Alaska Comm. R. Evid. 606

As amended through November 12, 2024

Rule 606 - Competency of Juror as Witness

(a)At the Trial. At common law a juror otherwise qualified as a witness was not rendered incompetent because of his position on the jury although there is a conflict of authority as to whether a juror may remain on the jury after testifying. Uniform Rule 43 (1953) resolved the dispute by prohibiting testimony of a juror altogether. This rule, like the Federal Rule after which it is modeled, follows the lead of the Uniform Rule and adopts the view that participation in a trial as a witness compromises the impartiality of a juror sitting as factfinder in that trial. This view is very similar to the position articulated in Rule 605, which bars a trial judge from testifying in a trial in which he presides.

The second sentence of subdivision (a) departs from Federal Rule 606 which provides that should a juror be called to testify, the opposing party shall be afforded an opportunity to object out of the hearing of the jury. This is very different from Federal Rule 605 which provides that when a judge is called as a witness, no objection is needed to preserve a claim of error. The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 606 distinguishes the two rules on the ground that when a juror is called to testify, the judge is not so involved as to call for departure from the usual principles requiring an objection to be made. Alaska Rule 606 rejects this distinction and recognizes that any objection to the competency of the factfinder called to testify might jeopardize the integrity of the factfinding process. Under the Federal Rule, only after the witness' name is called is the objection raised. The other jurors may suspect that if the witness does not testify it is because counsel has objected. Jurors are less likely to be able to understand why they cannot testify than are judges: this rule is designed to eliminate the need for jury speculation. If voir dire is handled carefully, counsel should be alerted to situations in which a potential juror could develop into a witness later in the trial and counsel should be able to disqualify such potential jurors. There is no reason to expect that this rule will be unduly burdensome for trial lawyers and there is no need to tolerate any possibility that the integrity of the factfinders will be compromised.

(b)Inquiry Into Validity of Verdict on Indictment. Generally there has been agreement among common law jurisdictions that the mental operations and the emotional reactions of jurors during the deliberative process should not be the subject of later inquiry. There has been substantial disagreement as to whether a juror should be able to impeach a verdict in which he participated by testifying about other matters. See 8 Wigmore § § 2352, 2353, 2354. This rule, like the Federal Rule after which it is modeled, limits impeachment of jury verdicts to inquiries about extraneous prejudicial information and outside influences which may have been improperly brought to bear upon any juror.

The policy reasons underlying the exclusion of jurors' affidavits or testimony impeaching verdicts include protection of jurors against annoyance or embarrassment, freedom of deliberation, and finality of verdicts. Allowing inquiry into the mental operations and emotional reactions of jurors in reaching a given verdict would invite constant review as a result of tampering and harassment. Moreover, even without pressure by counsel or litigants, many jurors are likely to have second thoughts about their verdicts after they are excused by the Court and the influence of fellow jurors dissipates. Such second thoughts might cause jurors to question their verdicts if permitted to do so. Yet these policy reasons are not promoted by a blanket prohibition against inquiry into irregularities which occur in the jury process when such irregularities result from prejudicial extraneous information or influences injected into or brought to bear upon the deliberative process. If the judicial system is operating properly, such inquiries should rarely be necessary. Failure to examine the relatively few cases that may arise would permit injustices to go uncorrected without reason.

The line between what is the proper subject of subsequent inquiry and what is to be insulated from review is a fine one. The federal decisions have sought to protect the components of deliberation, including arguments, statements, discussions, mental and emotional reactions, votes, and any other features of the process. Alaska cases draw similar lines between permissible and impermissible inquiry. Like most federal courts before the adoption of the Federal Rules, Alaska law generally provides that a juror cannot impeach a verdict by testimony or affidavit, but it recognizes exceptions.

Exceptions to the general rule have been made and it has been held that the type of misconduct which may impeach a verdict is fraud, bribery, forcible coercion or any other obstruction of justice. Whether the verdict should be set aside and a new trial ordered rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge, but generally the verdict should stand unless the evidence clearly establishes a serious violation of the juror's duty and deprives a party of a fair trial.

West v. State, 409 P.2d 847, 852 (Alaska 1966). The effect of this approach is to restrict inquiry into the deliberations of the jury and to permit inquiry into extraneous matters.

This rule reflects the same spirit as the decided cases. For example, exposure of some jurors in the jury room to a newspaper article concerning the case has been viewed as an exception to the general rule against impeachment. See Watson v. State, 413 P.2d 22, 24 (Alaska 1966). This falls within the contemplated interpretation of the language of this rule as "extraneous prejudicial information."

This rule does not purport to set out the substantive grounds requiring verdicts to be set aside for irregularity. It does attempt to define the guidelines concerning the competency of jurors to testify as to those grounds. Can a verdict be impeached if a juror has falsely denied bias or prejudice during voir dire? See Poulin v. Zartman, 542 P.2d 251, 264 (Alaska 1975). Hard cases remain and must be decided with policies underlying the rule in mind: to insulate the deliberative process and to promote finality of verdicts while not foreclosing testimony as to the extrinsic forces erroneously injected into the process.

Alaska Comm. R. Evid. 606