(a)Repeal of local rules. All District Court local rules, including local procedures and standing orders having the effect of local rules, enacted before April 1, 1988 are hereby repealed.(b)Authority to enact local rules on matters which are strictly local. Each court by action of a majority of its judges may from time to time propose local rules and amendments of local rules not inconsistent with the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure or Practice Standards set forth in C.R.C.P. 121(c), nor inconsistent with any directive of the Supreme Court. A proposed rule or amendment shall not be effective until approved by the Supreme Court. No local procedure shall be effective unless adopted as a local rule in accordance with this Section (b) of C.R.C.P. 121. To obtain approval, three copies of any proposed local rule or amendment of a local rule shall be submitted to the Supreme Court through the office of the State Court Administrator. Reasonable uniformity of local rules is required. Numbering and format of any proposed local rule or amendment of a local rule shall be as prescribed by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court's approval of a local rule or local procedure shall not preclude review of that rule or procedure under the law of circumstances of a particular case.(c)Matters of statewide concern. The Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure and the following rule subject areas called "Practice Standards" are declared to be of statewide concern and shall preempt and control in their form and content over any differing local rule: District Court* Practice Standards
§§ 1-1 to End
*Includes Denver Probate Court where applicable.
Section 1-1Entry of Appearance and Withdrawal
(1)Entry of Appearance.No attorney shall appear in any matter before the court unless that attorney has entered an appearance by filing an Entry of Appearance or signing a pleading. An entry of appearance shall state (a) the identity of the party for whom the appearance is made; (b) the attorney's office address; (c) the attorney's telephone number; (d) the attorney's E-Mail address; and (e) the attorney's registration number.
(2)Withdrawal From an Active Case.(a) An attorney may withdraw from a case, without leave of court where the withdrawing attorney has complied with all outstanding orders of the court and either files a notice of withdrawal where there is active co-counsel for the party represented by the withdrawing attorney, or files a substitution of counsel, signed by both the withdrawing and replacement attorney, containing the information required for an Entry of Appearance under subsection 1 of this Practice Standard as to the replacement attorney.(b) Otherwise an attorney may withdraw from a case only upon approval of the court. Such approval shall rest in the discretion of the court, but shall not be granted until a motion to withdraw has been filed and served on the client and the other parties of record or their attorneys and either both the client and all counsel for the other parties consent in writing at or after the time of the service of said motion, or at least 14 days have expired after service of said motion. Every motion to withdraw shall contain the following advisements: (I) the client has the burden of keeping the court and the other parties informed where notices, pleadings or other papers may be served;(II) if the client fails or refuses to comply with all court rules and orders, the client may suffer possible dismissal, default or other sanctions;(III) the dates of any proceedings, including trial, which dates will not be delayed nor proceedings affected by the withdrawal of counsel;(IV) the client's and the other parties' right to object to the motion to withdraw within 14 days after service of the motion;(V) if the client is not a natural person, that it must be represented by counsel in any court proceedings unless it is a closely held entity and first complies with section 13-1-127, C.R.S.; and(VI) the client's last known address and telephone number.(c) The client and the opposing parties shall have 14 days after service of a motion to withdraw within which to file objections to the withdrawal.(d) If the motion to withdraw is granted, the withdrawing attorney shall promptly notify the client and the other parties of the effective date of the withdrawal.(3)Withdrawal From Completed Cases.In any civil case which is concluded and in which all related orders have been submitted and entered by the court and complied with by the withdrawing attorney, an attorney may withdraw from the case without leave of court by filing a notice in the form and content of Appendix to Chapters 1 to 17A, Form 36, C.R.C.P. JDF Form 83, which shall be served upon the client and all other parties of record or their attorneys, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 5. The withdrawal shall automatically become effective 14 days after service upon the client and all other parties of record or their attorneys unless there is an objection filed, in which event the matter shall be assigned to an appropriate judicial officer for determination.
(4)Entries of Appearance and Withdrawals by Members or Employees of Law Firms, Professional Corporations or Clinics.The entry of an appearance or withdrawal by an attorney who is a member or an employee of a law firm, professional corporation or clinic shall relieve other members or employees of the same law firm, professional corporation or clinic from the necessity of filing additional entries of appearance or withdrawal in the same litigation unless otherwise indicated.
(5)Notice of Limited Representation Entry of Appearance and Withdrawal.In accordance with C.R.C.P. 11(b) and C.R.C.P. Rule 311(b), an attorney may undertake to provide limited representation to a pro se party involved in a court proceeding. Upon the request and with the consent of a pro se party, an attorney may make a limited appearance for the pro se party in one or more specified proceedings, if the attorney files and serves with the court and the other parties and attorneys (if any) a notice of the limited appearance prior to or simultaneous with the proceeding(s) for which the attorney appears. At the conclusion of such proceeding(s), the attorney's appearance terminates without the necessity of leave of court, upon the attorney filing a notice of completion of limited appearance. Service on an attorney who makes a limited appearance for a party shall be valid only in connection with the specific proceeding(s) for which the attorney appears.
Committee Comment
The purpose of section 1-1 (5) is to implement Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure 11(b) and 311(b), which authorize limited representation of a pro se party either on a pro bono or fee basis, in accordance with Colorado Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2. This provision provides assurance that an attorney who makes a limited appearance for a pro se party in a specified case proceeding(s), at the request of and with the consent of the pro se party, can withdraw from the case upon filing a notice of completion of the limited appearance, without leave of court.
Source: Committee comment amended and adopted June 17, 1999, effective July 1, 1999; entire section and committee comment repealed and readopted October 20, 2005, effective January 1, 2006; 2.(b) amended and effective January 7, 2010; 5. added and effective October 20, 2011; IP 2.(b), 2.(b)(IV), 2.(c), and 3. amended and adopted December 14, 2011, effective January 1, 2012, for all cases pending on or filed on or after January 1, 2012, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 1(b).
Committee Comment
An "active case" is any case other than a "completed case" as described in subsection 3 of the Practice Standard.
Section 1-2Special Admission of Out-of-State and Foreign Attorneys
Special admission of an out-of-state or foreign attorney shall be in accordance with C.R.C.P. Chapter 18, Rules Governing Admission to the Bar 205.3 and 205.5.
Source: Entire section amended and adopted and committee comment repealed October 20, 2005, effective January 1, 2006.
Section 1-3Jury Fees
Each party exercising the right to trial by jury shall file and serve a demand therefor and simultaneously pay the requisite jury fee. The demand and payment of the jury fee shall be in accordance with Rule 38. The jury fee shall not be returned under any circumstances. Failure of a party to timely file and serve a demand for trial by jury and pay the jury fee shall constitute a waiver of that party's right to trial by jury. When any party exercises the right to trial by jury, every other party to the action must pay the requisite jury fee unless such other party files a notice of waiver of the right to trial by jury pursuant to Rule 38(a)(2). Any party who has demanded a trial by jury and has paid the requisite jury fee and any party who has not waived the right to trial by jury and has paid the requisite jury fee is entitled to trial by jury of all issues properly designated for trial by jury unless that party waives such right pursuant to Rule 38(e).
Source: Entire section repealed and reenacted July 12, 1990, effective September 1, 1990.
Committee Comment
Amendment of this practice standard is to conform it to the requirements of C.R.S. 13-71-144 (1989) and amended C.R.C.P 38. Under that statutory requirement, each party who wishes to be assured of having a jury trial, must demand a jury trial and pay a jury fee within the time specified. The case will be tried to a jury if the party demanding a jury trial makes a timely demand, pays the jury fee at the time of the demand and does not later waive a jury trial. If a demand is timely made and the jury fee timely paid, the right to jury trial cannot be withdrawn as against a party who has demanded a jury trial and timely paid a jury fee. For a party to be certain of having a jury trial, that party must demand it and timely pay a jury fee.
Section 1-4Suppression for Service of Process
In any civil action, upon written request of the claiming party, the fact of the filing of a case shall be suppressed by the clerk only upon order of the court to secure service of summons or other process and such order shall expire upon service of such summons or other process.
Committee Comment
This Practice Standard was a local rule found in most districts. It provides the machinery for the clerk to temporarily suppress the fact of filing of a case temporarily to avoid publicity that may affect ability to serve process. Such temporary suppression in aid of service of process, is different from the Practice Standard pertaining to limitation of access to court files.
Section 1-5Limitation of Access to Court Files
(1)Nature of Order. Upon motion by any party named in any civil action, the court may limit access to court files. The order of limitation shall specify the nature of limitation, the duration of the limitation, and the reason for limitation.(2)When Order Granted. An order limiting access shall not be granted except upon a finding that the harm to the privacy of a person in interest outweighs the public interest.(3)Application for Order. A motion for limitation of access may be granted, ex parte, upon motion filed with the complaint, accompanied by supporting affidavit or at a hearing concerning the motion.(4)Review by Order. Upon notice to all parties of record, and after hearing, an order limiting access may be reviewed by the court at any time on its own motion or upon the motion of any person.Committee Comment
This Practice Standard was made necessary by lack of uniformity throughout the districts concerning access to court files. Some districts permitted free access after service of process was obtained. Others, particularly in malpractice or domestic relations cases, almost routinely prohibited access to court file information. The committee deemed it preferable to have machinery available for limitation in an appropriate case, but also a means for other entities having interest in the litigation, including the media, to have access.
Section 1-6Settings for Trials or Hearings/Settings by Telephone
(1) All settings of trials and hearings, other than those set on the initiative of the court, shall be by the courtroom clerk upon notice to all other parties. Settings by telephone are encouraged. The original or a copy of the notice shall be on file with the courtroom clerk before the setting and shall contain the following: (a) The caption of the case with designation "Notice to Set" or "Notice to Set by Telephone."(b) The nature of the matter being set.(c) The date and time at which the setting will occur.(d) The courtroom clerk's address, by division or courtroom number if applicable and telephone number.(e) A statement that the party or attorney being notified may appear or if not present, will be called at or about the time specified.(f) A statement if the setting is to be by telephone.(2) The party issuing the notice to set shall be responsible for contacting all other counsel and clearing available dates with them.(3) Any attorney receiving the notice to set who does not personally appear at the setting shall have personnel at his or her office, supplied with a current appointment calendar and authorized to make settings for that attorney, at the date and time in the notice.(4) The party requesting the setting shall immediately confirm in writing the date and time of the matter that has been set with all other parties or their attorneys and shall file that confirmation with the court.Committee Comment
The change in Standard 1-6 is to allow for settings on initiative of the Court. This change is to resolve the question raised by several districts as to whether the Court had the power to initiate its own settings. There has also been a slight tidying-up of language of the first sentence.
Section 1-7Audio-Visual Devices
The photographing, broadcasting, televising or recording of court proceedings in any courtroom shall be governed in accordance with Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct of the State of Colorado.
Committee Comment
This Practice Standard was deemed necessary because it was apparent from local rules of a number of counties that there was a general lack of awareness of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct pertaining to photographing, broadcasting, televising or recording court proceedings. This Practice Standard draws attention to Canon 3 and incorporates its provisions by reference.
Section 1-8Consolidation
A party seeking consolidation shall file a motion to consolidate in each case sought to be consolidated. The motion shall be determined by the court in the case first filed in accordance with Practice Standard § 1-15. If consolidation is ordered, all subsequent filings shall be in the case first filed and all previous filings related to the consolidated cases placed together under that case number, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Consolidation of matters pending in other districts shall be determined in accordance with C.R.C.P. 42.1.
Section 1-9RELATED CASES
1. A party to a civil case shall file a notice identifying all related cases of which the party has actual knowledge. 2. Related cases are civil, criminal, or other proceedings that: a) involve one or more of the same parties and common questions of fact; and b) are pending in any state or federal court or were terminated within the previous 12 months. 3. A party shall file the required notice at the time of its first pleading under Rule 7(a) or its first motion under Rule 12(b). 4. A party shall promptly file a supplemental notice of any change in the information required under this rule.Committee Comment
The purpose of this Practice Standard is to afford notice of related state or federal cases that are pending or were recently terminated. Any actions to be taken following such notice are left to the parties and the court.
Section 1-10Dismissal for Failure to Prosecute
(1) Upon due notice to the opposite party, any party to a civil action may apply to have any action dismissed when such action has not been prosecuted or brought to trial with due diligence.(2) The court, on its own motion, may dismiss any action not prosecuted with due diligence, upon 35 days' notice in writing to each attorney of record and each appearing party not represented by counsel, or require the parties to show cause in writing why the case should not be dismissed. Showing of cause and objections thereto shall be determined in accordance with Practice Standard § 1-15 (Determination of motions).(3) If the case has not been set for trial, no activity of record in excess of 12 continuous months shall be deemed prima facie failure to prosecute.(4) Failure to show cause on or before the date set forth in the court's notice shall justify dismissal without further proceedings.(5) Any dismissal under this rule shall be without prejudice unless otherwise specified by the court. Source: 2. amended and adopted December 14, 2011, effective January 1, 2012, for all cases pending on or filed on or after January 1, 2012, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 1(b).
Committee Comment
The purpose of this Practice Standard is to encourage prosecution of pending cases and permit machinery to dispose of matters which are not being prosecuted. Dismissal is without prejudice, and there are sufficient safeguards incorporated into the Practice Standard to permit retention on the docket if cause for the delay and interest in the case is shown. The Practice Standard does not mandate that the court search its files and send out notices, but permits such action if the court wishes. The Practice Standard also permits initiation of the procedure by motion.
Section 1-11Continuances
Motions for continuances of hearings or trials shall be determined in accordance with Practice Standard 1-15 and shall be granted only for good cause. Stipulations for continuance shall not be effective unless and until approved by the court. A motion for continuance or request for extension of time will not be considered without a certificate that a copy of the motion has also been served upon the moving attorney's client.
Source: Entire section amended and adopted April 14, 1994, effective January 1, 1995, for all cases filed on or after that date.
Section 1-12Matters Related to Discovery
(1) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, reasonable notice for the taking of depositions pursuant to C.R.C.P. 30(b)(1) shall not be less than 7 days. Before serving a notice to take a deposition, counsel seeking the deposition shall make a good faith effort to schedule it by agreement at a time reasonably convenient and economically efficient to the proposed deponent and counsel for all parties. Prior to scheduling or noticing any deposition, all counsel shall confer in a good faith effort to agree on a reasonable means of limiting the time and expense of that deposition. Pending resolution of any motion pursuant to C.R.C.P. 26(c), the filing of the motion shall stay the discovery at which the motion is directed. If the court directs that any discovery motion under Rule 26(c) be made orally, then movant's written notice to the other parties that a hearing has been requested on the motion shall stay the discovery to which the motion is directed.(2) Motions under Rules 26(c) and 37(a), C.R.C.P., shall set forth the interrogatory, request, question or response constituting the subject matter of the motion.(3) Interrogatories and requests under Rules 33, 34, and 36, C.R.C.P., and the responses thereto shall be served upon other counsel or parties, but shall not be filed with the court. If relief is sought under Rule 26(c), C.R.C.P., or Rule 37(a), C.R.C.P., copies of the portions of the interrogatories, requests, answers or responses in dispute shall be filed with the court contemporaneously with the motion. If interrogatories, requests, answers or responses are to be used at trial, the portions to be used shall be made available and placed, but not filed, with the trial judge at the outset of the trial insofar as their use reasonably can be anticipated.(4) The originals of all stenographically reported depositions shall be delivered to the party taking the deposition after submission to the deponent as required by Rule 30(e), C.R.C.P. The original of the deposition shall be retained by the party to whom it is delivered to be available for appropriate use by any party in a hearing or trial of the case. If a deposition is to be used at trial, it shall be made available for inspection and placed, but not filed with the trial judge at the outset of the trial insofar as its use reasonably can be anticipated.(5) Unless otherwise ordered, the court will not entertain any motion under Rule 37(a), C.R.C.P., unless counsel for the moving party has conferred or made reasonable effort to confer with opposing counsel concerning the matter in dispute before the filing of the motion. Counsel for the moving party shall file a certificate of compliance with this rule at the time the motion under Rule 37(a), C.R.C.P., is filed. If the court requires that any discovery motion be made orally, then movant must make a reasonable effort to confer with opposing counsel before requesting a hearing from the court. Source:
1. amended April 14, 1994, effective January 1, 1995, for all cases filed on or after that date; committee comment approved June 10, 1994; committee comment corrected and effective January 9, 1995;
1. amended and adopted December 14, 2011, effective January 1, 2012, for all cases pending on or filed on or after January 1, 2012, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 1(b).
Comments
1994
[1] Provisions of the practice standard are patterned in part after the local rule now in effect in the United States District court for the District of Colorado. This practice standard specifies the minimum time for the serving of a notice to take deposition. Before serving a notice, however, counsel are required to make a good faith effort to schedule the deposition by agreement at a time reasonably convenient and economically efficient to the deponent and all counsel. Counsel are also required to confer in a good faith effort to agree on a reasonable means of limiting the time and expense of any deposition. The provisions of this Practice Standard are also designed to lessen paper mass/filing space problems and resolve various general problems related to discovery.2015
[2] This rule was amended to address situations arising in courts that require oral discovery motions. Section 1-13Deposition by Audio Tape Recording
When a deposition is taken by audio tape recording under C.R.C.P. 30(b)(4), the following procedures shall be followed:
(a) An oath or affirmation shall be administered to the witness by a notary public or other officer authorized to administer oaths.(b) Two tape recorders with separate microphones shall be used.(c) Speakers shall identify themselves before each statement except during extended colloquy between examiner and deponent.(d) The recording shall be transcribed at the expense of the party taking the deposition.(e) The transcribed testimony shall be made available for correction and signature by the deponent in accordance with Rule 30(e), C.R.C.P.(f) The tape from which the transcription is made shall be retained by the party taking the deposition. The second tape shall be retained by the adverse party. Both tapes shall be preserved until the litigation is concluded.(g) The party responsible for the transcription shall make available to the other parties upon request copies of the transcription at a reasonable charge and shall also submit to the other parties copies of changes, if any, which are made by the deponent and shall also inform the other parties of the date when the deposition is available for signature and whether signature is obtained.(h) The transcription shall be retained by the party taking the deposition and made available in accordance with Paragraph 4 Practice Standard 1-12 (Matters Related To Discovery). Source: Entire section amended and adopted October 20, 2005, effective January 1, 2006.
Committee Comment
This Practice Standard sets forth detailed procedural safeguards for taking of depositions by tape recording as set out in Sanchez v. District Court, 200 Colo. 33, 624 P.2d 1314 (1981).
Section 1-14Default Judgments
(1) To enter a default judgment under C.R.C.P. 55(b) of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, the following documents in addition to the motion for default judgment are necessary: (a) Appropriate documentation showing valid service on the particular defendant in accordance with Rule 4, C.R.C.P. or applicable statute.(b) An affidavit stating facts showing that venue of the action is proper. The affidavit may be executed by the attorney for the moving party.(c) An affidavit or affidavits establishing that the particular defendant is not a minor, an incapacitated person, an officer or agency of the State of Colorado, or in the military service. The affidavit must be executed by the attorney for the moving party on the basis of reasonable inquiry.(d) An affidavit or affidavits or exhibits establishing the amount of damages and interest, if any, for which judgment is being sought. The affidavit may not be executed by the attorney for the moving party. The affidavit must be executed by a person with knowledge of the damages and the basis therefor.(e) If attorney fees are requested, an affidavit that the defendant agreed to pay attorney fees or that they are provided by statute; that they have been paid or incurred; and that they are reasonable. The attorney for the moving party may execute the affidavit setting forth those matters listed in or required by Colorado Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5.(f) If the action is on a promissory note, and the original note is paper based, the original note shall be presented to the court in order that the court may make a notation of the judgment on the face of the note.(g) A proposed form of judgment which shall recite in the body of the judgment: (1) The name of the party or parties to whom the judgment is to be granted;(2) The name of the party or the parties against whom judgment is being taken;(3) Venue has been considered and is proper;(4) When there are multiple parties against whom judgment is taken, whether the relief is intended to be a joint and several obligation;(5) Where multiple parties are involved, language to comply with C.R.C.P. 54(b), if final judgment is sought against less than all the defendants;(6) The principal amount, interest and attorney's fees, if applicable, and costs which shall be separately stated.(2) If further documentation, proof or hearing is required, the court shall so notify the moving party.(3) If the party against whom default judgment is sought is in the military service, or his status cannot be shown, the court shall require such additional evidence or proceeding as will protect the interests of such party in accordance with the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA), 50 USC § 3931, including the appointment of an attorney when necessary. The appointment of an attorney shall be made upon application of the moving party, and expense of such appointment shall be borne by the moving party, but taxable as costs awarded to the moving party as part of the judgment except as prohibited by law.(4) In proceedings which come within the provisions of Rules 55 or 120, C.R.C.P., attendance by the moving party or his attorney shall not be necessary in any instance in which all necessary elements for entry of default under those rules are self-evident from verified motion in the court file. When such matter comes up on the docket with no party or attorney appearing and the court is of the opinion that necessary elements are not so established, the court shall continue or vacate the hearing and advise the moving party or attorney accordingly.Source: 1., 3., and committee comment amended and adopted October 20, 2005, effective January 1, 2006.
Comment
2006
This Practice Standard was needed because neither C.R.C.P. 55, nor any local rule specified the elements necessary to obtain a default judgment and each court was left to determine what was necessary. One faced with the task of attempting to obtain a default judgment usually found themselves making several trips to the courthouse, numerous phone calls and redoing needed documents several times. The Practice Standard is designed to minimize both court and attorney time. The Practice Standard sets forth a standardized check list which designates particular items needed for obtaining a default judgment. For guidance on affidavits, see C.R.C.P. 108. See also Section 13-63-101, C.R.S., concerning affidavits and requirements by the court.
Section 1-15Determination of Motions
(1)Motions and Briefs; When Required; Time for Serving and Filing-Length.(a) Except motions during trial or where the court orders that certain or all non-dispositive motions be made orally, any motions involving a contested issue of law shall be supported by a recitation of legal authority incorporated into the motion, which shall not be filed with a separate brief. Unless the court orders otherwise, motions and responsive briefs not under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) or (2), or 56 are limited to 15 pages, and reply briefs to 10 pages, not including the case caption, signature block, certificate of service and attachments. Unless the court orders otherwise, motions and responsive briefs under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) or (2) or 56 are limited to 25 pages, and reply briefs to 15 pages, not including the case caption, signature block, certificate of service and attachments. All motions and briefs shall comply with C.R.C.P.10(d)(b) The responding party shall have 21 days after the filing of the motion or such lesser or greater time as the court may allow in which to file a responsive brief. If a motion is filed 42 days or less before the trial date, the responding party shall have 14 days after the filing of the motion or such lesser or greater time as the court may allow in which to file a responsive brief.(c) Except for a motion pursuant to C.R.C.P. 56, the moving party shall have 7 days after the filing of the responsive brief or such greater or lesser time as the court may allow to file a reply brief. For a motion pursuant to C.R.C.P. 56, the moving party shall have 14 days after the filing of the responsive brief or such greater or lesser time as the court may allow to file a reply brief.(d) A motion shall not be included in a response or reply to the original motion.(2)Affidavits. If facts not appearing of record may be considered in disposition of the motion, the parties may file affidavits with the motion or within the time specified for filing the party's brief in this section 1-15, Rules 6, 56 or 59, C.R.C.P., or as otherwise ordered by the court. Copies of such affidavits and any documentary evidence used in connection with the motion shall be served on all other parties.(3)Effect of Failure to File Legal Authority. If the moving party fails to incorporate legal authority into a written motion, the court may deem the motion abandoned and may enter an order denying the motion. Other than motions seeking to resolve a claim or defense under C.R.C.P. 12 or 56, failure of a responding party to file a responsive brief may be considered a confession of the motion.(4)Motions to be Determined on Briefs, When Oral Argument is Allowed; Motions Requiring Immediate Attention. Motions shall be determined promptly if possible. The court has discretion to order briefing or set a hearing, on the motion. If possible, the court shall determine oral motions at the conclusion of the argument, but may take the motion under advisement or require briefing before ruling. Any motion requiring immediate disposition shall be called to the attention of the courtroom clerk by the party filing such motion.(5)Notification of Court's Ruling; Setting of Argument or Hearing When Ordered. Whenever the court enters an order denying or granting a motion without a hearing, all parties shall be forthwith notified by the court of such order. If the court desires or authorizes oral argument or an evidentiary hearing, all parties shall be so notified by the court. After notification, it shall be the responsibility of the moving party to have the motion set for oral argument or hearing. Unless the court orders otherwise, a notice to set oral argument or hearing shall be filed in accordance with Practice Standard § 1-6 within 7 days of notification that oral argument or hearing is required or authorized.(6)Effect of Failure to Appear at Oral Argument or Hearing. If any of the parties fails to appear at an oral argument or hearing, without prior showing of good cause for non-appearance, the court may proceed to hear and rule on the motion.(7)Sanctions. If a frivolous motion is filed or if frivolous opposition to a motion is interposed, the court may assess reasonable attorney's fees against the party or attorney filing such motion or interposing such opposition.(8)Duty to Confer. Unless a statute or rule governing the motion provides that it may be filed without notice, moving counsel and any self-represented party shall confer with opposing counsel and any self-represented parties before filing a motion. The requirement of self-represented parties to confer and the requirement to confer with self-represented parties shall not apply to any incarcerated person, or any self-represented party as to whom the requirement is contrary to court order or statute, including, but not limited to, any person as to whom contact would or precipitate a violation of a protection or restraining order. The motion shall, at the beginning, contain a certification that the movant in good faith has conferred with opposing counsel and any self-represented parties about the motion. If the relief sought by the motion has been agreed to by the parties or will not be opposed, the court shall be so advised in the motion. If no conference has occurred, the reason why, including all efforts to confer, shall be stated.(9)Unopposed Motions. All unopposed motions shall be so designated in the title of the motion.(10)Proposed Order. EXCEPT FOR ORDERS CONTAINING SIGNATURES OF THE PARTIES OR ATTORNEYS AS REQUIRED BY STATUTE OR RULE, each motion shall be accompanied by a proposed order submitted in editable format. The proposed order complies with this provision if it states that the requested relief be granted or denied. Orders that are submitted as proposed shall not contain the word (PROPOSED) in the caption of the order. Proposed Orders must only be designated as proposed in the e-filing transmission.(11) Motions to Reconsider. Motions to reconsider interlocutory orders of the court, meaning motions to reconsider other than those governed by C.R.C.P. 59 or 60, are disfavored. A party moving to reconsider must show more than a disagreement with the court's decision. Such a motion must allege a manifest error of fact or law that clearly mandates a different result or other circumstance resulting in manifest injustice. The motion shall be filed within 14 days from the date of the order, unless the party seeking reconsideration shows good cause for not filing within that time. Good cause for not filing within 14 days from the date of the order includes newly available material evidence and an intervening change in the governing legal standard. The court may deny the motion before receiving a responsive brief under paragraph 1(b) of this standard. Source:
1.
amended and effective September 6, 1990;
1.
and committee comment amended July 9, 1992, effective October 1, 1992; 1., 3., and 8. amended and adopted April 14, 1994, effective January 1, 1995, for all cases filed on or after that date; committee comment approved June 10, 1994; committee comment corrected May 14, 1996;
1.
and 8. amended and adopted and 9. added and adopted October 20, 2005, effective January 1, 2006;
1.
amended and effective June 28, 2007;
1.
corrected and effective November 5, 2007; 8. and committee comment para. 2 amended and effective October 12, 2009;
1.
and 5. amended and adopted December 14, 2011, effective January 1, 2012, for all cases pending on or filed on or after January 1, 2012, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 1(b); 10. added and effective February 29, 2012; 10. amended and effective June 7, 2013;
2. amended and effective December 31, 2013; 11. added and committee comment amended effective September 18, 2014.
Comments
1994
[1] This Practice Standard was necessary because of lack of uniformity among the districts concerning how motions were to be made, set and determined. The Practice Standard recognizes that oral argument and hearings are not necessary in all cases, and encourages disposition of motions upon written submissions. The standard also sets forth the uniform requirements concerning filing of legal authority, filing of matters not already of record necessary to determination of motions, and the manner of setting an oral argument if argument is permitted. The practice standard is broad enough to include all motions, including venue motions. Some motions will not require extended legal analysis or affidavits. Obviously, if the basis for a motion is simple and routine, the citation of authorities can be correspondingly simple. Motions or briefs in excess of 10 pages are discouraged.[2] This standard specifies contemporaneous recitation of legal authority either in the motion itself for all motions except those under C.R.C.P. Rule 56. Moving counsel should confer with opposing counsel before filing a motion to attempt to work out the difference prompting the motion. Every motion must, at the beginning, contain a certification that the movant, in good faith, has conferred with opposing counsel about the motion. If there has been no conference, the reason why must be stated. To assist the court, if the relief sought by the motion has been agreed to or will not be opposed, the court is to be so advised in the motion.[3] Paragraph 4 of the standard contains an important feature. Any matter requiring immediate action should be called to the attention of the courtroom clerk by the party filing a motion for forthwith disposition. Calling the urgency of a matter to the attention of the court is a responsibility of the parties. The court should permit a forthwith determination.2014
[4] Paragraph 11 of the standard neither limits a trial court's discretion to modify an interlocutory order, on motion or sua sponte, nor affects C.R.M. 5(a).2015
[5] The sentence in the 1994 comment that "motions or briefs in excess of 10 pages are discouraged" has been superseded by the 2015 amendments to the rule on the length of motions and briefs. The sentence in the 1994 comment that "moving counsel should confer with opposing counsel before filing a motion to attempt to work out the difference prompting the motion" is corrected to change the word "should" to "shall" to be consistent with the wording of the rule. Section 1-16Preparation of Orders and Objections as to Form
(1) When directed by the court, the attorney for the prevailing party or such attorney as the court directs shall file and serve a proposed order within 14 days of such direction or such other time as the court directs. Prior to filing the proposed order, the attorney shall submit it to all other parties for approval as to form. The proposed order shall be timely filed even if all parties have not approved it as to form. A party objecting to the form of the proposed order as filed with court shall have 7 days after service of the proposed order to file and serve objections and suggested modifications to the form of the proposed order.(2) Alternatively, when directed by the court, the attorney for the prevailing party or such attorney as the court directs shall file and serve a stipulated order within 14 days after the ruling, or such other time as the court directs. Any matter upon which the parties cannot agree as to form shall be designated in the proposed order as "disputed." The proposed order shall set forth each party's specific alternative proposal for each disputed matter.(3) Objecting, proposing modification or agreeing to the form of a proposed order or stipulated order, shall not affect a party's rights to appeal the substance of the order. Source: Entire section repealed and readopted October 20, 2005, effective January 1, 2006;
1. and 2. amended and adopted December 14, 2011, effective January 1, 2012, for all cases pending on or filed on or after January 1, 2012, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 1(b).
Section 1-17Court Settlement Conferences
(1) At any time after the filing of Disclosure Certificates as required by C.R.C.P. 16, any party may file with the courtroom clerk and serve a request for a court settlement conference, together with a notice for setting of such request. The court settlement conference shall, if the request is granted, be conducted by any available judge other than the assigned judge. In all instances, the assigned judge shall arrange for the availability of a different judge to conduct the court settlement conference.(2) All discussions at the settlement conference shall remain confidential and shall not be disclosed to the judge who presides at trial. Statements at the settlement conference shall not be admissible evidence for any purpose in any other proceeding.(3) This Rule shall not apply to proceedings conducted pursuant to Rule 16.2(i). Source: Entire section amended and adopted September 30, 2004, effective for Domestic Relations Cases as defined in 16.2(a) filed on or after January 1, 2005, and for post-decree motions filed on or after January 1, 2005.
Committee Comment
This Practice Standard provides machinery for settlement conference upon request of the parties. The Practice Standard was deemed necessary because it was previously not possible to have a settlement conference in some districts. The committee recognized that there may be practical difficulties in a particular district because of nonavailability of a separate judge. It was felt that this problem could perhaps be largely overcome by cooperation between several districts or by use of a retired judge to make the service available.
Part 2 of the Practice Standard was deemed necessary to encourage settlement conference participation by litigants. Confidentiality and nonadmissibility of statements or communications made at settlement conference should override and prevail as a matter of policy over any asserted right or interest to the contrary.
Section 1-18Pre-Trial Procedure, Case Mangement, Disclosure and Simplification of Issues
Pretrial procedure, case management, disclosure and simplification of issues shall be in accordance with C.R.C.P. 16.
Editor's note: The Committee Comment to this section, was deleted from these rules when changes were made to this section November 12, 1987, pursuant to Court change #1987 (17).
Section 1-19Jury Instructions
Jury instructions shall be prepared and tendered to the court pursuant to C.R.C.P. 16(g).
1983
This Standard makes preparation and timing of submission of jury instructions uniform throughout the state. It reasonably assures preparation of instructions and verdict forms before commencement of trial, but retains some needed flexibility in their final form. To permit use of preprepared forms, save time and expense, and to facilitate last-moment revision, the Standard mandates use of photocopies rather than typed originals for submission to the jury.
Source: Entire section amended and adopted April 14, 1994, effective January 1, 1995, for all cases filed on or after that date.
Section 1-20Size, and Format of Documents
All court documents shall be prepared in 8-1/2" x 11" format with black type or print and conform to the format, and spacing requirements specified in C.R.C.P. 10(d). Except documents filed by E-Filing or facsimile copy, all court documents shall be on recycled white paper. Any form required by these rules may be reproduced by word processor or other means, provided that the reproduction substantially follows the format of the form and indicates the effective date of the form which it reproduces.
Source: Entire section amended and effective September 6, 1990; entire section and committee comment amended July 9, 1992, effective October 1, 1992; entire section amended March 17, 1994, effective July 1, 1994; entire section and committee comment amended and adopted October 20, 2005, effective January 1, 2006.
Committee Comments
This standard draws attention to the requirements of C.R.C.P. 10(d) pertaining to paper size, paper quality, format and spacing of court documents. Color of paper and print requirements for documents not filed by E-Filing or facsimile copy were made necessary because colors other than black and white create photocopying and microfilming difficulties. Provision is also made to clarify that forms reproduced by word processor are acceptable if they follow the format of the form and state the effective date of the form which it reproduces.
Section 1-21Court Transcripts
(1) A party requesting a transcript shall arrange for preparation of the transcript directly with the reporter, or if the session or proceeding was recorded by mechanical or electronic means, the courtroom clerk. Where a transcript is to be made a part of the record on appeal, a party shall request preparation of the transcript by reference in the Designation of Record and by direct arrangement with the court reporter or courtroom clerk as provided herein.(2) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a court reporter may require a deposit of sufficient money to cover the estimated cost of preparation before preparing the transcript.(3) The transcript shall be signed and certified by the person preparing the transcript. A transcript lodged with the court shall not be removed from the court without court order except when transmitted to the appellate court. Source: 1. and 3. amended and adopted October 20, 2005, effective January 1, 2006.
Committee Comment
This Practice Standard sets forth uniform requirements for obtaining, paying for, certification and removal of court reporter transcripts.
Section 1-22Costs and Attorney Fees
(1)Costs A party claiming costs shall file a Bill of Costs within 21 days of the entry of order or judgment, or within such greater time as the court may allow. The Bill of Costs shall itemize and total costs being claimed. Taxing and determination of costs shall be in accordance with C.R.C.P. 54(d) and Practice Standard § 1-15. Any party that may be affected by the Bill of Costs may request a hearing within the time permitted to file a reply in support of the Bill of Costs. Any request shall identify those issues that the party believes should be addressed at the hearing. When required to do by law, the court shall grant a party's timely request for a hearing. In other cases where a party has made a timely request for a hearing, the court shall hold a hearing if it determines in its discretion that a hearing would materially assist the court in ruling on the motion.(2)Attorney Fees.(a) Scope. This practice standard applies to requests for attorney fees made at the conclusion of the action, including attorney fee awards requested pursuant to Section 13-17-102, C.R.S. It also includes awards of fees made to the prevailing party pursuant to a contract or statute where the award is dependent upon the achievement of a successful result in the litigation in which fees are to be awarded and the fees are for services rendered in connection with that litigation. This practice standard does not apply to attorney fees which are part of a judgment for damages and incurred as a result of other proceedings, or for services rendered other than in connection with the proceeding in which judgment is entered. This practice standard also does not apply to requests for attorney fees on matters relating to pre-trial sanctions and motions for default judgment unless otherwise ordered by the court.(b)Motion and Response. Any party seeking attorney fees under this practice standard shall file and serve a motion for attorney fees within 21 days of entry of judgment or such greater time as the court may allow. The motion shall explain the basis upon which fees are sought, the amount of fees sought, and the method by which those fees were calculated. The motion shall be accompanied by any supporting documentation, including materials evidencing the attorney's time spent, the fee agreement between the attorney and client, and the reasonableness of the fees. Any response and reply, including any supporting documentation, shall be filed within the time allowed in practice standard § 1-15. The court may permit discovery on the issue of attorney fees only upon good cause shown when requested by any party.(c)Hearing; Determination of Motion. Any party which may be affected by the motion for attorney fees may request a hearing within the time permitted to file a reply. Any request shall identify those issues which the party believes should be addressed at the hearing. When required to do so by law, the court shall grant a party's timely request for a hearing. In other cases where a party has made a timely request for a hearing, the court shall hold a hearing if it determines in its discretion that a hearing would materially assist the court in ruling on the motion. In exercising its discretion as to whether to hold a hearing in these cases, the court shall consider the amount of fees sought, the sufficiency of the disclosures made by the moving party in its motion and supporting documentation, and the extent and nature of the objections made in response to the motion. The court shall make findings of fact to support its determination of the motion. Attorney fees awarded under this practice standard shall be taxed as costs. Source: Amended and committee comment added, July 9, 1992, effective October 1, 1992;
1. and 2.(b) amended and adopted December 14, 2011, effective January 1, 2012, for all cases pending on or filed on or after January 1, 2012, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 1(b). Amendments effective July 1, 2015 for cases filed on or after July 1, 2015.
Comments
[1]COSTS. This Standard establishes a uniform, optimum time within which to claim costs. The 15 day requirement encourages prompt filings so that disputes on costs can be determined with other post-trial motions. This Standard also requires itemization and totaling of cost items and reminds practitioners of the means of determining disputes on costs. C.R.S. 13-16-122 (1981) sets forth those items generally awardable as costs.[2]ATTORNEY FEES. Subject to certain exceptions, this Standard establishes a uniform procedure for resolving attorney fee disputes in matters where the request for attorney fees is made at the conclusion of an action of where attorney fees are awarded to the prevailing party (see "Scope"). Unless otherwise ordered by the court, attorney fees under C.R.S. 14-10-119 should be heard at the time of the hearing on the motion or proceeding for which they are requested.2015
[3] The prior version of Rule 121, Section 1-22 (2) addressed when and under what circumstances a party is entitled to a hearing regarding an award of attorney fees, but no rule addressed the circumstances regarding a hearing on costs. The procedural mechanisms regarding awards of attorney fees and awards of costs should be the same, and thus the rule change adds the existing language regarding hearings on attorney fees to awards of costs. Section 1-23Bonds in Civil Actions
(1)Bonds Which Are Automatically Effective Upon Filing With The Court. The following bonds are automatically effective upon filing with the clerk of the court: (a) Cash bonds in the amount set by court order, subsection 3 of this rule, or any applicable statute.(b) Certificates of deposit issued by a bank chartered by either the United States government or the State of Colorado, in the amount set by court order, subsection 3 of this rule, or any applicable statute. The certificate of deposit shall be issued in the name of the clerk of the court and payable to the clerk of the court, and the original of the certificate of deposit must be deposited with the clerk of the court.(c) Corporate surety bonds issued by corporate sureties presently authorized to do business in the State of Colorado in the amount set by court order, subsection 3 of this rule, or any applicable statute. A power of attorney showing the present or current authority of the agent for the surety signing the bond shall be filed with the bond.(2)Bonds Which Are Effective Only Upon Entry of an Order Approving the Bond.(a) Letters of credit issued by a bank chartered by either the United States government or the State of Colorado, in the amount set by court order, subsection 3 of this rule, or any applicable statute. The beneficiary of the letter of credit shall be the clerk of the district court. The original of the letter of credit shall be deposited with the clerk of the court.(b) Any Other Proposed Bond.(3)Amounts of Bond.(a)Supersedeas Bonds. Unless the court otherwise orders, or any applicable statute directs a higher amount, the amount of a supersedeas bond to stay execution of a money judgment shall be 125% of the total amount of the judgment entered by the court (including any prejudgment interest, costs and attorneys fees awarded by the court). The amount of a supersedeas bond to stay execution of a non-money judgment shall be determined by the court. Nothing in this rule is intended to limit the court's discretion to deny a stay with respect to non-money judgments. Any interested party may move the trial court (which shall have jurisdiction not withstanding the pendency of an appeal) for an increase in the amount of the bond to reflect the anticipated time for completion of appellate proceedings or any increase in the amount of judgment.(b)Other Bonds. The amounts of all other bonds shall be determined by the court or by any applicable statute.(4)Service of Bonds Upon All Parties of Record. A copy of all bonds or proposed bonds filed with the court shall be served on all parties of record in accordance with C.R.C.P. 5(b).(5)No Unsecured Bonds. Except as expressly provided by statute, and except with respect to appearance bonds, no unsecured bond shall be accepted by the court.(6)Objections to Bonds. Any party in interest may file an objection to any bond which is automatically effective under subsection 1 of this rule or to any proposed bond subject to subsection 2 of this rule. A bond, which is automatically effective under subsection 1 remains in effect unless the court orders otherwise. Any objections shall be filed not later than 14 days after service of the bond or proposed bond except that objections based upon the entry of any amended or additional judgment shall be made not later than 14 days after entry of any such amended or additional judgment. (7)Bonding over a Lien. If a money judgment has been made a lien upon real estate by the filing of a transcript of the judgment record by the judgment creditor, the lien shall be released upon the motion of the judgment debtor or other interested party if a bond for the money judgment has been approved and filed as provided in this section 1-23. The order of the court releasing the lien may be recorded with the clerk and recorder of the county where the property is located. Once the order is recorded, all proceedings by the judgment creditor to enforce the judgment lien shall be discontinued, unless a court orders otherwise.(8). Proceedings against Surety or other Security Provider. When these rules require or permit the giving of a bond or other type of security, the surety or other security provider submits to the jurisdiction of the court. The liability of the surety or other security provider may be enforced on motion without the necessity of an independent action. At the time any party seeks to enforce such liability, it shall provide notice of its motion or other form of request to all parties of record and the surety or other security provider in accordance with C.R.C.P. 5(b).(9). Definition. The term "bond" as used in this rule includes any type of security provided to stay enforcement of a money judgment or any other obligation including providing security underC.R.C.P. 65.Source: Entire section and committee comment repealed and readopted October 20, 2005, effective January 1, 2006; 6. amended and adopted December 14, 2011, effective January 1, 2012, for all cases pending on or filed on or after January 1, 2012, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 1(b).
Comment
2006
[1] The Committee is aware that issues have arisen regarding the effective date of a bond, and thus the effectiveness of injunction orders and other orders which are conditioned upon the filing of an acceptable bond. Certain types of bonds are almost always acceptable and thus, under this rule, are automatically effective upon filing with the Court subject to the consideration of timely filed objections. Other types of bonds may or may not be acceptable and should not be effective until the Court determines the sufficiency of the bond. The court may permit property bonds upon such conditions as are appropriate to protect the judgment creditor (or other party sought to be protected). Such conditions may include an appraisal by a qualified appraiser, information regarding liens and encumbrances against the property, and title insurance.
[2] This rule also sets the presumptive amount of a supersedeas bond for a money judgment. The amount of a supersedeas bond for a non-money judgment must be determined in the particular case by the court and this rule is not intended to affect the court's discretion to deny a supersedeas bond in the case of a non-money judgment.
Section 1-25Facsimile Copies
(1) Facsimile copy, defined. A facsimile copy is a copy generated by a system that encodes a document into electrical signals, transmits these electrical signals over a telephone/data line, then reconstructs the signals to print an exact duplicate of the original document at the receiving end.(2) Facsimile copies which conform with the quality requirements specified in C.R.C.P. 10(d)(1) may be filed with the court in lieu of the original document. Once filed with the court, the facsimile copy shall be treated as an original for all court purposes. If a facsimile copy is filed in lieu of the original document, the attorney or party filing the facsimile shall retain the original document for production to the court, if requested to do so.(3) The court is not required to provide confirmation that it has received a facsimile transmission.(4) Any facsimile copy transmitted directly to the court shall be accompanied by a cover sheet which states the title of the document, case number, number of pages, identity and voice telephone number of transmitter and any instructions.(5) Payment of any required filing fees shall not be deferred for documents filed with the court by facsimile transmission.(6) This rule shall not require courts to have a fascimile machine nor shall the court be required to transmit orders or other material to attorneys or parties via facsimile transmission. Source: Entire section and committee comment added and effective September 6, 1990.
Committee Comment
Facsimile transmissions are becoming commonplace in the business world. It was therefore deemed reasonable that the court system adapt to accommodate the use of this technology. Use of the technology, however, should not create more work for court staff. In order not to add to the duties of overburdened court personnel, provision is made that court personnel need not provide confirmation that a facsimile transmission has been received. This should not create difficulty for attorneys because almost all equipment manufactured today provides confirmation that a document has been received. This confirmation should be attached to the document sent and retained with the original document in the party's file.
The committee envisioned at least two ways in which facsimile filings could be accomplished. The first would be an arrangement where the facsimile machine would be located in a court clerk's office. The other would be where transmissions would be made to a machine outside the courthouse and then delivered to the clerk for filing. These rules were designed to accommodate both kinds of filings.
Ordinary thermofax paper fades in sunlight, deteriorates with handling and has a short shelf life. Therefore, only permanent plain paper which is not subject to these infirmities is acceptable for court purposes.
The committee also recognized that a requirement for filing of the original after filing of a facsimile copy would create more work for court staff. The committee therefore decided to accept facsimile copies in lieu of the original with the provision that the original would be maintained if it were ever needed for any purpose.
The requirement under C.R.C.P. 121, Sec. 1-15 for filing of a copy of any motions or briefs has been modified so that a copy is also filed with the clerk of the court. The clerk of the court is then responsible for distributing the copy to the courtroom clerk. This change is necessary because the courtroom clerk will ordinarily not have a separate facsimile machine.
Some judicial districts have or are acquiring the ability to accept credit cards or bank cards for payment of fees and fines. In the judicial districts where bank cards can be used for payment, parties may file complaints, answers and other pleadings which require a filing fee by faxing an appropriate bank card authorization along with the pleadings. If a judicial district does not accept payment by bank card, those types of pleadings cannot be filed by facsimile transmission because payment of filing fees will not be deferred.
The committee believes that reasonable fees can be charged for the costs associated with facsimile filings. However, the setting of such fees is not within the scope of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The adoption of this rule does not require an attorney to have a designated facsimile telephone number.
Section 1-26Electronic Filing and Service System
(1)Definitions:(a)Document: A pleading, motion, writing or other paper filed or served under the E-System.(b)E-Filing/Service System: The E-Filing/Service System ("E-System ") approved by the Colorado Supreme Court for filing and service of documents via the Internet through the Court-authorized E-System provider.(c)Electronic Filing: Electronic filing ("E-Filing ") is the transmission of documents to the clerk of the court, and from the court, via the E-System.(d)Electronic Service: Electronic service ("E-Service ") is the transmission of documents to any party in a case via the E-System. Parties who have subscribed to the E-System have agreed to receive service, other than service of a summons, via the E-System.(e)E-System Provider: The E-Service/E-Filing System Provider authorized by the Colorado Supreme Court.(f)Signatures:(I)Electronic Signature: an electronic sound, symbol, or process attached to or logically associated with an electronic record and executed or adopted by the person with the intent to sign the E-filed or E-served document.(II)Scanned Signature: A graphic image of a handwritten signature.(2)Types of Cases Applicable: E-Filing and E-Service may be used for certain cases filed in the courts of Colorado as the service becomes available. The availability of the E-System will be determined by the Colorado Supreme Court and announced through its web site http://www.courts.state.co.us/supct/supct.htm and through published directives to the clerks of the affected court systems. E-Filing and E-Service may be mandated pursuant to Subsection 13 of this Practice Standard 1-26.(3)To Whom Applicable:(a) Attorneys licensed or certified to practice law in Colorado, or admitted pro hac vice under C.R.C.P. 205.3 or 205.5, may register to use the E-System. The E-System provider will provide an attorney permitted to appear pursuant to C.R.C.P. 205.3 or 205.5 with a special user account for purposes of E-Filing and E-Serving only in the case identified by a court order approving pro hac vice admission. The E-System provider will provide an attorney certified as pro bono counsel pursuant to C.R.C.P. 204.6 with a special user account for purposes of E-Filing and E-Serving in pro bono cases as contemplated by that rule. An attorney may enter an appearance pursuant to Rule 121, Section 1-1, through E-Filing. In districts where E-Filing is mandated pursuant to Subsection 13 of this Practice Standard 1-26, attorneys must register and use the E-System.(b) Where the system and necessary equipment are in place to permit it, pro se parties and government entities and agencies may register to use the E-System.(4)Commencement of Action-Service of Summons: Cases may be commenced under C.R.C.P. 3 by E-Filing the initial pleading. Service of a summons shall be made in accordance with C.R.C.P. 4.(5)E-Filing-Date and Time of Filing: Documents filed in cases on the E-System may be filed under C.R.C.P. 5 through an E-Filing. A document transmitted to the E-System Provider by 11:59 p.m. Colorado time shall be deemed to have been filed with the clerk of the court on that date.(6)E-Service-When Required - Date and Time of Service: Documents submitted to the court through E-Filing shall be served under C.R.C.P. 5 by E-Service. A document transmitted to the E-System Provider for service by 11:59 p.m. Colorado time shall be deemed to have been served on that date.(7)Filing Party to Maintain the Signed Copy-Paper Document Not to Be Filed-Duration of Maintaining of Document: A printed or printable copy of an E-Filed or E-Served document with original, electronic, or scanned signatures shall be maintained by the filing party and made available for inspection by other parties or the court upon request, but shall not be filed with the court. When these rules require a party to maintain a document, the filer is required to maintain the document for a period of two years after the final resolution of the action, including the final resolution of all appeals. For domestic relations decrees, separation agreements and parenting plans, original signature pages bearing the attorneys, parties', and notaries' signatures must be scanned and E-filed. For probate of a will, the original must be lodged with the court.(8)Documents Requiring E-Filed Signatures: For E-Filed and E-Served documents, signatures of attorneys, parties, witnesses, notaries and notary stamps may be affixed electronically or documents with signatures obtained on a paper form scanned.(9) C.R.C.P. 11 Compliance: An e-signature is a signature for the purposes of C.R.C.P. 11.(10)Documents under Seal: A motion for leave to file documents under seal may be E-Filed. Documents to be filed under seal pursuant to an order of the court may be E-Filed at the direction of the court; however, the filing party may object to this procedure.(11)Transmitting of Orders, Notices and Other Court Entries: Beginning January 1, 2006, courts shall distribute orders, notices, and other court entries using the E-System in cases where E-Filings were received from any party.(12)Form of E-Filed Documents:C.R.C.P. 10 shall apply to E-Filed documents. A document shall not be transmitted to the clerk of the court by any other means unless the court at any later time requests a printed copy.(13)E-Filing May be Mandated: With the permission of the Chief Justice, a chief judge may mandate E-Filing within a county or judicial district for specific case classes or types of cases. A judicial officer may mandate E-Filing and E-Service in that judicial officer's division for specific cases, for submitting documents to the court and serving documents on case parties. Where E-Filing is mandatory, the court may thereafter accept a document in paper form and the court shall scan the document and upload it to the E-Service Provider. After notice to an attorney that all future documents are to be E-Filed, the court may charge a fee of $50 per document for the service of scanning and uploading a document filed in paper form. Where E-Filing and E-Service are mandatory, the Chief Judge or appropriate judicial officer may exclude pro se parties from mandatory E-Filing requirements.(14)Relief in the Event of Technical Difficulties:(a) Upon satisfactory proof that E-Filing or E-Service of a document was not completed because of: (1) an error in the transmission of the document to the E-System Provider which was unknown to the sending party; (2) a failure of the E-System Provider to process the E-Filing when received, or (3) other technical problems experienced by the filer or E-System Provider, the court may enter an order permitting the document to be filed nunc pro tunc to the date it was first attempted to be sent electronically.(b) Upon satisfactory proof that an E-Served document was not received by or unavailable to a party served, the court may enter an order extending the time for responding to that document.(15)Form of Electronic Documents(a)Electronic document format, size and density. Electronic document format, size, and density shall be as specified by Chief Justice Directive # 11-01.(b)Multiple Documents: Multiple documents (including proposed orders) may be filed in a single electronic filing transaction. Each document (including proposed orders) in that filing must bear a separate document title.(c)Proposed Orders: Proposed orders shall be E-Filed in editable format. Proposed orders that are E-Filed in a non-editable format shall be rejected by the Court Clerk's office and must be resubmitted. Orders that are submitted as proposed shall not contain the word (PROPOSED) in the caption of the order. Proposed Orders must only be designated as proposed in the e-filing transmission. Source: Entire section and committee comment added and effective 3/7/2000; entire section and committee comment amended and effective 4/17/2003; entire section and committee comment repealed and readopted October 20, 2005, effective 1/1/2006; 6. amended and adopted December 14, 2011, effective 1/1/2012, for all cases pending on or filed on or after January 1, 2012, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 1(b); 1.(f), 4., 6. to 9., and 15.(a) amended and effective 6/21/2012; 4. and 6. amended and effective 5/9/2013; 3. and committee comment amended and effective 12/31/2013; §§1-14(3), 1-19, and 1-23 amended effective 1/12/2017, effective1/1/2018; amended December 7, 2017, effective 1/1/2018; amended, effective4/5/2018; amended, effective 3/5/2020; amended and adopted by the Court, En Banc, August 17, 2020 effective 8/17/2020, effective immediately; amended January 7, 2021, effective 4/1/2021; amended and adopted by the Court, En Banc, effective 1/11/2024 effective immediately; Amended and Adopted by the Court, En Banc, September 5, 2024, effective 9/5/2024.COMMENTS
2000
[1] C.R.C.P. 77 provides that courts are always open for business. This Practice Standard is intended to comport with that rule.
2013
[2] The Court authorized service provider for the program is the Integrated Colorado Courts E-Filing System (http://www.jbits.courts.state.co.us/icces/). "Editable Format" is one which is subject to modification by the court using standard means such as Word or WordPerfect format.
2017
[3] Effective November 1, 2016, the name of the court authorized service provider changed from the "Integrated Colorado Courts E-Filing System" to "Colorado Courts E-Filing" (www.jbits.courts.state.co.us/efiling/).
Annotation Law reviews. For article, "Keeping up With Local Dissolution Procedures", see 12 Colo. Law. 767 (1983). For article, "Alternative Depositions: Practice and Procedure", see 19 Colo. Law. 57 (1990). For article, "Colorado's New Rules of Civil Procedure, Part I: Case Management and Disclosure", see 23 Colo. Law. 2467 (1994). For article, "Motions for Default Judgments", see 24 Colo. Law. 1295 (1995). For article, "Discrete Task Representation a/k/a Unbundled Legal Services", see 29 Colo. Law. 5 (January 2000). For article, "Electronic Filing's First Year in Colorado", see 31 Colo. Law. 41 (April 2002). For article, "Revisiting the Recovery of Attorney Fees and Costs in Colorado", see 33 Colo. Law.11 (April 2004). For article, "Bonds in Colorado Courts: A Primer for Practitioners", see 34 Colo. Law. 59 (March 2005). For article, "2006 Amendments to the Civil Rules: Modernization, New Math, and Polishing", see 35 Colo. Law. 21 (May 2006). For article, "Limited Scope Representation Under the Proposed Amendment to C.R.C.P. 121, § 1-1 ", see 40 Colo. Law. 89 (November 2011). Purpose of rule. This rule is intended to provide uniformity among the various district courts as to procedural matters. People ex rel. Sullivan v. Swihart, 897 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1995). Authority of district court rules is recognized so long as they do not conflict with the Colorado rules of civil procedure or with any directive of the supreme court. Danburg v. Realties, Inc., 677 P.2d 439 (Colo. App. 1984). Not all standing orders are local rules. Section (a) of this rule clearly distinguishes between "standing orders having the effect of local rules" and those that do not. Therefore, not all standing orders are required to be reviewed by the supreme court. People ex rel. Sullivan v. Swihart, 897 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1995). Standing order of chief judge of judicial district prohibiting possession of a deadly weapon or firearm in designated areas of courthouse was a valid exercise of the chief judge's authority as to administrative matters, did not affect the procedural rights of litigants, and did not require supreme court approval under this rule. People ex rel. Sullivan v. Swihart, 897 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1995). Late filings. This rule applies only to the failure to file a brief and does not apply to late filings. Charles Milne Assoc. v. Toponce, 770 P.2d 1313 (Colo. App. 1988). Trial court's failure to comply with procedural requirements concerning notice and time for filing responsive brief before ruling on motion to dismiss is an abuse of discretion. Lanes v. Scott, 688 P.2d 251 (Colo. App. 1984). Court's sua sponte order of dismissal for failure to prosecute cannot stand if it is not preceded by the notice required by § 1-10 and C.R.C.P. 41. In re Custody of Nugent, 955 P.2d 584 (Colo. App. 1997); Koh v. Kumar, 207 P.3d 900 (Colo. App. 2009). A delay reduction order does not suffice to provide notice of dismissal under § 1-10. Koh v. Kumar, 207 P.3d 900 (Colo. App. 2009). Juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in declining to consider failure of the mother to file a responsive pleading to the father's posttrial motion as a confession of motion. M.H.W. by M.E.S. v. D.J.W., 757 P.2d 1129 (Colo. App. 1988). Failure to give an opportunity to respond to authority cited in support of or in opposition to a motion is harmless unless prejudice is shown. Benson v. Colo. Comp. Ins. Auth., 870 P.2d 624 (Colo. App. 1994). Where there has been an unusual delay in prosecuting an action, prejudice to the defendant will be presumed. Therefore, in the absence of mitigating circumstances, an unusual delay in prosecuting an action justifies dismissal with prejudice. Richardson v. McFee, 687 P.2d 517 (Colo. App. 1984). Trial court held not to have abused discretion in dismissing action with prejudice for failure to prosecute. Rossi v. Mathers, 749 P.2d 964 (Colo. App. 1987). Scope of issues raised by a trial data certificate is limited only by the breadth of notice provided by the complaint. Under our rules of civil procedure, the precise legal theory asserted by a claimant is not controlling, so long as the complaint gives sufficient notice of the transaction sued upon. Yoder v. Hooper, 695 P.2d 1182 (Colo. App. 1984), aff'd, 732 P.2d 852 (Colo. 1987). Trial court erred when it concluded deponent received "reasonable notice" of deposition under § 1-12 (1). Deponent received deposition notice only two days before the deposition, and one of those days was a Sunday. As such, deponent did not receive at least five days notice before the deposition. However, under C.R.C.P. 32(d)(1), "all errors and irregularities in the notice for taking a deposition are waived unless written objection is promptly served upon the party giving the notice". Keenan ex rel. Hickman v. Gregg, 192 P.3d 485 (Colo. App. 2008) Provision inapplicable to summary judgment motions. Because of the drastic nature of summary judgment, provisions under § 1-15 concerning confession of motions are inapplicable to motions for summary judgment under this rule. Seal v. Hart, 755 P.2d 462 (Colo. App. 1988). Failure to present controverting affidavit or other evidentiary materials are not grounds for summary judgment. Murphy v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 747 P.2d 691 (Colo. App. 1987). Failure of nonmoving party to present affidavits or other evidentiary materials opposing a motion for summary judgment does not alone provide a proper basis for the entry of a judgment on the pleadings. Quiroz v. Goff, 46 P.3d 486 (Colo. App. 2002). Only under extreme circumstances should sanction of dismissal or entry of default judgment be imposed. This rule should not be applied in a manner which unreasonably denies a party its day in court. Nagy v. District Court, 762 P.2d 158 (Colo. 1988) (decided under rule in effect prior to 1987 repeal and readoption); Pinkstaff v. Black & Decker (U.S.), Inc., 211 P.3d 698 (Colo. 2009). It is within the district court's discretion to conduct an evidentiary hearing or rule on the submitted motions to vacate or modify an arbitration award. BFN-Greely, LLC v. Adair Group, Inc., 141 P.3d 937 (Colo. App. 2006). Mere citation of a rule of civil procedure is not a "recitation of legal authority" as required by § 1-15 (7) of this rule. Box v. Wickham, 713 P.2d 415 (Colo. App. 1985). Trial court improperly awarded attorney fees upon determining that a motion was frivolous due to an erroneous finding that the court had no jurisdiction. In re Smith, 757 P.2d 1159 (Colo. App. 1988). Post-trial motion for the award of attorney fees is analogous to a request for taxing costs and should follow procedures established by C.R.C.P. 54(d) and § 1-22 of this rule. A trial court may address the issue of the award of attorney fees for services rendered in connection with the underlying litigation on a post-trial basis, whether or not counsel has previously sought to "reserve" the issue. Roa v. Miller, 784 P.2d 826 (Colo. App. 1989). An award of attorney fees under § 13-17-102 cannot be held to be confessed by failure to respond to a motion for fees. Artes-Roy v. Lyman, 833 P.2d 62 (Colo. App. 1992). A claim or defense is frivolous for purposes of assessing attorney fees if the proponent can present no rational argument based on the evidence or law in support of that claim or defense. McKown-Katy v. Rego Co., 776 P.2d 1130 (Colo. App. 1989), rev'd in part on other grounds, 801 P.2d 536 (Colo. 1990). Determination of whether motion is frivolous is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. McKown-Katy v. Rego Co., 776 P.2d 1130 (Colo. App. 1989), rev'd in part on other grounds, 801 P.2d 536 (Colo. 1990). Whether motion was frivolous under § 1-15 (7) is applied in Liebowitz v. Aimexco Inc., 701 P.2d 140 (Colo. App. 1985). Award of attorney fees incurred in pursuing motions for sanctions improper under § 1-15 (7) where the defense to the motions, while ultimately unsuccessful, had a rational basis in fact and law and did not lack substantial justification. Boulder County Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Kraft Bldg. Contractors, 122 P.3d 1019 (Colo. App. 2005). The provisions of § 1-15 concerning confession of a motion by failing to respond thereto are inapplicable to a motion for summary judgment. Koch v. Sadler, 759 P.2d 792 (Colo. App. 1988). Rule is permissive, not mandatory, so that failure to file brief in opposition to motion for partial summary judgment may be considered a confession of the motion, but is not automatically considered such. Visintainer Sheep v. Centennial Gold, 748 P.2d 358 (Colo. App. 1987). A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim must be considered on its merits like a motion for summary judgment and cannot be deemed confessed by a failure to respond. Therefore, trial court erred in failing to consider the merits of plaintiffs' claims for relief as required by C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) in resolving defendant's motion to dismiss. Hemmann Mgmt. Servs. v. Mediacell, Inc., 176 P.3d 856 (Colo. App. 2007). A party has 15 days to respond to a motion and it is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to grant a motion only 12 days after it was filed. Weatherly v. Roth, 743 P. 2d 453 (Colo. App. 1987). Trial court's ex-parte communication with defendant's counsel directing counsel to prepare the form of order was not improper and did not require the attorney fee order to be vacated, where the communication was made after the court had reached its decision based on full briefing of the issues and a telephone hearing, where plaintiff's counsel was given an opportunity to object and did in fact object, and where there was no evidence of bias on the part of the judge or prejudice to plaintiff as a result of the court's action. Aztec Minerals Corp. v. State, 987 P.2d 895 (Colo. App. 1999). Trial judge's refusal to disqualify himself from proceeding amounted to abuse of discretion where trial judge acted as settlement judge in litigation underlying the present legal malpractice case and allegations, in light of policies expressed in § 1-17 of this rule that a settlement judge for a particular action should not thereafter have any dealings with the case and that a judge assigned for proceedings other than settlement should not be privy to discussions that occurred at court settlement conferences, were sufficient to raise a reasonable inference of the appearance of actual or apparent bias or prejudice. Tripp v. Borchard, 29 P.3d 345 (Colo. App. 2001). For factors to use in determining appropriateness and severity of sanctions for failure to file a trial data certificate, see Nagy v. District Court, 762 P.2d 158 (Colo. 1988) (decided under rule in effect prior to 1987 repeal and readoption). Sanction imposed for violation of § 1-18 's requirement of timely filing of trial data certificate denied defendant its right to defend against plaintiff's claim. AAA Crane Serv. v. Omnibank, 723 P.2d 156 (Colo. App. 1986). Sanctions may include dismissal, but only if court follows notice requirements of C.R.C.P. 41(b) and § 1-10 (2) of this rule. Maxwell v. W.K.A. Inc., 728 P.2d 321 (Colo. App. 1986). In addition, it was an abuse of discretion for court to impose a sanction for both parties' failure to file trial data certificates which was detrimental only to plaintiff, and benefitted the equally noncomplying defendants. Maxwell v. W.K.A. Inc., 728 P.2d 321 (Colo. App. 1986). Imposition of sanctions for noncompliance is not mandated; the language of § 1-18 (1)(d) is permissive in nature. Nagy v. District Court, 762 P.2d 158 (Colo. 1988) (decided under rule in effect prior to 1987 repeal and readoption). The trial court has considerable discretion to determine whether noncompliance with mandatory pretrial procedures justifies the imposition of sanctions against the noncomplying party. People v. Milton, 732 P.2d 1199 (Colo. 1987). Trial court's decision not to impose any sanction for noncompliance with pretrial procedures is an abuse of discretion only if, based on the particular circumstances, the decision was manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. People v. Milton, 732 P.2d 1199 (Colo. 1987). Trial court did not abuse its discretion for failing to prohibit the state's witnesses from testifying in case in chief for failure to file trial data certificate setting forth the names of the witnesses. People v. Milton, 732 P.2d 1199 (Colo. 1987). Trial court did not apply an erroneous legal standard in determining reasonableness of plaintiff's attorney fees. Without any supporting affidavit or exhibit, defendants' opposition to award of attorney fees incurred in connection with contempt proceedings constituted mere argument and did not create a genuine issue of material fact as to the reasonableness of the fees. Moreover, the award of attorney fees was based on sufficient evidence supporting the reasonableness of the fees. Madison Capital Co., LLC v. Star Acquisition VIII, 214 P.3d 557 (Colo. App. 2009). Notwithstanding the discretionary language in § 1-22 (2)(c), a party is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine a reasonable amount of attorney fees, when the party presents an expert's affidavit raising disputed issues of fact and a significant amount of fees has been requested. Roberts v. Adams, 47 P.3d 690 (Colo. App. 2001). Discretion to grant or deny belated request. Where party did not file motion for fees until 24 days after expiration of 15-day period and did not request extension of time nor offer excuse for delay, court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion. Major v. Chons Bros., Inc., 53 P.3d 781 (Colo. App. 2002). Although § 1-22 requires a party seeking costs to file a request within 15 days of the judgment, it also permits the request to be filed within such greater time as the court may allow. Although plaintiff filed the request for costs outside of the deadline, the court chose to address the issue. There is no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to address plaintiff's request under the "within such greater time as the court may allow" standard. Phillips v. Watkins, 166 P.3d 197 (Colo. App. 2007). A request for an award of costs and fees under § 1-22 which has been filed beyond the 15-day deadline does not preclude the trial court's consideration even though the party fails to request an extension of time. In re Wright, 841 P.2d 358 (Colo. App. 1992). Not an abuse of discretion for trial court to award attorney fees under § 1-22 beyond the 15-day deadline and without expressly granting an extension. US Fax Law Ctr., Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc., 205 P.3d 512 (Colo. App. 2009); Anderson v. Pursell, 244 P.3d 1188 (Colo. 2010). The court relied on specified information indicating the reasons for the late filing of the motion for attorney fees. US Fax Law Ctr., Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc., 205 P.3d 512 (Colo. App. 2009). Trial court not required to deny a motion for costs and attorney fees if it is filed outside of the 15-day time limit, even if the submitting party does not request an extension of time. Anderson v. Pursell, 244 P.3d 1188 (Colo. 2010). Issues concerning recovery of attorney fees not sought as damages are outside the purview of C.R.C.P. 59 and outside the purview of C.R.C.P. 59(j) 's requirement that a motion be denied as a matter of law if it is not decided within 60 days. Anderson v. Pursell, 244 P.3d 1188 (Colo. 2010). Even though plaintiff filed his bill of costs and an amended bill of costs more than 15 days after the entry of judgment, the trial court considered both the bill of costs and the amended bill in awarding minimal costs. Thus, the bill of costs was filed within "such greater time as the court may allow" and the trial court was required under § 13-17-202 to award the plaintiff "reasonable costs" incurred after the offer of settlement. Borquez v. Robert C. Ozer, P.C., 923 P.2d 166 (Colo. App. 1995), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 940 P.2d 371 (Colo. 1997). The rule does not require a court to determine that a filing made outside the 15-day period was attributable to excusable neglect or to make any other findings such as those required under C.R.C.P. 6(b). Parry v. Kuhlmann, 169 P.3d 188 (Colo. App. 2007). Section 1-22 (2) does not require a party seeking attorney fees as costs to provide the disclosures mandated under C.R.C.P. 26 for experts who will testify at trial. Chartier v. Weinland Homes, Inc., 25 P.3d 1279 (Colo. App. 2001). Failure of wife to file a motion in conformity with this rule in dissolution of marriage action does not operate as a waiver of her request for fees where wife had properly requested fees in her response to husband's petition; attorney fees were also listed as a disputed issue in the parties' joint trial management certificate; and husband acknowledged that wife raised the issue at the permanent orders hearing. In re Hill, 166 P.3d 269 (Colo. App. 2007). The right to a jury trial, once proper demand is made and fee is paid pursuant to § 1-3 of this rule, may be lost only for reasons stated in C.R.C.P. 39(a). The trial court, in an action for payment of medical benefits, abused its discretion in denying the insured a jury trial on the basis that the insured failed to file jury instructions in accordance with § 1-19 of this rule. Neither this rule nor C.R.C.P. 39(a) includes a waiver provision on such basis. Whaley v. Keystone Life Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 404 (Colo. App. 1989). Where defendant in prior action sought and obtained dismissal for failure to prosecute but did not specifically request dismissal with prejudice, order of dismissal did not so specify, and no good cause was shown for defendant's failure to request dismissal with prejudice, subsequent "clarification" of order to specify dismissal with prejudice was ineffective. McElvaney v. Batley, 824 P.2d 73 (Colo. App. 1991). Expert's designation and summary of testimony was available and met the requirement of this rule to provide both sides with the opportunity to prepare adequately for trial and to prevent undue surprise. Fenton v. Fibreboard Corp., 827 P.2d 564 (Colo. App. 1991). Confession of motion due to failure to respond in accordance with subsection (3) does not automatically render a pro se litigant's claims "frivolous and groundless". Separate findings on the issue are required before court may award attorney fees against such parties under § 13-17-102. Artes-Roy v. Lyman, 833 P.2d 62 (Colo. App. 1992). Defendants waived their rights to a hearing on costs pursuant to this section where they did not request such hearing at trial. Van Schaack v. Van Schaack Holdings, Ltd., 856 P.2d 15 (Colo. App. 1992). It was within the trial court's discretion to award expert witness fees for designated experts who did not testify at trial where such award was supported by evidence in the record. Van Schaack v. Van Schaack Holdings, Ltd., 856 P.2d 15 (Colo. App. 1992). Trial court had discretion to impose sanctions, including issuing an order limiting scope of expert's testimony at trial where plaintiff failed to disclose identity of experts or their opinions and failed to supplement responses to discovery when additional information became known. Locke v. Vanderark, 843 P.2d 27 (Colo. App. 1992). Trial court properly excluded psychiatrist's testimony regarding the association between IQ and hydrocephalic condition where plaintiff failed to disclose opinion, failed to disclose psychiatrist's qualifications, and failed to update discovery responses. Locke v. Vanderark, 843 P.2d 27 (Colo. App. 1992). Trial court properly held that tardily disclosed expert opinion went beyond fair scope of previously disclosed opinion where plaintiff failed to make timely disclosure of expert's opinion concerning damages relating to matters beyond those provided in discovery. Locke v. Vanderark, 843 P.2d 27 (Colo. App. 1992). Generally, the trial court determines a motion on the written motion and submitted briefs, and it is within the discretion of the court whether to allow an evidentiary hearing. City & County of Denver v. Ameritrust, 832 P.2d 1054 (Colo. App. 1992). Section 1-5 creates a presumption that all court records are to be open. Anderson v. Home Ins. Co., 924 P.2d 1123 (Colo. App. 1996). Section 1-5 places the burden upon the party seeking to limit access to a court file to overcome this presumption in favor of public accessibility by demonstrating that the harm to the privacy of a person in interest outweighs the public interest in the openness of court files. Anderson v. Home Ins. Co., 924 P.2d 1123 (Colo. App. 1996). The fact that the parties claim that a court file contains extremely personal, private, and confidential matters is generally insufficient to constitute a privacy interest warranting the sealing of that entire file under § 1-5. In re Purcell, 879 P.2d 468 (Colo. App. 1994); Anderson v. Home Ins. Co., 924 P.2d 1123 (Colo. App. 1996). The expectation of privacy or confidentiality in court records has been found to exist only in those limited instances involving sexual assault claims, trade secrets, potentially defamatory material, or threats to national security. Anderson v. Home Ins. Co., 924 P.2d 1123 (Colo. App. 1996). A broad limited access order denying access to the entire court file was not warranted where a medical malpractice charge against a licensed health care professional implicates the public interest and involves more than a private dispute between individuals. Anderson v. Home Ins. Co., 924 P.2d 1123 (Colo. App. 1996). Court may not enter a limited access order based solely upon an agreement between the parties to the litigation. If the evidence does not support the required finding under § 1-5 (2), no such order may be entered. Anderson v. Home Ins. Co., 924 P.2d 1123 (Colo. App. 1996). Court did not abuse its discretion in denying party's request to seal record where it was not required to seal the record under this section and the record contained nothing unusual and no material that would mandate that it be sealed. In re Purcell, 879 P.2d 468 (Colo. App. 1994). Movant's constitutional right to due process was not violated by trial court's denial of motion for costs and damages without a separate hearing on the motion where movant did not request an evidentiary hearing on its motion and trial court, in ruling on the motion, assumed movant could prove damages but determined, based on written motion and briefs, that an award of damages would be oppressive and inequitable. City & County of Denver v. Ameritrust, 832 P.2d 1054 (Colo. App. 1992). Trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing defendants to file their reply to plaintiff's response more than ten days after the response was filed where, in accepting the reply, the court stated that it had been filed within a reasonable time and that, in the interest of fundamental fairness, substance would be placed ahead of procedure. Armstead v. Memorial Hosp., 892 P.2d 450 (Colo. App. 1995). Letter of credit was properly released by trial court, since the court was the beneficiary of the letter of credit. Vento v. Colo. Nat'l Bank, 985 P.2d 48 (Colo. App. 1999). Section 1-1 (2) is applied in Barry v. Ashley Anderson, P.C., 718 F. Supp. 1492 (D. Colo. 1989). Section 1-10 is applied in Powers v. Prof'l Rodeo Cowboys, 832 P.2d 1099 (Colo. App. 1992). Section 1-10 (2) is applied in Maxwell v. W.K.A. Inc., 728 P.2d 321 (Colo. App. 1986). Section 1-11 is applied in Herrera v. Anderson, 736 P.2d 416 (Colo. App. 1987); Todd v. Bear Valley Village Apts., 980 P.2d 973 (Colo. 1999). Section 1-15 is applied in Herrera v. Anderson, 736 P.2d 416 (Colo. App. 1987); Ogawa v. Riley, 949 P.2d 118 (Colo. App. 1997). Section 1-18 is applied in Baumann v. Rhode, 710 P.2d 493 (Colo. App. 1985); Conrad v. Imatani, 724 P.2d 89 (Colo. App. 1986); Coffee v. Inman, 728 P.2d 376 (Colo. App. 1986). Section 1-19 is applied in Whaley v. Keystone Life Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 404 (Colo. App. 1989).