Colo. R. Evid. 301
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by statute or by these rules, a presumption imposes upon the party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of non-persuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast.
CRE 301
Committee Comment
This rule is essentially identical to the Federal rule, thus achieving a desirable degree of uniformity and simplicity. The rule gives all of the proper traditional benefits of a presumption, but places no new burdens upon the opposing party. See House Report, p.7; Senate Report, p. 9; Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference; also 1 Jones, Evidence § 3.6 (6th ed.); McCormick, Evidence, § 354 (2nd ed. 1972). Contra, see Weiss v. Axler, 137 Colo. 544, 328 P.2d 88 (1958).
.Annotation Law reviews. For note, "Res Ipsa Loquitur - The Effect of Comparative Negligence", see 53 U. Colo. L. Rev. 777 (1982). For article, "Rule 301: Overcoming Presumptions", see 27 Colo. Law. 55 (January 1998). Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur no longer creates a presumption of negligence which shifts the burden of disproving the presumed fact of negligence to the opponent of the presumption. The doctrine only shifts the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut the presumed fact of negligence. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Co., 676 P.2d 25 (Colo. App. 1983). There is a presumption that adherence to the applicable standard of care adopted by a profession constitutes due care for those practicing that profession. The presumption, however, is a rebuttable one, and the burden in on the one challenging the standard of care to rebut the presumption by competent evidence. United Blood Servs. v. Quintana, 827 P.2d 509 (Colo. 1992). Plaintiff was not required to bear the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut the presumed fact that compliance with industry standards establishes "accepted good engineering practices" for purposes of tort liability since the fact that a defendant utility company complied with such practices is not dispositive of whether the utility was negligent in the activities which resulted in decedent's electrocution and since it is almost impossible for a plaintiff to present evidence to establish that compliance with industry standards was not, under the facts of a particular case, "accepted good engineering practice," that would rebut that presumption. Yampa Valley Elec. v. Telecky, 862 P.2d 252 (Colo. 1993). Trial court committed reversible error in giving jury instruction, because there was no statutory or common law justification to support the rebuttable presumption contained in the instruction. Yampa Valley Elec. v. Telecky, 862 P.2d 252 (Colo. 1993). Applied in Montgomery Elevator Co. v. Gordon, 619 P.2d 66 (Colo. 1980); 1st Charter Lease Co. v. McAL, Inc., 679 P.2d 114 (Colo. App. 1984); People v. Gallegos, 692 P.2d 1074 (Colo. 1984).