The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness:
A statement that:
If admitted, the statement may be read into evidence but not received as an exhibit.
The pendency of an appeal may be shown but does not affect admissibility.
Del. R. Evid. 803
Comment
D.R.E. 803(1), (2), (3), (4), (6), (7), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), (19), (20), (21), (23) and (24) track the corresponding federal rules. D.R.E. 803(5), (8) and (22) do not.
D.R.E. 803(5) tracks F.R.E. 803(5) except that the last sentence was revised in 1980. The revision was made to enable the court to decide whether recorded recollection once admitted as evidence may be received as an exhibit or merely read. It is intended by this change to permit, in the court's discretion, the admission of a recorded recollection as an exhibit regardless of who offered it. The court should weigh whether the admission as an exhibit would unduly influence the jury. D.R.E. 803(5) should be read more broadly than its literal language. A recorded statement should qualify for admission even if it was recorded by another party if it appears that the statement does in fact reflect the prior knowledge of the witness.
D.R.E. 803(6) was amended in 2001, tracking a similar amendment to F.R. E. 803(6) in effect on December 31, 2000, to permit satisfying the foundational requirements for the admissibility of a business record through certification as an alternative to the expense and inconvenience of producing a time-consuming foundational witness. This amendment is consistent with existing Superior Court practice. This amendment should be interpreted with reference to D.R.E. 902(11) and 902(12) providing for the self-authentication of domestic and foreign records under the certification procedures provided for in D.R.E. 803(6).
D.R.E. 803(6) does not make admissible records created for the litigation such as the report of a medical doctor retained to examine a party at the request of the opposing party. Likewise, a toxicologist's report on the presence of drugs would not be admissible because of D.R.E. 803(8). But see 10 Del. C. §4330-32; 21 Del. C. §4177(h).
See Rule of Civil Procedure 33(c) relating to discovery of business records.
D.R.E. 803(8) tracks U.R.E. 803(8), which was believed to be preferable over F.RE. 803(8).
New D.R.E. 803(10) tracks Justice Scalia's dicta in Melendez-Dias v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009). Justice Scalia stated that drug chemistry reports could be admitted if the prosecution first notified the accused of its intent to use drug chemistry reports in its case in chief, and the accused did not demand that the drug chemist appear and testify in court. Melendez-Dias, 557 U.S. at 325-26.
The provisions of D.R.E. 803(18) are not intended to change the provisions of 18 Del. C. §6807 relating to the evidence to be considered by a medical malpractice review panel.
D.R.E. 803(21) deals only with hearsay issues concerning reputation and opinion. See D.R.E. 404, 405 and 608 for substantive issues.
D.R.E. 803(22) tracks F.R.E. 803(22) except that the words " a felony under the law pursuant to which the person was convicted" were substituted for the words "the conviction was for a crime punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than a year." See D.R.E. 609(a) for similar treatment.
Nothing in D.R.E. 803(22) should prohibit the admission of evidence of a plea of guilty to any crime where such plea constitutes an admission under D.R.E. 801(d)(2). Boyd & Reed v. Hammond, Del. Supr., 187 A.2d 413 (1963).
D.R.E. 803(24) was transferred to D.R.E. 807, which was adopted in 2001, tracking a similar change to the federal rules.
For prior Delaware cases illustrating the law covered by this rule, see Carpenter v. Greene, Del. Supr., 396 A.2d 150 (1977); Halko v. State, Del. Super., 204 A.2d 628 (1964); Garrod v. Good, Del. Supr., 203 A.2d 112 (1964); Cloud v. State, Del. Supr., 154 A.2d 680 (1959); Curren v. State, Del. Supr., 122 A.2d 126 (1956); State v. Long, Del. Oyer & Term., 123 A. 350 (1923); In Re Kemp's Will, Del. Super., 186 A. 890 (1935); Derrickson v. State, Del. Supr., 321 A.2d 497 (1974); Rice v. Simmons, Del. Super., 2 Del. 309 (1837); Wilkins v. Wilmington, Del. Super., 42 A. 418 (1895); State v. Boleslowski, Del. Oyer & Term., 178 A. 431 (1934); Grossman v. Delaware Elec. Power, Del. Super., 155 A. 806 (1929); Johnson v. State, Del. Supr., 253 A.2d 206 (1969); Millman v. Millman, Del. Supr., 359 A.2d 158 (1976); State v. Henson, Del. Super., 319 A.2d 43 (1974); Watts v. Delaware Coach Co., Del. Super., 58 A.2d 689 (1948); Ayers v. Quillen & Sons, Del. Supr., 188 A.2d 510 (1963); State v. Tucker, Del. Gen. Sess., 139 A. 253 (1927); Hooven v. Hooven, Del. Super., 130 A. 495 (1925); Kreisher v. State, Del. Supr., 303 A.2d 651 (1973).
D.R.E. 803 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. The pre-2017 "Comment" to D.R.E. 803 was revised only as necessary to reflect the 2017 amendments and the current language of F.R.E. 803. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.