Conn. R. Evid. 6-8

As amended through July 1, 2024

Section 6-8 - Scope of Cross-Examination and Subsequent Examinations; Leading Questions

(a)Scope of cross-examination and subsequent examinations. Cross-examination and subsequent examinations shall be limited to the subject matter of the preceding examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness, except in the discretion of the court.

(b)Leading questions. Leading questions shall not be used on the direct or redirect examination of a witness, except that the court may permit leading questions, in its discretion, in circumstances such as, but not limited to, the following:

(1) when a party calls a hostile witness or a witness identified with an adverse party,

(2) when a witness testifies so as to work a surprise or deceit on the examiner,

(3) when necessary to develop a witness' testimony, or

(4) when necessary to establish preliminary matters.

Conn. Code. Evid. 6-8

Amended Dec. 14, 2017, to take effect 2/1/2018.

COMMENTARY

(a) Scope of cross-examination and subsequent examinations.

Subsection (a) is in accord with common law. E.g., State v. Ireland, 218 Conn. 447, 452, 590 A.2d 106 (1991) (scope of cross-examination); Mendez v. Dorman, 151 Conn. 193, 198, 195 A.2d 561 (1963) (same); see State v. Jones, 205 Conn. 638, 666, 534 A.2d 1199 (1987) (scope of redirect examination); Grievance Committee v. Dacey, 154 Conn. 129, 151-52, 222 A.2d 220 (1966), appeal dismissed, 386 U.S. 683, 87 S. Ct. 1325, 18 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1967) (same). The trial court is vested with discretion in determining whether evidence offered on cross-examination or during a subsequent examination relates to subject matter brought out during the preceding examination. See Canton Motorcar Works, Inc. v. DiMartino, 6 Conn. App. 447, 458, 505 A.2d 1255 (1986); Larensen v. Karp, 1 Conn. App. 228, 230, 470 A.2d 715 (1984).

Subsection (a) recognizes the discretion afforded the trial judge in determining the scope of cross-examination and subsequent examinations. E.g., State v. Prioleau, 235 Conn. 274, 302, 664 A.2d 793 (1995) (cross-examination); see State v. Conrod, 198 Conn. 592, 596, 504 A.2d 494 (1986) (redirect examination). Thus, subsection (a) does not preclude a trial judge from permitting a broader scope of inquiry in certain circumstances, such as when a witness could be substantially inconvenienced by having to testify on two different occasions.

(b) Leading questions.

Subsection (b) addresses the use of leading questions on direct or redirect examination. A leading question is a question that suggests the answer desired by the examiner in accord with the examiner's view of the facts. E.g., Hulk v. Aishberg, 126 Conn. 360, 363, 11 A.2d 380 (1940); State v. McNally, 39 Conn. App. 419, 423, 665 A.2d 137 (1995).

Subsection (b) restates the common-law rule. See Mendez v. Dorman, supra, 151 Conn. 198; Bradbury v. South Norwalk, 80 Conn. 298, 302-303, 68 A. 321 (1907). The court is vested with discretion in determining whether leading questions should be permitted on direct or redirect examination. E.g., Hulk v. Aishberg, supra, 126 Conn. 363; State v. Russell, 29 Conn. App. 59, 67, 612 A.2d 471, cert. denied, 224 Conn. 908, 615 A.2d 1049 (1992).

Subsection (b) sets forth illustrative exceptions to the general rule that are discretionary with the court. Exceptions (1) and (2) are well established. Mendez v. Dorman, supra, 151 Conn. 197-98; State v. Stevens, 65 Conn. 93, 98-99, 31 A. 496 (1894); Stratford v. Sanford, 9 Conn. 275, 284 (1832). For purposes of exception (1), "a witness identified with an adverse party'' also includes the adverse party.

Under exception (3), the court may allow the calling party to put leading questions to a young witness who is apprehensive or reticent; e.g., State v. Salamon, 287 Conn. 509, 559-60, 949 A.2d 1092 (2008) (excessively nervous minor victim of assault); State v. Hydock, 51 Conn. App. 753, 765, 725 A.2d 379 (minor victim who "evinced fear and hesitancy to testify''), cert. denied, 248 Conn. 929, 733 A.2d 845 (1999); State v. Parsons, 28 Conn. App. 91, 104, 612 A.2d 73, cert. denied, 223 Conn. 920, 614 A.2d 829 (1992); or to a witness who has trouble communicating. See State v. Salamon, supra, 560 (native French speaker with substantial difficulty testifying in English). The court may also allow the calling party to put leading questions to a witness whose recollection is exhausted. See State v. Palm, 123 Conn. 666, 675-76, 197 A.2d 168 (1938).

Under exception (4), the court has discretion to allow a calling party to use leading questions to develop preliminary matters in order to expedite the trial. State v. Russell, supra, 29 Conn. App. 68; see State v. Castelli, 92 Conn. 58, 65-66, 101 A.2d 476 (1917).

It is intended that subsection (b) will coexist with General Statutes § 52-178. That statute allows any party in a civil action to call an adverse party, or certain persons identified with an adverse party, to testify as a witness, and to examine that person ``to the same extent as an adverse witness.'' The statute has been interpreted to allow the calling party to elicit testimony from the witness using leading questions. See Fasanelli v. Terzo, 150 Conn. 349, 359, 189 A.2d 500 (1963); see also Mendez v. Dorman, supra, 151 Conn. 196-98.