USA v. Langford

REPLY

N.D. Cal.June 23, 2015

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 602693486v1 PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP MARC H. AXELBAUM # 209855 marc.axelbaum@pillsburylaw.com LINDSAY A. LUTZ # 254442 lindsay.lutz@pillsburylaw.com Four Embarcadero Center, 22nd Floor San Francisco, CA 94111 Telephone: (415) 983-1000 Facsimile: (415) 983-1200 Attorneys for Defendant EVELYN LANGFORD IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, vs. EVELYN LANGFORD, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) No. 3:15-cr-00035-JST DEFENDANT LANGFORD’S REPLY TO UNITED STATES’ SENTENCING MEMORANDUM Date: June 26, 2015 Time: 9:30 a.m. Judge: Hon. Jon S. Tigar Court: Courtroom 9, 19th Floor Case4:15-cr-00035-JST Document21 Filed06/23/15 Page1 of 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 602693486v1 - 1 - Pursuant to Criminal Local Rule 32-5(c), Defendant Evelyn Langford files this Reply to the United States’ Sentencing Memorandum (“U.S. Mem.”), Dkt. 17.1 In this Reply, Ms. Langford uses the same defined terms she first introduced in her original Sentencing Memorandum (“Mem.”), Dkt. 18. Ms. Langford’s Mental Health Arguments are Consistent with the Statements I. in Her Plea Agreement. In the United States’ Sentencing Memorandum, the Government argues that the conclusion of Dr. Lines regarding Ms. Langford’s intent is “contradicted by the defendant’s admissions” in the Plea Agreement, including that she acted “corruptly and with the intent to be influenced or rewarded.” U.S. Mem. at 6 n.3. To begin with, Ms. Langford emphasizes that she accepts responsibility for her offense. Ms. Langford does not claim that she lacked criminal intent. Rather, she argues that, at the time of the offense, she suffered from a significantly reduced mental capacity that contributed substantially to the commission of the offense and that should be taken into account as a part of “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). See Mem. at 9-10. Dr. Lines diagnosed Ms. Langford with PTSD and concluded that she suffered from diminished mental capacity and impaired judgment at the time of the offense conduct. Lines Report, at 7-8. In reaching this conclusion, Dr. Lines reviewed the statements made in the Plea Agreement. See id. at 1. Dr. Lines nevertheless concluded that Ms. Langford’s “knowledge of the conduct as wrong was questionable” because her “cognitive capacity was overwhelmed” and “her reasoning was substantially distorted.” Id. at 7. At its heart, Dr. Lines’ conclusion regarding this issue is that the PTSD and the psychological pressure resulting from her complex relationship with her father substantially distorted Ms. 1 Consistent with Criminal Local Rule 32-5(c), in this Reply, Ms. Langford does not directly address the Reply filed earlier today by the government (Dkt. 19), and instead limits the arguments herein to the argument made in the government’s original Sentencing Memorandum (Dkt. 17) regarding Dr. Lines’ report. Having reviewed the government’s Reply, however, Ms. Langford submits that nothing in this Reply is inconsistent with or undercut by anything in the government’s Reply. Case4:15-cr-00035-JST Document21 Filed06/23/15 Page2 of 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 602693486v1 - 2 - Langford’s reasoning related to the offense conduct. Id. That conclusion is not inconsistent with the statements made in the Plea Agreement and should be considered as part of the Court’s analysis of the Section 3553(a)(1) factors. In addition, Ms. Langford’s admissions in the plea agreement are not inconsistent with her arguments that she would satisfy the requirements of USSG Section 5K2.13 (whether viewed, by Section 5K2.13’s terms, as a ground for “departure,” or as a policy statement under Section 3553(a)(5)). Courts have held that granting a departure based on diminished mental capacity is not inconsistent with a finding that the defendant possessed the requisite criminal intent. In United States v. Zedner, 401 F.3d 36, 52 (2nd Cir. 2005), rev’d on other grounds, 547 U.S. 489 (2006), the Second Circuit stated, “[t]he defendant could have acted with criminal intent so as to be guilty of a crime, while at the same time suffering from a diminished mental capacity that would justify departure.” Id. And in both United States v. Menyweather, 447 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2005) and United States v. Cantu, 12 F.3d 1506, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993), discussed at greater length in Ms. Langford’s Sentencing Memorandum, the Ninth Circuit held that PTSD could constitute a basis for a finding of diminished capacity, even though the defendants had pleaded guilty. Under the Section 5K2.13 diminished mental capacity analysis, diminished capacity is present when the defendant’s ability to understand the wrongfulness of the behavior or to exercise the power of reason is “significantly impaired.” USSG § 5K2.13, app. note 1. Dr. Lines’ report supports a finding of diminished capacity due to reduced ability to understand wrongfulness or exercise the power of reason. This is different from saying that Ms. Langford had absolutely no capacity to know wrong from right or exercise her powers of reason. The difference is one of degree, not kind, and it distinguishes her diminished capacity argument and the facts that support it from a claim that she lacked criminal intent altogether. Her admissions in the plea agreement are accordingly not inconsistent with her arguments at sentencing. The fact that she may have later concealed certain things from ASG and Department of Labor employees (see U.S. Sent. Mem. at 6 n.3) does not mean that she did not have a significantly impaired Case4:15-cr-00035-JST Document21 Filed06/23/15 Page3 of 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 602693486v1 - 3 - ability to understand the wrongfulness of her behavior or exercise her powers of reason at the time of the offense. Dr. Lines’ Conclusions and the Arguments Based on Them are Otherwise II. Unchallenged. The Government’s challenge to Dr. Lines’ opinion is limited to his conclusion regarding Ms. Langford’s ability to understand the wrongfulness of her conduct. This conclusion goes to Ms. Langford’s ability to show she suffered from a “significantly reduced mental capacity” under the first prong of the test only. See USSG § 5K2.13, app. note 1 (“Significantly reduced mental capacity” means the defendant “has a significantly impaired ability to (A) understand the wrongfulness of the behavior comprising the offense or to exercise the power of reason; or (B) control behavior that the defendant knows is wrongful.”) (emphasis added). The Government does not otherwise challenge the opinions of Dr. Lines, including, notably, his diagnosis that Ms. Langford suffers from PTSD and his conclusion that she would have been able to prevent herself from engaging in the conduct under more psychologically intact conditions. Diminished capacity is present not only when the defendant has the inability to understand wrongfulness or exercise the power of reason; it is also present when the defendant has a “significantly impaired ability” to “control behavior that the defendant knows is wrongful.” USSG § 5K2.13, app. note 1. Dr. Lines concludes that Ms. Langford’s “ability to withstand engaging in the conduct was lacking.” Lines Report, at 7. Ms. Langford therefore satisfies the second (independent) prong of the significantly reduced mental capacity analysis under Section 5K2.13 – a point the government has not disputed. Case4:15-cr-00035-JST Document21 Filed06/23/15 Page4 of 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 602693486v1 - 4 - Dated: June 22, 2015. PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP MARC H. AXELBAUM LINDSAY A. LUTZ Four Embarcadero Center, 22nd Floor San Francisco, CA 94111 By: /s/ Marc H. Axelbaum Marc H. Axelbaum Attorneys for Defendant Evelyn Langford Case4:15-cr-00035-JST Document21 Filed06/23/15 Page5 of 5