Ga. Code. Jud. Cond. 2.5
Commentary:
[1] Judges may perform weddings during their normal office hours, when doing so does not interfere with or delay court proceedings, security, or operations. Some courts and judges may have minimal time available for conducting weddings.
[2] Judges who perform weddings during their normal office hours, for which they are collecting a salary or are paid a per diem, shall not require payment for this service. Judges may receive a reasonable tip, gratuity, or negotiated consideration only for weddings performed both away from the courthouse and outside their normal office hours. See OCGA § 19-3-49. It is inappropriate for a judge to have a policy of performing weddings only afterhours and off-site in order to receive payment.
[3] Any remuneration received for performing a wedding shall be reported under Rule 3.15 as extra-judicial compensation.
[4] As Rule 2.1 states, the primary role of judges is to "serve as the arbiters of facts and law for the resolution of disputes." See also Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Henry County Bd. of Comm'rs, 315 Ga. 39, 50 (2) (b) (880 SE2d 168) (2022) ("The judicial power is that which declares what law is, and applies it to past transactions and existing cases; it expounds and judicially administers the law; it interprets and enforces the law in a case in litigation." (cleaned up)). But our constitutional system of separated powers also vests in at least some judges and organizations of judges an additional role, that of policy-maker with respect to administrative duties. Much of that authority is vested in the Supreme Court, but at least some is vested in other classes of courts as well. See, e.g., Ga. Const. Art. VI, Sec. IX, Par. I (providing for the advice and consent of councils of trial courts in the adoption by the Supreme Court of uniform trial court rules). Judges in whom the Constitution has vested policy-making power must be free to exercise that power in the manner they believe best serves the public, even if that involves preferring and advocating for particular outcomes within the scope of that policy-making power in a manner that otherwise would be forbidden if it instead regarded an impending matter or a pending proceeding. While judges must always be impartial in their exercise of adjudicative duties (which this Code identifies by the use of the terms "impending matters" and "pending proceedings"), extending to policy-making administrative duties that same requirement of impartiality - at least in the colloquial sense of that word - would be in tension with the nature of policy-making power. As used in this Code, of course, impartiality has a narrower, two-fold meaning than its colloquial sense: (1) avoiding bias and prejudice, and (2) maintenance of an open mind in considering issues that may come before a judge. The first such meaning applies to all judicial actions, which Rule 2.5 (A) reiterates. But the second meaning is limited to the exercise of adjudicative duties, as are the recusal obligations of Rule 2.11, which by its very terms apply only to proceedings. In the same way, Rule 2.9 's prohibition on ex parte communications, by its text and nature, applies only to impending matters and pending proceedings, and hence has no application to administrative duties unrelated to such matters or proceedings. That judges, lawyers, members of the public, or other stakeholders may have and communicate an interest in how a judge performs administrative duties does not convert the administrative duty into an adjudicative duty.
Ga. Code. Jud. Cond. 2.5