Mass. R. Civ. P. 4
Mass. R. Civ. P. 4
Reporter's Notes--2021
With the adoption of the Massachusetts Rules of Electronic Filing (Mass. R. E. F.) (Supreme Judicial Court Rule 1:25, effective September 1, 2018), parties may electronically file case initiating documents and may serve documents on other parties electronically. However, where a case is electronically filed, service of process must be accomplished consistent with the provisions of Rule 4, i.e., through a sheriff or deputy sheriff, constable, or person specially appointed by the court. See Rule 4(a) (unless there is written consent or the court has otherwise ordered); Mass. R. E. F. 6(c). There is no electronic service of process on a defendant.
Reporter's Notes:
(July 1996): With the merger of the District/Municipal Courts Rules of Civil Procedure into the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure in 1996, two differences that had existed between the two sets of rules have been eliminated. Prior to the merger, the District Court version of Rule 4(f) required proof of service to be made to the court and to the party; in addition, the District Court version included constables among those who are not required to make an affidavit of service. The merged set of rules adopts the version of Rule 4(f) contained in the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the merged set of rules, proof of service in the District Court is required to be made only to the court and constables are required to make affidavit of service.
It should be noted that there may be additional requirements in connection with service of process imposed by statute. See, for example, G.L. c. 223, § 31, which provides that where service is made at the defendant's last and usual place of abode in District Court actions, "the officer making service shall forthwith mail first class a copy of the summons to such last and usual place of abode. The date of mailing and the address to which the summons was sent shall be set forth.in the officer's return."
(July 1988): This amendment sets a 90 day limit after filing for the service of the summons and complaint upon defendants, unless "good cause" is shown. On April 7, 1986 the Supreme Judicial Court ordered, inter alia, that: "The time standards set forth below for the trial, settlement or other disposition of civil cases are hereby adopted applicable to cases entered in any department of the Trial Court on or after July 1, 1988: CIVIL CASES OTHER THAN FAMILY LAW CASES, Superior Court, District Court, and Boston Municipal Court, all jury and non-jury cases within 24 months after filing." The amendment should aid parties and the courts in meeting the time standards promulgated by the Supreme Judicial Court. The amendment is patterned after Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j), but the Massachusetts amendment prescribes a 90 day limit, rather than the 120 days in the Federal Rules, in order to further aid in the timely disposition of cases.
If a party does not think it will be able to obtain service within the 90 day period, a timely motion can be made for "cause shown" for an enlargement of time pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1). Moreover, Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(j) also permits a party to "show good cause why such service was not made within" the 90 day period.
(June 1976): Rule 4(d)(3) governs service upon the Commonwealth or one of its agencies (but not upon a political subdivision, see Rule 4(d)(4), or an authority or board (Rule 4(d)(5) ). As originally promulgated, the rule made no provision for service upon the agency directly. Moreover, certain sections of the Administrative Procedure Act, G.L. Chapter 30A, Sections 14(1), (2), seemed to conflict with Rule 4(d)(3). In order to rationalize the procedure for appealing from an administrative decision, legislation has been prepared to amend G.L. Chapter 30A, Sections 14(1) and (2). Essentially, the amendments ensure that in all appeals of this sort, the appellant will serve the agency-and every party to the agency proceedings-pursuant to the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure governing service of process. Thus service upon the agency itself follows Rule 4(d)(3), and service upon the other parties looks to Rule 4(d)(1) (which remains unamended).
The original Rule 4(d)(3) required service only upon the Attorney General, not upon the agency. Such service, however, could be effected by certified or registered mail. As amended, Rule 4(d)(3) requires service upon the agency (through either its chairman, any one of its members, or its secretary or clerk). The rule also retains the old requirement of service upon the Attorney General, explicitly directed to the Boston office, to expedite handling. But each service, whether on the agency or the Attorney General, may be made by certified or registered mail. Moreover, as the amendment to Rule 4(c) makes explicit, the actual mailing maybe accomplished by the party or his attorney, rather than any of the usual process servers.
It is worth realizing that, although the amendment to Rule 4(d)(3) resulted primarily from a desire to integrate the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure and the Administrative Procedure Act, the new, simplified service procedure which the amendment establishes applies to any action against the Commonwealth or any agency, not merely to administrative appeals. It does not, of course, alter any substantive principles concerning administrative review or the Commonwealth's liability to suit.
Finally, the amendment to Rule 4(d)(3) does not affect the requirement of Rule 4(d)(6) that, when in any action to which the Commonwealth is not a party, the validity of an agency (or other official) order comes into question, the party raising the question must notify the Attorney General.
(December 1975): The last sentence of Rule 4(c) makes clear that whenever a statute, like the so-called long-arm statute, G.L. Chapters 223A, Sections 1-3, authorizes service by certified or registered mail, it is not necessary to enlist the aid of a process server to do the mailing.
(February 1975): Rule 4(c) has been amended to make clear that process in the types of actions covered by Rule 4(h) need not be served by any of the individuals enumerated in Rule 4(c).
Rule 4(h) has been inserted to correct a serious inconvenience resulting from the apparent applicability to such Probate Court matters as petitions for instructions and accounts of Rule 4 's general service requirements. If Rule 4, as originally promulgated, applied to this type of case, the cost of service might frequently assume excessive proportions. A petition for instructions involving a trust with numerous beneficiaries could require substantial service charges; an account in a common trust fund with over a thousand participants would impose massive expenses.
Prior to July 1, 1974, it was unquestioned that notice of the pendency of a petition for instructions, or the presentation for allowance of an account could be-and invariably was-effected by citation, served in hand or by publication. Moreover, a statute, G.L. Ch. 215, Sec. 46, authorized the court to direct service to be made by registered mail, thus permitting appreciable saving in service costs. (Another statute, G.L. Ch. 4, Sec. 7, equating certified mail with registered mail for this purpose, permitted an even less expensive procedure.)
As the amendatory legislation accompanying the Rules, St. 1973, Ch. 1114, repealed neither G.L. Ch. 215, Sec. 46, nor G.L.Ch. 4, Sec. 7, many probate courts continued to issue citations in the old form even after July 1, 1974. Others required service in accordance with Rule 4.
To eliminate the confusion, and to maximize flexibility in the particular class of actions affected, Rule 4(h) now explicitly approves both methods of procedure: in any Probate Court action seeking instructions or the allowance of an account, service may-but need not-be made by citation. In those rare cases whose strategy dictates service by an officer, the usual Rule 4 procedure is available.
Although the change in Rule 4(c) and the language of Rule 4(h) are both declaratory of existing practice as to accounts, the Supreme Judicial Court, in the order of February 24, 1975, promulgating the amendments, specifically made the new material retroactive to July 1, 1974. Thus service between July 1, 1974, and February 24, 1975, was valid so long as it was made either: (1) in accordance with a citation; or (2) in accordance with Rule 4.
(1973) Rule 4 deals with process and service. It extensively changes Federal Rule 4 to meet state conditions and to adopt such existing state law as the "long-arm" statute, G.L. c. 223A, §§ 1-8. Rule 4(a), unlike Federal Rule 4(a), puts the onus of delivering process to the server upon the plaintiff or his attorney, rather than upon the clerk. It explicitly allows the plaintiff or the attorney to obtain the blank summons form in advance.
Rule 4(c) permits special court appointment of process servers.
Rule 4(d) somewhat changes the Massachusetts rule that in actions of tort or contract, not involving an attachment, the summons need not contain a copy of the declaration. Under Rule 4(d), the summons does not contain the complaint, but the two must be served together.
Rule 4(d)(1) allows process to be "left at [defendant's] last and usual place of abode," G.L. c. 223, § 31. The Rule makes clear that service on a statutorily authorized agent may also require the giving of additional notice, and that the plaintiff must consult the statute and fulfill its requirements. If service in any of the modes prescribed by Rule 4(d)(1) is impossible, the plaintiff may obtain an order of notice. See G.L. c. 223, § 34; c. 227, § 7. Divorce proceedings brought in the Superior Court, c. 208, § 6, although governed by these rules, are, in matters of notice and service, controlled by G.L. c. 208, § 8.
Rule 4(d)(1) incorporates prior law covering service upon infants and incompetents. No statute treats the situation precisely of G.L. c. 206, § 24. At common law, an infant or an incompetent must be served like any other defendant, and service must precede the appointment of a guardian ad litem, Taylor v. Lovering, 171 Mass. 303, 306, 50 N.E. 612, 613 (1898); Reynolds v. Remick, 327 Mass. 465, 469, 470-471, 99 N.E.2d 279, 281-282 (1951).
Rule 4(d)(2) governs service upon a business entity. Basically, it allows the entity to be served via its officers, manager, or service-receiver designated by appointment or statute. A domestic entity may, alternatively, be served by leaving the papers at the principal office with the person in charge of the business. This somewhat widens prior Massachusetts practice. For an example of the kind of statutory notice covered by the proviso clause of Rule 4(d)(2), see G.L. c. 181, § 4. The "order-of-notice" provision follows Rule 4(d)(1).
Rule 4(d)(2), unlike the cognate Federal Rule, does not refer to "partnerships." Because Massachusetts law so clearly treats partners as individuals for purposes of suit, Shapira v. Budish, 275 Mass. 120, 126, 175 N.E. 159, 161 (1931), use of the federal language would work an undesirable change in substantive law.
Rule 4(d)(3), like Federal Rule 4(d)(4), covers service upon the sovereign or one of its agencies. Service is complete upon delivery to the Attorney-General's office or upon the mailing of the papers to him by registered or certified mail.
Rule 4(d)(4) governs service upon political subdivisions of the Commonwealth subject to suit. It simplifies the procedure set out in G.L. c. 223, § 37, and applies the principles of the rest of Rule 4 to service of political subdivisions. Rule 4(d)(4) requires the plaintiff to bring the fact of suit to the attention of the person who is most likely to sound the litigational alarm; but it does not require him to do more.
Rule 4(d)(5) applies the principles of Rule 4(d) to service of public entities subject to suit under a common name.
Rule 4(d)(6) is designed to ensure that the Attorney General receives prompt notification of any possible court test (however collateral) of an order of an officer or agency of the Commonwealth. The Rule seeks to minimize the inconvenience to the public which results when such test does not come to the Attorney General's attention until late in the litigation. Rule 4(d)(6) is therefore a mandate of convenience. Failure to observe it will not vitiate otherwise valid service; courts should, however, be alert to compel observance of its requirements.
Rule 4(e) controls out-of-state service. It embodies the procedure set out in the long-arm statute (G.L. c. 223A, §§ 6-7 ), which in turn relied heavily upon Federal Rule 4(i) (a section omitted, therefore, from these rules). Rule 4(e) is largely self- explanatory and is flexible enough, when read with Rule 4(d)(1) and (2) and G.L. c. 223, § 37; c. 223A, §§ 1-3, to cover most order-of-notice situations. See also c. 227, § 7.
Rule 4(f) requires direct filing by the server. It should be emphasized that any delay by the process server does not bar the plaintiff. See Peeples v. Ramspacher, 29 F. Supp. 632, 633 (E.D.S.C. 1939).
Rule 4(g) tracks Federal Rule 4(h) verbatim. It follows the spirit of the Federal Rules, refusing to allow "technicalities" to obstruct justice. See Rule 15 (covering amendments to pleadings) and Rule 60 (covering relief from judgments). It will work no substantial change in Massachusetts practice. See G.L. c. 231, § 51.