended effective July 1, 1997; July 1, 1998; July 1, 2017.]
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