Conn. R. Evid. 4-3
Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or surprise, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Conn. Code. Evid. 4-3
COMMENTARY
Section 4-3 establishes a balancing test under which the probative value of proffered evidence is weighed against the harm likely to result from its admission. See, e.g., State v. Rinaldi, 220 Conn. 345, 356, 599 A.2d 1 (1991); Farrell v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 203 Conn. 554, 563, 525 A.2d 954 (1987); State v. DeMatteo, 186 Conn. 696, 702-703, 443 A.2d 915 (1982). The task of striking this balance is relegated to the court's discretion. E.g., State v. Paulino, 223 Conn. 461, 477, 613 A.2d 720 (1992).
The discretion of a trial court to exclude relevant evidence on the basis of unfair prejudice is well established. E.g., State v. Higgins, 201 Conn. 462, 469, 518 A.2d 631 (1986). All evidence adverse to an opposing party is inherently prejudicial because it is damaging to that party's case. Berry v. Loiseau, 223 Conn. 786, 806, 614 A.2d 414 (1992); Chouinard v. Marjani, 21 Conn. App. 572, 576, 575 A.2d 238 (1990). For exclusion, however, the prejudice must be "unfair'' in the sense that it "unduly arouse[s] the jury's emotions of prejudice, hostility or sympathy''; State v. Wilson, 180 Conn. 481, 490, 429 A.2d 931 (1980); or "tends to have some adverse effect upon [the party against whom the evidence is offered] beyond tending to prove the fact or issue that justified its admission into evidence.'' State v. Graham, 200 Conn. 9, 12, 509 A.2d 493 (1986), quoting United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 943 (2d Cir. 1980).
Common law recognized unfair surprise as a factor to be weighed against the probative value of the evidence. See, e.g., State v. Higgins, supra, 201 Conn. 469; State v. DeMatteo, supra, 186 Conn. 703. When dangers of unfair surprise are claimed to outweigh probative value, nothing precludes the court from fashioning a remedy other than exclusion, e.g., continuance, when that remedy will adequately cure the harm suffered by the opposing party.
Section 4-3 also recognizes the court's authority to exclude relevant evidence when its probative value is outweighed by factors such as confusion of the issues or misleading the jury; Farrell v. St. Vincent's Hospital, supra, 203 Conn. 563; see State v. Gaynor, 182 Conn. 501, 511, 438 A.2d 749 (1980); State v. Sebastian, 81 Conn. 1, 4, 69 A. 1054 (1908); or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. See, e.g., State v. Parris, 219 Conn. 283, 293, 592 A.2d 943 (1991); State v. DeMatteo, supra, 186 Conn. 702-703; Hydro-Centrifugals, Inc. v. Crawford Laundry Co., 110 Conn. 49, 54-55, 147 A. 31 (1929).