Wilson v. Citimortgage, Inc. et al

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM with Brief In Support

N.D. Ga.March 27, 2017

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION QUANDA L. WILSON, Civil Action File No. 1:17-cv-00007-ODA-JSA Plaintiff, v. CITIMORTGAGE, INC. and DOES 1-10 INCLUSIVE, Defendants. DEFENDANT CITIMORTGAGE, INC.'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT COMES NOW Defendant CitiMortgage, Inc. ("CitiMortgage"), through its undersigned counsel, and moves this Court to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This Motion is based upon the allegations contained in Plaintiff's Complaint, the Memorandum of Law in support of this Motion, and all other pleadings of record. WHEREFORE, CitiMortgage respectfully requests that this Court grant this Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice, and tax Plaintiff with all costs of action. Case 1:17-cv-00007-ODE-JSA Document 7 Filed 03/27/17 Page 1 of 4 2 Respectfully submitted, this 27th day of March, 2017. BAKER, DONELSON, BEARMAN, CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ, PC Suite 1600, Monarch Plaza 3414 Peachtree Rd. NE Atlanta, Georgia 30326 Phone: 404-577 6000 Fax: 404-221-6501 swalsh@bakerdonelson.com mkvalheim@bakerdonelson.com /s/ Sarah-Nell H. Walsh Sarah-Nell H. Walsh Georgia Bar No. 141240 Madeleine G. Kvalheim Georgia Bar No. 131496 Attorneys for Defendant CitiMortgage, Inc. Case 1:17-cv-00007-ODE-JSA Document 7 Filed 03/27/17 Page 2 of 4 3 CERTIFICATION OF FONT I hereby certify that the foregoing document has been prepared in 14-point Times New Roman font and complies with LR 5.1(B), N.D. Ga. This 27th day of March, 2017. BAKER, DONELSON, BEARMAN, CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ, PC Suite 1600, Monarch Plaza 3414 Peachtree Rd. NE Atlanta, Georgia 30326 Phone: 404-577 6000 Fax: 404-221-6501 swalsh@bakerdonelson.com mkvalheim@bakerdonelson.com /s/ Sarah-Nell H. Walsh Sarah-Nell H. Walsh Georgia Bar No. 141240 Madeleine G. Kvalheim Georgia Bar No. 131496 Attorneys for Defendant CitiMortgage, Inc. Case 1:17-cv-00007-ODE-JSA Document 7 Filed 03/27/17 Page 3 of 4 4 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that I have this day served the within and foregoing CITIMORTGAGE, INC.'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT by the CM/ECF online filing system with the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, which will automatically send email notification to all counsel of record upon the following: Joseph Powell McClelland, III, Esq. Joseph P. McClelland, LLC P.O. Box 100 583 East Third Street Jackson, GA 30233 Submitted this 27th day of March, 2017. BAKER, DONELSON, BEARMAN, CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ, PC Suite 1600, Monarch Plaza 3414 Peachtree Rd. NE Atlanta, Georgia 30326 Phone: 404-577 6000 Fax: 404-221-6501 swalsh@bakerdonelson.com mkvalheim@bakerdonelson.com /s/ Sarah-Nell H. Walsh Sarah-Nell H. Walsh Georgia Bar No. 141240 Madeleine G. Kvalheim Georgia Bar No. 131496 Attorneys for Defendant CitiMortgage, Inc. Case 1:17-cv-00007-ODE-JSA Document 7 Filed 03/27/17 Page 4 of 4 4851-4198-8165 v5 2791169-000315 03/27/2017 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION QUANDA L. WILSON, Civil Action File No. 1:17-cv-00007-ODA-JSA Plaintiff, v. CITIMORTGAGE, INC. and DOES 1-10 INCLUSIVE, Defendants. CITIMORTGAGE, INC.'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT COMES NOW, CitiMortgage, Inc. ("CitiMortgage" or "Defendant") and pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, files this Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (“Complaint"), showing this Honorable Court as follows: INTRODUCTION Plaintiff's Complaint boldly asserts illusory allegations against Defendant without any particularity or specificity to support her claims. While Plaintiff generally alleges Defendant violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act Case 1:17-cv-00007-ODE-JSA Document 7-1 Filed 03/27/17 Page 1 of 15 2 4851-4198-8165 v5 2791169-000315 03/27/2017 ("TCPA") 1 , the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") 2 , and the Georgia Fair Businesses Practices Act ("FBPA") 3 , Plaintiff fails to provide any factual support for her claims. While Plaintiff blandly recites the elements of a TCPA claim, that Defendant "placed dozens, if not hundreds, of telephone calls to Plaintiff's cellular telephone," and did so "without [sic] the prior express consent," she fails to correlate those actions to the Defendant and sufficiently plead any element of such a claim or a violation of the law. Furthermore, while Plaintiff attempts to list unknown Defendant employees as Defendants, she has pled no claims against them nor demonstrated that they are liable for the alleged phone calls as agents of CitiMortgage. Plaintiff fails to even plead claims for violations of the FDCPA or the FBPA. As such, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for violation of the TCPA, FDCPA or FBPA, and her Complaint must be dismissed. STATEMENT OF FACTS Plaintiff alleges in her Complaint that Defendant "placed dozens, if not hundreds, of telephone calls to Plaintiff's cellular telephone" between "January 1, 2013 and continuing until 2016" on her cellular telephone without alleging how she came to such a conclusion. (Compl. ¶1, 21). Plaintiff states that "[t]hese calls 1 47 U.S.C. § 227 2 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692, et seq. 3 O.C.G.A. §10-1-390, et seq. Case 1:17-cv-00007-ODE-JSA Document 7-1 Filed 03/27/17 Page 2 of 15 3 4851-4198-8165 v5 2791169-000315 03/27/2017 were an attempt to collect a debt from an unknown third party." (Compl. ¶ 22). Plaintiff generally and without any supporting details alleges that the Defendant did not have her consent to call her cellular telephone and even though she asked that the calls cease on some unspecified date, Defendant continued to place calls to her cellular telephone. (Compl. ¶23-25). Plaintiff alleges that all of the calls were made using an "automatic telephone dialing system" with "pre-recorded messages" as prohibited by the TCPA, and as evidenced by the "frequency of the calls, [t]he persistence of the calls, [a]n unnatural period of silence when answered, 'Dead air' calls . . . [and] the Plaintiff's inability to stop the calls." (Compl. ¶27-28, 30). Plaintiff also names as defendants unknown individuals from CitiMortgage who allegedly placed the calls. (Compl. ¶13-14). Further, while Plaintiff alleges violations of the FDCPA and FBPA, she fails to plead any essential elements of such causes of actions. (Compl. ¶ 1, 6, 15). Instead, Plaintiff pleads that for Defendant's violations of the TCPA, she has suffered actual injury and is entitled to damages and injunctive relief. (Compl. ¶ 31, 32). Case 1:17-cv-00007-ODE-JSA Document 7-1 Filed 03/27/17 Page 3 of 15 4 4851-4198-8165 v5 2791169-000315 03/27/2017 STANDARD OF REVIEW Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of an action when the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.ˮ Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal marks and citations omitted). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.ˮ Id. at 555 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,ˮ as the complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.ˮ Id. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.ˮ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 US. at 556). The Supreme Court in Iqbal held: Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in Case 1:17-cv-00007-ODE-JSA Document 7-1 Filed 03/27/17 Page 4 of 15 5 4851-4198-8165 v5 2791169-000315 03/27/2017 a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Although for the purposes of a motion to dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we 'are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation'. Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. . . . [W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not “show[n]ˮ-that the pleader is entitled to relief. 556 U.S. at 678-79 (internal marks and citations omitted). ARGUMENT AND CITATION OF AUTHORITY I. PLAINTIFF'S TCPA CLAIM FAILS TO MEET THE REQUISITE PLEADING STANDARD OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. The Complaint makes naked assertions that Defendant has violated the TCPA with insufficient factual predicate to support any claim. The TCPA makes it unlawful for any party, "to make any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice...to any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone service ...or any service for which the called party is charged for the call." Harrington v. Case 1:17-cv-00007-ODE-JSA Document 7-1 Filed 03/27/17 Page 5 of 15 6 4851-4198-8165 v5 2791169-000315 03/27/2017 RoundPoint Mortg. Servicing Corp., 163 F.Supp.3d 1240, 1243 (M.D.F.L. 2016) (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 227(b)(1)(A)(iii); (b)(1)(B)). Thus, Plaintiff needs to establish that (1) Defendant made a non-emergency call without Plaintiff's consent, (2) using an automatic telephone dialing system ("ATDS") or an artificial or prerecorded voice, (3) in which the Plaintiff is charged for the communications. Id. Turning to the pleading standards, a Complaint must be dismissed when it fails to satisfy the pleading requirements under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) and 10. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) requires "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." A claim is frivolous "where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the United States Supreme Court clearly stated that Rule 8 does not "require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing to Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007)). "A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. Plaintiff's Complaint contains the precise formulaic recitation of the elements of the TCPA that Twombly expressly rejects, amounting to nothing more Case 1:17-cv-00007-ODE-JSA Document 7-1 Filed 03/27/17 Page 6 of 15 7 4851-4198-8165 v5 2791169-000315 03/27/2017 than threadbare "naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement," which the Supreme Court has rejected. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Plaintiff's claims fail straight out of the gate because she fails to provide any factual support for the allegation that Defendant called her. Furthermore, Plaintiff fails to: provide any representative sample of the times and dates of the alleged phone calls, provide an estimated number of calls that is more than mere speculation, provide context for these calls, explain why Defendant did not have consent to make such calls, provide the dates on which she requested the calls cease, and detail any conversations she had with Defendant. Plaintiff simply makes an unadorned accusation that Defendant unlawfully called her an unspecified number of times devoid of factual support. As a consequence of all of the above deficiencies, Defendant cannot even investigate Plaintiff's claims and would be forced to engage in costly and time-consuming investigation even to determine whether any such calls were made. Thus, Plaintiff's Complaint falls woefully short of the pleading requirements established by Iqbal and Twombly, and, consequently, the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and must be dismissed. Case 1:17-cv-00007-ODE-JSA Document 7-1 Filed 03/27/17 Page 7 of 15 8 4851-4198-8165 v5 2791169-000315 03/27/2017 II. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM UNDER THE FDCPA FAILS BECAUSE SHE FAILS TO PLEAD THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CLAIM. Plaintiff's Complaint makes a hollow allegation that Defendant has violated the FDCPA without actually pleading such as a cause of action. See Compl. ¶ 1, 6, 15. In order to prevail on a FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) she has been the object of collection activity arising from a consumer debt; (2) the defendant attempting to collect on the debt qualifies as a "debt collector" under the FDCPA; and (3) the defendant has engaged in a prohibited act or has failed to perform a requirement imposed by the FDCPA. See Gardner v. TBO Capital LLC, 986 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1332 (N.D. Ga. 2013); see also Ga. ex rel. Saunders v. Mortg. Electr. Registration Sys., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37982, *27 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 11, 2011). Where a plaintiff fails to state with specificity how the elements of an FDCPA claim are met, the complaint should be dismissed. See Kennedy v. U. S., 478 Fed. Appx. 584, 586 (11th Cir. 2012) (affirming the dismissal of a plaintiff's FDCPA claim where she "failed to state what action or inaction of the defendants allegedly violated these statutes"); see also Dynott v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, No. 1:13-cv-1474-WSD, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34058, at *5-6 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 17, 2014) (dismissing FDCPA claim because the plaintiff did "not allege sufficiently specific actions that Defendants took to violate the statute"); Ferguson Case 1:17-cv-00007-ODE-JSA Document 7-1 Filed 03/27/17 Page 8 of 15 9 4851-4198-8165 v5 2791169-000315 03/27/2017 v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-2464, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185152, at *20- 21 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 8, 2013) (finding that plaintiff failed to state a FDCPA claim because his complaint did "not state what specific activities supposedly violated the statute," or "specify how each Defendant supposedly violated the statute"). As stated supra, Plaintiff fails to assert that any of these elements have been met and fails to plead any factual predicate which would support any FDCPA claim. Thus, Plaintiff failed to adequately allege a violation of the FDCPA. Furthermore, any such a claim fails as a matter of law as Plaintiff is not a "consumer" and Defendant is not a "debt collector" as defined by the FDCPA. 1. Plaintiff Is Not A "Consumer" Under The FDCPA. Plaintiff's FDCPA claim fails as a matter of law because Plaintiff is not a "consumer" as defined under the FDCPA. "The term 'consumer' means any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). A "debt" is defined as "[a]ny obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes …" 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). Case 1:17-cv-00007-ODE-JSA Document 7-1 Filed 03/27/17 Page 9 of 15 10 4851-4198-8165 v5 2791169-000315 03/27/2017 Plaintiff has no standing to bring a claim under the FDCPA as she is not a "consumer." Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that she is a third-party that mistakenly received calls from Defendant and therefore cannot qualify as a "consumer" under the FDCPA. Additionally, the Complaint is devoid of any facts which would demonstrate that Plaintiff is obligated or allegedly obligated for any debt. Accordingly, Plaintiff lacks standing to assert a claim under the FDCPA and the Complaint must be dismissed. 2. Defendant Is Not "Debt Collector" Under The FDCPA. The FDCPA imposes certain requirements on the business of "debt collectors" as defined under its provisions. This definition does not apply to CitiMortgage as a loan servicer. Under the FDCPA, the term "debt collector" is defined as: [A]ny person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another. Notwithstanding the exclusion provide by clause (F) of the last sentence of this paragraph, the term includes any creditor who, in the process of collecting his own debts, uses any name other than his own which would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such debts. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). Case 1:17-cv-00007-ODE-JSA Document 7-1 Filed 03/27/17 Page 10 of 15 11 4851-4198-8165 v5 2791169-000315 03/27/2017 As a loan servicer, the FDCPA does not apply to Defendant. See Fenello v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159925 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (finding that the FDCPA is not applicable to mortgage servicers). Moreover, the individual defendants -- "Does 1-10, inclusive" -- are also not "debt collectors" under the FDCPA and there are no allegations in the Complaint to support another conclusion. Because Defendant is not a "debt collector" under the law, the Complaint must be dismissed. III. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM UNDER THE FBPA FAILS BECAUSE SHE FAILS TO PLEAD THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CLAIM AND BECAUSE SUCH A CLAIM FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW AS TO DEFENDANT. The FBPA prohibits the use of “[u]nfair or deceptive practices in the conduct of consumer transactions,” (O.C.G.A. § 10-1-393(a)) and permits a private right of action where a claimant has been individually injured by the breach of a duty generally owed to the consuming public. Zeeman v. Black, 156 Ga. App. 82, 84-85 (1980). To prevail under the FBPA, a claimant must prove three elements: “a violation of the Act, causation, and injury.” Id. at 86-87. Plaintiff fails to assert a claim under the FBPA, as she does not set forth a violation of the Act, causation, or injury, much less any factual predicate that would support such a claim. O.C.G.A. § 10-1-390, et seq. (Compl., ¶¶ 1, 5, 6). Case 1:17-cv-00007-ODE-JSA Document 7-1 Filed 03/27/17 Page 11 of 15 12 4851-4198-8165 v5 2791169-000315 03/27/2017 Furthermore, to the extent this Court construes Plaintiff's FBPA reference as a valid claim, the claim fails as a matter of law because the FBPA does not apply to Defendant. Georgia courts have refrained from extending the FBPA into the heavily regulated mortgage industry. See Jenkins v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 822 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1375-76 (M.D. Ga. 2011) (dismissing borrower’s FBPA claim “because the area of mortgage transactions is heavily regulated by the Truth in Lending Act, the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, and the Georgia Residential Mortgage Act,” and therefore, the FBPA does not apply); see also, Stewart, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 216, at * 11 (internal citations omitted) (“Because the mortgage industry is regulated and because the specific conduct at issue here is regulated by the GRMA, [borrower’s] FBPA claim fails.”). Because Defendant is a mortgage servicer and because Plaintiff fails to adequately plead a cause of action under the FBPA, Plaintiff's Complaint must be dismissed. IV. PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN INJUNCTION. Plaintiff is not entitled to her requested injunctive relief because she has not shown sufficient likelihood of success on the merits of her claim. A claim for preliminary injunctive relief requires a showing of “a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the underlying case,ˮ while a permanent injunction Case 1:17-cv-00007-ODE-JSA Document 7-1 Filed 03/27/17 Page 12 of 15 13 4851-4198-8165 v5 2791169-000315 03/27/2017 requires actual success on the merits. McDaniel v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Case No. 1:14-cv-2337-WSD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34562, at *22-23 (2016). If Plaintiff's claims fail as a matter of law, injunctive relief cannot be granted. Id. As shown previously, Plaintiff's claims against Defendant fail as a matter of law. As a result, Plaintiff has failed to show any likelihood of success on the merits of her claim. Therefore, entry of temporary or permanent injunctive relief is not warranted and is unnecessary. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, CitiMortgage respectfully requests that the Court dismiss with prejudice Plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety. Respectfully submitted this 27th day of March, 2017. BAKER, DONELSON, BEARMAN, CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ, PC Suite 1600, Monarch Plaza 3414 Peachtree Rd. NE Atlanta, Georgia 30326 Phone: 404-577 6000 Fax: 404-221-6501 swalsh@bakerdonelson.com mkvalheim@bakerdonelson.com /s/ Sarah-Nell H. Walsh Sarah-Nell H. Walsh Georgia Bar No. 141240 Madeleine G. Kvalheim Georgia Bar No. 131496 Attorneys for Defendant CitiMortgage, Inc. Case 1:17-cv-00007-ODE-JSA Document 7-1 Filed 03/27/17 Page 13 of 15 14 4851-4198-8165 v5 2791169-000315 03/27/2017 CERTIFICATION OF FONT I hereby certify that the foregoing document has been prepared in 14-point Times New Roman font and complies with LR 5.1(B), N.D. Ga. This 27th day of March, 2017. BAKER, DONELSON, BEARMAN, CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ, PC Suite 1600, Monarch Plaza 3414 Peachtree Rd. NE Atlanta, Georgia 30326 Phone: 404-577 6000 Fax: 404-221-6501 swalsh@bakerdonelson.com mkvalheim@bakerdonelson.com /s/ Sarah-Nell H. Walsh Sarah-Nell H. Walsh Georgia Bar No. 141240 Madeleine G. Kvalheim Georgia Bar No. 131496 Attorneys for Defendant CitiMortgage, Inc. Case 1:17-cv-00007-ODE-JSA Document 7-1 Filed 03/27/17 Page 14 of 15 15 4851-4198-8165 v5 2791169-000315 03/27/2017 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that I have this day served the within and foregoing CITIMORTGAGE, INC.'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT by the CM/ECF online filing system with the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, which will automatically send email notification to all counsel of record upon the following: Joseph Powell McClelland, III, Esq. Joseph P. McClelland, LLC P.O. Box 100 583 East Third Street Jackson, GA 30233 Submitted this 27th day of March, 2017. BAKER, DONELSON, BEARMAN, CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ, PC Suite 1600, Monarch Plaza 3414 Peachtree Rd. NE Atlanta, Georgia 30326 Phone: 404-577 6000 Fax: 404-221-6501 swalsh@bakerdonelson.com mkvalheim@bakerdonelson.com /s/ Sarah-Nell H. Walsh Sarah-Nell H. Walsh Georgia Bar No. 141240 Madeleine G. Kvalheim Georgia Bar No. 131496 Attorneys for Defendant CitiMortgage, Inc. Case 1:17-cv-00007-ODE-JSA Document 7-1 Filed 03/27/17 Page 15 of 15