This Rule applies to all aspects of judicial notice and must, therefore, be read in conjunction with both Rule 201 and Rule 202.
In considering taking judicial notice, the court is not restricted to sources of information proffered by the parties, but may consult any source, including treatises, experts, scientific journals, etc. No exclusionary rule except a valid claim of privilege shall apply. However, the court as a matter of discretion, should disclose, on request, the main sources on which a decision to take judicial notice is or was based, in order to make the parties' opportunity to be heard meaningful.
Authority upon the propriety of taking judicial notice against an accused in a criminal case with respect to matters other than venue is relatively meager. While it may be argued that the right of jury trial does not extend to matters which are beyond reasonable dispute, the rule opts for the greater protection of the accused's right to a jury trial afforded by the limited instruction that the jury may, but is not required to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. The Federal Rule is in accord. Much of the concern about a possible need to take notice of some facts in criminal cases can be eliminated by careful attention to the elements of an offense. Venue and jurisdiction are not usually elements of a crime. Of course, they must be proper (assuming an appeal will be taken). But the same judge who decides in a civil case whether a court has jurisdiction and what proper venue is can do so in a criminal case. Of course, venue and jurisdiction questions may involve factfinding, but many questions left for the court involve factfinding. See, e.g., Rule 104(a), supra. Consider also change of venue motions and attacks on jury verdicts. Factfinding unrelated to the elements of the crime can be done by the judge. With this in mind, Rule 203 is drafted to avoid the knotty constitutional questions that would arise were an attempt made to permit judicial notice of some facts relevant to the merits of an action but not others. To draw such a line might be to resurrect the "ultimate issue" test abandoned in Rule 704, infra.
Rule 203(c) is drafted so that it conclusively states that determining questions of law shall be a matter for the court. When the determination of the law of foreign states and foreign countries was treated as a question of fact, it became a matter for the jury in appropriate cases. Statutes and acts such as the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 have attempted to remove this anomaly in traditional court and jury functions. This subdivision expresses the view that determining the law is a function of the court. See Uniform Rule 10(4) for an identical provision. If judicial notice of law is not taken, evidence will be required, but the decision on what the law is remains that of the court.
Nothing in the rule is intended to suggest that it authorizes a lawyer to argue jury nullification to the jury in a criminal case. The jury simply is to be told that a noticed fact is treated as if evidence of it were authorized, and the trier of fact is to treat it as if evidence were submitted. A defense lawyer can argue that any fact should be disbelieved by the jury and this is as true of a judicially noticed fact as of any other fact.
Alaska Comm. R. Evid. 203