Sup. Ct. R. D.C. 12-I
COMMENT TO 2024 AMENDMENTS
Subsections (g)(2)(B), (g)(2)(C)(iii), and (g)(3)(A) of this rule have been amended to substitute "transferred" for "certified" to conform with the general restylinq of the Superior Court rules.
COMMENT TO 2019 AMENDMENTS
This rule has been amended consistent with the stylistic changes to the civil rules. Also, in response to Crockett v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr., 16 A.3d 949 (D.C. 2011), subsection (g)(2)(B) was amended to make clear that a judgment for possession may not be entered as a sanction for a defendant's failure to comply with a pretrial payment order in any case in which the complaint does not allege the defendant's nonpayment of rent as a basis for the entry of a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, i.e., that a judgment for possession is unavailable as a sanction in a case lacking a nonpayment of rent claim regardless of whether there is a contractual landlord-tenant relationship between the parties, and regardless of whether the defendant is or is alleged to be a "tenant" within the meaning of the Rental Housing Act.
This rule does not foreclose the court, in a case in which there is no landlord-tenant relationship between the parties (e.g., where the defendant is alleged to be a squatter, terminated employee, permissive occupant, or foreclosed homeowner), from fashioning an equitable remedy to protect the legitimate interests of both parties and to maintain a proper balance during the litigation. See Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Co., 430 F.2d 474, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ; Davis v. Rental Assocs. Inc., 456 A.2d 820, 823 (D.C. 1983). Such a remedy may include payment for the fair use and occupancy of the property, while the litigation is pending, in the form of a bond, a periodic payment, or both. See Lindsey v. Prillman, 921 A.2d 782, 785 (D.C. 2007) ("[W]e decline to say that a periodic-payment protective order can never be contemplated for use outside the typical landlord-tenant context ...."). However, "[p]rotective orders, by their very nature, are designed to govern a contractual landlord-tenant relationship, and their utility is questionable when the litigants lack such a relationship." Crockett, 16 A.3d at 952. See Walker v. Smith, 499 A.2d 446, 450 (D.C. 1985) ("Moreover, in the absence of the traditional landlord-tenant relationship, with privity of contract, the validity of [a] protective order is open to serious question."). The amount of any payment required in such a case must be strictly limited to the value of the use and occupancy of the premises. Crockett, 16 A.3d at 953 n.8 ("[T]he only conceivable reason to enter a protective order in [a case that does not involve parties with a landlord-tenant relationship] would be to protect the [plaintiff's] interest in the value of the use and occupation of the home during the pendency of litigation.").