Fl. R. Civ. P. 1.431
Committee Notes
1971 Adoption. Subdivision (a) is new. It is intended to replace section 40.101, Florida Statutes, declared unconstitutional in Smith v. Portante, 212 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 1968), after supplying the deficiencies in the statute. It is intended to simplify the task of selecting prospective jurors, both for the venire and for the panel for trial in a particular action. The forms referred to in subdivision (a) are forms 1.983 and 1.984. Subdivisions (b)-(e) are sections 53.031, 53.021, 53.011, and 53.051, Florida Statutes, without substantial change.
1976 Amendment. Subdivision (e) has been added to establish a procedure for challenging jurors without members of the panel knowing the source of the challenge, to avoid prejudice. Subdivision (f) is a renumbering of the previously enacted rule regarding alternate jurors.
Subdivision (g) has been added to establish a procedure for interviewing jurors. See also Canons of Professional Responsibility DR 7 108.
1988 Amendment. Subdivision (f) has been added to ensure the right to "back-strike" prospective jurors until the entire panel has been accepted in civil cases. This right to back-strike until the jurors have been sworn has been long recognized in Florida. Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United Building Systems, Inc., 408 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). However, in the recent case of Valdes v. State, 443 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), the court held that it was not error for a court to swear jurors one at a time as they were accepted and thereby prevent retrospective peremptory challenges. The purpose of this subdivision is to prevent the use of individual swearing of jurors in civil cases. Former subdivisions (f) and (g) have been redesignated as (g) and (h) respectively.
1992 Amendment. Subdivision (g)(2) is amended to minimize the inequity in numbers of peremptory challenges allowed in selecting alternate jurors in actions with multiple parties.
2005 Amendment. Subdivision (c)(1) is amended to ensure that prospective jurors may be challenged for cause based on bias in favor of or against nonparties against whom liability or blame may be alleged in accordance with the decisions in Fabre v. Marin, 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993), or Nash v. Wells Fargo Guard Services, Inc., 678 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1996).
2013 Amendment. Subdivision (i) governs the responsibility of the court for ensuring that parties and their counsel are aware of all contact with the jury that could affect the outcome of the case. Trial judges may have differing views on what constitutes harmless or routine ex parte communication with jurors. Reasonable variations are therefore permitted, provided the judge adequately advises counsel, before the trial begins, of the specific circumstances under which the court has determined that jury communications will not be reported to the parties. The rule does not prevent the bailiff or other courtroom personnel from discussing such routine matters as juror parking, location of break areas, how and when to assemble for duty, dress, and which items of a juror's personal property may be brought into the courthouse or jury room. However, for example, questions or remarks from a juror about such matters as the length of a witness's testimony, when court will adjourn on a given day, or how long the trial may take to complete should be reported to the judge, as these matters may be of interest to the parties. Any doubt as to whether a communication may or may not be of interest to the parties should be resolved in favor of promptly informing the court, the parties, and counsel, even if it is after the fact. This will best ensure that the parties have the opportunity to object to any improper communication and give the court an opportunity to cure any prejudice, if an objection is made.