C.r.c.p. 51
The parties shall tender jury instructions pursuant to C.R.C.P. 16(g). All instructions shall be submitted to the parties, who shall make all objections thereto before they are given to the jury. Only the grounds so specified shall be considered on motion for a new trial or on appeal or certiorari. Before argument, the court shall read its instructions to the jury but shall not comment upon the evidence. Such instructions shall be taken by the jury when it retires. All instructions offered by the parties, or given by the court, shall be filed with the clerk and, with the endorsement thereon indicating the action of the court, shall be taken as part of the record of the cause.
C.r.c.p. 51
Annotation I. General Consideration. Law reviews. For article, "Limitations of the Power of Courts in Instructing Juries", see 6 Dicta 23 (March 1929). For article, "Shall Colorado Procedure Conform with the Proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?", see 15 Dicta 5 (1938). For article, "Colorado Criminal Procedure-Does It Meet Minimum Standards?", see 28 Dicta 14 (1951). For article, "Trials: Rules 38-53 ", see 23 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 571 (1951). For article, "One Year Review of Civil Procedure", see 34 Dicta 69 (1957). For article, "Jury Nullification and the Rule of Law", see 17 Colo. Law. 2151 (1988). For article "There is Still a Chance: Raising Unpreserved Arguments on Appeal", see 42 Colo. Law. 29 (June 2013). Annotator's note. Since this rule is similar to § 205 of the former Code of Civil Procedure, which was supplanted by the Rules of Civil Procedure in 1941, relevant cases construing that section have been included in the annotations to this rule. Annotator's note. Since this rule is similar to § 205 of the former Code of Civil Procedure, which was supplanted by the Rules of Civil Procedure in 1941, relevant cases construing that section have been included in the annotations to this rule. The giving of an instruction for special findings by a jury is discretionary with the court. Brown v. Maier, 96 Colo. 1, 38 P.2d 905 (1934). Where there was no statute or rule to support the presumption created by a jury instruction, the presumption could only be properly given if it was supported by common law rules governing the admissibility and evidentiary effect of defendant electrical utility's compliance with industry standards. Yampa Valley Elec. v. Telecky, 862 P.2d 252 (Colo. 1993). In the absence of a showing of abuse of discretion, no error can be predicated on the refusal to give such an instruction. Brown v. Maier, 96 Colo. 1, 38 P.2d 905 (1934). A judgment of the trial court refusing to give requested instruction will not be reversed unless the refusal results in substantial, prejudicial error. Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175 (Colo. 1992). The purpose of jury instructions is to provide the jury with the applicable law so that its attention will be directed to the specific issues that are to be determined. Rio Grande S. R.R. Co. v. Campbell, 44 Colo. 1, 96 P. 986 (1908); Yampa Valley Elec. v. Telecky, 862 P.2d 252 (Colo. 1993). The trial court may exercise sound discretion as to the form and style in which instructions shall be given. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Kerns, 172 Colo. 59, 470 P.2d 34 (1970). The duty imposed upon the trial court necessarily involves a large discretion as to the form and style in which instructions to the jury shall be given. Moffat v. Tenney, 17 Colo. 189, 30 P. 348 (1892). Court should state all issues and both parties' cases. A clear statement of the issues to the jury is eminently proper, but the court should be careful to state all the issues and put the case not only as it is laid by the plaintiff, but also as it is controverted by the defendant; he is entitled to have his defense and case stated. Kindel v. Hall, 8 Colo. App. 63, 44 P. 781 (1896). A party is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case when it is supported by competent evidence. Davis v. Cline, 177 Colo. 204, 493 P.2d 362 (1972). A party is entitled to a jury instruction only when it is supported by the evidence and is consistent with existing law. Sufficient competent evidence, rather a mere scintilla of evidence, is required to support an instruction. Melton by and through Melton v. Larrabee, 832 P.2d 1069 (Colo. App. 1992). Jury instruction that the highest degree of care was owed by the defendant gas service company in the distribution of propane gas was proper in action for negligence for gas explosion that destroyed home of insurance company's client, as was instruction on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur; record showed that explosion would not have occurred but for negligence. U.S. Fidelity and Guarantee Co. v. Salida Gas Serv. Co., 793 P.2d 602 (Colo. App. 1989). It is error for the court to instruct a jury on questions not presented by the pleadings, or with reference to matters irrelevant to the evidence. Bijou Irrigation Dist. v. Cateran Land & Live Stock Co., 73 Colo. 93, 213 P. 999 (1923); McCaffrey v. Mitchell, 98 Colo. 467, 56 P.2d 926, 57 P.2d 900 (1936). Trial court's failure to instruct jury on loss of future earning capacity was error. Evidence was presented that the plaintiff had previously worked as a nurse aide at a specified rate of compensation, and testimony was such that a reasonable inference could be made that a return to work would be problematic. Plaintiff was not required to introduce evidence of an intention to return to work in the future. Martinez v. Shapland, 833 P.2d 837 (Colo. App. 1992). Trial court has discretion to issue or refuse to issue instruction on loss of future earning capacity, but the court's decision must be based on the evidence and be premised on the presence or absence of evidence regarding earnings. When there is evidence in the record the court has an obligation to present proper instruction to the jury in support of a party's theory of recovery. Martinez v. Shapland, 833 P.2d 837 (Colo. App. 1992). A trial court cannot in its instructions to the jury withdraw from its consideration a proper defense and, by an erroneous construction of the law, reenact a statute, disregarding its plain provisions, so as to fit the case under consideration. Potts v. Bird, 93 Colo. 547, 27 P.2d 745 (1933). The charge of the court is to be taken as a whole. Coors v. Brock, 22 Colo. App. 470, 125 P. 599 (1912). Instructions are to be read together and considered as a unified whole. Kendall v. Lively, 94 Colo. 483, 31 P.2d 343 (1934). In construing a charge, each instruction is to be considered in connection with the entire charge. Dozenback v. Raymer, 13 Colo. 451, 22 P. 787 (1889). Court's instruction to the jury at the close of evidence outweighs any previous instruction. In determining an award for damages, the jury was justified in considering evidence previously barred by an order in limine because the court's final instructions effectively negated that order. Belfor USA Group v. Rocky Mtn. Caulking & Waterproofing, 159 P.3d 672 (Colo. App. 2006). Tendered instruction on "inherently dangerous activity" was properly refused, where record did not indicate that installation of heat tape was an activity analogous to other inherently dangerous activities. Melton by and through Melton v. Larrabee, 832 P.2d 1069 (Colo. App. 1992). All instructions should be considered in determining whether the necessary law has been correctly stated. All of the trial court's instructions to the jury are to be read and considered as a whole in determining whether all the necessary law has been correctly stated to the jury. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Kerns, 172 Colo. 59, 470 P.2d 34 (1970). Instructions to the jury are to be read and considered together in determining whether it has been adequately and correctly advised of the law. Martin v. Bralliar, 36 Colo. App. 254, 540 P.2d 1118 (1975). If, when so read and considered, they constitute a fair, full, and reasonably accurate statement of the law, the fact that some isolated portions may seem to be incomplete or incorrect is immaterial. Kendall v. Lively, 94 Colo. 483, 31 P.2d 343 (1934). Regardless of the fact that some instructions were not in the form suggested by the Colorado Jury Instructions, and that there was some overlapping, when read as a whole, they adequately and correctly informed the jury as to the law applicable to the case, which is the test as to whether the instructions constituted reversible error. Hotchkiss v. Preble, 33 Colo. App. 431, 521 P.2d 1278 (1974). If, in considering the charge as a whole, an appellate court is satisfied that the jury was not improperly advised as to any material point in the case, the judgment will not be reversed on account of an erroneous instruction. Dozenback v. Raymer, 13 Colo. 451, 22 P. 787 (1889). An instruction, which by itself might be erroneous, may be qualified by what appears in another part of the charge. Coors v. Brock, 22 Colo. App. 470, 125 P. 599 (1912). Jury instructions were so erroneous or so confusing or misleading as probably to lead the jury into error of such proportion as to require a new trial, where the jury was not instructed to consider separately any of the elements of the inherently dangerous activity exception and the jury was given no instruction at all on the issue of whether the accident was caused by the collateral negligence of the defendant. Huddleston v. Union Rural Elec. Ass'n, 841 P.2d 282 (Colo. 1992). An instruction may be cured. An instruction which is merely defective, incomplete, or ambiguous or which leaves room for improper inferences may be cured by another point in the charge. Nelson v. Nelson, 27 Colo. App. 104, 146 P. 1079 (1915); Block v. Balajty, 31 Colo. App. 237, 502 P.2d 1117 (1972). The refusal to give requested instructions does not constitute error where the instructions given by the court are sufficiently comprehensive to advise the jury fully upon the questions presented for its determination. Weicker Transf. & Storage Co. v. Bedwell, 95 Colo. 280, 35 P.2d 1022 (1934). Where a legal principle is adequately covered in other instructions given, it is not error for the court to refuse a requested specific instruction. Mohler v. Park County Sch. Dist. Re-2, 32 Colo. App. 388, 515 P.2d 112 (1973). Where correct instructions are given covering all the points of a case, the refusal of others, though correct in themselves, is not ground of error. Dozenback v. Raymer, 13 Colo. 451, 22 P. 787 (1889). When a tendered instruction is no more than a restatement of the court's instruction, it is not error to refuse the tendered instruction. Lockwood v. Travelers Ins. Co., 179 Colo. 103, 498 P.2d 947 (1972). Jury instruction which was merely a statement of the parties' pleadings and contained the trial court's admonition that the contentions of the parties in the pleadings were not to be considered by the jury as evidence was not improper or prejudicial. Schafer v. Nat'l Teal Co., 32 Colo. App. 372, 511 P.2d 949 (1973). A requested instruction which contains unwarranted assumptions is properly refused. Alamosa v. Johnson, 99 Colo. 134, 60 P.2d 1087 (1936). An instruction should not be given which creates issue of fact not supported by evidence or which tends to mislead or divert minds of jury from real factual issues. Dolan v. Mitchell, 179 Colo. 359, 502 P.2d 72 (1972). An instruction which states that the defendant has to prove a matter by a preponderance of the evidence is incorrect, because such an instruction shifts the entire burden of proof rather than shifting only the burden of going forward with the evidence to rebut the presumption and plaintiff's "prima facie" case. Lockwood v. Travelers Ins. Co., 179 Colo. 103, 498 P.2d 947 (1972). Where it is necessary that the jury be properly and fully instructed on a measure and counsel fails to tender suitable instructions thereon, it is the duty of the court to so instruct on its own motion. Kendall v. Hargrave, 142 Colo. 120, 349 P.2d 993 (1960). In instructing on its own motion, an appellate court may execute its discretion in noticing error appearing on the face of the record even though not raised by the parties. Kendall v. Hargrave, 142 Colo. 120, 349 P.2d 993 (1960). Tendered instruction on negligence properly refused. It was not error for the trial court to refuse defendants tendered instruction where the instruction would have been proper as to only two of plaintiff's three theories of negligence and the defendants did not attempt to limit the instructions' applicability to those two theories. Kerby v. Flamingo Club, Inc., 35 Colo. App. 127, 532 P.2d 975 (1974). Rule restricts parties not court. This rule serves only as a restriction on parties to an action both by requiring assistance in the orderly administration of justice and by preventing a miscarriage of justice: it is not a bar to the court where the trial judge is attempting to secure substantial justice. First Nat'l Bank v. Campbell, 198 Colo. 344, 599 P.2d 915 (1979). The court's action in giving an example of the application of a comparative negligence instruction is not reversible error where the evidence supports the amount of the verdict, the court gave the summary closing instruction, and the defendant did not make any contemporaneous objection to the remarks. Bravo v. Wareham, 43 Colo. App. 1, 605 P.2d 58 (1979). Where the trial court refused to make plaintiff's tendered instruction part of the record but defendant admits that the instruction was tendered and refused, this rule will not act as a technical or procedural bar on the right of the plaintiff to protest the failure to instruct on the issue raised in the tendered instruction. Martinez v. Atlas Bolt & Screw Co., 636 P.2d 1287 (Colo. App. 1981). Trial court's improper refusal to grant defendant's tendered instruction was harmless where the instruction given by the court contained the essence of his claimed defense. People v. Berry, 703 P.2d 613 (Colo. App. 1985). Electrical utility was not entitled to a jury instruction creating a rebuttable presumption that adherence to industry standards presumes compliance with "accepted good engineering practice in the electric industry", since whether the utility complied with accepted good engineering practices, or whether it exercised due care is best determined by the jury after it has examined the relevant evidence and been properly instructed concerning the effect of the utility's compliance with the industry's minimum standards. Yampa Valley Elec. v. Telecky, 862 P.2d 252 (Colo. 1993). Trial court committed reversible error in giving jury instruction, because there was no statutory or common law justification to support the rebuttable presumption contained in the instruction. Yampa Valley Elec. v. Telecky, 862 P.2d 252 (Colo. 1993). Failure to instruct jury on standard of care required of a practitioner with a sub-specialty or special training constituted prejudicial error. Short v. Kinkade, 685 P.2d 210 (Colo. App. 1983). Trial court erred in refusing to instruct jury on the doctrine of res ipsa locquitur. The trial court should consider all legitimate inferences from the evidence in light most favorable to plaintiffs and submit the issue of res ipsa locquitur if the evidence reasonably permits the conclusion that negligence is the more probable explanation. Gambrell by and through Eddy v. Ravin, 764 P.2d 362 (Colo. App. 1988). Evidence raising issue whether physician held himself out as specialist required jury instructions. Physician in medical malpractice case who advertised in the "Yellow Pages" under "Family Practice, Obstetrics and Pediatrics" and who held himself out as a family practitioner who delivered babies required jury instructions on the standard of care applicable to specialists and the standard of care applicable to general practitioners and on the jury's duty to apply the appropriate standard of care based upon its determination on the issue of whether the physician was a specialist. Gambrell by and through Eddy v. Ravin, 764 P.2d 362 (Colo. App. 1988), aff'd 788 P.2d 817 (Colo. App. 1992). Where a requested jury instruction was legally correct and clearly applicable to a material question of fact in controversy, failure to give such instruction constituted reversible error. Horton v. Mondragon, 705 P.2d 977 (Colo. App. 1984). Tendered instruction on affirmative defense neither pled nor raised at trial by defendant properly refused. Where assumption of risk is neither pled nor raised at trial by defendant, cautionary instruction that it was not a defense to plaintiff's claim was properly excluded. Cruz v. Union Pacific R. Co., 707 P.2d 360 (Colo. App. 1985). Failure to request instructions conforming to evidence of legal theory, or to take other steps at trial to permit the jury to consider the theory, precludes plaintiff from introducing such theory on appeal. Alzado v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 752 P.2d 544 (Colo. 1988). Public policy supports disclosing to juries the effect that their deliberative decisions will have; thus, there was no error in instructing a jury that the effect of its findings regarding a statute of limitations could bar plaintiff's claim where the jury was also instructed that it should not be influenced by sympathy and the defendant failed to provide any evidence that the jury ignored this instruction. Salazar v. Am. Sterlizer Co., 5 P.3d 357 (Colo. App. 2000). Applied in Roblek v. Horst, 147 Colo. 55, 362 P.2d 869 (1961); Jones v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. No. R-1, 154 Colo. 590, 392 P.2d 165 (1964); Nunn v. Car-Skaden, 163 Colo. 328, 430 P.2d 615 (1967); Wales v. Howard, 164 Colo. 167, 433 P.2d 493 (1967); Norden v. Henry, 167 Colo. 274, 447 P.2d 212 (1968); Downing v. Don Ward & Co., 28 Colo. App. 75, 470 P.2d 868 (1970); First Nat'l Bank v. Campbell, 41 Colo. App. 406, 589 P.2d 501 (1978); Mobell v. City & County of Denver, 671 P.2d 433 (Colo. App. 1983). II. Numbered. Good practice requires that instructions be numbered. Kansas Pac. Ry. v. Ward, 4 Colo. 30 (1877). Formerly, it was held that the omission to number instructions was not a fatal defect. Gibbs v. Wall, 10 Colo. 153, 14 P. 216 (1887). A party cannot complain because instructions are irregularly numbered where no possible prejudice results to him, nor can such alleged error be reviewed when raised for the first time on appeal. Austin v. Austin, 42 Colo. 130, 94 P. 309 (1908). III. In Writing. Instructions to the jury should be written. Dorsett v. Crew, 1 Colo. 18 (1864). The court should not orally qualify or modify jury instructions. Dorsett v. Crew, 1 Colo. 18 (1864); Gile v. People, 1 Colo. 60 (1867); Montelius v. Atherton, 6 Colo. 224 (1882); Lee v. Stahl, 9 Colo. 208, 11 P. 77 (1886). By express consent of counsel, charge to jury may be given orally. Keith v. Wells, 14 Colo. 321, 23 P. 991 (1890). An error is not cured by the extension of the instructions by the stenographer and the signature of the judge. Brown v. Crawford, 2 Colo. App. 235, 29 P. 1137 (1873), aff'd, 21 Colo. 272, 40 P. 692 (1895). Where the trial court orally answers the question of a juror concerning the interpretation of a given instruction, it does not commit error where the answer is correct. Schlesinger v. Miller, 97 Colo. 583, 52 P.2d 402 (1935). An admonition orally addressed by the presiding judge to the jury to the effect that they must be controlled by the evidence, not substituting their own judgment or impressions, is not error. Denver City Tramway Co. v. Armstrong, 21 Colo. App. 640, 123 P. 136 (1912). IV. Objections. Law reviews. For article, "Necessity for Exceptions to Instructions in Colorado", see 1 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 102 (1929). This rule provides that parties must make objections to any proposed instructions before they are submitted to the jury and that only the grounds so specified shall be considered on appeal. Ross v. Colo. Nat'l Bank, 170 Colo. 436, 463 P.2d 882 (1969); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bowser, 779 P.2d 1376 (Colo. App. 1989). Parties cannot prevail upon the ground of error in an instruction to which they made no objection upon the trial. Phillips v. Komornic, 159 Colo. 335, 411 P.2d 238 (1966). Plaintiff's failure to object to jury instructions constituted a waiver of any claim of error to the instruction. Martin v. Minnard, 862 P.2d 1014 (Colo. App. 1993); Gorsich v. Double B Trading Co., Inc., 893 P.2d 1357 (Colo. App. 1994); Voller v. Gertz, 107 P.3d 1129 (Colo. App. 2004). An appellate court will not ordinarily consider objections to instructions when those objections were not made during the course of the trial. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Kerns, 172 Colo. 59, 470 P.2d 34 (1970). Court may, in its discretion, notice error of record. This rule, providing that only grounds specified in objections to instructions will be considered on appeal, is modified by C.A.R. 1(d), permitting an appellate court at its discretion to notice any error of record whether raised by counsel or not. Warner v. Barnard, 134 Colo. 337, 304 P.2d 898 (1956). Discretion will be exercised by the court when necessary to do justice. Warner v. Barnard, 134 Colo. 337, 304 P.2d 898 (1956); Blueflame Gas, Inc. v. Van Hoose, 679 P.2d 579 (Colo. 1984). The supreme court does not hold that it would not make an exception to the rule concerning objections to instructions where its enforcement would result in a miscarriage of justice. Mansfield v. Harris, 79 Colo. 164, 244 P. 474 (1926). The contemporaneous objection rule has a salutary purpose in the orderly administration of justice; its principle is to enable trial judges to clarify or correct misleading or erroneous instructions before they are given to a jury, and thereby prevent costly retrials necessitated by obvious and prejudicial error. Scheer v. Cromwell, 158 Colo. 427, 407 P.2d 344 (1965); Ross v. Colo. Nat'l Bank, 170 Colo. 436, 463 P.2d 882 (1969); First Nat'l Bank v. Campbell, 198 Colo. 344, 599 P.2d 915 (1979); Baum v. S.S. Kresge Co., 646 P.2d 400 (Colo. App. 1982). Objections should be timely. Objections to instructions should be made in such time and manner as to give the trial court an opportunity to correct the same, if found erroneous. Jacobs v. Mitchell, 2 Colo. App. 456, 31 P. 235 (1892); Colo. Utils. Corp. v. Casady, 89 Colo. 168, 300 P. 606 (1931). When instructions are about to be given to the jury, counsel may not sit idly by and allow improper instructions to be given without proper and specific objections thereto in time for the court to correct the instructions before giving them to the jury since it is not in furtherance of justice to permit them to lie in wait and catch the court in error for the purpose of obtaining a reversal. Blanchard v. People, 74 Colo. 431, 222 P. 649 (1924). Agreement for making objections in new trial motion is ineffectual. An agreement between the parties' attorneys approved by the court, that objections made to plaintiff's instructions for the first time in defendant's motion for a new trial should be considered as having been made before the instructions were given to the jury, is ineffectual. Thompson v. Davis, 117 Colo. 82, 184 P.2d 133 (1947). Objections to instructions on a former trial do not eliminate the necessity of a renewal of the objections in a new trial if the party wishes to avail himself of such objections, for except by stipulation or proper order to the contrary, every judgment depends upon its own record only. Everett v. Cole, 86 Colo. 414, 282 P. 253 (1929). Error based on instructions will not be considered where the abstract of record contains no exceptions to the giving of such instructions. Mullen v. Griffin, 60 Colo. 464, 154 P. 90 (1916); Wertz v. Lawrence, 69 Colo. 540, 195 P. 647 (1921). To entitle a party to a consideration of an assignment of error based upon the refusal of the trial court to give requested instructions, the abstract must set out the instructions given by the court. Rollman v. Stenger, 84 Colo. 507, 271 P. 625 (1928). Where neither the requested instructions nor those given are set out in the abstract, plaintiff in error is not entitled to a ruling on assignments of error based thereon. Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Lorton, 97 Colo. 545, 51 P.2d 693 (1935). Failure to object waives error. It is the duty of counsel to examine or listen to the reading of instructions when given, and, if objections or errors are not called to the attention of the court at the time, they must ordinarily be deemed waived. Gilligan v. Blakesley, 93 Colo. 370, 26 P.2d 808 (1933); Scheer v. Cromwell, 158 Colo. 427, 407 P.2d 344 (1965); Ross v. Colo. Nat'l Bank, 170 Colo. 436, 463 P.2d 882 (1969); Bear Valley Church of Christ v. DeBose, 928 P.2d 1315 (Colo. 1996). A party is required to make specific objections to an instruction in the trial court, to entitle him to assign error thereon on review. Schwalbe v. Postle, 80 Colo. 1, 249 P. 495 (1926); Sandner v. Temmer, 81 Colo. 57, 253 P. 400 (1927); Koontz v. People, 82 Colo. 589, 263 P. 19 (1927); Colo. Nat'l Bank v. Ashcraft, 83 Colo. 136, 263 P. 23 (1927); Small v. Clark, 83 Colo. 211, 263 P. 933 (1928); Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P.2d 740 (1935). If objections not made in lower court, they will not be considered on review. Objections to instructions not specifically made in the lower court before they are given will not be considered on review. Baldwin v. Scott, 65 Colo. 53, 173 P. 716 (1918); Krohn v. Colo. Springs Interurban Ry., 70 Colo. 243, 199 P. 88 (1921); Bijou Irrigation Dist. v. Cateran Land & Live Stock Co., 73 Colo. 93, 213 P. 999 (1923); Blanchard v. People, 74 Colo. 431, 222 P. 649 (1925); Galligan v. Bua, 77 Colo. 386, 236 P. 1016 (1925); Clark v. Giacomini, 85 Colo. 530, 277 P. 306 (1929); Colo. Utils. Corp. v. Casady, 89 Colo. 156, 300 P. 601 (1931); Boynton v. Fox Denver Theaters, Inc., 121 Colo. 227, 214 P.2d 793, 24 A.L.R.2d 235 (1950); Sharoff v. Iacino, 123 Colo. 456, 231 P.2d 959 (1951); Kennedy-Fudge v. Fink, 644 P.2d 91 (Colo. App. 1982). A general objection to the whole of an instruction will not prevail where such instruction contains distinct propositions, one of which is sound in law. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Gumaer, 22 Colo. App. 495, 125 P. 589 (1912). General exceptions to instructions "in each and every part thereof" are insufficient. Jacobs v. Mitchell, 2 Colo. App. 456, 31 P. 235 (1892). Single objection to error appearing in other instructions is sufficient. Where the attention of the trial court was sufficiently directed to objectionable words in an instruction, then the point is saved for consideration on appeal, although specific objections are not made to other instructions in which the error is repeated. Lewis v. La Nier, 84 Colo. 376, 270 P. 656 (1928). Where one argues that instructions could have been differently arranged, he must complain of the arrangement at the time that the instructions are submitted by the parties and before they are given to the jury. Mallett v. Pirkey, 171 Colo. 271, 466 P.2d 466 (1970). Contemporaneous objection requirement inapplicable to sua sponte grant of new trial. This rule does not apply to the trial court when it sua sponte grants a new trial; the purposes of the contemporaneous objection requirement of this rule are not violated when the trial court acts on its own initiative to order a new trial under C.R.C.P. 59(d) (now 59(c)(1)). First Nat'l Bank v. Campbell, 198 Colo. 344, 599 P.2d 915 (1979). Where an objection sufficiently directs the court's attention to the asserted error, the purpose of this rule, to enable the trial judge to correct instructions before they are given to the jury, is satisfied. Blueflame Gas, Inc. v. Van Hoose, 679 P.2d 579 (Colo. 1984). "Plain error" rule should be applied sparingly where there is a full and uninhibited opportunity to object to a charge. In re Massey v. Riebold, 3 Bankr. 110 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980 ). V. Read to Jury. This rule provides that the instructions shall be read to the jury before argument. Ress v. Rediess, 130 Colo. 572, 278 P.2d 183 (1954). It is error to instruct a jury orally. Home Pub. Mkt. v. Newrock, 111 Colo. 428, 142 P.2d 272 (1943). This rule clearly prohibits comment on the evidence by the trial court. Angelopoulos v. Wise, 133 Colo. 133, 293 P.2d 294 (1956). Instructions should be on law applicable to facts. It is the duty of the court, before the argument is begun, to give the jury such instructions upon the law applicable to the facts as may be necessary for their guidance. Pickett v. Handy, 5 Colo. App. 295, 38 P. 606 (1884); Dozenback v. Raymer, 13 Colo. 451, 22 P. 787 (1889). The existence of facts proper for the consideration of the jury must not be assumed in the instructions of the court. Kinney v. Williams, 1 Colo. 191 (1870). Instructions to the jury should be confined to the law of the case, leaving the facts to be determined by the jury. Sopris v. Truax, 1 Colo. 89 (1868). Faulty instruction involves fatal error. An instruction which announces as the law what is not the law, or which assumes as proven what is not supported by the evidence, or which withdraws from the jury an issue of fact exclusively within its province involves fatal error. King Solomon Tunnel & Dev. Co. v. Mary Verna Mining Co., 22 Colo. App. 528, 127 P. 129 (1912). It is clearly error for a court to assume in an instruction that any disputed fact in a suit is true or has been established. Foster v. Feder, 135 Colo. 585, 316 P.2d 576 (1957). It is not required that every instruction should by express words require the jury to find "from the evidence". Sholine v. Harris, 22 Colo. App. 63, 123 P. 330 (1912).