Conn. R. Evid. 8-3
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:
The hearsay statement itself may not be considered to establish the declarant's authority under (C); the existence or scope of the relationship under (D); or the existence of the conspiracy or participation in it under (E).
Conn. Code. Evid. 8-3
COMMENTARY
(1) Statement by party opponent.
Section 8-3(1) sets forth six categories of party opponent admissions that were excepted from the hearsay rule at common law and adds one more category which has been adopted in the Federal Rules of Evidence and a majority of other states.
(A) The first category excepts from the hearsay rule a party's own statement when offered against him or her. E.g., In re Zoarski, 227 Conn. 784, 796, 632 A.2d 1114 (1993); State v. Woodson, 227 Conn. 1, 15, 629 A.2d 386 (1993). Under Section 8-3(1) (A), a statement is admissible against its maker, whether he or she was acting in an individual or representative capacity when the statement was made.The rule is in accord with the modern trend. E.g., Fed. R. Evid. 801(d) (2) (A). A party statement is admissible under Section 8-3(1), regardless of whether the person making the statement has personal knowledge of the facts stated therein. Dreir v. Upjohn Co., 196 Conn. 242, 249, 492 A.2d 164 (1985). If the statement at issue was made by the party opponent in a deposition, the statement is admissible in accordance with Practice Book § 13-31(a) (3). That provision permits an adverse party to use at trial, for any purpose, the deposition of a party, or a person who at the time of the deposition was an officer, director, or managing agent of a party, or a person designated under Practice Book § 13-27(h) to testify on behalf of a public or private corporation, partnership, association or government agency. This rule of practice was deemed "analogous'' to Section 8-3(1) in Gateway Co. v. DiNoia, 232 Conn. 223, 238 n.11, 654 A.2d 342 (1995) (construing Practice Book § 248 [1] [c], predecessor to Practice Book § 13-31 [a] [3]).
(B) The second category recognizes the common-law hearsay exception for "adoptive admissions.'' See, e.g., State v. John, 210 Conn. 652, 682-83, 557 A.2d 93, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 824, 110 S. Ct. 84, 107 L. Ed. 2d 50 (1989); Falker v. Samperi, 190 Conn. 412, 426, 461 A.2d 681 (1983). Because adoption or approval may be implicit; see, e.g., State v. Moye, 199 Conn. 389, 393-94, 507 A.2d 1001 (1986); the common-law hearsay exception for tacit admissions, under which silence or a failure to respond to another person's statement may constitute an admission; e.g., State v. Morrill, 197 Conn. 507, 535, 498 A.2d 76 (1985); Obermeier v. Nielsen, 158 Conn. 8, 11-12, 255 A.2d 819 (1969); is carried forward in Section 8-3(1) (B). The admissibility of tacit admissions in criminal cases is subject to the evidentiary limitations on the use of an accused's postarrest silence; see State v. Ferrone, 97 Conn. 258, 266, 116 A. 336 (1922); and the constitutional limitations on the use of the accused's post-Miranda warning silence. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-19, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976); see, e.g., State v. Zeko, 177 Conn. 545, 554, 418 A.2d 917 (1977).
(C) The third category restates the common-law hearsay exception for "authorized admissions.'' See, e.g., Presta v. Monnier, 145 Conn. 694, 699, 146 A.2d 404 (1958); Collins v. Lewis, 111 Conn. 299, 305-306, 149 A. 668 (1930). For this exception to apply,the speaker must have actual or apparent authority to speak concerning the subject upon which he or she speaks in the declaration at issue; a mere agency relationship e.g., employer-employee without more, is not enough to confer such authority. E.g., Liebman v. Society of Our Lady of Mount St. Carmel, Inc., 151 Conn. 582, 586, 200 A.2d 721 (1964); Munson v. United Technologies Corp., 28 Conn. App. 184, 188, 609 A.2d 1066, cert. denied, 200 Conn. 805, 510 A.2d 192 (1992); cf. Graham v. Wilkins, 145 Conn. 34, 40-41, 138 A.2d 705 (1958); Haywood v. Hamm, 77 Conn. 158, 159, 58 A. 695 (1904). The proponent need not, however, show that the speaker was authorized to make the particular statement sought to be introduced. The existence of [speaking] authority to speak for the principal is to be determined by reference to the substantive law of agency. See, e.g., Ackerman v. Sobol Family Partnership, LLP, 298 Conn. 495, 508-12, 4 A.3d 288 (2010) (applying principles of agency law to conclude that attorney had authority to bind client to settlement). Although not expressly mentioned in the exception, the Code in no way abrogates the common-law rule that speaking authority must be established without reference to the purported agent's out-of-court statements, save when those statements are independently admissible. See Section 1-1(d) (2). See generally Robles v. Lavin, 176 Conn. 281, 284, 407 A.2d 957 (1978).
(D) The fourth category encompasses the exception set forth in Fed. R. Evid. 801(d) (2) and adopted in a majority of state jurisdictions. The notes of the federal advisory committee on the 1972 proposed rules express "dissatisfaction'' with the traditional rule requiring proof that the agent had actual authority to make the offered statement on behalf of the principal. The advisory committee notes cite to a "substantial trend [which] favors admitting statements relating to a matter within the scope of the agency or employment. Grayson v. Williams, 256 F.2d 61 (10th Cir. 1958); Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij N.V. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines v. Tuller, 110 U.S. App. D.C. 282, 292 F.2d 775, 784 [(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921, 82 S. Ct. 243, 7 L. Ed 2d 136] (1961); Martin v. Savage Truck Lines, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 417 (D.D.C. 1954 ), and numerous state court decisions collected in 4 Wigmore, 1964 Supp., 66-73. . . .'' Fed. R. Evid. 801(d) (2) (D) advisory committee note. This trend has continued since then. See, e.g., B & K Rentals & Sales Co. v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 324 Md. 147, 158, 596 A.2d 640 (1991) (adopting federal approach and observing "[t]he authorities, both courts and commentators, have almost universally condemned the strict common law rule in favor of the . . . rule set forth in [Fed. R. Evid. 801(d) (2) ]''). Id., 645. Connecticut now adopts the modern rule as well, and, in doing so, overrules the line of cases adhering to the common law by requiring proof that the declarant was authorized to speak on behalf of the employer or principal. See Cascella v. Jay James Camera Shop, Inc., 147 Conn. 337, 341, 160 A.2d 899 (1960); Wade v. Yale University, 129 Conn. 615, 617, 30_A.2d 545 (1943).
(E) The fifth category encompasses the hearsay exception for statements of coconspirators. E.g., State v. Peeler, 267 Conn. 611, 628-34, 841 A.2d 181 (2004); State v. Couture, 218 Conn. 309, 322, 589 A.2d 343 (1991); State v. Pelletier, 209 Conn. 564, 577, 552 A.2d 805 (1989); see also State v. Vessichio, 197 Conn. 644, 654-55, 500 A.2d 1311 (1985) (additional foundational elements include existence of conspiracy and participation therein by both declarant and party against whom statement is offered), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1122, 106 S. Ct. 1642, 90 L. Ed. 2d 187 (1986). The exception is applicable in civil and criminal cases alike. See Cooke v. Weed, 90 Conn. 544, 548, 97 A. 765 (1916). The proponent must prove the foundational elements by a preponderance of the evidence and independently of the hearsay statements sought to be introduced. State v. Carpenter, 275 Conn. 785, 838, 882 A.2d 604 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1025, 126 S. Ct. 1578, 164 L. Ed. 2d 309 (2006); State v. Vessichio, supra, 655; State v. Haggood, 36 Conn. App. 753, 767, 653 A.2d 216, cert. denied, 233 Conn. 904, 657 A.2d 644 (1995).
(F) The sixth category of party opponent admissions is derived from Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Keeler, 44 Conn. 161, 162-64 (1876).
(G) The final category incorporates the common-law hearsay exception applied in Pierce v. Roberts, 57 Conn. 31, 40-41, 17 A. 275 (1889), and Ramsbottom v. Phelps, 18 Conn. 278, 285 (1847).
(2) Spontaneous utterance.
The hearsay exception for spontaneous utterances is well established. See, e.g., State v. Stange, 212 Conn. 612, 616-17, 563 A.2d 681 (1989); Cascella v. Jay James Camera Shop, Inc., 147 Conn. 337, 341-42, 160 A.2d 899 (1960); Perry v. Haritos, 100 Conn. 476, 483-84, 124 A. 44 (1924). Although the language of Section 8-3(2) is not identical to the language used in pre-Code cases to describe the exception; cf. State v. Stange, supra, 616-17; Rockhill v. White Line Bus Co., 109 Conn. 706, 709, 145 A. 504 (1929); Perry v. Haritos, supra, 484; State v. Guess, 44 Conn. App. 790, 803, 692 A.2d 849 (1997), aff'd, 244 Conn. 761, 751 A.2d 643 (1998); the provision incorporates the same principles. See, e.g., State v. Kirby, 280 Conn. 361, 374-77, 908 A.2d 506 (2006).
The event or condition triggering the utterance must be sufficiently startling, so "as to produce nervous excitement in the declarant and render [the declarant's] utterances spontaneous and unreflective.'' State v. Rinaldi, 220 Conn. 345, 359, 599 A.2d 1 (1991).
(3) Statement of then-existing physical condition.
Section 8-3(3) embraces the hearsay exception for statements of then-existing physical condition. Martin v. Sherwood, 74 Conn. 475, 481-82, 51 A. 526 (1902); State v. Dart, 29 Conn. 153, 155 (1860); see McCarrick v. Kealy, 70 Conn. 642, 645, 40 A. 603 (1898).
The exception is limited to statements of then-existing physical condition, whereby the declarant describes how the declarant feels at the time the declarant makes the hearsay statement. Statements concerning past physical condition; Martin v. Sherwood, supra, 74 Conn. 482; State v. Dart, supra, 29 Conn. 155; or the events leading up to or the cause of a present condition; McCarrick v. Kealy, supra, 70 Conn. 645; are not admissible under this exception. Cf. Section 8- 3(5) (exception for statements made to physician for purpose of obtaining medical treatment or advice and describing past or present bodily condition or cause thereof).
(4) Statement of then-existing mental or emotional condition.
Section 8-3(4) embodies what is frequently referred to as the "stateof- mind'' exception to the hearsay rule. See, e.g., State v. Periere, 186 Conn. 599, 605-606, 442 A.2d 1345 (1982).
The exception allows the admission of a declarant's statement describing his or her then-existing mental or emotional condition when the declarant's mental or emotional condition is a relevant issue in the case. E.g., State v. Perkins, 271 Conn. 218, 256-259, 856 A.2d 917 (2004) (defendant's state-of-mind at time of hearsay statement not relevant to any issue in case); State v. Periere, supra, 186 Conn. 606-607 (relevant to show declarant's fear) Only statements describing then-existing mental or emotional condition, i.e., that existing when the statement is made, are admissible.
The exception also covers a declarant's statement of present intention to perform a subsequent act as an inference that the subsequent act actually occurred. E.g., State v. Rinaldi, 220 Conn. 345, 358 n.7, 599 A.2d 1 (1991); State v. Santangelo, 205 Conn. 578, 592, 534 A.2d 1175 (1987); State v. Journey, 115 Conn. 344, 351, 161 A.2d 515 (1932). The inference drawn from the statement of present intention that the act actually occurred is a matter of relevancy rather than a hearsay concern.
When a statement describes the declarant's intention to do a future act in concert with another person, e.g., "I am going to meet Ralph at the store at ten,'' the case law does not prohibit admissibility. See State v. Santangelo, supra, 205 Conn. 592. But the declaration can be admitted only to prove the declarant's subsequent conduct, not to show what the other person ultimately did. State v. Perelli, 125 Conn. 321, 325, 5 A.2d 705 (1939). Thus, in the example above, the declarant's statement could be used to infer that the declarant actually did go to meet Ralph at the store at ten, but not to show that Ralph went to the store at ten to meet the declarant.
Placement of Section 8-3(4) in the "availability of the declarant immaterial'' category of hearsay exceptions confirms that the admissibility of statements of present intention to show future acts is not conditioned on any requirement that the declarant be unavailable. See State v. Santangelo, supra, 205 Conn. 592 (dictum suggesting that declarant's unavailability is precondition to admissibility).
While statements of present intention looking forward to the doing of some future act are admissible under the exception, backwardlooking statements of memory or belief offered to prove the act or event remembered or believed are inadmissible. See Wade v. Yale University, 129 Conn. 615, 618-19, 30 A.2d 545 (1943). But see State v. Santangelo, supra, 205 Conn. 592-93. As the advisory committee note to the corresponding federal rule suggests, "[t]he exclusion of `statements of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed' is necessary to avoid the virtual destruction of the hearsay rule which would otherwise result from allowing state of mind, provable by a hearsay statement, to serve as the basis for an inference of the happening of the event which produced the state of mind.'' Fed. R. Evid. 803(3) advisory committee note, citing Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 54 S. Ct. 22, 78 L. Ed. 196 (1933). For cases dealing with the admissibility of statements of memory or belief in will cases, see Spencer's Appeal, 77 Conn. 638, 643, 60 A. 289 (1905); Vivian Appeal, 74 Conn. 257, 260-62, 50 A. 797 (1901); Comstock v. Hadlyme Ecclesiastical Society, 8 Conn. 254, 263-64 (1830). Cf. Babcock v. Johnson, 127 Conn. 643, 644, 19 A.2d 416 (1941) (statements admissible only as circumstantial evidence of state of mind and not for truth of matter asserted); In re Johnson's Will, 40 Conn. 587, 588 (1873) (same).
(5) Statement for purposes of obtaining medical diagnosis or treatment.
Statements made in furtherance of obtaining a medical diagnosis or treatment are excepted from the hearsay rule. E.g., State v. DePastino, 228 Conn. 552, 565, 638 A.2d 578 (1994). This is true even if diagnosis or treatment is not the primary purpose of the medical examination or the principal motivation for the statement; State v. Griswold, 160 Conn. App. 528, 553, 557, 127 A.3d 189 (statements made during forensic interview in child sexual abuse context), cert. denied, 320 Conn. 907, 128 A.3d 952 (2015); as long as the statement is "reasonably pertinent'' to obtaining diagnosis or treatment. Id.
It is intended that the term "medical'' be read broadly so that the exception would cover statements made for the purpose of obtaining diagnosis or treatment for both somatic and psychological maladies and conditions. See State v. Wood, 208 Conn. 125, 133-34, 545 A.2d 1026, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 895, 109 S. Ct. 235, 102 L. Ed. 2d 225 (1988).
Statements concerning the cause of an injury or condition traditionally were inadmissible under the exception. See Smith v. Hausdorf, 92 Conn. 579, 582, 103 A. 939 (1918). Subsequent cases recognize that, in some instances, causation may be pertinent to medical diagnosis or treatment. See State v. Daniels, 13 Conn. App. 133, 135, 534 A.2d 1253 (1987); cf. State v. DePastino, supra, 228 Conn. 565. Section 8-3(5), thus, excepts from the hearsay rule statements describing "the inception or general character of the cause or external source'' of an injury or condition when reasonably pertinent to medical diagnosis or treatment.
Statements as to causation that include the identity of the person responsible for the injury or condition ordinarily are neither relevant to nor in furtherance of the patient's medical treatment. State v. DePastino, supra, 228 Conn. 565; State v. Dollinger, 20 Conn. App. 530, 534, 568 A.2d 1058, cert. denied, 215 Conn. 805, 574 A.2d 220 (1990). Both the Supreme and Appellate Courts have recognized an exception to this principle in cases of domestic child abuse. State v. DePastino, supra, 565; State v. Dollinger, supra, 534-35; State v. Maldonado, 13 Conn. App. 368, 372-74, 536 A.2d 600, cert. denied, 207 Conn. 808, 541 A.2d 1239 (1988) The courts reason that "[i]n cases of sexual abuse in the home, hearsay statements made in the course of medical treatment which reveal the identity of the abuser, are reasonably pertinent to treatment and are admissible. . . . If the sexual abuser is a member of the child victim's immediate household, it is reasonable for a physician to ascertain the identity of the abuser to prevent recurrences and to facilitate the treatment of psychological and physical injuries.'' (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dollinger, supra, 535, quoting State v. Maldonado, supra, 374; accord State v. DePastino, supra, 565. In 2001, this reasoning was extended to apply the exception to adult victims of sexual abuse as well. State v. Kelly, 256 Conn. 23, 45, 770 A.2d 908 (2001). "In any sexual assault, the identity of the perpetrator undoubtedly is relevant to the physician to facilitate the treatment of psychological and physical injuries.'' (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
Traditionally, the exception seemingly required that the statement be made to a physician. See, e.g., Wilson v. Granby, 47 Conn. 59, 76 (1879). Statements qualifying under Section 8-3(5), however, may be those made not only to a physician, but to other persons involved in the treatment of the patient, such as a nurse, a paramedic, an interpreter or even a family member. This approach is in accord with the modern trend. See State v. Maldonado, supra, 13 Conn. App. 369, 374 n.3 (statement by child abuse victim who spoke only Spanish made to Spanish speaking hospital security guard enlisted by treating physician as translator).
Common-law cases address the admissibility of statements made only by the patient. E.g., Gilmore v. American Tube & Stamping Co., 79 Conn. 498, 504, 66 A. 4 (1907). Section 8-3(5) does not, by its terms, restrict statements admissible under the exception to those made by the patient. For example, if a parent were to bring his or her unconscious child into an emergency room, statements made by the parent to a health care provider for the purpose of obtaining treatment and pertinent to that treatment fall within the scope of the exception.
Early common law distinguished between statements made to physicians consulted for the purpose of treatment and statements made to physicians consulted solely for the purpose of testifying as an expert witness. Statements made to these socalled "nontreating'' physicians were not accorded substantive effect. See, e.g., Zawisza v. Quality Name Plate, Inc., 149 Conn. 115, 119, 176 A.2d 578 (1961); Rowland v. Phila., Wilm. & Baltimore R. Co., 63 Conn. 415, 418-19, 28 A. 102 (1893). This distinction was eliminated by the court in George v. Ericson, 250 Conn. 312, 324-25, 736 A.2d 889 (1999), which held that nontreating physician could rely on such statements The distinction between admission only as foundation for the expert's opinion and admission for all purposes was considered too inconsequential to maintain. Accordingly, the word "diagnosis'' was added to, and the phrase "advice pertaining thereto'' was deleted from, the phrase "medical treatment or advice pertaining thereto'' in Section 8-3(5) of the 2000 edition of the Code.
(6) Recorded recollection.
The hearsay exception for past recollection recorded requires four foundational requirements. First, the witness must have had personal knowledge of the event recorded in the memorandum or record. Papas v. Aetna Ins. Co., 111 Conn. 415, 420, 150 A. 310 (1930); Jackiewicz v. United Illuminating Co., 106 Conn. 302, 309, 138 A. 147 (1927); Neff v. Neff, 96 Conn. 273, 278, 114 A. 126 (1921).
Second, the witness' present recollection must be insufficient to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately about the event recorded. State v. Boucino, 199 Conn. 207, 230, 506 A.2d 125 (1986). The rule thus does not require the witness' memory to be totally exhausted. See id. Earlier cases to the contrary, such as Katsonas v. W.M. Sutherland Building & Contracting Co., 104 Conn. 54, 69, 132 A. 553 (1926), apparently have been rejected. See State v. Boucino, supra, 230. "Insufficient recollection'' may be established by demonstrating that an attempt to refresh the witness' recollection pursuant to Section 6-9(a) was unsuccessful. See Katsonas v. W.M. Sutherland Building & Contracting Co., supra, 69.
Third, the memorandum or record must have been made or adopted by the witness "at or about the time'' the event was recorded. Gigliotti v. United Illuminating Co., 151 Conn. 114, 124, 193 A.2d 718 (1963); Neff v. Neff, supra, 96 Conn. 278; State v. Day, 12 Conn. App. 129, 134, 529 A.2d 1333 (1987).
Finally, the memorandum or record must accurately reflect the witness' knowledge of the event as it existed at the time of the memorandum's or record's making or adoption. See State v. Vennard, 159 Conn. 385, 397, 270 A.2d 837 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1011, 91 S. Ct. 576, 27 L. Ed. 2d 625 (1971), overruled on other grounds by State v. Ferrell, 191 Conn. 37, 43 n.6, 463 A.2d 573 (1983) ; Capone v. Sloan, 149 Conn. 538, 543, 182 A.2d 414 (1962); Hawken v. Dailey, 85 Conn. 16, 19, 81 A. 1053 (1911); State v. Juan V., 109 Conn. App. 431, 441 n.9, 951 A.2d 651 ("[p]roving the record was accurate when made is an essential element of this exception''), cert. denied, 289 Conn. 931, 958 A.2d 161 (2008).
A memorandum or record admissible under the exception may be read into evidence and received as an exhibit. Katsonas v. W.M. Sutherland Building & Contracting Co., supra, 104 Conn. 69; see Neff v. Neff, supra, 96 Conn. 278-79. Because a memorandum or record introduced under the exception is being offered to prove its contents, the original must be produced pursuant to Section 10-1, unless its production is excused. See Sections 10-3 through 10-6; cf. Neff v. Neff, supra, 278.
Multiple person involvement in recordation and observation of the event recorded is contemplated by the exception. For example, A reports to B an event A has just observed. B immediately writes down what A reported to him. A then examines the writing and adopts it as accurate close to the time of its making. A is now testifying and has forgotten the event. A may independently establish the foundational requirements for the admission of the writing under Section 8-3(6). Cf. Curtis v. Bradley, 65 Conn. 99, 31 A. 591 (1894).
The past recollection recorded exception to the hearsay rule is to be distinguished from the procedure for refreshing recollection, which is covered in Section 6-9.
(7) Public records and reports.
Section 8-3(7) sets forth a hearsay exception for certain public records and reports. The exception is derived primarily from common law although public records and reports remain the subject of numerous statutes. See, e.g., General Statutes §§ 12-39bb, 19a-412.
Although Connecticut has neither precisely nor consistently defined the elements comprising the common-law public records exception to the hearsay rule; cf. Hing Wan Wong v. Liquor Control Commission, 160 Conn. 1, 9, 273 A.2d 709 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 938, 91 S. Ct. 931, 28 L. Ed. 2d 218 (1971); Section 8-3(7) gleans from case law three distinct requirements for substantive admissibility. Proviso (A) is found in cases such as Hing Wan Wong v. Liquor Control Commission, supra, 9, Russo v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 125 Conn. 132, 139, 3 A.2d 844 (1939), and Ezzo v. Geremiah, 107 Conn. 670, 679-80, 142 A. 461 (1928). Proviso (B) comes from cases such as Gett v. Isaacson, 98 Conn. 539, 543-44, 120 A. 156 (1923), and Enfield v. Ellington, 67 Conn. 459, 462, 34 A. 818 (1896). Proviso (C) is derived from Heritage Village Master Assn., Inc. v. Heritage Village Water Co., 30 Conn. App. 693, 701, 622 A.2d 578 (1993), and from cases in which public records had been admitted under the business records exception. See, e.g., State v. Palozie, 165 Conn. 288, 294-95, 334 A.2d 458 (1973); Mucci v. LeMonte, 157 Conn. 566, 569, 254 A.2d 879 (1969).
The "duty'' under which public officials act, as contemplated by proviso (A), often is one imposed by statute. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Kozlowski, 171 Conn. 705, 717-18, 372 A.2d 110 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 969, 97 S. Ct. 2930, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1066 (1977); HingWanWong v. Liquor Control Commission, supra, 160 Conn. 8-10. Nevertheless, Section 8-3(7) does not preclude the recognition of other sources of duties.
Proviso (C) anticipates the likelihood that more than one individual may be involved in the making of the public record. By analogy to the personal knowledge requirement imposed in the business records context; e.g., In re Barbara J., 215 Conn. 31, 40, 574 A.2d 203 (1990); proviso (C) demands that the public record be made upon the personal knowledge of either the public official who made the record or someone, such as a subordinate, whose duty it was to relay that information to the public official. See, e.g., State v. Palozie, supra, 165 Conn. 294-95 (public record introduced under business records exception).
(8) Statement in learned treatises.
Exception (8) explicitly permits the substantive use of statements contained in published treatises, periodicals or pamphlets on direct examination or cross-examination under the circumstances prescribed in the rule. In the case of a journal article, the requirement that the treatise is recognized as a "standard authority in the field''; (internal quotation marks omitted) Filippelli v. Saint Mary's Hospital, 319 Conn. 113, 136, 124 A.3d 501 (2015); generally requires proof that the specific article at issue is so recognized. See id., 137-38; Musorofiti v. Vlcek, 65 Conn. App. 365, 382-83, 783 A.2d 36, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 938, 786 A.2d 426 (2001). There may be situations, however, in which a journal is so highly regarded that a presumption of authoritativeness will arise with respect to an article selected for publication in that journal without any additional showing. See Filippelli v. Saint Mary's Hospital, supra, 138.
Although most of the earlier decisions concerned the use of medical treatises; e.g., Cross v. Huttenlocher, 185 Conn. 390, 395, 440 A.2d 952 (1981); Perez v. Mount Sinai Hospital, 7 Conn. App. 514, 520, 509 A.2d 552 (1986); Section 8-3(8), by its terms, is not limited to that one subject matter or format. Ames v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 8 Conn. App. 642, 650-51, 514 A.2d 352 (1986) (published technical papers on design and operation of riding lawnmowers), cert. denied, 201 Conn. 809, 515 A.2d 378 (1986).
Connecticut allows the jury to receive the treatise, or portion thereof, as a full exhibit. Cross v. Huttenlocher, supra, 185 Conn. 395-96; see State v. Gupta, 297 Conn. 211, 239, 998 A.2d 1085 (2010). If admitted, the excerpts from the published work may be read into evidence or received as an exhibit, as the court permits. See Cross v. Huttenlocher, supra, 395-96; see also Filippelli v. Saint Mary's Hospital, supra, 319 Conn. 139-41 (trial court has discretion to require redaction so that only portion of article admitted as full exhibit).
(9) Statement in ancient documents.
The hearsay exception for statements in ancient documents is well established. Jarboe v. Home Bank & Trust Co., 91 Conn. 265, 270-71, 99 A. 563 (1917); New York, N.H. & H. R. Co. v. Cella, 88 Conn. 515, 520, 91 A. 972 (1914); see Clark v. Drska, 1 Conn. App. 481, 489, 473 A.2d 325 (1984).
The exception, by its terms, applies to all kinds of documents, including documents produced by electronic means, and electronically stored information, and is not limited to documents affecting an interest in property. See Petroman v. Anderson, 105 Conn. 366, 369-70, 135 A. 391 (1926) (ancient map introduced under exception).
"[M]ore than thirty years'' means any instant of time beyond the point in time at which the document has been in existence for thirty years.
(10) Published compilations.
Connecticut cases have recognized an exception to the hearsay ruleÐor at least have assumed an exception exists for these items. Henry v. Kopf, 104 Conn. 73, 80-81, 131 A. 412 (1925) (market reports); see State v. Pambianchi, 139 Conn. 543, 548, 95 A.2d 695 (1953) (compilation of used automobile prices); Donoghue v. Smith, 114 Conn. 64, 66, 157 A. 415 (1931) (mortality tables).
(11) Statement in family bible.
Connecticut has recognized, at least in dictum, an exception to the hearsay rule for factual statements concerning personal or family history contained in family bibles. See Eva v. Gough, 93 Conn. 38, 46, 104 A. 238 (1918).
(12) Personal identification.
A witness' in-court statement of his or her own name or age is admissible, even though knowledge of this information often is based on hearsay. Blanchard v. Bridgeport, 190 Conn. 798, 806, 463 A.2d 553 (1983) (name); Toletti v. Bidizcki, 118 Conn. 531, 534, 173 A. 223 (1934) (name), overruled on other grounds by Petrillo v. Maiuri, 138 Conn. 557, 563, 86 A.2d 869 (1952); State v. Hyatt, 9 Conn. App. 426, 429, 519 A.2d 612 (1987) (age); see Creer v. Active Auto Exchange, Inc., 99 Conn. 266, 276, 121 A. 888 (1923) (age).