Colo. R. Crim. P. 30
A party who desires instructions shall tender his proposed instructions to the court in duplicate, the original being unsigned. All instructions shall be submitted to the parties, who shall make all objections thereto before they are given to the jury. Only the grounds so specified shall be considered on motion for a new trial or on review. Before argument the court shall read its instructions to the jury, but shall not comment upon the evidence. Such instructions may be read to the jury and commented upon by counsel during the argument, and they shall be taken by the jury when it retires. All instructions offered by the parties, or given by court, shall be filed with the clerk and, with the endorsement thereon indicating the action of the court, shall be taken as a part of the record of the case.
Colo. R. Crim. P. 30
Annotation I. General Consideration. Law reviews. For article, "Limitations of the Power of Courts in Instructing Juries", see 6 Dicta 23 (March 1929). For article, "Criminal Procedure", which discusses a recent Tenth Circuit decision dealing with the failure to instruct on lesser included offense, see 62 Den. U. L. Rev. 191 (1985). For article, "Pronouncements of the U.S. Supreme Court Relating to the Criminal Law Field: 1985-1986", which discusses a recent case relating to jury instructions, see 15 Colo. Law. 1616 (1986). "Instruction" construed. An instruction is an exposition of the principles of law applicable to a case, or to some branch or phase of a case, which the jury is bound to apply in order to render the verdict, establishing the rights of the parties in accordance with the facts proved. Kolkman v. People, 89 Colo. 8, 300 P. 575 (1931). Jury presumed to understand and heed. In the absence of a showing to the contrary, it is presumed that the jury understands instructions and heeds them. People v. Motley, 179 Colo. 77, 498 P.2d 339 (1972); People v. Jacobs, 179 Colo. 182, 499 P.2d 615 (1972); People v. Knapp, 180 Colo. 280, 505 P.2d 7 (1973). Applied in Brasher v. People, 81 Colo. 113, 253 P.827 (1927); Marshall v. People, 160 Colo. 323, 417 P.2d 491 (1966); People v. Butcher, 180 Colo. 429, 506 P.2d 362 (1973); People v. Thorpe, 40 Colo. App. 159, 570 P.2d 1311 (1977); People v. Padilla, 638 P.2d 15 (Colo. 1981); People v. Swanson, 638 P.2d 45 (Colo. 1981); People v. Mack, 638 P.2d 257 (Colo. 1981); People v. Founds, 631 P.2d 1166 (Colo. App. 1981); People v. Dillon, 633 P.2d 504 (Colo. App. 1981); Massey v. People, 649 P.2d 1070 (Colo. 1982); People v. Handy, 657 P.2d 963 (Colo. App. 1982); People v. Jones, 665 P.2d 127 (Colo. App. 1982). II. Duty to Instruct. A. In General. Law reviews. For article, "Jury Nullification and the Rule of Law", see 17 Colo. Law. 2151 (1988). Purpose of this rule is to enable the trial judge to prevent error from occurring and to correct an error if an improper instruction is tendered. People v. Barker, 180 Colo. 28, 501 P.2d 1041 (1972). The procedure set forth in this rule affords counsel the opportunity to structure closing arguments based on the instructions which will govern the jury's deliberations. People v. Bastin, 937 P.2d 761 (Colo. App. 1996). Court has a duty to instruct the jury properly on all of the elements of the offenses charged. People v. Bastin, 937 P.2d 761 (Colo. App. 1996). Court has a corresponding duty to correct erroneous instructions. People v. Bastin, 937 P.2d 761 (Colo. App. 1996). Counsel has a duty to assist the court by objecting to erroneous instructions and by tendering correct instructions. Arellano v. People, 177 Colo. 286, 493 P.2d 1362 (1972); Fresquez v. People, 178 Colo. 220, 497 P.2d 1246 (1972); People v. Zapata, 759 P.2d 754 (Colo. App. 1988). It is incumbent on counsel to object to the court's proposed instruction, if defective or deficient, and to request and tender correct instructions, or instructions that have been overlooked or omitted by the court. People v. Sharpe, 183 Colo. 64, 514 P.2d 1138 (1973). And to request instruction. It is the responsibility of a party's counsel to request an instruction if he believed circumstances warranted, and, having failed to do so, the party cannot afterwards complain that such instruction was not given. Edwards v. People, 73 Colo. 377, 215 P. 855 (1923); Rhodus v. People, 158 Colo. 264, 406 P.2d 679 (1965). All objections must be made prior to submission to jury. Defendant must make all objections which he has to instructions prior to their submission to the jury. People v. O'Donnell, 184 Colo. 104, 518 P.2d 945 (1974); People v. Tilley, 184 Colo. 424, 520 P.2d 1046 (1974). In determining the propriety of any one instruction, the instructions must be considered as a whole, and, if the instructions as a whole properly instruct a jury, then there is no error. People v. Kurts, 721 P.2d 1201 (Colo. App. 1986). Failure to instruct the jury properly with respect to an essential element of the offense charged generally constitutes reversible error. People v. Williams, 707 P.2d 1023 (Colo. App. 1985); People v. Gracey, 940 P.2d 1050 (Colo. App. 1996). The trial court's failure to re-instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof prior to closing arguments did not constitute structural or plain error. The court instructed the jury on these matters before the trial and reminded the jury of these instructions before closing arguments. The court also pointed jurors to their handbooks that included the instruction. This was enough to indicate that jurors were aware of the proper standard of review. People v. Baenziger, 97 P.3d 271 (Colo. App. 2004). Jury notebooks are not to supplant the requirement of Crim. P. 30 that jurors be orally instructed prior to closing arguments. People v. Baenziger, 97 P.3d 271 (Colo. App. 2004). The practice of instructing the jurors immediately prior to closing arguments has many benefits, including ensuring that the jury hears and considers all the applicable law before deliberations and aiding the overall comprehension of the jury. Because the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt are so critical in a criminal case, it is especially important to instruct the jury on those points at the close of the case. People v. Baenziger, 97 P.3d 271 (Colo. App. 2004). B. Law of the Case. Duty to instruct on all issues. The trial court has a duty to properly instruct the jury on every issue presented, and the failure to do so with respect to the essential elements of the crime charged constitutes plain error. People v. Archuleta, 180 Colo. 156, 503 P.2d 346 (1972). Ingrained in the law is the right of an accused to insist that the court instruct the jury on all legal questions in order to reach a true verdict. People v. Woods, 179 Colo. 441, 501 P.2d 117 (1972). It is the trial court's duty to instruct the jury on all matters of law which it may consider. People v. Alvarez, 187 Colo. 290, 530 P.2d 506 (1975). Trial court has duty to instruct the jury on the law, properly, plainly, and accurately, on every issue presented. People v. Zapata, 759 P.2d 754 (Colo. App. 1988), aff'd on other grounds, 779 P.2d 1307 (Colo. 1989). Instruction directing the jury to accept as fact any portion of a witness' testimony invades the province of the jury. People v. Roybal, 775 P.2d 67 (Colo. App. 1989). Thus, in a felony child abuse case where the defendant raised the affirmative defense of religious healing, the defendant's tendered instruction asking the court to instruct the jury that the court had determined as a matter of law that the defendant was acting in good faith and that the defendant was a duly accredited practitioner of a recognized church or religion would have invaded the province of the jury, and therefor was properly denied. People v. Lybarger, 790 P.2d 855 (Colo. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 807 P.2d 570 (Colo. 1991). Whether or not requested to do so. The court has a duty to fully instruct the jury on every issue presented, whether requested to do so or not. People v. Mackey, 185 Colo. 24, 521 P.2d 910 (1974). Instructions to the jury should be confined to the law of the case, leaving the facts to be determined by the jury. Sopris v. Truax, 1 Colo. 89 (1868); Rumley v. People, 149 Colo. 132, 368 P.2d 197 (1962); People v. Bercillio, 179 Colo. 383, 500 P.2d 975 (1972). And to issues for which evidence has been presented. Instructions should relate to and be confined to issues concerning which evidence has been presented. Rumley v. People, 149 Colo. 132, 368 P.2d 197 (1962). Including presumptions of fact. It is the duty of the court to draw the attention of the jury to the points in the case and to presumptions of fact, which the law authorizes them to deduce from the evidence. Hill v. People, 1 Colo. 436 (1872). As well as issues presented by pleadings. No instruction should be given by the court, either on its own motion or at the request of counsel, which tenders an issue that is not presented by the pleadings or supported by the evidence or which deviates therefrom in any material respect. Martinez v. People, 166 Colo. 524, 444 P.2d 641 (1968); Luna v. People, 170 Colo. 1, 461 P.2d 724 (1969). Instructions must be plain and accurate. It is the duty of the trial court to instruct the jury so plainly and accurately on the law of the case that they may comprehend the principles involved. Rumley v. People, 149 Colo. 132, 368 P.2d 197 (1962); People v. Garcia, 690 P.2d 869 (Colo. App. 1984). It is bad practice to give to the jury instruction on abstract propositions of law not called for by the evidence even though the instruction is harmless. Nilan v. People, 27 Colo. 206, 60 P. 485 (1900). The trial court should instruct on a principle of law when there is some evidence to support it, but should not instruct on abstract principles of law unrelated to the issues in controversy. People v. Kurts, 721 P.2d 1201 (Colo. App. 1986). Or excerpts from court opinions. Mere abstract statements of law or excerpts from court opinions generally should not be given as instructions. Rumley v. People, 149 Colo. 132, 368 P.2d 197 (1962). Or law review article. To allow counsel to read an opinion from a law review article on the credibility of eyewitness identifications would have substituted the writer for the judge, and usurped the trial court's duty to instruct on the law. People v. Alvarez, 187 Colo. 290, 530 P.2d 506 (1975). Sufficiency of instruction determined by facts of case. The question of the sufficiency of instructions must be determined always by the facts of each case. Rumley v. People, 149 Colo. 132, 368 P.2d 197 (1962). Requested instruction not justified by the evidence is properly refused. Morletti v. People, 72 Colo. 7, 209 P. 796 (1922); Kinselle v. People, 75 Colo. 579, 227 P. 823 (1924); Dickson v. People, 82 Colo. 233, 259 P. 1038 (1927); Rumley v. People, 149 Colo. 132, 368 P.2d 197 (1962). And refusal is not error. Where the court finds that there is no evidence of a certain matter, it is not error to refuse to instruct thereon. McCune v. People, 179 Colo. 262, 499 P.2d 1184 (1972). C. Defendant's Theory. Accused in a criminal case is entitled to an instruction based on his theory of the case. Martinez v. People, 166 Colo. 524, 444 P.2d 641 (1968); Roybal v. People, 177 Colo. 144, 493 P.2d 9 (1972); People v. Montague, 181 Colo. 143, 508 P.2d 388 (1973); People v. Griego, 183 Colo. 419, 517 P.2d 460 (1973); People v. White, 632 P.2d 609 (Colo. App. 1981); People v. Anaya, 732 P.2d 1241 (Colo. App. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 764 P.2d 779 (Colo. 1988); People v. Banks, 804 P.2d 203 (Colo. App. 1990). An instruction embodying a defendant's theory of the case must be given by the trial court if the record contains any evidence to support the theory, the rationale being the belief that it is for the jury and not the court to determine the truth of the defendant's theory. People v. Nunez, 841 P.2d 261 (Colo. 1992). A trial court has an affirmative obligation to cooperate with counsel to either correct the tendered theory of the case instruction or to incorporate the substance of such in an instruction drafted by the court. People v. Nunez, 841 P.2d 261 (Colo. 1992). Although an alibi defense not an affirmative defense so as to place on the People the burden of proof to rebut, and trial court did not err by refusing a theory of case instruction treating alibi as an affirmative defense, defendant was entitled to a properly worded instruction setting forth his theory of the case. People v. Nunez, 824 P.2d 54 (Colo. App. 1991). As constitutional right. A defendant has a constitutional right to have a lucid, accurate, and comprehensive statement by the court to the jury of the law on the subject from his standpoint. Bustamonte v. People, 157 Colo. 146, 401 P.2d 597 (1965). No matter how improbable or unreasonable the contention, a defendant is entitled to an appropriate instruction upon the hypothesis that it might be true. Johnson v. People, 145 Colo. 314, 358 P.2d 873 (1961); People v. Moya, 182 Colo. 290, 512 P.2d 1155 (1973); People v. Banks, 804 P.2d 203 (Colo. App. 1990); People v. Nunez, 841 P.2d 261 (Colo. 1992); People v. Gordon, 32 P.3d 575 (Colo. App. 2001). Or poorly drafted. The fact that an instruction on the defendant's theory may be ineptly worded, grammatically incorrect, or inaccurate in some particular does not excuse the trial court from properly instructing on the theory of defense, assuming there is evidence to support such an instruction. People v. Moya, 182 Colo. 290, 512 P.2d 1155 (1973). Failure to give instruction requires new trial. Where no instruction is given by the trial court embodying the theory of defendant, a new trial must be had. Johnson v. People, 145 Colo. 314, 358 P.2d 873 (1961). Because the determination of the truth of defendant's theory is a jury function, it is error for the court to refuse to give defendant's instruction on the theory of his defense. People v. Moya, 182 Colo. 290, 512 P.2d 1155 (1973); Nora v. People, 176 Colo. 454, 491 P.2d 62 (1971). No new trial required if erroneous instruction causes no prejudice. Where instruction implied that one nonessential factor was an element of the crime, but jury's finding on that point was immaterial to the verdict and defense counsel was not unfairly misled in formulating closing argument or prevented from arguing any meritorious defense, denial of defense's motion for mistrial was not an abuse of discretion. People v. Bastin, 937 P.2d 761 (Colo. App. 1996). The failure to give a jury instruction on a defendant's theory of the case constitutes reversible error. People v. Nunez, 841 P.2d 261 (Colo. 1992). Instruction must be grounded upon evidence and in proper form. A defendant under certain circumstances is entitled to an instruction based on his theory of the case, but it must be grounded upon the evidence and not a mere fanciful invention of counsel nor one involving an impossibility, and it must be in proper form. Marn v. People, 175 Colo. 242, 486 P.2d 424 (1971); Kurtz v. People, 177 Colo. 306, 494 P.2d 97 (1972). Defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case subject to two conditions: The instruction must be in proper form, and must be supported by evidence in the record. People v. Duran, 185 Colo. 359, 524 P.2d 296 (1974). Defendant's jury instruction on his theory of the case must be in proper form and based on evidence in the record. People v. Griego, 183 Colo. 419, 517 P.2d 460 (1973). A defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case, provided it is grounded in the evidence. People v. Mackey, 185 Colo. 24, 521 P.2d 910 (1974). A defendant is entitled to instructions consistent with his theory of the case if there is evidence to support it. People v. Nace, 182 Colo. 127, 511 P.2d 501 (1973); People v. Travis, 183 Colo. 255, 516 P.2d 121 (1973); People v. Meller, 185 Colo. 389, 524 P.2d 1366 (1974); People v. Shearer, 650 P.2d 1293 (Colo. App. 1982); People v. Banks, 804 P.2d 203 (Colo. App. 1990). General instruction should be adapted to defendant's theory. When a general instruction does not particularly direct the jury's attention to defendant's theory, it is the duty of the court either to correct the tendered instruction or to give the substance of it in an instruction drafted by the court. Nora v. People, 176 Colo. 454, 491 P.2d 62 (1971). Or supplementary instruction given. If a statutory instruction does not fit a particular case, or if it is given and yet other supplementary instructions are needed to state a defendant's position, then such, when properly worded and tendered, should be submitted to the jury. Bustamonte v. People, 157 Colo. 146, 401 P.2d 597 (1965). No instruction where no theory other than denial set forth. When a tendered instruction does not set forth any theory of the case other than a general denial, is merely a restatement of defendant's evidence without any resultant theory, and is merely another attempt to reargue the case, the defendant is not entitled to have it reiterated in instructions given by the court. Marn v. People, 175 Colo. 242, 486 P.2d 424 (1971); People v. Cole, 926 P.2d 164 (Colo. App. 1996). A defendant is not entitled to an instruction on a theory of the case that is simply a denial of the charges and a trial court may also refuse to give a tendered theory of the case instruction which contains argumentative matter or which is merely a restatement of the defendant's evidence. People v. Gracey, 940 P.2d 1050 (Colo. App. 1996). Defendant not entitled to different instructions concerning same subject. Though a defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case, he is not entitled to different instructions, all concerning the same general subject, and each couched in only slightly different verbiage. Bennett v. People, 168 Colo. 360, 451 P.2d 443 (1969). A properly worded instruction setting forth defendant's theory, when supported by the evidence, should always be given by a trial court unless the defendant's theory is encompassed in other instructions to the jury. People v. Moya, 182 Colo. 290, 512 P.2d 1155 (1973); People v. Meller, 185 Colo. 389, 524 P.2d 1366 (1974). All that is required is that the theory of the case be accurately embodied in the instructions given by the court. McCune v. People, 179 Colo. 262, 499 P.2d 1184 (1972); People v. Montague, 181 Colo. 143, 508 P.2d 388 (1973). The trial court properly rejected defendant's theory of defense instruction on the grounds that it was argumentative, did little more than summarize defendant's version of the incident, and was encompassed within the other instructions. People v. Lee, 18 P.3d 192 (Colo. App. 2000). Once a principle is covered it is not error to refuse to repeat the instruction in other language. McCune v. People, 179 Colo. 262, 499 P.2d 1184 (1972); People v. Montague, 181 Colo. 143, 508 P.2d 388 (1973). Instruction may be refused where jury otherwise adequately instructed. Where the jury is adequately instructed by the court and defendant's instructions would add nothing, it is not error to refuse to give instructions tendered by the defendant. Yerby v. People, 176 Colo. 115, 489 P.2d 1308 (1971); People v. Focht, 180 Colo. 259, 504 P.2d 1096 (1972); People v. Shearer, 650 P.2d 1293 (Colo. App. (1982); People v. Cole, 926 P.2d 164 (Colo. App. 1996); People v. Gordon, 32 P.3d 575 (Colo. App. 2001). No error occurred when trial court refused to give instruction requested by defendant which merely restated points covered by other instructions and reiterated a general denial of guilt. People v. Anaya, 732 P.2d 1241 (Colo. App. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 764 P.2d 779 (Colo. 1988); People v. Lybarger, 790 P.2d 855 (Colo. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 807 P.2d 570 (Colo. 1991). No abuse of discretion by court in refusal to give defendant's proposed misidentification instructions when such instructions were repetitive, were substantially included in stock instructions, and placed undue emphasis on a single issue presented by the evidence. People v. Zapata, 759 P.2d 754 (Colo. App. 1988), aff'd on other grounds, 779 P.2d 1307 (Colo. 1989); People v. Harte, 131 P.3d 1180 (Colo. App. 2005). Where tendered instructions do not contain a correct statement of the law, and the instructions given by the court adequately advise the jury of the refusal to submit defendant's tendered instructions, which are covered by those given by the trial court, is not error. Quintana v. People, 178 Colo. 213, 496 P.2d 1009 (1972). Evidence of affirmative defense of "treatment by spiritual means" in criminal child abuse case was sufficient to require trial court to instruct the jury on such defense. Lybarger v. People, 807 P.2d 570 (Colo. 1991). Where the trial record contained substantial evidence to support the defendant's alibi theory of defense and the jury instructions set forth only the elements of the offense and the burden of proof and did not encompass or embody the defendant's defense of alibi, it was reversible error for the trial court to fail to correct the tendered alibi instruction or to incorporate an alibi instruction in the other jury instructions. People v. Nunez, 841 P.2d 261 (Colo. 1992). III. Form. Object of rule. One object of this rule is that the jury may have all the instructions before them when they retire to consider their verdict, and in that view it can make but little difference whether instructions are given orally or read from a book, for, in either case, they would be equally liable to forget them. Gile v. People, 1 Colo. 60 (1867). All instructions must be submitted to the jury in writing. Dorsett v. Crew, 1 Colo. 18 (1864); Gile v. People, 1 Colo. 60 (1867); Nieto v. People, 160 Colo. 179, 415 P.2d 531 (1966). Failure to do so is error. Failure to submit instructions to the jury in writing has always been held to be an error. Dorsett v. Crew, 1 Colo. 18 (1864); Gile v. People, 1 Colo. 60 (1867); Nieto v. People, 160 Colo. 179, 415 P.2d 531 (1966). Giving instructions orally not error if without prejudice. If a statement can be considered as an instruction as to the law, it being in favor of the plaintiff in error, giving it orally is at most an error without prejudice, and one that does not constitute a ground for reversal. Irving v. People, 43 Colo. 260, 95 P. 940 (1908); Martinez v. People, 124 Colo. 170, 235 P.2d 810 (1951). Instructions cannot be orally qualified or modified. Dorsett v. Crew, 1 Colo. 18 (1864). But failure of counsel to object to oral clarifying comments made by the trial court in response to a request by the jury, particularly where counsel is a more or less active participant in this further instructing of the jury, amounts to a waiver of any rights afforded by this rule. Valley v. People, 165 Colo. 555, 441 P.2d 14, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 925, 89 S. Ct. 256, 21 L. Ed. 2d 260 (1968). There is no restriction to the giving of additional written instructions to the jury by the court, in a proper case, after they have retired to consider their verdict. Davis v. People, 83 Colo. 295, 264 P. 658 (1928). But should be given in presence of counsel. Good practice requires that the court, before giving such an instruction, should call the jury into the courtroom and read it to them in the presence of counsel for both sides, unless they waive this formality, inasmuch as trial courts should not communicate with the jury on matters affecting the rights of the parties except in open court and in the presence of counsel. Ray v. People, 147 Colo. 587, 364 P.2d 578 (1961). If not, there must be prejudice for reversible error. While the giving of an additional instruction outside of the presence of counsel is bad procedure, it is not reversible error where it does not appear that it in any manner prejudices the rights of the defendant. Ray v. People, 147 Colo. 587, 364 P.2d 578 (1961). Comments to jury are not instructions. Comments to the jury are advisory and in no respect binding upon the jury, hence they are not instructions, and therefore they need not precede the arguments nor be reduced to writing as provided in this rule. Kolkman v. People, 89 Colo. 8, 300 P. 575 (1931). Provided they do not modify or qualify instructions. The remarks of the trial court do not constitute an instruction within this rule where they are merely an oral direction which in no way modifies or qualifies an instruction given. Irving v. People, 43 Colo. 260, 95 P. 940 (1908). "Instructions" to jury to revise verdicts not within rule. Where, upon verdict, the judge "instructs" the jury that the accused cannot be convicted of more than one offense and directs them to revise their verdict, these remarks are not instructions within the meaning of this rule. Bush v. People, 68 Colo. 75, 187 P. 528 (1920). Nor court's answer to jury on what is charged. When the jury asks the court whether defendant is charged with a certain offense only or with that offense and another, the court's answer to the jury's question is not an instruction to the jury within the meaning of the provisions of this rule. Wiseman v. People, 179 Colo. 101, 498 P.2d 930 (1972). Trial court's response to jury's question concerning instructions outside the presence of defense counsel was reversible error because it was a denial of the constitutional right to counsel. Such error is harmless only if so demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt. If jury's question shows a fundamental misunderstanding of the instructions, it is prejudicial to the defendant. Leonardo v. People, 728 P.2d 1252 (Colo. 1986). Three instructions on one page not error. Where trial court instructed jury by placing three instructions on one sheet of paper-instructions related to the burden of proof, the presumption of innocence, and reasonable doubt-and defendant contends the jury was thereby confused, but no contention is made that the instructions did not properly set forth the law, and defendant has totally failed to suggest how these three instructions, if given on three separate sheets of paper, would have resulted in greater clarity, nor does he explain how the placing of the instructions on one sheet of paper would confuse the jury, this claim of error is totally without merit. People v. Romero, 182 Colo. 50, 511 P.2d 466 (1973). The court committed harmless error in failing to give the jury cautionary hearsay instructions after each hearsay witnesses' testimony. Three hearsay witnesses testified in sequence, the court gave the cautionary instruction following the testimony of the last hearsay witness and during the general charge to the jury, and the hearsay testimony corroborated the testimony of other witnesses. People v. Valdez, 874 P.2d 415 (Colo. App. 1994). IV. Content. A. In General. No instruction which is contradictory in itself is good. Magwire v. People, 77 Colo. 149, 235 P. 339 (1925). Irreconcilable instructions require reversal. Where instructions given by the court are irreconcilable, and it is impossible to say which the jury followed or what the verdict would have been but for the error, a reversal is imperative. Clair v. People, 9 Colo. 122, 10 P. 799 (1886); White v. People, 76 Colo. 208, 230 P. 614 (1924). Erroneous instruction is not cured by another covering the same point which is correct. Mackey v. People, 2 Colo. 13 (1873); Lybarger v. People, 807 P.2d 570 (Colo. 1991). Cumulative effect of improper instruction with proper instruction was to provide the jury with mixed messages and did not dispel the potential for harm created by erroneous instruction. Lybarger v. People, 807 P.2d 570 (Colo. 1991). All instructions are to be taken together, and what might mislead, when considered by itself, may be corrected by another passage of the charge. Forte v. People, 57 Colo. 450, 140 P. 789 (1914); Clarke v. People, 64 Colo. 164, 171 P. 69 (1918); Taylor v. People, 21 Colo. 426, 42 P. 652 (1895); Ausmus v. People, 47 Colo. 167, 107 P. 204 (1910). Instructions in a case must be read and considered as a whole. McCune v. People, 179 Colo. 262, 499 P.2d 1184 (1972); People v. Casey, 185 Colo. 58, 521 P.2d 1250 (1974). In determining the effect of a particular instruction, it must be read in conjunction with the other instructions. People v. Manier, 184 Colo. 44, 518 P.2d 811 (1974). Not error if jury adequately informed. Where the instructions, when read together, adequately inform the jury of the applicable law, there is no error. Blincoe v. People, 178 Colo. 34, 494 P.2d 1285 (1972). If, taken as a whole, the instructions adequately inform the jury of the law, there is no reversible error. People v. Manier, 184 Colo. 44, 518 P.2d 811 (1974). Even though one instruction is not proper. Where one instruction is not entirely proper, its use does not constitute reversible error when the instructions read as a whole adequately inform the jury on the law. People v. Olona, 180 Colo. 299, 505 P.2d 372 (1973). Where the law of the case is clearly and explicitly set forth in one point of the charge, the effect of equivocal language elsewhere is thereby eliminated. LeMaster v. People, 54 Colo. 416, 131 P. 269 (1913). An inadequate instruction is not deemed to constitute fundamental error although it does not fully instruct the jury as to the definition of the crime, nor follows the statutory definition, where, when it is read in conjunction with the other instructions, it appears that in substance the jury is told of the elements of the crime. Morehead v. People, 167 Colo. 287, 447 P.2d 215 (1968). The omission from one instruction of the words "from the evidence" does not constitute reversible error when, by other instructions, the jury is told that its findings must be based upon the evidence, and that alone. Gorman v. People, 7 Colo. 596, 31 P. 335, 31 Am. St. R. 350 (1884); Boykin v. People, 22 Colo. 496, 45 P. 419 (1896). Improper jury instructions not grounds for reversal on appeal where defendant did not object to such instructions at trial and failed to raise such issue in motion for new trial. People v. Quintana, 701 P.2d 1264 (Colo. App. 1985). When reversal not required despite failure to instruct on element. Where the court fails to give an instruction on one element of a crime, reversal is not called for when the prima facie case established by the state stands unrebutted, the defendant offers no defense of which he is deprived by the failure to give the instruction, and he does not object to the instructions given nor request other instructions. Ruark v. People, 164 Colo. 257, 434 P.2d 124 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1044, 88 S. Ct. 1644, 20 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1968). It is not error to refuse cumulative instructions. Minich v. People, 8 Colo. 440, 9 P. 4 (1885). Since requested instructions need not be given when covered by other instructions. It is not error for a trial court to fail to give a tendered instruction covering the same matter already dealt with in other instructions. People v. Mackey, 185 Colo. 24, 521 P.2d 910 (1974); People v. Lee, 199 Colo. 301, 607 P.2d 998 (1980); People v. Garcia, 690 P.2d 869 (Colo. App. 1984). Perhaps no point of law is more amply substantiated in Colorado than the rule that requested instructions which are covered by instructions given by the court are properly refused. Dougherty v. People, 1 Colo. 514 (1872); May v. People, 8 Colo. 210, 6 P. 816 (1885); Van Houton v. People, 22 Colo. 53, 43 P. 137 (1895); Benedict v. People, 23 Colo. 126, 46 P. 637 (1896); Thompson v. People, 26 Colo. 496, 59 P. 51 (1899); Covington v. People, 36 Colo. 183, 85 P. 832 (1960); O'Grady v. People, 42 Colo. 312, 95 P. 346 (1908); Campbell v. People, 55 Colo. 302, 133 P. 1043 (1913); De Rinzie v. People, 56 Colo. 249, 138 P. 1009 (1914); McKee v. People, 72 Colo. 55, 209 P. 632 (1922); Brindisi v. People, 76 Colo. 244, 230 P. 797 (1924); Roll v. People, 78 Colo. 589, 243 P. 641 (1926); Wilder v. People, 86 Colo. 35, 278 P. 594, 65 A.L.R. 1260 (1929); Abshier v. People, 87 Colo. 507, 289 P. 1081 (1930); Gould v. People, 89 Colo. 596, 5 P.2d 580 (1931); Farmer v. People, 90 Colo. 250, 7 P.2d 947 (1932); Jagger Prod. Co. v. Gylling, 90 Colo. 517, 10 P.2d 942 (1932); Updike v. People, 92 Colo. 125, 18 P.2d 472 (1933); Militello v. People, 95 Colo. 519, 37 P.2d 527 (1934). Instructions for multiple offenses. It is error for court to instruct jury that it could convict if evidence showed crime occurred within 3 years prior to filing of information. Such instruction is only proper if evidence proves one act, but date of incident is in question. Woertman v. People, 804 P.2d 188 (Colo. 1991). Because they tend to confuse jury. When a proposition of law is once clearly stated in the charge, a repetition thereof in the same or different language only tends to confuse the jury. Minich v. People, 8 Colo. 440, 9 P. 4 (1885). Combining instructions not abuse of discretion. Combining in one instruction the instructions on presumption of innocence, burden of proof, and reasonable doubt does not amount to an abuse of discretion, where no prejudice is shown. People v. Sharpe, 183 Colo. 64, 514 P.2d 1138 (1973). Particular portions of evidence should not be singled out and emphasized by special instructions. Gallegos v. People, 166 Colo. 409, 444 P.2d 267 (1968). Special instruction unfair if not warranted by the evidence. Where the evidence does not warrant it, a special instruction is unfair and a basis for reversible error. Gallegos v. People, 166 Colo. 409, 444 P.2d 267 (1968). When an instruction conceivably could be improved by rephrasing in certain particulars, yet it adequately states the basic requirements, then the jury is properly charged. Jorgensen v. People, 178 Colo. 8, 495 P.2d 1130 (1972). Although an instruction may be unduly prolix, if it properly advises the jury it is not in error. Yerby v. People, 176 Colo. 115, 489 P.2d 1308 (1971). Instruction interfering with jurors' deliberation is error. Where there is little doubt that the giving of an additional instruction interferes with the free and unbiased deliberation of the jurors, the trial court errs in acting, abusing its discretion. Mogan v. People, 157 Colo. 395, 402 P.2d 928 (1965). A defendant's due process rights are violated when a trial court intrudes on the jury's deliberative process and deprives the jury of its fact-finding duty. People v. Gracey, 940 P.2d 1050 (Colo. App. 1996). The court's response to the jurors' question effectively amounted to an impermissible directed verdict, where the primary contested issue at trial was the defendant's authority to borrow money from victim's account and that response left the jury with no alternative but to determine that defendant had no such authority. People v. Gracey, 940 P.2d 1050 (Colo. App. 1996). Instruction may assume commission of a crime. In a prosecution where there was no dispute at all that a crime was committed and the only defense made is that it was done by another, that the defendants had no part in it, and that instead of encouraging or assisting the criminal they came to the rescue of the injured party, and instruction that "if you believe beyond a reasonable doubt from all the facts and circumstances and evidence in the case that these men aided, abetted and encouraged the offense then you may find them guilty as charged in this information", is not reversible error because it assumes the commission of the crime instead of requiring the jury to find such fact beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence. Komrs v. People, 31 Colo. 212, 73 P. 25 (1903). B. Statutory Language. Instruction based on statute upheld. In a felony child abuse case, the court properly instructed the jury that if the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that a reason other than spiritual treatment existed demonstrating that the child was endangered, the defendant was not entitled to the affirmative defense of spiritual healing. In addition, an instruction referring to the statutory duty of a parent to provide medical care was proper. People v. Lybarger, 790 P.2d 855 (Colo. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 807 P.2d 570 (Colo. 1991). Trial court's decision to use instruction tracking deadly physical force language in § 18-1-704 instead of instruction containing specific language requested by defendant was not erroneous. People v. Phillips, 91 P.3d 476 (Colo. App. 2004). It is a good rule to couch instructions in the language of a statute. Bustamonte v. People, 157 Colo. 146, 401 P.2d 597 (1965). Objection to such instruction is not tenable. The objection that instructions in a criminal case are given in the language of a statute is not tenable. Kent v. People, 8 Colo. 563, 9 P. 852 (1885). If the language is clear. Where an instruction is worded substantially in the language of the statute, no more is required if the language is clear. People v. Dago, 179 Colo. 1, 497 P.2d 1261 (1972); People v. Pahlavan, 83 P.3d 1138 (Colo. App. 2003). Other instructions may be proper. An instruction couched in the language of a statute is not the only type of instruction that is proper. Bustamonte v. People, 157 Colo. 146, 401 P.2d 597 (1965). Inclusion of inapplicable provisions not necessarily error. Even in cases where the inclusion verbatim of inapplicable subsections of statutes in instructions to the jury are said to be improper, the giving of such an instruction does not, in itself, constitute reversible error. Bodhaine v. People, 175 Colo. 14, 485 P.2d 116 (1971). Instruction based on statute upheld. Where instructions on specific intent are phrased in the language of a statute, such instructions are proper and will be upheld on review. Blincoe v. People, 178 Colo. 34, 494 P.2d 1285 (1972). Jury instruction which is in conflict with the legislative intent of § 18-1-407 concerning affirmative defenses should not be used. People v. Rex, 689 P.2d 669 (Colo. App. 1984). In instructing the jury on the issue of the voluntariness of a confession, the court need not define the term since the general understanding of the word is clear. Kwiatkowski v. People, 706 P.2d 407 (Colo. 1985). Jury instruction providing supplemental definition of "knowing" for the purposes of second degree murder was unnecessary, but was not reversible error. The trial court's instruction did not pose a barrier to the jury in considering fully the defendant's affirmative defense. People v. Baca, 852 P.2d 1302 (Colo. App. 1992). C. Particular Instructions. Giving or refusal of cautionary instructions rests largely in the sound discretion of the trial court, and in the absence of a showing of an abuse of discretion and resulting prejudice to the defendant the trial court's ruling will not be disturbed. Luna v. People, 170 Colo. 1, 461 P.2d 724 (1969). Such as on weighing testimony of private detectives. The giving of instructions as to the caution to be observed in weighing testimony of private detectives or persons employed to find evidence is based upon rules of practice rather than of law and rests largely in the discretion of the trial judge. O'Grady v. People, 42 Colo. 312, 95 P. 346 (1908). Where the jury has been instructed to disregard tendered evidence, it must be presumed that the jury in the performance of its duty did so. People v. Goff, 187 Colo. 103, 530 P.2d 514 (1974). Credibility of defendant's testimony. The jury may be instructed that in determining the credibility of the defendant in a criminal case testifying in his own behalf, they have a right to take into consideration the fact that he is interested in the result of the prosecution, as well as his demeanor and conduct during the trial. Minich v. People, 8 Colo. 440, 9 P. 4 (1884); Boykin v. People, 22 Colo. 496, 45 P. 419 (1896); O'Brien v. People, 42 Colo. 40, 94 P. 284 (1908). Or of witness who has wilfully testified falsely. An instruction directing the jury that they are at liberty to disregard the entire testimony of a witness who has wilfully testified falsely to a material point is good. Minich v. People, 8 Colo. 440, 9 P. 4 (1885). Only one instruction on credibility of witnesses necessary. The practice of giving two instructions on the creditibility of witnesses is not necessary, and is not the modern trend, for it is the better practice to give only one instruction as to credibility of witnesses. Fernandez v. People, 176 Colo. 346, 490 P.2d 690 (1971). It is not error to deny a special instruction on credibility of eyewitnesses where a general instruction on credibility is given. People v. Ross, 179 Colo. 293, 500 P.2d 127 (1972); People v. Lopez, 182 Colo. 152, 511 P.2d 889 (1973). Where the stock instruction on credibility includes language of caution to the jury applicable to the witnesses' testimony, it is not an abuse of the trial court's discretion to refuse another cautionary instruction. Luna v. People, 170 Colo. 1, 461, P.2d 724 (1969). The failure of the court sua sponte to specially instruct the jury on an identification issue is not patently prejudicial where the jury is given an instruction concerning the credibility of witnesses which details the factors to be considered by them such as means of knowledge, strength of memory, and opportunities for observation. Fresquez v. People, 178 Colo. 220, 497 P.2d 1246 (1972). But separate instruction on defendant's credibility not error. While it is unnecessary and poor practice to give the jury a separate instruction on the credibility of a defendant as a witness, the giving of such an instruction does not constitute reversible error. People v. Hankin, 179 Colo. 70, 498 P.2d 1116 (1972). The giving of separate instruction dealing with the credibility of defendant as witness was not reversible error, although the better procedure is to give only one integrated credibility instruction. Lamb v. People, 181 Colo. 446, 509 P.2d 1267 (1973). Including in sanity trial. In a sanity trial, the court does not commit prejudicial error by instructing the jury specifically concerning the test of defendant's credibility as a witness, while a general instruction on the credibility of witnesses is also given. Elliott v. People, 176 Colo. 373, 490 P.2d 687 (1971). Where the evidence in a criminal case is wholly circumstantial, it is error to instruct the jury that they need not be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of each link in the chain of circumstances relied upon to establish the defendant's guilt. Clair v. People, 9 Colo. 122, 10 P. 799, 97 Am. St. R. 780 (1886). If in ruling upon the sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence in circumstantial evidence cases judges must follow the rule that the evidence must be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence, it follows that the better practice is to so advise the jury. People v. Calise, 179 Colo. 162, 498 P.2d 1154 (1972). No error if defendant is not prejudiced. Where an instruction conveys the essence of the law to be applied in regard to circumstantial evidence and when all the instructions are read as a whole the defendant is not prejudiced by this instruction which does not include the language that "the circumstances relied upon must be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence", there is no error. People v. Hankin, 179 Colo. 70, 498 P.2d 1116 (1972). Circumstantial evidence held sufficient basis for instruction. Yerby v. People, 176 Colo. 115, 489 P.2d 1308 (1971). Stock instruction on presumption of innocence held inappropriate. Renfrow v. People, 176 Colo. 160, 489 P.2d 582 (1971); Brown v. People, 177 Colo. 397, 494 P.2d 587 (1972). For instruction on presumption of innocence recommended by supreme court, see Martinez v. People, 172 Colo. 82, 470 P.2d 26 (1970). Trial court need not instruct jury to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence where the evidence of defendant's guilt was primarily direct. People v. Lopez, 182 Colo. 152, 511 P.2d 889 (1973). A court does not err in instructing the jury that they are "not to search for a doubt". People v. Sharpe, 183 Colo. 64, 514 P.2d 1138 (1973). Where instruction on presumption of innocence was given prior to recommendation of supreme court that it be reworded to exclude objectionable language, giving of such instruction was not reversible error. People v. Pacheco, 180 Colo. 39, 502 P.2d 70 (1972). The giving of a stock instruction on the presumption of innocence does not constitute reversible error just because of its historical use. Jorgensen v. People, 178 Colo. 8, 495 P.2d 1130 (1972). Submitting erroneous instruction on presumption of innocence would ordinarily require reversal, but only if the defendant objected to the instruction. People v. Simmons, 182 Colo. 350, 513 P.2d 193 (1973). Instruction that defendant not compelled to testify. It is error to refuse a tendered instruction that the defendant is not compelled to testify, and that the fact that he does not testify cannot be used as an inference of guilt and should not prejudice him in any way. People v. Crawford, 632 P.2d 626 (Colo. App. 1981). Limiting instruction on prior convictions. When defendant's prior felony convictions are elicited during his testimony, a limiting instruction is required. People v. Goldsberry, 181 Colo. 406, 509 P.2d 801 (1973). Instructions where evidence of other crimes is used. When evidence from other crimes is used: First, the prosecutor should advise the trial court of the purpose for which he offers the evidence; secondly, if the court admits such evidence, it should then and there instruct the jury as to the limited purpose for which the evidence is being received and for which the jury may consider it; thirdly, the general charge should contain a renewal of the instruction on the limited purpose of such evidence; lastly, the offer of the prosecutor and the instructions of the court should be in carefully couched terms-they should refer to "other transactions", "other acts", or "other conduct" and should eschew such designations as "similar offenses", "other offenses", "similar crimes", and so forth. Kurtz v. People, 177 Colo. 306, 494 P.2d 97 (1972); Howe v. People, 178 Colo. 248, 496 P.2d 1040 (1972). Where evidence relating to other prior incidents of a similar nature between the defendant and the prosecuting witness is admitted, and the court gives an oral cautionary instruction to the jury on the limited relevance of similar act testimony at the conclusion of the prosecuting witness's testimony as well as a similar written instruction when the case is submitted to the jury, there is no reversible error. People v. Elliston, 181 Colo. 118, 508 P.2d 379 (1973). Even when defendant has not requested such. Where the trial judge instructs the jury on the limited purposes for which evidence of prior felony convictions is admitted when the defendant has not requested such an instruction, such action is proper inasmuch as the judge has a duty to instruct the jury on the limited purpose for which such evidence is admissible in his general instructions. Lee v. People, 170 Colo. 268, 460 P.2d 796 (1969). Evidence of former convictions used to attack credibility. Where testimony as to former convictions is elicited for the purpose of attacking the defendant's credibility, the court acts properly in so instructing the jury. Candelaria v. People, 177 Colo. 136, 493 P.2d 355 (1972). When instructing a deadlocked jury deliberating a charge involving lesser offenses, the court should first ask whether there is a likelihood of progress towards a unanimous verdict upon further deliberation. If the jury indicates that a unanimous verdict is unlikely, the court should then inquire whether the jury is divided over guilt as to any one of the offenses and nonguilt as to all offenses or, instead, whether the division centers only on the particular degree of guilt. People v. Lewis, 676 P.2d 682 (Colo. 1984); People v. Hayward, 55 P.3d 803 (Colo. App. 2002). When a lesser offense involves elements that are not necessarily included in a greater offense, the additional instruction should set forth the nonincluded elements of the offense and should advise the jury that before the defendant can be found guilty of that particular offense each of the jurors must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted in such a manner so as to satisfy all of the nonincluded elements. People v. Lewis, 676 P.2d 682 (Colo. 1984). Instruction on lesser included offense limited. The rule that an instruction on a lesser included offense is required when requested is limited to those cases where there is evidence to support such an instruction. People v. Ross, 179 Colo. 293, 500 P.2d 127 (1972). A defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense, unless it is clear from the evidence that the defendant is guilty of the greater offense or nothing at all. Ortega v. People, 178 Colo. 419, 498 P.2d 1121 (1972). Mere chance of the jury's rejection of uncontroverted testimony and conviction on a lesser charge does not necessitate an instruction on the lesser charge. People v. Campbell, 678 P.2d 1035 (Colo. App. 1983). The giving of such instruction is not mandatory. Where the court already knew that a juror disagreed with the other jurors and felt pressured to issue a verdict against her conscience, court had reasonable concern that such an instruction could be perceived as coercive. People v. Barnard, 12 P.3d 290 (Colo. App. 2000). Defendant was not entitled to special instruction concerning testimony of immunized witnesses where, considering circumstances of case, the standard credibility instruction given by trial court was sufficient. People v. Loggins, 709 P.2d 25 (Colo. App. 1985). There must be evidence tending to establish lower grade. In a prosecution for a crime which includes within the charge lower grades of crime, where there is any evidence tending to establish a lower grade, the jury should be instructed as to such lower grade; but, where there is no evidence tending to establish a lower grade, such lower grade should not be submitted to the jury. Carpenter v. People, 31 Colo. 284, 72 P.1072 (1903). Lesser nonincluded offense. A defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser nonincluded offense when he requests such an instruction and there is evidence to support it. People v. Best, 665 P.2d 644 (Colo. App. 1983). Trial court's refusal to give a lesser nonincluded offense instruction does not justify reversal if the court instructed on a comparable lesser nonincluded offense. People v. Rubio, 222 P.3d 355 (Colo. App. 2009). The decision whether to request a lesser offense instruction is a matter to be decided by counsel after consultation with the defendant. Arko v. People, 183 P.3d 555 (Colo. 2008). Instruction on reasonable doubt upheld. Minich v. People, 8 Colo. 440, 9 P. 4 (1885); People v. Couch, 179 Colo. 324, 500 P.2d 967 (1972); People v. Focht, 180 Colo. 259, 504 P.2d 1096 (1972); People v. Rubio, 222 P.3d 355 (Colo. App. 2009). An instruction to the jury that a reasonable doubt must be grounded upon irreconcilable evidence is incorrect, because the evidence may be insufficient to prove the charge. Mackey v. People, 2 Colo. 13 (1873). Instruction on general intent upheld. People v. Couch, 179 Colo. 324, 500 P.2d 967 (1972). But inadequate for specific intent crime. An instruction on general intent is inadequate guidance for a jury deliberating specific intent crime. People v. Mingo, 181 Colo. 390, 509 P.2d 800 (1973). Instruction on specific intent read in context with other instructions which made specific reference to specific intent, requiring proof of each element beyond a reasonable doubt, adequately informs the jury of the law. People v. Couch, 179 Colo. 324, 500 P.2d 967 (1972). Instruction omitting specific "animus" improper. An instruction which makes the question of guilt depend solely upon the intentional doing of an unlawful act constitutes prejudicial error in cases where the specific "animus" as a material element of the crime for which the accused is convicted is omitted. Gonzales v. People, 166 Colo. 557, 445 P.2d 74 (1968). Instruction dealing with the effect of defendant's statement does not require for its submission that the defendant's statement reached the level of a confession or a direct admission of a crime. People v. Naranjo, 181 Colo. 273, 509 P.2d 1235 (1973). Instruction on definition of confession held properly denied. Roybal v. People, 177 Colo. 144, 493 P.2d 9 (1972). Instruction on weight given confession is improper comment on evidence. An instruction that tells a jury that a confession may be entitled to great weight is an improper comment upon the weight of the evidence. Fincher v. People, 26 Colo. 169, 56 P. 902 (1899). Admonition does not cure erroneous admission of incriminating statement. An admonition or an instruction to the jury to disregard involuntary incriminating statements does not cure the erroneous admission of such statements. Edmisten v. People, 176 Colo. 262, 490 P.2d 58 (1971). Unless such is not an issue of significance. Where the admissions of the defendant in the nature of either extrajudicial statements or a confession is not an issue of significance, the giving of an instruction on them is not grounds for relief. Yerby v. People, 176 Colo. 115, 489 P.2d 1308 (1971). Instruction held not to be judicial comment on the evidence. People v. Olona, 180 Colo. 299, 505 P.2d 372 (1973). Comments of counsel. Where the trial judge instructed the jury that comments of counsel were not evidence and should not be considered as such, in the absence of a showing to the contrary, it is presumed that the jury understood the instructions and heeded them. People v. Becker, 187 Colo. 344, 531 P.2d 386 (1975). Instruction defining accomplice held not fatally erroneous. Komrs v. People, 31 Colo. 212, 73 P. 25 (1903). Instruction on accomplice's testimony held proper. Wisdom v. People, 11 Colo. 170, 17 P. 519 (1887); People v. Small, 177 Colo. 118, 493 P.2d 15 (1972). nstruction on evidence showing plan, scheme, and design held proper. Mays v. People, 177 Colo. 92, 493 P.2d 4 (1972). Instruction on flight. Where there is evidence of flight as a deliberate attempt to avoid detection or arrest for a crime just committed, an instruction on flight is proper. Gallegos v. People, 166 Colo. 409, 444 P.2d 267 (1968); Nunn v. People, 177 Colo. 87, 493 P.2d 6 (1972). Instruction on alibi held sufficient. McGregor v. People, 176 Colo. 309, 490 P.2d 287 (1971). Instruction on alibi held liable to mislead jury and was therefore grounds for new trial. Wisdom v. People, 11 Colo. 170, 17 P. 519 (1887). Instruction on negligence held valid. People v. Olona, 180 Colo. 299, 505 P.2d 372 (1973). Instruction on complicity appropriate where evidence was sufficient to show that two or more persons were jointly engaged in the commission of a crime. People v. Phillips, 732 P.2d 1226 (Colo. App. 1986). Instruction on defendant's denials and theory of case held error. Trial court's instruction that defendant's denials of charges and theory of case were issues but not evidence held incorrect statement of law and reversible error. People v. Herbison, 761 P.2d 263 (Colo. App. 1988). State's pattern reasonable doubt jury instruction accurately describes proof beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Alvarado-Juarez, 252 P.3d 1135 (Colo. App. 2010). Where trial court should have given an additional clarifying instruction, its failure to do so did not constitute prejudicial error where conviction could not have been affected by the lack of response to jurors' inquiry. People v. Fell, 832 P.2d 1015 (Colo. App. 1991). Trial court's comment regarding whether defendant was the initial aggressor did not violate this rule and did not constitute error, much less plain error. With respect to a trial court's comments, questions, and demeanor, more than mere speculation concerning the possibility of prejudice must be demonstrated to warrant a reversal. The record must clearly establish bias, and the test is whether the trial judge's conduct so departed from the required impartiality as to deny the defendant a fair trial. People v. Martinez, 224 P.3d 1026 (Colo. App. 2009), aff'd on other grounds, 244 P.3d 135 (Colo. 2010). Court responded to defendant's objection to prosecutor's closing argument about self-defense by finding there was "some evidence" defendant was initial aggressor. Its ruling was on a matter of law, it did not invade the fact-finding province of the jury, and court immediately instructed jurors that they were to decide the facts. People v. Martinez, 224 P.3d 1026 (Colo. App. 2009), aff'd on other grounds, 244 P.3d 135 (Colo. 2010). Failure to give curative instruction not reversible error. Failure to give a curative instruction, in the absence of a request by defense counsel, did not constitute reversible error. People v. Rogers, 187 Colo. 128, 528 P.2d 1309 (1974). Curative jury instruction to disregard prior invalid conviction remedied any harm that may have resulted from reference to the invalid conviction. People v. McNeely, 68 P.3d 540 (Colo. App. 2002). Instructions as a whole held to have adequately advised jury on premeditation. Carroll v. People, 177 Colo. 288, 494 P.2d 80 (1972). Instruction reducing prosecutor's obligation prejudicial. Prejudice to the defendant is inevitable when the court instructs the jury in such a way as to reduce the prosecution's obligation to prove each element of its case beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Kanan, 186 Colo. 255, 526 P.2d 1339 (1974); Lybarger v. People, 807 P.2d 570 (Colo. 1991). Cumulative instructions containing erroneous statements of law and which were at odds with the standard jury instructions on affirmative defenses had the effect of relieving the prosecution of its burden of proof in regard to affirmative defenses. Lybarger v. People, 807 P.2d 570 (Colo. 1991). Trial court's additional instruction in response to jury's inquiry not error because defendant acceded to instruction and the inquiry did not show any misunderstanding or confusion on a matter of law central to the defendant's guilt or innocence. People v. Phillips, 91 P.3d 476 (Colo. App. 2004). Giving of "Allen charge" prior to September 22, 1971, held not error. People v. Lovato, 181 Colo. 99, 507 P.2d 860 (1973). But error when no confusion in jurors' minds on the law. Ordinarily a trial judge is within his rightful province when he urges agreement upon a jury at loggerheads with itself; but this process has its limits, and it is a specifically delicate matter to importune unanimity when there is no indication of confusion or misapprehension in the minds of the jurors on the law of the case. Mogan v. People, 157 Colo. 395, 402 P.2d 928 (1965). "Time-fuse" instruction is plain error. The giving of a "time-fuse" instruction (which grants the jury a time limit to finish its deliberations, at the end of which the jury will be dismissed) constitutes plain error and requires reversal. Allen v. People, 660 P.2d 896 (Colo. 1983). Instruction that the jury could consider defendant's voluntary absence from the trial as evidence of guilt was not error. The court had made reasonable inquiry as to the defendant's whereabouts before continuing the trial. People v. Tafoya, 833 P.2d 841 (Colo. App. 1992). V. Motion for New Trial. Failure to comply with this rule will ordinarily result being precluded from raising an objection for the first time on motion for new trial. Arellano v. People, 177 Colo. 286, 493 P.2d 1362 (1972); Fresquez v. People, 178 Colo. 220, 497 P.2d 1246 (1972). Where grounds specified in motion are not the same as before court. Where the "grounds so specified" before the trial court are not the same as are thereafter urged in a motion for new trial, then the grounds may not be considered raised for the first time in the motion for a new trial. Zeiler v. People, 157 Colo. 332, 403 P.2d 439 (1965). VI. On Review. A. In General. Errors in instructions generally not basis for collateral attack. As a general rule, errors in jury instructions do not constitute fundamental error that would provide a basis for collateral attack. People v. Shearer, 181 Colo. 237, 508 P.2d 1249 (1973). Assumption that jury followed instructions. The reviewing court must assume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the jury followed the court's instructions. People v. Palmer, 189 Colo. 354, 540 P.2d 341 (1975); People v. Montoya, 709 P.2d 58 (Colo. App. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 736 P.2d 1208 (Colo. 1987). And that court properly instructed jury. On review, in the absence of all of the instructions, it will be assumed that the trial court properly instructed the jury on the law applicable to the facts and the issues. Luna v. People, 170 Colo. 1, 461 P.2d 724 (1969). Error benefiting party not prejudicial. Where one is benefited by an error in submitting or failing to submit an instruction, he cannot claim prejudicial error. Atwood v. People, 176 Colo. 183, 489 P.2d 1305 (1971). A party cannot complain when an instruction given is more favorable to him than the one refused. Lowdermilk v. People, 70 Colo. 459, 202 P. 118 (1921); Abshier v. People, 87 Colo. 507, 289 P. 1081 (1930). Where a court errs in giving an instruction that prejudices the state rather than the defendant in that it increases the state's burden beyond that required, no grounds for reversal are created. Early v. People, 178 Colo. 167, 496 P.2d 1021 (1972). No error where instructions support defendant's theory. Defendant cannot try the case on one theory and claim error on appeal where the trial court, in instructing the jury, acquiesced in that theory. People v. Lankford, 185 Colo. 445, 524 P.2d 1382 (1974). Or where approved by defense. Assignments of error based on instructions specifically approved by the defense will not be considered. Giacomozzi v. People, 72 Colo. 13, 209 P. 798 (1922). No error where defendant acquitted. Where the requested instructions went only to the question of a charge of which the defendant was acquitted, the refusal to give the instructions is not subject to review. Hughes v. People, 175 Colo. 351, 487 P.2d 810 (1971). Mere nondirection where no instruction is requested is not error. Brown v. People, 20 Colo. 161, 36 P. 1040 (1894); West v. People, 60 Colo. 488, 156 P. 137 (1915); Clarke v. People, 64 Colo. 164, 171 P. 69 (1918); Rowan v. People, 93 Colo. 473, 26 P.2d 1066 (1933). In reviewing claims based on clerical errors in instructions, the court must assume that the jury took a common sense view of the instruction. People v. Turner, 730 P.2d 333 (Colo. App. 1986). For court to determine the effect of particular instruction, it must be read in conjunction with the other instructions. People v. Zapata, 759 P.2d 754 (Colo. App. 1988), aff'd on other grounds, 779 P.2d 1307 (Colo. 1989). Under the doctrine of invited error, a party cannot complain where he has been the instrument for injecting error in the case, and any error caused by the failure of the trial court to give the jury an instruction due to the defendant's objections is error injected by the defendant and cannot be complained of on appeal. People v. Collins, 730 P.2d 293 (Colo. 1986). When a party injects or invites error in trial proceedings, he cannot later seek reversal on appeal because of that error. People v. Zapata, 759 P.2d 754 (Colo. App. 1988), aff'd on other grounds, 779 P.2d 1307 (Colo. 1989). A claim of plain error relative to a jury instruction must be tested by examining the sufficiency of the instructions as a whole. People v. Turner, 730 P. 2d 333 (Colo. App. 1986). The cumulative effect of improper jury instructions that contained erroneous statements of law which relegated to the jury the function of determining whether an affirmative defense was available in a case and which had the effect of relieving the prosecution of its burden of proof in regard to the affirmative defense was plain error even though a proper jury instruction was provided with the improper jury instruction. The proper jury instruction was insufficient to dispel the potential harm created by the erroneous jury instructions. Lybarger v. People, 807 P.2d 570 (Colo. 1991). Failure to instruct jury on element not necessarily structural, requiring reversal. If element uncontested, supported by overwhelming evidence, and jury verdict would have been same absent error, failure to instruct harmless. People v. Geisendorfer, 991 P.2d 308 (Colo. App. 1999). A trial court commits constitutional error when it correctly instructs the jury regarding the elements of the crime but instructs the jury that, as a matter of law, the prosecution has satisfied its burden of proving one of the elements, thereby withdrawing that element from the jury's consideration. People v. Gracey, 940 P.2d 1050 (Colo. App. 1996). B. Requirements. Failure to object at trial bars review. Where appellants argue that certain of the instructions given were erroneous, but they failed to raise any objection to these instructions at trial, offered no alternative instructions, and then failed to raise the issue in their motion for a new trial, an appellate court will not ordinarily review the assignment of error. People v. Buckner, 180 Colo. 65, 504 P.2d 669 (1972). See Morehead v. People, 167 Colo. 287, 447 P.2d 215 (1968); Tanksley v. People, 171 Colo. 77, 464 P.2d 862 (1970). Trial counsel must specify which instructions he is objecting to and tender correct instructions, and having failed to so object at trial, the issue cannot be raised on appeal. People v. Green, 183 Colo. 25, 514 P.2d 769 (1973). Where defendant did not object to the jury instruction, nor offer a substitute, or include the asserted ground in his motion for new trial, consequently, it will not be considered for the first time on appeal. Lamb v. People, 181 Colo. 446, 509 P.2d 1267 (1973). An appellate court ordinarily does not notice objections to instructions not raised at the trial court level. Keady v. People, 32 Colo. 57, 74 P. 892 (1903); Buschman v. People, 80 Colo. 173, 249 P. 652 (1926); Ruark v. People, 164 Colo. 257, 434 P.2d 124 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1044, 88 S. Ct. 1644, 20 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1968). Ordinarily, the supreme court will not take note of erroneous instructions in the absence of a contemporaneous objection which gives the trial court an opportunity to correct error in its proceedings. People v. Meller, 185 Colo. 389, 524 P.2d 1366 (1974). Unless manifest prejudice amounting to plain error. Where the defendant does not object to an instruction given, or tender any alternate instruction which might more adequately set forth the law, his assignment of error is not valid unless there is manifest prejudice amounting to plain error. People v. Bercillio, 179 Colo. 383, 500 P.2d 975 (1972). Where defendant did not tender his own instructions, nor did he object to the instructions given, nor did he raise objections to the instructions in his motion for a new trial, a reviewing court is not required to review the arguments raised for the first time, and would not do so unless fundamental error appears. People v. Manier, 184 Colo. 44, 518 P.2d 811 (1974). Where a defendant failed to object to the adequacy of the jury instructions in his motion for a new trial, a judgment will not be reversed unless plain error occurred. People v. Frysig, 628 P.2d 1004 (Colo. 1981). Where defendant only made a general objection to jury instructions, and failed to make a timely specific objection, supreme court will not consider argument by defendant that instructions were in error, absent plain error. People v. O'Donnell, 184 Colo. 104, 518 P.2d 945 (1974). Where the defendant failed to make any objection prior to submission of the instructions, absent plain error, the court would not consider the defendant's arguments on review. People v. Tilley, 184 Colo. 424, 520 P.2d 1046 (1974); People v. Casey, 185 Colo. 58, 521 P.2d 1250 (1974). Where defendant did not challenge the giving of the instruction at trial, only error so substantial as to constitute plain error requires reversal. People v. Turner, 730 P.2d 333 (Colo. App. 1986). Within the meaning of rule 52. Review as to an alleged error not previously specified to the trial court is precluded unless the alleged error be deemed "plain error" within the meaning of Crim. P. 52(b). People v. Brionez, 39 Colo. App. 396, 570 P.2d 1296 (1977). "Plain error" rule must be read in harmony with this rule. People v. Barker, 180 Colo. 28, 501 P.2d 1041 (1972). Review confined to whether plain error present. Where an instruction issue is raised for the first time on appeal, review is confined to a consideration of whether the error falls within the definition of plain error. People v. Barker, 180 Colo. 28, 501 P.2d 1041 (1972); People v. Zapata, 759 P.2d 754 (Colo. App. 1988), aff'd on other grounds, 779 P.2d 1307 (Colo. 1989); People v. Lybarger, 790 P.2d 855 (Colo. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 807 P.2d 570 (Colo. 1991); People v. Knight, 167 P.3d 141 (Colo. App. 2006). Where instructions used by the trial court fail to define the statutory terms, failure to object to the tendered instructions or raise any constitutional objection to the statute at the trial court level raises the standard of review to one of "plain error". People v. Cardenas, 42 Colo. App. 61, 592 P.2d 1348 (1979). Appellate court reviews only for plain error where defendant fails to make all objections to the jury instructions before the instructions are submitted to the jury. People v. Sweeney, 78 P.3d 1133 (Colo. App. 2003). No plain error where a reasonable jury would not interpret the instructions to permit two aggravated robbery convictions where defendant took property from only one victim during a single episode. People v. Sweeney, 78 P.3d 1133 (Colo. App. 2003). "Plain error" not found. Where an instruction is not objected to by defendant when tendered by the court, the defendant does not tender a "proper" instruction, and he does not mention the asserted error in instruction in a motion for new trial, there is no plain error. People v. Green, 178 Colo. 77, 495 P.2d 549 (1972). Where from the court's review of all instructions it was satisfied that there was no "plain error" in the giving of the instruction which the defendant challenged for the first time on appeal, there was no need to discuss the several arguments advanced by the defendant. People v. Spinuzzi, 184 Colo. 412, 520 P.2d 1043 (1974). Broad objection insufficient for review. An objection in broad coverage, giving no basis whatever to point up with some reasonable particularity the nature of any shortcoming, is no objection at all and is not entitled to consideration on review. Cruz v. People, 165 Colo. 495, 441 P.2d 22 (1968). Where a great number of instructions are given, most of them dependent to some extent on each other, then, where they are full and fair to the defendant in a criminal case by stating the law correctly, an appellate court will not review them, or any part of them, upon a vague and general charge of error. Jones v. People, 6 Colo. 452, 45 Am. R. 526 (1882). Where instructions are given as a general charge and the exceptions are only general in their character, the party excepting is not in position to urge his objection on appeal. Liggett v. People, 26 Colo. 364, 58 P. 144 (1899). Refusal to give instruction not error if no prejudice. The court's refusal to give defendant's tendered instruction is not error where no prejudice to defendant is shown or apparent in record. Young v. People, 180 Colo. 62, 502 P.2d 81 (1972). Jury instruction that if defendant was found to be the initial aggressor he was not entitled to benefit of self-defense was harmless error. There was no real possibility the jury was misled and the instruction was at most cumulative of another instruction concerning self-defense. People v. Manzanares, 942 P.2d 1235 (Colo. App. 1996). Where record does not disclose any request during trial for the submission to the jury of a question, an appellate court declines to pass on the question of error in failure to submit. McClary v. People, 79 Colo. 205, 245 P. 491 (1926); McNulty v. People, 180 Colo. 246, 504 P.2d 335 (1972). No error in trial court's instruction on deadly weapon or in court's response to jury's question on deadly weapon where defense did not object to the instruction or tender an alternative instruction or object to the court's referral to the instruction in answering the question, and, in some circumstances, fists may be considered a deadly weapon. People v. Pennese, 830 P.2d 1085 (Colo. App. 1991). Jury instruction providing supplemental definition of "knowing" for the purposes of second degree murder was unnecessary, but was not reversible error. The trial court's instruction did not pose a barrier to the jury in considering fully the defendant's affirmative defense. People v. Baca, 852 P.2d 1302 (Colo. App. 1992). .