Colo. R. Civ. P. 58
C.R.C.P. 58
Annotation I. General Consideration. Law reviews. For article, "Notes on Proposed Amendments to Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure", see 27 Dicta 165 (1950). For article, "Amendments to the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure", see 28 Dicta 242 (1951). For article, "Judgment: Rules 54-63 ", see 23 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 581 (1951). Applied in Dill v. County Court, 37 Colo. App. 45, 541 P.2d 1272 (1975); Ayala v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 43 Colo. App. 357, 603 P.2d 979 (1979); Hawkins v. Powers, 635 P.2d 915 (Colo. App. 1981); Marks v. District Court, 643 P.2d 741 (Colo. 1982); Henley v. Wendt, 640 P.2d 271 (Colo. App. 1982); Davis Mfg. & Supply Co. v. Coonskin Props., Inc., 646 P.2d 940 (Colo. App. 1982); Pasbrig v. Walton, 651 P.2d 459 (Colo. App. 1982); In re Chambers, 657 P.2d 458 (Colo. App. 1982); Moore & Co. v. Williams, 657 P.2d 984 (Colo. App. 1982); People in Interest of C.A.W., 660 P.2d 10 (Colo. App. 1982); Bassett v. Eagle Telecommunications, 750 P.2d 73 (Colo. App. 1987); In re Hoffner, 778 P.2d 702 (Colo. App. 1989). II. Entry. The entry of judgment is a purely ministerial act. Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. Villa Italia, Ltd., 35 Colo. App. 252, 539 P.2d 137 (1975); Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. Villa Italia, Ltd., 541 P.2d 118 (Colo. App. 1975). Relief sought, and therefore time limitations, for judgment entered pursuant to this rule is pursuant to C.R.C.P. 59(a)(4) even though relief sought was from costs taxed by clerk pursuant to C.R.C.P. 54. Davis v. Bruton, 797 P.2d 830 (Colo. App. 1990). Section (a) indicates a sequence of events in which the entry of judgment follows, in point of time, the preparation of the written form of judgment. Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. Villa Italia, Ltd., 35 Colo. App. 252, 539 P.2d 137 (1975); Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. Villa Italia, Ltd., 541 P.2d 118 (Colo. App. 1975). This rule provides that upon a special verdict the court shall direct the appropriate judgment, and other provisions indicate that the court shall direct the entry of a judgment. City of Aurora v. Powell, 153 Colo. 4, 383 P.2d 798 (1963). This rule requires that a court's preparation of the written form of the judgment precede the clerk's entry of judgment. Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. Villa Italia, Ltd., 35 Colo. App. 252, 539 P.2d 137 (1975); Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. Villa Italia, Ltd., 541 P.2d 118 (Colo. App. 1975). The clerk's entries are administrative, not judicial. City of Aurora v. Powell, 153 Colo. 4, 383 P.2d 798 (1963). Court's "findings, conclusions, and order" is sufficient to function as the written form of the judgment required by section (a). Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. Villa Italia, Ltd., 35 Colo. App. 252, 539 P.2d 137 (1975); Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. Villa Italia, Ltd., 541 P.2d 118 (Colo. App. 1975). Where the record does not contain any document executed before the clerk's notation of judgment in the register of actions, the notation cannot function as an entry of judgment. Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. Villa Italia, Ltd., 35 Colo. App. 252, 539 P.2d 137 (1975); Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. Villa Italia, Ltd., 541 P.2d 118 (Colo. App. 1975). Lack of a proper order determining a C.R.C.P. 59 motion was not fatal to appeal where party appealed from underlying order of dissolution of marriage, not from denial of the rule 59 motion. In re Christen, 899 P.2d 339 (Colo. App. 1995). Section (a) of this rule applies in dissolution of marriage cases with multiple issues. Poor v. District Court, 190 Colo. 433, 549 P.2d 756 (1976). Until the written form of a dissolution decree, together with the written permanent orders were prepared, signed by the judge, and then entered on the register of actions, there was no entry of judgment. Poor v. District Court, 190 Colo. 433, 549 P.2d 756 (1976). Likewise, a magistrate's order shall be signed and in writing in accordance with section (a). A magistrate's order modifying child support decree becomes effective, for the purposes of appeal, when the magistrate's order is signed. A nunc pro tunc order shall not affect a party's right to review. In re Spector, 867 P.2d 181 (Colo. App. 1993). Written decree terminating a parental relationship constitutes "a written form of the judgment" within the intent of section (a). People in Interest of A.M.D., 648 P.2d 625 (Colo. 1982). In dissolution proceeding, where trial court incorporated partial separation agreement as well as oral supplemental agreement into the degree of dissolution, there was a final, appealable order notwithstanding the fact that wife's counsel failed to prepare and file a written form of the supplemental agreement. The decree was dated and signed by the trial court and, by expressly incorporating both the partial separation agreement and the supplemental agreement, it left nothing further for the court to do in order to completely determine the rights of the parties. In re Sorensen, 166 P.3d 254 (Colo. App. 2007). Judgment is not entered until there is a signed written order. Sayat Nova, Inc. v. District Court, 619 P.2d 764 (Colo. 1980); Neoplan USA Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 721 P.2d 157 (Colo. App. 1986); Church v. Amer. Standard Ins. Co. of Wis., 742 P.2d 971 (Colo. App. 1987); In re Estate of Royal, 813 P.2d 790 (Colo. App. 1991); Hall v. Am. Standard Ins. Co. of Wis., 2012 COA 201, 292 P.3d 1196. Where court entered its "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment" and ordered separate decree quieting title to be prepared, there was no final judgment until the quiet title decree was signed. Reser v. Aspen Park Ass'n, 727 P.2d 378 (Colo. App. 1986). Judgment may be entered without the court's signature when that judgment is not prepared by counsel. Moore & Co. v. Williams, 672 P.2d 999 (Colo. 1983). For purposes of timely filing of a motion for new trial under C.R.C.P. 59(a)(1), a judgment is "entered" only upon notation in the judgment docket pursuant to section (a) of this rule and C.R.C.P. 79(d). City & County of Denver v. Just, 175 Colo. 260, 487 P.2d 367 (1971). The timeliness of a civil appeal is governed by C.A.R. 4(a) (appeals as of right), not section (a) of this rule. Section (a) of this rule, however, does control the date of entry of judgment for the purposes of a C.R.C.P. 59, new trial motion. Moore & Co. v. Williams, 672 P.2d 999 (Colo. 1983); Luna v. Fisher, 690 P.2d 264 (Colo. App. 1984). Final entry of judgment for purposes of timely notice of appeal under C.A.R. 4(a) based on denial of new trial motion is date on which court filed written judgment in fixed amount on special verdict since this written ruling adjudicated all claims, rights, and liabilities of parties. Vallejo v. Eldridge, 764 P.2d 417 (Colo. App. 1988). Order entered on minutes is effective as "written order" under section (a) of this rule. Wesson v. Bowling, 199 Colo. 30, 604 P.2d 23 (1979). A minute order was sufficiently clear and precise and may be entered on the register pursuant to section (a) of this rule where the order detailed the amount of the judgment and setoffs and assessed costs, gave the plaintiff the right to possession, provided that the plaintiff apply the defendant's security deposit to the judgment, allowed the plaintiff interest to the date of the judgment on the amount due on a note, and, finally, gave both parties 20 days to file motions. Hebron v. District Court, 192 Colo. 346, 558 P.2d 997 (1977). Entry of judgment effective upon notation in register. Both section (a) of this rule and C.R.C.P. 79(a) clearly state that entry of a judgment is effective upon notation in the register of actions. Hebron v. District Court, 192 Colo. 346, 558 P.2d 997 (1977). Written order denying motion for reconsideration of dismissal without prejudice complied with subsection (a) of this rule. The prior order dismissing the case without prejudice was not reduced to writing and did not comply with the requirements of this rule. SMLL, L.L.C. v. Daly, 128 P.3d 266 (Colo. App. 2005). Judgment becomes final upon notation, though not recorded in judgment record. Hebron v. District Court, 192 Colo. 346, 558 P.2d 997 (1977). A judgment is final when it disposes of the entire litigation on the merits and a motion for costs does not stay the finality of that judgment. Driscoll v. District Court, 870 P.2d 1250 (Colo. 1994). The court has the authority to supplement and modify the opinions it expresses in its oral remarks until the judgment has been reduced to writing, dated, and signed. In re West, 94 P.3d 1248 (Colo. App. 2004). Conclusion of juvenile hearing does not occur until filing in clerk's office. For purposes of § 19-1-110 (now § 19-1-108 ) (5), the "conclusion of the juvenile hearing" does not occur until the juvenile commissioner signs the written findings and recommendations and transmits them to the juvenile judge by filing in the office of the clerk. The five-day period within which to file a request for review does not commence running until the filing date. People in Interest of M.C.L., 671 P.2d 1339 (Colo. App. 1983). C.R.C.P. 6(e) does apply to extend time under this rule. Bonanza Corp. v. Durbin, 696 P.2d 818 (Colo. 1985). No reviewable judgment presented. An appellate court must see that the actual judgment has been pronounced by the court and then entered by the clerk and that it appears in the record; otherwise no reviewable judgment is presented. Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. Villa Italia, Ltd., 35 Colo. App. 252, 539 P.2d 137 (1975); Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. Villa Italia, Ltd., 541 P.2d 118 (Colo. App. 1975). Relation back of judgment so as to extinguish appeal right unconstitutional. Trial court's action in relating back matters decided on May 28 to the May 15 entry on the judgment docket had the effect of extinguishing the petitioner's right to appeal from the determination made on May 28. Under these circumstances, the 10-day period of C.R.C.P. 59(b), expired before the remaining issues in the case had even been determined by the trial court. This result contravenes the right of appeal granted by the Colorado constitution. In re Gardella, 190 Colo. 402, 547 P.2d 928 (1976) (decided prior to amendments made in 1977, 1984, and 1987). Read together, the rules provide that a motion for a new trial must be filed not later than 10 days following the notation of judgment in the trial court's register of actions (or judgment docket). In re Gardella, 190 Colo. 402, 547 P.2d 928 (1976) (decided prior to amendments made in 1977, 1984, and 1987). Time for motion after entry of order not issuance. Where the trial court issued its order nunc pro tunc on April 22, 1974, but the order was not noted in the registry of actions until May 31, 1974, the motion for new trial filed within 10 days from that date was timely filed. In re Talarico, 36 Colo. App. 389, 540 P.2d 1147 (1975) (decided prior to amendments made in 1977, 1984, and 1987). Even though a nunc pro tunc order generally is fully operative on the litigants' rights as of the prescribed effective date, a nunc pro tunc order cannot be used to reduce the time nor to defeat the right to take an appeal. Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. Villa Italia, Ltd., 35 Colo. App. 252, 539 P.2d 137 (1975); Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. Villa Italia, Ltd., 541 P.2d 118 (Colo. App. 1975). The filing on September 26 of an order nunc pro tunc as of September 25 cannot give effect to a clerk's September 25 entry of judgment, especially where the record does not indicate that the September 26 order was subsequently entered in the register of actions. Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. Villa Italia, Ltd., 35 Colo. App. 252, 539 P.2d 137 (1975); Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. Villa Italia, Ltd., 541 P.2d 118 (Colo. App. 1975). Where notice of entry of judgment is mailed to only one party in contravention of subsection (a) of this rule, the time provided by C.R.C.P. 59(a) for filing a post-trial motion commences from the date that the notice is mailed by that party to the party subsequently moving for post-trial relief. Padilla v. D.E. Frey & Co., Inc., 939 P.2d 475 (Colo. App. 1997). Trial judge's failure to sign minute order does not prevent the court of appeals from considering the appeal. Furlong v. Gardner, 956 P.2d 545 (Colo. 1998). Applied in Lewis v. Buckskin Joe's, Inc., 156 Colo. 46, 396 P.2d 933 (1964). III. Satisfaction. Court has authority to order satisfaction apart from acknowledgment. A court has the authority to order a satisfaction of judgment even though there had not been an acknowledgment by the judgment creditor and without the filing of a motion by the debtor to compel such an acknowledgment. Osborn Hdwe. Co. v. Colo. Corp., 32 Colo. App. 254, 510 P.2d 461 (1973). Execution sale constitutes satisfaction to extent of proceeds. In the absence of a defect justifying setting an execution sale aside, a levy and sale under an execution constitutes a satisfaction only to the extent of the proceeds of the sale. Gale v. Rice, 636 P.2d 1280 (Colo. App. 1981). Rule authorizes a court to enter satisfaction of judgment on behalf of a judgment debtor, even though a judgment creditor refuses to acknowledge payment, so long as the judgment debtor has paid the judgment amount into the court registry. Vento v. Colo. Nat'l Bank, 985 P.2d 48 (Colo. App. 1999). Applied in Chateau Chaumont Condo. v. Aspen Title Co., 676 P.2d 1246 (Colo. App. 1983).
For judgment upon multiple claims or involving multiple parties, see C.R.C.P. 54(b); for judgment record, see C.R.C.P. 79(d); for attachments, see C.R.C.P. 102; for garnishment, see C.R.C.P. 103; for replevin, see C.R.C.P. 104.