69 Fed. Reg. 9857 (Mar. 2, 2004)

Biweekly Notice; Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations

Federal RegisterMar 2, 2004

69 Fed. Reg. 9857 (Mar. 2, 2004)

I. Background

Pursuant to section 189a.(2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or NRC staff) is publishing this regular biweekly notice. The Act requires the Commission publish notice of any amendments issued, or proposed to be issued and grants the Commission the authority to issue and make immediately effective any amendment to an operating license upon a determination by the Commission that such amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, notwithstanding the pendency before the Commission of a request for a hearing from any person.

This biweekly notice includes all notices of amendments issued, or proposed to be issued from, February 5, 2004, through February 19, 2004. The last biweekly notice was published on February 17, 2004 (69 FR 7517).

Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

The Commission has made a proposed determination that the following amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration. Under the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The basis for this proposed determination for each amendment request is shown below.

The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of publication of this notice will be considered in making any final determination. Within 60 days after the date of publication of this notice, the licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene.

Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the expiration of 60 days after the date of publication of this notice. The Commission may issue the license amendment before expiration of the 60-day period provided that its final determination is that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. In addition, the Commission may issue the amendment prior to the expiration of the 30-day comment period should circumstances change during the 30-day comment period such that failure to act in a timely way would result, for example in derating or shutdown of the facility. Should the Commission take action prior to the expiration of either the comment period or the notice period, it will publish in the Federal Register a notice of issuance. Should the Commission make a final No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, any hearing will take place after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this action will occur very infrequently.

Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to Room 6D22, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of written comments received may be examined at the Commission's Public Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint North, Public File Area O1F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. The filing of requests for a hearing and petitions for leave to intervene is discussed below.

Within 60 days after the date of publication of this notice, the licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's “Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings” in 10 CFR part 2. Interested persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.309, which is available at the Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Public File Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available records will be accessible from the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System's (ADAMS) Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, http://www.nrc.gov/ reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/. If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the Commission or a presiding officer designated by the Commission or by the Chief Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or the Chief Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of a hearing or an appropriate order.

As required by 10 CFR 2.309, a petition for leave to intervene shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the following general requirements: (1) The name, address and telephone number of the requestor or petitioner; (2) the nature of the requestor's/petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (3) the nature and extent of the requestor's/petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (4) the possible effect of any decision or order which may be entered in the proceeding on the requestor's/petitioner's interest. The petition must also set forth the specific contentions which the petitioner/requestor seeks to have litigated at the proceeding.

Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner/requestor shall provide a brief explanation of the bases for the contention and a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the contention and on which the petitioner/requestor intends to rely in proving the contention at the hearing. The petitioner/requestor must also provide references to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware and on which the petitioner/requestor intends to rely to establish those facts or expert opinion. The petition must include sufficient information to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner/requestor to relief. A petitioner/requestor who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.

If a hearing is requested, and the Commission has not made a final determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration, the Commission will make a final determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held. If the final determination is that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance of the amendment. If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place before the issuance of any amendment.

A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must be filed by: (1) First class mail addressed to the Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; (2) courier, express mail, and expedited delivery services: Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth Floor, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, 20852, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; (3) E-mail addressed to the Office of the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, HEARINGDOCKET@NRC.GOV or (4) facsimile transmission addressed to the Office of the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, Attention: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff at (301) 415-1101, verification number is (301) 415-1966. A copy of the request for hearing and petition for leave to intervene should also be sent to the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and it is requested that copies be transmitted either by means of facsimile transmission to 301-415-3725 or by email to OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov. A copy of the request for hearing and petition for leave to intervene should also be sent to the attorney for the licensee.

Nontimely requests and/or petitions and contentions will not be entertained absent a determination by the Commission or the presiding officer of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the petition, request and/or the contentions should be granted based on a balancing of the factors specified in 10 CFR 2.309(a)(1)(i)-(viii).

For further details with respect to this action, see the application for amendment which is available for public inspection at the Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Public File Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available records will be accessible from the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System's (ADAMS) Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the NRC PDR Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737 or by email to pdr@nrc.gov.

AmerGen Energy Company, LLC, Docket No. 50-461, Clinton Power Station, Unit 1, DeWitt County, Illinois, Docket No. 50-219, Oyster Creek Generating Station, Ocean County, New Jersey, Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (TMI-1), Dauphin County, Pennsylvania

Date of amendment request: January 30, 2004.

Description of amendment request: The licensee proposes to revise the operating licenses to reflect the current 100% ownership of AmerGen by Exelon Generation Company. In particular, the proposed amendments will remove PECO and British Energy from the licenses, and will remove certain license conditions in their entirety which were imposed to acknowledge the indirect foreign ownership in AmerGen by British Energy plc. Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed changes are administrative in nature and would merely conform the facility operating licenses to reflect the current ownership structure of AmerGen. No actual plant equipment or accident analyses will be affected by the proposed changes. Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed changes are administrative in nature and would merely conform the facility operating licenses to reflect the current ownership structure of AmerGen. No actual plant equipment or accident analyses will be affected by the proposed changes and no failure modes not bounded by previously evaluated accidents will be created.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed change is administrative in nature and would merely conform the facility operating licenses to reflect the current ownership structure of AmerGen. No actual plant equipment or accident analyses will be affected by the proposed changes. Additionally, the proposed changes will not relax any criteria used to establish safety limits, will not relax any safety system settings, or will not relax the bases for any limiting conditions for operation. Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in any margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Attorney for licensee: Edward J. Cullen, Jr., Esquire, Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary, Exelon Generation Company, LLC, 300 Exelon Way, Kennett Square, PA 19348.

NRC Section Chief: Richard J. Laufer.

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Docket No. 50-247, Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2 (IP2), Westchester County, New York

Date of amendment request: January 29, 2004.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would increase the maximum authorized reactor core power level from 3114.4 megawatt thermal (MWt) to 3216 MWt. This represents a nominal increase of 3.26% rated thermal power. Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The evaluations and analyses associated with this proposed change to core power level have demonstrated that all applicable acceptance criteria for plant systems, components, and analyses (including the Final Safety Analysis Report Chapter 14 safety analyses) will continue to be met for the proposed increase in licensed core thermal power for IP2. The subject increase in core thermal power will not result in conditions that could adversely affect the integrity (material, design, and construction standards) or the operational performance of any potentially affected system, component or analysis. Therefore, the probability of an accident previously evaluated is not affected by this change. The subject increase in core thermal power will not adversely affect the ability of any safety-related system to meet its intended safety function. Further, the radiological dose evaluations in support of this power uprate effort show all acceptance criteria are met.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The evaluations of this proposed amendment show that all applicable acceptance criteria for plant systems, components, and analyses (including FSAR [final safety analysis report] Chapter 14 safety analyses) will continue to be met for the proposed power increase in IP2 licensed core thermal power. The subject increase in core thermal power will not result in conditions that could adversely affect the integrity (material, design, and construction standards) or operational performance of any potentially affected system, component, or analyses. The subject increase in core thermal power will not adversely affect the ability of any safety-related system to meet its safety function. Furthermore, the conditions and changes associated with the subject increase in core thermal power will neither cause initiation of any accident, nor create any new credible limiting single failure. The power uprate does not result in changing the status of events previously deemed to be non-credible being made credible. Additionally, no new operating modes are proposed for the plant as a result of this requested change.

Therefore, the subject increase in core thermal power level will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

The evaluations associated with this proposed change show that all applicable acceptance criteria for plant systems, components, and analyses (including FSAR Chapter 14 safety analyses) will continue to be met for this proposed increase in IP2 licensed core thermal power. The subject increase in core thermal power will not result in conditions that could adversely affect the integrity (material, design, and construction standards) or operational performance of any potentially affected system, component, or analysis. The subject power uprate will not adversely affect the ability of any safety-related system to meet its intended safety function.

Therefore, the subject increase in core thermal power will not involve a significant reduction in [a] margin of safety.

Attorney for licensee: Mr. John Fulton, Assistant General Counsel, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 440 Hamilton Avenue, White Plains, NY 10601.

NRC Section Chief: Richard J. Laufer.

Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-368, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit No. 2, Pope County, Arkansas

Date of amendment request: February 9, 2004.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would remove the pressurizer heatup and cooldown limits, and the associated action and surveillance requirements, from the Technical Specifications and place them in a licensee controlled document.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The probability of an accident is unchanged as a result of the proposed change to delete the ANO-2 [Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2] pressurizer heatup and cooldown rates and associated action, surveillance requirement, and bases from the TS [Technical Specification]. The cooldown and heatup rates are not initiators to any accidents or pressurizer transients discussed in the ANO-2 SAR [Safety Analysis Report]. Therefore, the probability of an accident is not changed.

The purpose of the pressurizer heatup and cooldown limits is to ensure that given transient events will not negatively affect the pressurizer structural integrity beyond Code [American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code] allowables. These limits will be maintained within ASME Code allowables in a licensee controlled document in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59. Therefore, the consequences of an accident are not increased.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The limitations imposed on the pressurizer heatup and cooldown rates are provided to assure that the pressurizer is operated within the design criteria assumed for the flaw evaluation and fatigue analysis performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section XI, subsection IWB-3600 requirements. The ANO-2 SAR has analyzed the conditions that would result from a thermal or pressurization transient on the ANO-2 pressurizer. The proposed deletion of the pressurizer heatup and cooldown rates and relocation of the limits to a licensee controlled document does not change the way that the pressurizer is designed or operated.

Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

The margin of safety is established by the rules contained in the ASME Section III Code. Any future changes to the cooldown or heatup rates will be evaluated using 10 CFR 50.59, “Changes, Tests and Experiments,” and are required to meet the ASME Code margins.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Attorney for licensee: Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esquire, Winston and Strawn, 1400 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20005-3502.

NRC Section Chief: Robert A. Gramm.

Exelon Generation Company, LLC, and PSEG Nuclear LLC, Docket No. 50-277, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 2, York and Lancaster Counties, Pennsylvania

Date of application for amendment: February 12, 2004.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would revise technical specification (TS) Table 3.3.6.1-1, “Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation,” to increase the TS Allowable Value (AV) related to the setpoint for the Main Steam Tunnel Temperature—High system isolation function for those instruments located within the Reactor Building. A new Function, 1.f, would be added to represent the Reactor Building Main Steam Tunnel Temperature—High. Existing Function 1.e would be renamed to clarify that it represents only the Turbine Building Main Steam Tunnel Temperature—High.

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The leak detection instrumentation associated with the proposed amendment is designed to detect Main Steam Line leakage in the range of one to ten percent of rated steam flow. This design basis remains unchanged. This ensures that the criteria for acceptance as established in the original licensing bases remains valid. The previous analysis for establishing the allowable value for Main Steam Line Tunnel High temperature in the Reactor Building can be improved using industry standard, state of the art computer modeling techniques. The new analysis using the GOTHIC computer code is appropriate because it accurately accounts for the building heat structures, HVAC effects, and outside air temperatures. The proposed change increases the operating margin, which reduces the potential for unnecessary plant transients. Raising the setpoint causes a greater time to detect the leak, but remains bounded by existing analysis for the design basis break of the main steam line documented in Table 14.9.8 of the Peach Bottom [Updated Final Safety Analysis Report] UFSAR. There are no impacts on equipment qualification. Changes to the instrumentation used to detect a steam line leak do not affect the probability of occurrence of the leak. Hence, it is concluded that raising the allowable value for Reactor Building Main Steam Tunnel high temperature does not significantly increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed amendment does not impact the physical design or location of the associated leak detection instrumentation. The leak detection instrumentation associated with the proposed amendment will continue to detect main steam line leakage in the range of one to ten percent of rated steam flow. The instruments will still initiate the automatic isolation of the appropriate containment isolation valves to mitigate steam leakage as credited in the original licensing bases. This proposed amendment is associated only with the results of a main steam line leak in the Reactor Building portion of the Main Steam Tunnel and has no impact on the initiation of this leak. Therefore, the proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

Steam leaks in the affected area of the Reactor Building will be detected on a timely basis so that the Group 1 Primary Containment Isolation Valves are promptly closed. The analysis performed for the proposed amendment demonstrates that the appropriate instruments will promptly initiate automatic system isolation upon sensing a temperature in excess of the new setpoint. Therefore, the proposed amendment ensures that the criteria for acceptance as established in the original licensing bases remain valid. Further, the proposed amendment eliminates a potential cause for unnecessary plant shutdowns created by conditions other than a main steam line leak. Equipment qualification and structural integrity of systems, structures, and components located within the Reactor Building are not affected by the proposed amendment. Therefore, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

Attorney for Licensee: Mr. Edward Cullen, Vice President and General Counsel, Exelon Generation Company, LLC, 2301 Market Street, S23-1, Philadelphia, PA 19101.

NRC Acting Section Chief: Darrell J. Roberts.

FPL Energy Seabrook, LLC, Docket No. 50-443, Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1, Rockingham County, New Hampshire

Date of amendment request: February 4, 2004.

Description of amendment request: This amendment request proposes to update the Technical Specifications (TSs) to correct a non-conservatism in a TS Table, correct a reference error, update titles, incorporate formatting changes to increase ease of use, and remove a permit issuance date to ease administrative burden.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. The proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed changes do not adversely affect accident initiators or precursors nor alter the design assumptions, conditions, and configuration of the facility or the manner in which the plant is operated and maintained. In addition, the proposed changes do not affect the manner in which the plant responds in normal operation, transient or accident conditions nor do they change any of the procedures related to operation of the plant. The proposed changes do not alter or prevent the ability of structures, systems and components (SSCs) to perform their intended function to mitigate the consequences of an initiating event within the acceptance limits assumed in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). The proposed changes are editorial in nature and only correct, update and modify the Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan.

The proposed changes do not affect the source term, containment isolation or radiological release assumptions used in evaluating the radiological consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the Seabrook Station UFSAR. Further, the proposed changes do not increase the types and amounts of radioactive effluent that may be released offsite, and do not significantly increase individual or cumulative occupational/public radiation exposures.

Based on the above, the proposed changes will not significantly increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. The proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

The proposed changes do not change the operation or the design basis of any plant system or component during normal or accident conditions. The proposed changes do not include any physical changes to the plant. In addition, the proposed changes do not change the function or operation of plant equipment or introduce any new failure mechanisms. The plant equipment will continue to respond per the design and analyses and there will not be a malfunction of a new or different type introduced by the proposed changes.

The proposed changes are editorial in nature and only update Seabrook Station Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan to provide consistency and facilitate ease of use. The proposed changes do not modify the facility nor do they affect the plant's response to normal, transient or accident conditions. The changes do not introduce a new mode of plant operation. The changes do not affect plant safety. The plant's design and design basis are not revised and the current safety analyses remain in effect.

Thus, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. The propose changes do not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The proposed changes are editorial changes to the Seabrook Station Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan. The safety margins established through Limiting Conditions for Operation, Limiting Safety System Settings and Safety Limits as specified in the Technical Specifications are not revised nor is the plant design or its method of operation revised by the proposed changes.

Thus, it is concluded that the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis, and based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Attorney for licensee: M.S. Ross, Florida Power & Light Company, P.O. Box 14000, Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420.

Acting NRC Section Chief: Darrell J. Roberts.

Nebraska Public Power District, Docket No. 50-298, Cooper Nuclear Station, Nemaha County, Nebraska

Date of amendment request: December 9, 2003.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment request would: (1) Incorporate into the Updated Safety Analysis Report the overall Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Leakage Pathway configuration (including the post-accident manual actions necessary to establish that configuration) upon Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approval, (2) incorporate into the Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) licensing basis the loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) dose calculation methodology (currently approved on an interim basis) upon permanent approval by the NRC, and (3) delete License Condition 2.C.(6), eliminating the commitment to provide potassium iodide to the control room occupants during LOCA conditions with core damage.

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No

The ALT [alternate leakage treatment] pathway was determined using the NRC-endorsed method described in Reference 7.3 [NEDC-31858P-A Class III, August 1999, “BWROG [Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group] Report for Increasing MSIV Leakage Rate Limits and Elimination of Leakage Control Systems”]. The proposed manual actions to establish that configuration are designed to assure that MSIV leakage resulting after a LOCA with core damage will reach the Main Turbine Condenser via a pathway that has been evaluated as being seismically robust. The LOCA dose calculation methodology assumes this leakage reaches the turbine condenser complex. The manual actions are simple to perform and there are no concerns for personnel safety in carrying out these actions within the timeframes established. Accordingly, there is no significant increase in probability or consequences of a previously evaluated accident.

The LOCA dose calculation methodology is already approved on an interim basis, as documented in Reference 7.1 [letter to C. Warren (NPPD) [Nuclear Public Power District] from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission dated February 21, 2003, “Cooper Nuclear Station—Issuance of Amendment Regarding Design Basis Accidents” Radiological Dose Assessment Methodologies, and Revision to License Condition 2.C.(6) (TAC No. MB4654)”]. As there are no technical issues to resolve, the effects of permanent approval on the probability or consequences of an accident are bounded by the previous safety conclusions of License Amendment 196.

The deletion of License Condition 2.C.(6), following implementation of the seismic evaluation and permanent approval of the LOCA dose calculation methodology, is an administrative change to the CNS Operating License. Therefore, there are no associated effects on the probability or consequences of previously evaluated accidents.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No

The proposed changes only involve the treatment of the Loss-of-Coolant Accident. No other new or different kinds of accidents can be created by the proposed changes.

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No

The LOCA dose calculation methodology credits MSIV leakage plateout in the Main Turbine Condenser prior to release to the Turbine Building. The ALT pathway to the Main Turbine Condenser was determined using the NRC-endorsed method described in Reference 7.3. Therefore, the effects on safety margins due to crediting this configuration are bounded by the NRC Safety Evaluation conclusions on this methodology. Using the MSIV leakage assumed in the LOCA analysis and conservative assumptions, there is sufficient time for the CNS personnel to take the simple actions necessary to configure the pathway, and thereby assure that the radiological consequences are bounded by the LOCA dose calculation methodology results. Accordingly, there is no significant reduction in safety margin.

The LOCA dose calculation methodology is already approved on an interim basis, as documented in Reference 7.1. As there are no technical issues to resolve, the effects of permanent approval on the [ ] [margin of safety] are bounded by the previous safety conclusions of License Amendment 196.

Attorney for licensee: Mr. John R. McPhail, Nebraska Public Power District, Post Office Box 499, Columbus, NE 68602-0499.

NRC Section Chief: Robert A. Gramm.

Nuclear Management Company, LLC, Docket No. 50-331, Duane Arnold Energy Center, Linn County, Iowa;Docket No. 50-305, Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant, Kewaunee County, Wisconsin;Docket No. 50-263, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, Wright County, Minnesota;Docket No. 50-255, Palisades Plant, Van Buren County, Michigan;Docket Nos. 50-266 and 50-301, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Town of Two Creeks, Manitowoc County, Wisconsin;Docket Nos. 50-282 and 50-306, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, Goodhue County, Minnesota

Date of amendment request: January 30, 2004.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment deletes requirements in the Technical Specifications (TS) to maintain hydrogen recombiners and hydrogen and oxygen monitors. Licensees were generally required to implement upgrades as described in NUREG-0737, “Clarification of TMI [Three Mile Island] Action Plan Requirements,” and Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.97, “Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident.” Implementation of these upgrades was an outcome of the lessons learned from the accident that occurred at TMI, Unit 2. Requirements related to combustible gas control were imposed by Order for many facilities and were added to or included in the TS for nuclear power reactors currently licensed to operate. The revised 10 CFR 50.44, “Standards for Combustible Gas Control System in Light-Water-Cooled Power Reactors,” eliminated the requirements for hydrogen recombiners and relaxed safety classifications and licensee commitments to certain design and qualification criteria for hydrogen and oxygen monitors.

The NRC staff issued a notice of availability of a model no significant hazards consideration determination for referencing in license amendment applications in the Federal Register on September 25, 2003 (68 FR 55416). The licensee affirmed the applicability of the model NSHC determination in its application dated January 30, 2004.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:

Criterion 1—The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously Evaluated

The revised 10 CFR 50.44 no longer defines a design-basis loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) hydrogen release, and eliminates requirements for hydrogen control systems to mitigate such a release. The installation of hydrogen recombiners and/or vent and purge systems required by 10 CFR 50.44(b)(3) was intended to address the limited quantity and rate of hydrogen generation that was postulated from a design-basis LOCA. The Commission has found that this hydrogen release is not risk-significant because the design-basis LOCA hydrogen release does not contribute to the conditional probability of a large release up to approximately 24 hours after the onset of core damage. In addition, these systems were ineffective at mitigating hydrogen releases from risk-significant accident sequences that could threaten containment integrity.

With the elimination of the design-basis LOCA hydrogen release, hydrogen and oxygen monitors are no longer required to mitigate design-basis accidents and, therefore, the hydrogen monitors do not meet the definition of a safety-related component as defined in 10 CFR 50.2. RG 1.97 Category 1 is intended for key variables that most directly indicate the accomplishment of a safety function for design-basis accident events. The hydrogen and oxygen monitors no longer meet the definition of Category 1 in RG 1.97. As part of the rulemaking to revise 10 CFR 50.44, the Commission found that Category 3, as defined in RG 1.97, is an appropriate categorization for the hydrogen monitors because the monitors are required to diagnose the course of beyond design-basis accidents. Also, as part of the rulemaking to revise 10 CFR 50.44, the Commission found that Category 2, as defined in RG 1.97, is an appropriate categorization for the oxygen monitors, because the monitors are required to verify the status of the inert containment.

The regulatory requirements for the hydrogen and oxygen monitors can be relaxed without degrading the plant emergency response. The emergency response, in this sense, refers to the methodologies used in ascertaining the condition of the reactor core, mitigating the consequences of an accident, assessing and projecting offsite releases of radioactivity, and establishing protective action recommendations to be communicated to offsite authorities. Classification of the hydrogen monitors as Category 3, classification of the oxygen monitors as Category 2, and removal of the hydrogen and oxygen monitors from TS will not prevent an accident management strategy through the use of the SAMGs, the emergency plan (EP), the emergency operating procedures (EOP), and site survey monitoring that support modification of emergency plan protective action recommendations (PARs).

Therefore, the elimination of the hydrogen recombiner requirements and relaxation of the hydrogen and oxygen monitor requirements, including removal of these requirements from TS, does not involve a significant increase in the probability or the consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 2—The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a New or Different Kind of Accident From Any Previously Evaluated

The elimination of the hydrogen recombiner requirements and relaxation of the hydrogen and oxygen monitor requirements, including removal of these requirements from TS, will not result in any failure mode not previously analyzed. The hydrogen recombiner and hydrogen and oxygen monitor equipment was intended to mitigate a design-basis hydrogen release. The hydrogen recombiner and hydrogen and oxygen monitor equipment are not considered accident precursors, nor does their existence or elimination have any adverse impact on the pre-accident state of the reactor core or post accident confinement of radionuclides within the containment building.

Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

Criterion 3—The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant Reduction in the Margin of Safety

The elimination of the hydrogen recombiner requirements and relaxation of the hydrogen and oxygen monitor requirements, including removal of these requirements from TS, in light of existing plant equipment, instrumentation, procedures, and programs that provide effective mitigation of and recovery from reactor accidents, results in a neutral impact to the margin of safety.

The installation of hydrogen recombiners and/or vent and purge systems required by 10 CFR 50.44(b)(3) was intended to address the limited quantity and rate of hydrogen generation that was postulated from a design-basis LOCA. The Commission has found that this hydrogen release is not risk-significant because the design-basis LOCA hydrogen release does not contribute to the conditional probability of a large release up to approximately 24 hours after the onset of core damage.

Category 3 hydrogen monitors are adequate to provide rapid assessment of current reactor core conditions and the direction of degradation while effectively responding to the event in order to mitigate the consequences of the accident. The intent of the requirements established as a result of the TMI, Unit 2 accident can be adequately met without reliance on safety-related hydrogen monitors. Category 2 oxygen monitors are adequate to verify the status of an inerted containment.

Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety. The intent of the requirements established as a result of the TMI, Unit 2 accident can be adequately met without reliance on safety-related oxygen monitors. Removal of hydrogen and oxygen monitoring from TS will not result in a significant reduction in their functionality, reliability, and availability.

Based upon the reasoning presented above and the previous discussion of the amendment request, the requested change does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

Attorney for licensee: Jonathan Rogoff, Morgan Lewis, 1111 Pennsylvania Avenue NW.,Washington, DC 20004.

NRC Section Chief: L. Raghavan.

Omaha Public Power District, Docket No. 50-285, Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1, Washington County, Nebraska

Date of amendment request: December 1, 2003.

Description of amendment request: The proposed changes to the Fort Calhoun Technical Specifications (TSs) consist primarily of typographical changes and relocation of material not required to be in the TSs. The licensee has proposed changes to the following TSs: (1) Item 14 of Table 3-3 regarding testing of nuclear detector well cooling annulus exit air temperature detectors, (2) the title of Item of 10a.2 of Table 3-5, (3) TS Section 3.17(5)(ii), (4) TS Section 5.5, “Review and Audit,” (5) TS Section 5.6, “Reportable Event Action,” (6) TS Sections 5.7.1.b, 5.7.1.c, and 5.7.1.d, (7) TS Section 5.9.1.a, “Startup Report,” and (8) TS Section 5.9.4.c, “Fire Protection Program Deficiency Report.”

1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change relocates requirements for Nuclear Detector Cooling that do not meet the criteria for inclusion in the TS set forth in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). The requirements for Nuclear Detector Cooling are being relocated from TS to the USAR [Updated Safety Analysis Report], which will be maintained pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59, thereby reducing the level of regulatory control. The level of regulatory control has no impact on the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. Therefore, the change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The correction of typographical errors and relocation of specifications is not an initiator of any previously evaluated accident. The proposed changes will not prevent safety systems from performing their accident mitigation function as assumed in the safety analysis.

Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change relocates requirements for Nuclear Detector Cooling that do not meet the criteria for inclusion in TS set forth in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). The proposed change only affects the technical specifications and does not involve a physical change to the plant. Modifications will not be made to existing components nor will any new or different types of equipment be installed. The proposed change corrects typographical errors and relocates information that is unnecessary in the TS. This change will not alter assumptions made in safety analysis and licensing bases.

Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed change relocates requirements for Nuclear Detector Cooling that do not meet the criteria for inclusion in TS set forth in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). The change will not reduce a margin of safety since the location of a requirement has no impact on any safety analysis assumptions. In addition, the relocated requirements for Nuclear Detector Cooling remain the same as the existing TS. Since any future changes to these requirements or the surveillance procedures will be evaluated per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59, there will be no reduction in a margin of safety.

The additional proposed changes correct typographical errors and relocate redundant information not required to be in the TS.

Therefore, this technical specification change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

Attorney for licensee: James R. Curtiss, Esq., Winston & Strawn, 1400 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20005-3502.

NRC Section Chief: Stephen Dembek.

Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Docket Nos. 50-275 and 50-323, Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, San Luis Obispo County, California

Date of amendment requests: December 30, 2003.

Description of amendment requests: The proposed amendment deletes the requirements from the technical specifications (TS) to maintain hydrogen recombiners and hydrogen monitors. Licensees were generally required to implement upgrades as described in NUREG-0737, “Clarification of TMI [Three Mile Island] Action Plan Requirements,” and Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.97, “Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident.” Implementation of these upgrades was an outcome of the lessons learned from the accident that occurred at TMI Unit 2. Requirements related to combustible gas control were imposed by Order for many facilities and were added to or included in the TS for nuclear power reactors currently licensed to operate. The revised 10 CFR 50.44, “Standards for Combustible Gas Control System in Light-Water-Cooled Power Reactors,” eliminated the requirements for hydrogen recombiners and relaxed safety classifications and licensee commitments to certain design and qualification criteria for hydrogen and oxygen monitors.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:

Criterion 1—The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously Evaluated

With the elimination of the design-basis LOCA hydrogen release, hydrogen monitors are no longer required to mitigate design-basis accidents and, therefore, the hydrogen monitors do not meet the definition of a safety-related component as defined in 10 CFR 50.2. Category 1 in RG 1.97 is intended for key variables that most directly indicate the accomplishment of a safety function for design-basis accident events. The hydrogen monitors no longer meet the definition of Category 1 in RG 1.97. As part of the rulemaking to revise 10 CFR 50.44 the Commission found that Category 3, as defined in RG 1.97, is an appropriate categorization for the hydrogen monitors because the monitors are required to diagnose the course of beyond design-basis accidents.

The regulatory requirements for the hydrogen monitors can be relaxed without degrading the plant emergency response. The emergency response, in this sense, refers to the methodologies used in ascertaining the condition of the reactor core, mitigating the consequences of an accident, assessing and projecting offsite releases of radioactivity, and establishing protective action recommendations to be communicated to offsite authorities. Classification of the hydrogen monitors as Category 3, and removal of the hydrogen monitors from TS will not prevent an accident management strategy through the use of the severe accident management guidelines (SAMGs), the emergency plan (EP), the emergency operating procedures (EOP), and site survey monitoring that support modification of emergency plan protective action recommendations (PARs).

Therefore, the elimination of the hydrogen recombiner requirements and relaxation of the hydrogen monitor requirements, including removal of these requirements from TS, does not involve a significant increase in the probability or the consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 2—The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a New or Different Kind of Accident From Any Previously Evaluated

The elimination of the hydrogen recombiner requirements and relaxation of the hydrogen monitor requirements, including removal of these requirements from TS, will not result in any failure mode not previously analyzed. The hydrogen recombiner and hydrogen monitor equipment was intended to mitigate a design-basis hydrogen release. The hydrogen recombiner and hydrogen monitor equipment are not considered accident precursors, nor does their existence or elimination have any adverse impact on the pre-accident state of the reactor core or post accident confinement of radionuclides within the containment building.

Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

Criterion 3—The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant Reduction in the Margin of Safety

The elimination of the hydrogen recombiner requirements and relaxation of the hydrogen monitor requirements, including removal of these requirements from TS, in light of existing plant equipment, instrumentation, procedures, and programs that provide effective mitigation of and recovery from reactor accidents, results in a neutral impact to the margin of safety.

Category 3 hydrogen monitors are adequate to provide rapid assessment of current reactor core conditions and the direction of degradation while effectively responding to the event in order to mitigate the consequences of the accident. The intent of the requirements established as a result of the TMI Unit 2 accident can be adequately met without reliance on safety-related hydrogen monitors.

Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety. Removal of hydrogen monitoring from TS will not result in a significant reduction in their functionality, reliability, and availability.

Based upon the reasoning presented above and the previous discussion of the amendment request, the requested change does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

Attorney for licensee: Richard F. Locke, Esq., Pacific Gas and Electric Company, P.O. Box 7442, San Francisco, California 94120.

NRC Section Chief: Stephen Dembek.

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc., Georgia Power Company, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, City of Dalton, Georgia, Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366, Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Appling County, Georgia

Date of application for amendments: December 30, 2003.

Brief description of amendments: The amendment revised the Administrative Controls Section 5.1.5 to state any Senior Reactor Operator may be designated to be responsible for the control room command function.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.92(c), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

The proposed change to Technical Specifications Administrative Controls Section 5.1.5, involves the use of a more generic designation of SRO [Senior Reactor Operator] for the unit staff position responsible for the control room command function. Since the proposed change is administrative in nature, it does not involve any physical changes to any structures, systems, or components, nor will their performance requirements be altered. The proposed change also does not affect the operation, maintenance, or testing of the plant. Therefore, the response of the plant to previously analyzed accidents will not be affected. Consequently, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated?

As a result of the proposed change to the Technical Specifications, the qualification requirements for the unit staff position responsible for the control room command function will remain unchanged and the plant staff will continue to meet applicable regulatory requirements. Also, since no change is being made to design, operation, maintenance, or testing of the plant, no new methods of operation or failure modes are introduced by the proposed change. Therefore, the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated is not created.

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant decrease in the margin of safety?

The proposed change to the Technical Specifications will have no adverse impact on the onsite organizational features necessary to assure safe operation of the plant since the qualification requirements for the unit staff position for the control room command function remain unchanged. The adoption of the more generic designation of SRO for the individual responsible for control room command function will also reduce the regulatory burden of having to devote limited resources to process a license amendment whenever a title change for this position is implemented, thus improving plant efficiency. Therefore, the proposed change does not invoice a significant decrease in the margin of safety.

Attorney for licensee: Ernest L. Blake, Jr., Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037.

NRC Section Chief: John A. Nakoski.

STP Nuclear Operating Company, Docket Nos. 50-498 and 50-499, South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2, Matagorda County, Texas

Date of amendment request: February 3, 2004.

Description of amendment request: The proposed change allows entry into a mode or other specified condition in the applicability of a technical specification (TS), while in a condition statement and the associated required actions of the TS, provided the licensee performs a risk assessment and manages risk consistent with the program in place for complying with the requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 50, Section 50.65(a)(4). Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.4 exceptions in individual TSs would be eliminated, several notes or specific exceptions are revised to reflect the related changes to LCO 3.0.4, and Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.0.4 is revised to reflect the LCO 3.0.4 allowance.

This change was proposed by the industry's Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) and is designated TSTF-359. The NRC staff issued a notice of opportunity for comment in the Federal Register on August 2, 2002 (67 FR 50475), on possible amendments concerning TSTF-359, including a model safety evaluation and model no significant hazards consideration (NSHC) determination, using the consolidated line item improvement process. The NRC staff subsequently issued a notice of availability of the models for referencing in license amendment applications in the Federal Register on April 4, 2003 (68 FR 16579). The licensee affirmed the applicability of the following NSHC determination in its application dated February 3, 2004.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:

Criterion 1—The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously Evaluated

The proposed change allows entry into a mode or other specified condition in the applicability of a TS, while in a TS condition statement and the associated required actions of the TS. Being in a TS condition and the associated required actions is not an initiator of any accident previously evaluated. Therefore, the probability of an accident previously evaluated is not significantly increased. The consequences of an accident while relying on required actions as allowed by proposed LCO 3.0.4, are no different than the consequences of an accident while entering and relying on the required actions while starting in a condition of applicability of the TS. Therefore, the consequences of an accident previously evaluated are not significantly affected by this change. The addition of a requirement to assess and manage the risk introduced by this change will further minimize possible concerns. Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 2—The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a New or Different Kind of Accident From Any Previously Evaluated

The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed). Entering into a mode or other specified condition in the applicability of a TS, while in a TS condition statement and the associated required actions of the TS, will not introduce new failure modes or effects and will not, in the absence of other unrelated failures, lead to an accident whose consequences exceed the consequences of accidents previously evaluated. The addition of a requirement to assess and manage the risk introduced by this change will further minimize possible concerns. Thus, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from an accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 3—The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant Reduction in a Margin of Safety

The proposed change allows entry into a mode or other specified condition in the applicability of a TS, while in a TS condition statement and the associated required actions of the TS. The TS allow operation of the plant without the full complement of equipment through the conditions for not meeting the TS Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO). The risk associated with this allowance is managed by the imposition of required actions that must be performed within the prescribed completion times. The net effect of being in a TS condition on the margin of safety is not considered significant. The proposed change does not alter the required actions or completion times of the TS. The proposed change allows TS conditions to be entered, and the associated required actions and completion times to be used in new circumstances. This use is predicated upon the licensee's performance of a risk assessment and the management of plant risk. The change also eliminates current allowances for utilizing required actions and completion times in similar circumstances, without assessing and managing risk. The net change to the margin of safety is insignificant. Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Attorney for licensee: A. H. Gutterman, Esq., Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, 1111 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20004.

NRC Section Chief: Robert A. Gramm.

TXU Generation Company LP, Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446, Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2, Somervell County, Texas

Date of amendment request: January 21, 2004.

Brief description of amendments: The amendment would revise Technical Specifications (TSs) 3.3.1, “Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation,” 3.3.2, “Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation,” and 3.3.6, “Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation.” The purpose of the amendment is to adopt the completion time, test bypass time, and surveillance frequency time changes approved by the NRC in Topical Reports WCAP-14333-P-A, “Probabilistic Risk Analysis of the RPS [reactor protection system] and ESFAS Test Times and Completion Times,” and WCAP-15376-P-A, “Risk-Informed Assessment of the RTS and ESFAS Surveillance Test Intervals and Reactor Trip Breaker Test and Completion Times.” The proposed changes would revise the required actions for certain action conditions; increase the completion times for several required actions (including some notes); delete notes in certain required actions; and increase frequency time intervals (including certain notes) in several surveillance requirements (SRs).

1. Do the proposed changes involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

Overall protection system performance will remain within the bounds of the previously performed accident analyses since no hardware changes are proposed. The same reactor trip system (RTS) and engineered safety feature actuation system (ESFAS) instrumentation will continue to be used. The protection systems will continue to function in a manner consistent with the plant design basis. These changes to the Technical Specifications [in the amendment] do not result in a condition where the design, material, and construction standards that were applicable prior to the change are altered.

The proposed changes will not modify any system interface. The proposed changes will not affect the probability of any event initiators [because the proposed changes are not event initiators]. There will be no degradation in the performance of or an increase in the number of challenges imposed on safety-related equipment assumed to function during an accident situation. There will be no change to normal plant operating parameters or accident mitigation performance. The proposed changes will not alter any assumptions or change any mitigation actions in the radiological consequence evaluations in the FSAR [Comanche Peak Final Safety Analysis Report].

The determination that the results of the proposed changes are acceptable [to be considered for plant-specific Technical Specifications] was established in the NRC Safety Evaluations prepared for WCAP-14333-P-A (issued by letter dated July 15, 1998) and for WCAP-15376-P-A (issued by letter dated December 20, 2002). Implementation of the proposed changes will result in an insignificant risk impact. Applicability of these conclusions has been verified through plant-specific reviews and implementation of the generic analysis results in accordance with the respective NRC Safety Evaluation conditions [for the two WCAPs].

The proposed changes to the Completion Times, test bypass times, and Surveillance Frequencies reduce the potential for inadvertent reactor trips and spurious ESF [engineered safety feature] actuations, and therefore do not increase the probability of any accident previously evaluated. The proposed changes do not change the response of the plant to any accidents and have an insignificant impact on the reliability of the RTS and ESFAS signals. The RTS and ESFAS will remain highly reliable and the proposed changes will not result in a significant increase in the risk of plant operation. This is demonstrated by showing that the impact on plant safety as measured by the increase in core damage frequency (CDF) is less than 1.0E-06 per year and the increase in large early release frequency (LERF) is less than 1.0E-07 per year. In addition, for the Completion Time changes, the incremental conditional core damage probabilities (ICCDP) and incremental conditional large early release probabilities (ICLERP) are less than 5.0E-07 and 5.0E-08, respectively. These changes meet the acceptance criteria in Regulatory Guides 1.174 and 1.177. Therefore, since the RTS and ESFAS will continue to perform their [safety] functions with high reliability as originally assumed, and the increase in risk as measured by “CDF, “LERF, ICCDP, ICLERP risk metrics is within the acceptance criteria of existing [NRC] regulatory guidance, there will not be a significant increase in the consequences of any accidents.

The proposed changes do not adversely affect accident initiators or precursors nor alter the design assumptions, conditions, or configuration of the facility or the manner in which the plant is operated and maintained. The proposed changes do not alter or prevent the ability of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) from performing their intended [safety] function to mitigate the consequences of an initiating event within the assumed acceptance limits. The proposed changes do not affect the source term, containment isolation, or radiological release assumptions used in evaluating the radiological consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The proposed changes are consistent with safety analysis assumptions and resultant consequences.

Therefore, [the] change[s do] not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Do the proposed changes create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

There are no hardware changes nor are there any changes in the method by which any safety-related plant system performs its safety function. The proposed changes will not affect the normal method of plant operation. No performance requirements will be affected or eliminated. The proposed changes will not result in physical alteration to any plant system nor will there be any change in the method by which any safety-related plant system performs its safety function.

There will be no setpoint changes or changes to accident analysis assumptions.

No new accident scenarios, transient precursors, failure mechanisms, or limiting single failures are introduced as a result of these changes. There will be no adverse effect or challenges imposed on any safety-related system as a result of these changes.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. Do the proposed changes involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

The proposed changes do not affect the acceptance criteria for any analyzed event nor is there a change to any Safety Analysis Limit (SAL). There will be no effect on the manner in which safety limits, limiting safety system settings, or limiting conditions for operation are determined nor will there be any effect on those plant systems necessary to assure the accomplishment of protection functions. There will be no impact on the overpower limit, DNBR [departure from nucleate boiling ratio] limits, F_Q [heat flux hot channel factor], F_ΔH [nuclear enthalpy rise hot channel factor], LOCA PCT [loss-of-coolant accident peak cladding temperature], peak local power density, or any other margin of safety. The radiological dose consequence acceptance criteria listed in the [NRC] Standard Review Plan will continue to be met.Redundant RTS and ESFAS trains are maintained, and diversity with regard to the signals that provide reactor trip and engineered safety features actuation is also maintained. All signals credited as primary or secondary, and all operator actions credited in the accident analyses will remain the same. The proposed changes will not result in plant operation in a configuration outside the design basis. The calculated impact on risk is insignificant and meets the acceptance criteria contained in Regulatory Guides 1.174 and 1.177. Although there was no attempt to quantify any positive human factors benefit due to increased Completion Times and bypass test times, it is expected that there would be a net benefit due to a reduced potential for spurious reactor trips and actuations associated with testing.

Implementation of the proposed changes is expected to result in an overall improvement in safety, as follows:

(a) Reduced testing will result in fewer inadvertent reactor trips, less frequent actuation of ESFAS components, less frequent distraction of operations personnel without significantly affecting RTS and ESFAS reliability.

(b) Improvements in the effectiveness of the operating staff in monitoring and controlling plant operation will be realized. This is due to less frequent distraction of the operators and shift supervisor to attend to instrumentation Required Actions with short Completion Times.

(c) Longer repair times associated with increased Completion Times will lead to higher quality repairs and improved reliability.

(d) The Completion Time extensions for the reactor trip breakers will provide the utilities additional time to complete test and maintenance activities while at power, potentially reducing the number of forced outages related to compliance with reactor trip breaker Completion Times, and provide consistency with the Completion Times for the logic trains.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

Attorney for licensee: George L. Edgar, Esq., Morgan, Lewis and Bockius, 1800 M Street, NW., Washington, DC 20036.

NRC Section Chief: Robert A. Gramm.

Previously Published Notices of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

The following notices were previously published as separate individual notices. The notice content was the same as above. They were published as individual notices either because time did not allow the Commission to wait for this biweekly notice or because the action involved exigent circumstances. They are repeated here because the biweekly notice lists all amendments issued or proposed to be issued involving no significant hazards consideration.

For details, see the individual notice in the Federal Register on the day and page cited. This notice does not extend the notice period of the original notice.

Entergy Operations Inc., Docket No. 50-382, Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3

Date of amendment request: November 13, 2003.

Brief description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would allow an increase in the licensed power from 3441 megawatts thermal (MWt) to 3716 MWt. This represents an increase of approximately 8 percent above the current rated licensed thermal power. The proposed amendment would also change the operating license and the technical specifications appended to the operating license to provide for implementing uprated power operation.

Date of publication of individual notice in Federal Register: February 5, 2004.

Expiration date of individual notice: March 8, 2004.

Nebraska Public Power District, Docket No. 50-298, Cooper Nuclear Station, Nemaha County, Nebraska

Date of amendment request: January 30, 2004.

Brief description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would revise the Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) Technical Specifications (TS), by adding a temporary note to allow a one-time extension of a limited number of TS Surveillance Requirements (SRs). The temporary note states that the next required performance of the SR may be delayed until the current cycle refueling outage, but no later than February 2, 2005, and it expires upon startup from the refueling outage. With the exception of one SR, the period of additional time requested occurs during the next planned refueling outage.

Date of publication of individual notice in Federal Register: February 12, 2004 (69 FR 7023).

Expiration date of individual notice: March 15, 2004.

Notice of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses

During the period since publication of the last biweekly notice, the Commission has issued the following amendments. The Commission has determined for each of these amendments that the application complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment.

Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for A Hearing in connection with these actions was published in the Federal Register as indicated.

Unless otherwise indicated, the Commission has determined that these amendments satisfy the criteria for categorical exclusion in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared for these amendments. If the Commission has prepared an environmental assessment under the special circumstances provision in 10 CFR 51.12(b) and has made a determination based on that assessment, it is so indicated.

For further details with respect to the action see (1) the applications for amendment, (2) the amendment, and (3) the Commission's related letter, Safety Evaluation and/or Environmental Assessment as indicated. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, located at One White Flint North, Public File Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available records will be accessible from the Agencywide Documents Access and Management Systems (ADAMS) Public Electronic Reading Room on the internet at the NRC Web site, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the NRC Public Document Room (PDR) Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737 or by email to pdr@nrc.gov.

AmerGen Energy Company, LLC, et al., Docket No. 50-219, Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Ocean County, New Jersey

Date of application for amendment: December 2, 2003.

Brief description of amendment: The amendment revised Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.0.2 of the Technical Specifications (TSs) to extend the delay period, before entering a Limiting Condition for Operation, following a missed surveillance. The delay period is extended from the current limit of “* * * up to 24 hours or up to the limit of the specified frequency, whichever is less” to “* * * up to 24 hours or up to the limit of the specified frequency, whichever is greater.” The revised SR 4.0.2 specifies that a risk evaluation shall be performed for any surveillance delayed greater than 24 hours and the risk impact shall be managed. In addition, a new Section 6.21 is added to provide for a TS Bases Control Program.

Date of Issuance: February 5, 2004.

Effective date: February 5, 2004 and shall be implemented within 60 days of issuance.

Amendment No.: 240.

Facility Operating License No. DPR-16: Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: January 6, 2004 (69 FR 692).

The Commission's related evaluation of this amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated February 5, 2004.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

Carolina Power & Light Company, Docket No. 50-261, H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2, Darlington County, South Carolina

Date of application for amendment: June 11, 2003, as supplemented August 20 and October 13, 2003.

Brief description of amendment: The amendment allows the licensee to extend its Appendix J, Type A, Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test, Option B, for H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2, from the scheduled May 2004 timeframe to no later than April 9, 2007.

Date of issuance: February 11, 2004.

Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days.

Amendment No. 199.

Facility Operating License No. DPR-23. Amendment revises the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: December 23, 2003 (68 FR 74264).

The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated February 11, 2004.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

Duke Energy Corporation, Docket No. 50-270, Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Oconee County, South Carolina

Date of application of amendment: October 28, 2003.

Brief description of amendment: The amendment revised the licensing basis in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) to support installation of a passive low-pressure injection (LPI) cross connect inside containment. The changes to the UFSAR revise the licensing basis for selected portions of the core flood and LPI/Decay Heat Removal piping to allow exclusion of the dynamic effects associated with postulated rupture of that piping by application of leak-before-break technology.

Date of Issuance: February 5, 2004.

Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days from the date of issuance.

Amendment No.: 338.

Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-47: Amendment revised the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: December 9, 2003 (68 FR 68661)The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated February 5, 2004.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

Entergy Operations, Inc., System Energy Resources, Inc., South Mississippi Electric Power Association, and Entergy Mississippi, Inc., Docket No. 50-416, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Claiborne County, Mississippi

Date of application for amendment: May 12, 2003, as revised by letters dated December 5 and 18, 2003.

Brief description of amendment: By letter dated December 5, 2003, Entergy submitted a revised application for amendment to Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.6.1, “Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation,” to add a provision to the APPLICABILITY function that will eliminate the requirement that the Residual Heat Removal System Isolation, Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3, be OPERABLE under certain conditions during refueling outages. Specifically, the proposed change requested in the original application dated May 12, 2003, would remove the requirement for this isolation function, specified in Table 3.3.6.1-1, when the upper containment reactor cavity is at the High Water Level condition specified in TS 3.5.2, “Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) Shutdown.” The revised application adds a new surveillance requirement (SR) (SR 3.3.6.1.9) to verify every four hours that the water level in the upper containment pool is greater than or equal to 22 feet 8 inches above the reactor pressure vessel flange, and adds a footnote to Table 3.3.6.1-1, Item 5.b, for MODE 5 that states that the function is not required when the upper containment reactor cavity and transfer canal gates are removed and SR 3.3.6.1.9 is met. The proposed SR and footnote are only applicable in MODE 5. The May 12, 2003, application was previously noticed in the Federal Register on June 10, 2003 (68 FR 34665).

Date of issuance: January 23, 2004.

Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days of issuance.

Amendment No: 163.

Facility Operating License No. NPF-29: The amendment revises the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: December 15, 2003 (68 FR 69726). The December 18, 2003, supplemental letter provided clarifying information that did not change the scope of the December 15, 2003, Federal Register notice or the no significant hazards consideration determination therein.

The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated January 23, 2004.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC, Docket No. 50-410, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Oswego County, New York

Date of application for amendment: August 15, 2003, as supplemented by letter on September 15, 2003.

Brief description of amendment: The amendment revised the reactor coolant system pressure-temperature limit curves in Section 3.4.11, “RCS [Reactor Coolant System] Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits,” of the Technical Specifications. The revised curves are effective up to 22 effective full-power years.

Date of issuance: January 27, 2004.

Effective date: As of the date of issuance, to be implemented within 60 days.

Amendment No.: 110.

Facility Operating License No. NPF-69: Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: September 2, 2003 (68 FR 52235).

The staff's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated January 27, 2004.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No

The September 15, 2003, letter provided clarifying information within the scope of the original application and did not change the staff's initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.

Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC, Docket No. 50-410, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Oswego County, New York

Date of application for amendment: August 28, 2003.

Brief description of amendment: The amendment revised Section 3.1.7, “Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System,” of the Technical Specifications to support a transition from GE11 to GE14 fuel in the reactor core. The revised Section 3.1.7 raises the required calculated average boron concentration in the reactor from a concentration equivalent to 660 parts per million (ppm) natural boron to 780 ppm natural boron. The increased concentration is achieved by requiring use of sodium pentaborate solution enriched with the boron-10 isotope.

Date of issuance: February 13, 2004.

Effective date: As of the date of issuance to be implemented prior to startup from Refueling Outage 9.

Amendment No.: 111.

Facility Operating License No. NPF-69: Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: September 30, 2003 (68 FR 56345). The staff's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated February 13, 2004.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

PSEG Nuclear, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311, Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Salem County, New Jersey

Date of application for amendments: February 14, 2003, as supplemented on October 2, 2003.

Brief description of amendments: The amendments modify the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Technical Specifications (TSs) by: (1) Adding new TS 3/4.7.11, “Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration,” to define spent fuel pool boron concentration limits; (2) relocating fuel assembly storage requirements currently located in TS 5.6.1.2d to a new TS 3/4.7.12, “Fuel Assembly Storage in the Spent Fuel Pool;” and (3) relocating refueling boron concentration requirements from TS 3/4.9.1, “Boron Concentration,” to the Core Operating Limits Report.

Date of issuance: February 6, 2004.

Effective date: As of the date of issuance, and shall be implemented within 60 days.

Amendment Nos.: 262 and 244.

Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-70 and DPR-75: The amendments revised the TSs.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: April 29, 2003 (68 FR 22753).

The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated February 6, 2004.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket No. 50-390, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rhea County, Tennessee

Date of application for amendment: March 13, 2002, as supplemented on April 1 and November 21, 2003.

Brief description of amendment: The amendment approves revisions to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) to update the quality assurance criteria and the basis for the seismic qualification of the ducting installed as part of the suspended ceiling air delivery system in the main control room.

Date of issuance: February 12, 2004.

Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented in accordance with 10 CFR 50.71(e).

Amendment No.: 50.

Facility Operating License No. NPF-90: Amendment revised the UFSAR.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: April 15, 2003 (68 FR 18286). The supplemental letters provided clarifying information that did not expand the scope of the original request and did not change the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.

The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated February 12, 2004.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

Notice of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses and Final Determination of No Significant Hazards Consideration and Opportunity for a Hearing (Exigent Public Announcement or Emergency Circumstances)

During the period since publication of the last biweekly notice, the Commission has issued the following amendments. The Commission has determined for each of these amendments that the application for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment.

Because of exigent or emergency circumstances associated with the date the amendment was needed, there was not time for the Commission to publish, for public comment before issuance, its usual Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing.

For exigent circumstances, the Commission has either issued a Federal Register notice providing opportunity for public comment or has used local media to provide notice to the public in the area surrounding a licensee's facility of the licensee's application and of the Commission's proposed determination of no significant hazards consideration. The Commission has provided a reasonable opportunity for the public to comment, using its best efforts to make available to the public means of communication for the public to respond quickly, and in the case of telephone comments, the comments have been recorded or transcribed as appropriate and the licensee has been informed of the public comments.

In circumstances where failure to act in a timely way would have resulted, for example, in derating or shutdown of a nuclear power plant or in prevention of either resumption of operation or of increase in power output up to the plant's licensed power level, the Commission may not have had an opportunity to provide for public comment on its no significant hazards consideration determination. In such case, the license amendment has been issued without opportunity for comment. If there has been some time for public comment but less than 30 days, the Commission may provide an opportunity for public comment. If comments have been requested, it is so stated. In either event, the State has been consulted by telephone whenever possible.

Under its regulations, the Commission may issue and make an amendment immediately effective, notwithstanding the pendency before it of a request for a hearing from any person, in advance of the holding and completion of any required hearing, where it has determined that no significant hazards consideration is involved.

The Commission has applied the standards of 10 CFR 50.92 and has made a final determination that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The basis for this determination is contained in the documents related to this action. Accordingly, the amendments have been issued and made effective as indicated.

For further details with respect to the action see (1) the application for amendment, (2) the amendment to Facility Operating License, and (3) the Commission's related letter, Safety Evaluation and/or Environmental Assessment, as indicated. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, located at One White Flint North, Public File Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available records will be accessible from the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System's (ADAMS) Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC web site, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the NRC Public Document Room (PDR) Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737 or by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov.

The Commission is also offering an opportunity for a hearing with respect to the issuance of the amendment. Within 60 days after the date of publication of this notice, the licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's “Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings” in 10 CFR part 2. Interested persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.309, which is available at the Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Public File Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland, and electronically on the Internet at the NRC Web site, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/. If there are problems in accessing the document, contact the PDR Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov. If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the Commission or a presiding officer designated by the Commission or by the Chief Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or the Chief Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of a hearing or an appropriate order.

As required by 10 CFR 2.309, a petition for leave to intervene shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the following general requirements: (1) The name, address and telephone number of the requestor or petitioner; (2) the nature of the requestor's/petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (3) the nature and extent of the requestor's/petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (4) the possible effect of any decision or order which may be entered in the proceeding on the requestor's/petitioner's interest. The petition must also identify the specific contentions which the petitioner/requestor seeks to have litigated at the proceeding.

Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner/requestor shall provide a brief explanation of the bases for the contention and a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those facts or expert opinion. The petition must include sufficient information to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A petitioner/requestor who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.

Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the hearing. Since the Commission has made a final determination that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, if a hearing is requested, it will not stay the effectiveness of the amendment. Any hearing held would take place while the amendment is in effect.

A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must be filed by: (1) First class mail addressed to the Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; (2) courier, express mail, and expedited delivery services: Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth Floor, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, 20852, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; (3) E-mail addressed to the Office of the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, HEARINGDOCKET@NRC.GOV; or (4) facsimile transmission addressed to the Office of the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, Attention: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff at (301) 415-1101, verification number is (301) 415-1966. A copy of the request for hearing and petition for leave to intervene should also be sent to the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and it is requested that copies be transmitted either by means of facsimile transmission to 301-415-3725 or by email to OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov. A copy of the request for hearing and petition for leave to intervene should also be sent to the attorney for the licensee.

Omaha Public Power District, Docket No. 50-285, Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1, Washington County, Nebraska

Date of amendment request: February 6, 2004.

Description of amendment request: The amendment changes the implementation date from 30 days to 120 days for Amendment No. 224 issued on January 16, 2004, that approved a measurement uncertainty uprate to increase the licensed rated power by 1.6 percent from 1500 megawatts thermal (MWt) to 1524 MWt.

Date of issuance: February 13, 2004.

Effective date: February 13, 2004, and the fully implemented date for Amendment No. 224 (issued January 16, 2004) is changed to 120 days.

Amendment No.: 225.

Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-40: Amendment revises the implementation date for Amendment No. 224.

Public comments requested as to proposed no significant hazards consideration (NSHC): Yes. Omaha-World Herald. The notice provided an opportunity to submit comments on the Commission's proposed NSHC determination. No comments have been received.

The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment, finding of exigent circumstances, State consultation, and final NSHC determination are contained in a safety evaluation dated February 13, 2004.

Attorney for licensee: James R. Curtiss, Esq., Winston & Strawn, 1400 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20005-3502.

NRC Section Chief: Stephen Dembek.

Union Electric Company, Docket No. 50-483, Callaway Plant, Unit 1, Callaway County, Missouri

Date of application for amendment: February 5, 2004.

Brief description of amendment: The amendment revises Technical Specification 3.7.5, “Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System” to incorporate a one-time provision that extends the allowed outage time for an inoperable turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump.

Date of issuance: February 6, 2004.

Effective date: February 6, 2004.

Amendment No.: 158.

Facility Operating License No. NPF-30: The amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

Public comments requested as to proposed no significant hazards consideration (NSHC): No. The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment, finding of emergency circumstances, state consultation, and final NSHC determination are contained in a safety evaluation dated February 6, 2004.

Attorney for licensee: John O'Neill, Esq., Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037.

NRC Section Chief: Stephen Dembek.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 20th day of February 2004.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Ledyard B. Marsh,

Director, Division of Licensing Project Management,Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 04-4343 Filed 3-1-04; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-P