The approval of the supersedeas bond by the clerk of the trial court, unless contested by the opposing party, shall constitute a stay of the judgment when the judgment is for the payment of money only, or the payment of money and some other act and the appellant wishes to supersede the judgment as to the payment of money only. In the event the clerk declines to approve the bond, or the clerk's approval is contested, the requirements of (b) below shall apply.
When the judgment or order of a trial court is for the payment of money only, the filing and approval of a supersedeas bond conditioned as required by law shall operate to stay and suspend the execution of such judgment or order. The action of the clerk of the trial court in either approving or refusing to approve a supersedeas bond shall be subject to review by the trial court.
Ala. R. App. P. 8
Committee Comments
Court Comment dated Jan 12, 2005, to Rule 8(a) and (b)
In Ex parte Spriggs Enterprises, Inc., 376 So. 2d 1088, 1089 (Ala. 1979), the Alabama Supreme Court held that "[t]he plain meaning of Rule 8(a)(1) is that one who appeals a judgment against him for money damages only must execute a supersedeas bond in an amount equal to 125% of the amount of the judgment when the judgment exceeds $10,000. The language utilized in the rule is mandatory; the trial judge is given no discretion in setting the amount of the supersedeas bond." Note, however, that the Supreme Court has recognized, for good cause shown (set forth as grounds for a motion filed by the appellant) and pursuant to Rule 8(b) and Rule 2, the need to suspend the requirements of Rule 8(a) in extraordinary circumstances and to direct the trial court to accept a bend in an amount other than that required by Rule 8(a). For example, on December 29, 2003, in case no. 1030488, Ware v. Timmons, in response to a motion to suspend the requirement off Rule 8(a)(1), the Alabama Supreme Court issued an order, providing, in pertinent part: "It is ordered that the appellants are required to post with the trial court the maximum bond obtainable, based" on the appellants' entire net worth and available insurance coverage, to be determined by the trial court, within 14 days from the date of this order."
Subdivision (a) provides for the stay of execution of a judgment pending appeal in three situations:
(1) for payment of money only,
(2) for payment of money and performance of some other act or dutyand
(3) for performance of some act or duty other than for payment of money. In so providing, it supersedes Code 1940, Title 7, §§ 793, 794 and 795, while preserving the exceptions provided in ARCP Rule 62(e) (State of Alabama exemption).
Subdivision (a) basically restates Code 1940, Title 7, §§ 793, 794 and 795. It modifies a previous statutory requirement as to the amount of the supersedeas bond required where the judgment is for the payment of money only or for the payment of money and for the performance of some other act and the appellant wishes to supersede the judgment as to the portion of the judgment for money only.
The remainder of Rule 8 sets forth substantially the provisions of FRAP Rule 8, but the provisions dealing with civil and criminal actions are specifically separated to deal with the state's circumstances.
Rule 8 makes specific the case law rule that the principal as well as the surety is subject to summary proceedings on a bond given under this rule or under Rule 7. In this connection, see 9 Moore's Federal Practice 1308(2nd Ed.). By specific reference, bonds given under Rule 7 are made subject to this summary enforcement.
Subdivision (d) is based both on prior state practice and on Rule 8(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (FRCrimP).
See Committee Comment on death sentences. Rule 39(c).
See ARCP Rule 62, for companion provisions.
Committee Comments to Amendment to Rule 8(d)(1), Effective February 4, 1985.
Subdivision (d)(1) supersedes Code of Alabama 1975, § 12-22-243; § 15-18-80; that clause in § 15-18-82(a) reading "not less than 30 nor more than 100 days from the date of sentence, as the court may adjudge,"; the second and third sentences of § 15-18-84(a); and the second and third sentences of § 15-18-84(b). It is based on the recognition that appeal is automatic in death penalty cases, see § 12-22-150, § 13A-5-55, and Rule 39(c), A.R.A.P., and that the supreme court is in the best position to set an execution date and enter any necessary stays. In the limited circumstances described in § 15-16-23, the trial court has the authority to stay and reset the execution date, and in such a case the trial court's order resetting the date would constitute the execution warrant.
Court Comment to Amendments to Rules 8(a) and 8(d)(3) Effective January 1, 1997.
The amendments to Rules 8(a) and 8(d)(3) remove gender specific pronouns.
"Note from the reporter of decisions: The order amending Rule 8(d)(1), Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure, effective January 12, 2023, is published in that volume of Alabama Reporter that contains Alabama cases from __ So. 3d."