Snyder v. Owens & Minor Distribution, Inc. et al

MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

D. Md.August 25, 2016

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND JANET H. SNYDER, Individually and On Behalf of Other Similarly Situated Employees, Plaintiffs, v. OWENS & MINOR DISTRIBUTION, INC., OWENS & MINOR, INC., MARY COOK, MARY MCKENNA, and BERT SMITH, Defendants. Case No. 1:16-cv-02932-RDB Hon. Richard D. Bennett DEFENDANTS OWENS & MINOR, INC., MARY COOK, MARY MCKENNA, AND BERT SMITH’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT Defendants, Owens & Minor, Inc., as well as Mary Cook (“Cook”), Mary McKenna (“McKenna”), and Bert Smith (“Smith”) (collectively referred to herein as the “Individual Defendants”), by and through undersigned counsel, hereby respectfully move this Court, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for an Order dismissing the Complaint filed by Plaintiff Janet Snyder (“Plaintiff”) because it to state a claim upon which relief may be granted with respect to Defendants Owens & Minor, Inc. and the Individual Defendants. As set forth more fully in Defendants’ accompanying Memorandum in Support, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint with respect to Defendants Owens & Minor, Inc. and the Individual Defendants because the Complaint fails to satisfy the pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the standards stated by the United States Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Case 1:16-cv-02932-RDB Document 15 Filed 08/25/16 Page 1 of 3 2. Specifically, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not adequately plead that both Owens & Minor, Inc. and the Individual Defendants were her employers under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law (“MWPCL”), or the Maryland Wage and Hour Law (“MWHL”). Accordingly, for these reasons, the Defendants herein respectfully request that the Court dismiss her claims against Owens & Minor, Inc. and the Individual Defendants. The facts, arguments, and authorities in support of this motion are fully set forth in Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of their Motion to Dismiss, which is hereby incorporated by reference and being filed simultaneously with the instant Motion. WHEREFORE, Defendants Owens & Minor, Inc., Mary Cook, Mary McKenna, and Bert Smith respectfully request that this Court grant its partial motion to dismiss, with prejudice, and grant any other relief deemed necessary and proper. Dated: August 25, 2016 Respectfully submitted, /s/ Joshua B. Waxman Joshua B. Waxman (Fed. Bar No. 17990) jwaxman@littler.com Richard W. Black (Fed. Bar No. 15156) rblack@littler.com LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C. 815 Connecticut Avenue, NW Suite 400 Washington, DC 20006-4046 202.842.3400 (telephone) 202.841.0011 (fax) Counsel for Defendants Owens & Minor, Inc., Mary Cook, Mary McKenna, and Bert Smith Case 1:16-cv-02932-RDB Document 15 Filed 08/25/16 Page 2 of 3 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that, on August 25, 2016, I electronically filed the foregoing DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF filing system, and that copies were served electronically via the Court’s ECF system, upon the following: Neil R. Lebowitz, Esq. Lebowitz Law Firm 10440 Little Patuxent Parkway, Suite 590 Columbia, Maryland 21044 /s/ Joshua B. Waxman Joshua B. Waxman Case 1:16-cv-02932-RDB Document 15 Filed 08/25/16 Page 3 of 3 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND JANET H. SNYDER, Plaintiff, v. OWENS & MINOR DISTRIBUTION, INC., et al., Defendants. Case No. 1:16-cv-02932-RDB Hon. Richard D. Bennett MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANTS OWENS & MINOR, INC., MARY COOK, MARY MCKENNA, AND BERT SMITH IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT I. INTRODUCTION In her Complaint, Plaintiff Janet H. Snyder (“Plaintiff”) alleges that that Defendants Owens & Minor Distribution, Inc. (“OMDI”) and Owens & Minor, Inc. (collectively with OMDI referred to herein as the “Corporate Defendants”), as well as fellow employees Mary Cook (“Cook”), Mary McKenna (“McKenna”), and Bert Smith (“Smith”) (collectively referred to herein as the “Individual Defendants”) violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), the Maryland Wage and Hour Law (“MWHL”), and the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law (“MWPCL”) by allegedly misclassifying Purchasing Analysts nationwide as exempt from minimum wage and overtime requirements. Plaintiff’s Complaint, however, fails to satisfy the pleadings standards articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). In particular, Plaintiff has failed to plead specific facts sufficient to establish that Defendant Owens & Minor, Inc. or any of the three Individual Defendants (together, the Case 1:16-cv-02932-RDB Document 15-1 Filed 08/25/16 Page 1 of 13 2. “Moving Defendants”) were actually her “employer” for purposes of the FLSA, MWHL, or MWPCL, or to establish that any of them was a joint employer together with her actual employer, Defendant OMDI. For example, the only specific factual allegation Plaintiff makes at all with respect to Defendant Owens & Minor, Inc. is that it “wholly owned” Defendant OMDI. See Compl. ¶ 2. Likewise, the only specific factual allegation Plaintiff makes with respect to any of the Individual Defendants is that they allegedly “supervised Plaintiff at various times in the performance of her duties and participated in the control of the day-to-day operations of the business at Defendants’ facility on Magellan Road.” See Compl. ¶ 3. Plaintiff’s Complaint otherwise fails to plead any specific facts relating to the Moving Defendants and, instead, conclusorily bundles them with Defendant OMDI as “Defendants,” inferring that they were all her employer throughout even though she pleads no facts to establish that any of the Moving Defendants employed her. Ultimately, the Complaint fails to adequately plead an employment relationship between Plaintiff and the Moving Defendants, and her Complaint thus fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to those defendants. For this reason, and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and Local Rule 105 of this Court, Defendants respectfully request that the Court dismiss the Complaint with respect to the Moving Defendants. II. ARGUMENT A. Legal Standard Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, “a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Erikson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-4 (2007) (citations omitted). However, the United States Supreme Court has explained that “[w]hile a complaint Case 1:16-cv-02932-RDB Document 15-1 Filed 08/25/16 Page 2 of 13 3. attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Rather, a complaint’s specific “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right of relief above the speculative level,” and plaintiffs must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court reemphasized the Twombly pleading requirements and highlighted the following: (1) a pleading offering only “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” does not comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8; (2) Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 “demands more than an unadorned, the defendant- unlawfully-harmed me accusation . . .”; and (3) a complaint will not survive a motion to dismiss if it contains merely “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. at 678 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Accordingly, the Court held that “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,” and only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Id. at 678-79. Indeed, “[a] court considering a motion to dismiss may begin by identifying allegations that, because they are mere conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 664. Although “[the] court accepts all well-pled facts as true and construes these facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,” it does not consider “legal conclusions, elements of a cause of action, and bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009). Moreover, Case 1:16-cv-02932-RDB Document 15-1 Filed 08/25/16 Page 3 of 13 4. a court cannot accept as true “unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Wahi v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 562 F.3d 599, 615 n.26 (4th Cir. 2009). Indeed, the Fourth Circuit has held that the Supreme Court’s decision in Twombly establishes a review that is “more favorable to dismissal of a complaint” at the earliest stages of a case. Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.3 (4th Cir. 2008). In order to state a viable claim under the FLSA, MWHL, or MWPCL, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to establish that a named defendant who allegedly owes her unpaid wages is actually her statutory employer. Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to meet this standard with respect to the Moving Defendants in that it contains nothing more than mere threadbare recitals and conclusory allegations, which are insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish an employment relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant Owens & Minor, Inc. or the Individual Defendants. Accordingly, under Twombly and its progeny, the Complaint must be dismissed as to those defendants. B. Plaintiff Has Not Alleged Facts Sufficient to Establish that Defendant Owens & Minor, Inc. and the Individual Defendants Were Her Employer for Purposes of the FLSA, MWHL or MWPCL. 1. FLSA and MWHL The FLSA applies only to “employees” who are “employed” by “employers.” See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1); see also 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). More simply stated, “FLSA liability is predicated on an employer-employee relationship. Plaintiffs must allege in their complaint sufficient facts that each . . . [named party] is their employer, either singularly or jointly . . . .” Roman v. Guapos III, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 2d 407, 414 (D. Md. 2013). The MWHL is Maryland’s equivalent of the FLSA and the statute’s definition of “employer” is virtually the same as the definition in the FLSA. See Md. Code, Lab. & Empl., § 3-401(b) (“‘Employer’ includes a Case 1:16-cv-02932-RDB Document 15-1 Filed 08/25/16 Page 4 of 13 5. person who acts directly or indirectly in the interests of another employer with an employee.”); Watkins v. Brown, 173 F. Supp. 2d 409, 416 (D. Md. 2001). Therefore, when a plaintiff fails to sufficiently plead an employment or joint employment relationship under the FLSA, the plaintiff’s claims under the MWHL fail as well. See Hall v. DIRECTV, LLC, No. JFM-14-2355, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86892, *9 (D. Md. June 30, 2015) (“Plaintiffs’ claims under the Maryland Wage and Hour Law . . . fail because the definition of ‘employer’ is virtually the same under th[at] statute as under the FLSA.” (internal citations omitted)) To determine whether an entity is an “employer” (or even a “joint employer”) for purposes of the FLSA and MWHL, courts in the Fourth Circuit analyze the “economic reality” of the relationship between the parties at issue. See Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961); Schultz v. Capital Int’l Sec., Inc., 466 F.3d 298, 306 (4th Cir. 2006) (“The joint employment inquiry must take into account the real economic relationship . . . . The ultimate determination of joint employment must be based upon the circumstances of the whole activity.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Khalil v. Subway at Arundel Mills Office Park, Inc., No. CIV. CCB-09-158, 2011 WL 231793, *2 (D. Md. Jan. 24, 2011) (“To determine whether a particular individual is an ‘employer’ under both the FLSA and the MWHL, courts apply an ‘economic reality’ test.”). Under this “economic reality” inquiry, courts examine four factors. These factors are whether the putative employer is someone who: (1) had authority to hire and fire the employee; (2) supervised and controlled employee work schedules or conditions of employment; (3) determined the rate and method of payment; and (4) maintained employment records. Bonnette v. California Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Roman, 970 F. Supp. 2d at 413 (“[C]ourts in this district have largely applied some variation of the . . . Case 1:16-cv-02932-RDB Document 15-1 Filed 08/25/16 Page 5 of 13 6. four factors laid out in Bonnette.”). Within this rubric, Plaintiff must allege facts (as opposed to legal conclusions) to show that Defendant Owens & Minor, Inc. and the three Individual Defendants are either her employers or joint employers with another person or entity. Plaintiff has failed to do so. Instead, Plaintiff has simply made sweeping, conclusory assertions that Defendant Owens & Minor, Inc. and each of the Individual Defendants are her “employer” under the FLSA and MWHL. (See generally Compl. ¶¶ 1, 2, 6, 19, 25). Indeed, in most of her allegations, Plaintiff makes no attempt to distinguish between any of the Corporate Defendants or the Individual Defendants, and simply lumps them together as the “Defendants.” For example, Plaintiff states in her Complaint:  “The acts of Plaintiff described in this Complaint were authorized, ordered, approved, suffered, permitted, and/or ratified by Defendants”;  “[w]orking at home was expected by Defendants and known by them”; “Defendants did not keep a written record of the overtime hours worked by Plaintiff”; and  “[Defendants] never paid her any additional wages for working overtime hours”; and “Defendants had improperly deemed Plaintiff to be exempt from the entitlement to overtime pay under the federal and state wage and hour laws.” (Id. at ¶¶ 4, 11-13). These conclusory allegations that include no facts to establish that any of the Moving Defendants employed Plaintiff, or stood in a joint employer relationship with Defendant OMDI - her actual employer - are insufficient under the pleading standards articulated by the Supreme Court in Iqbal and Twombly. Plaintiff’s attempt to plead facts regarding the role of the Individual Defendants is undeniably threadbare. In that regard, Plaintiff’s Complaint includes a solitary statement alleging that the Individual Defendants’ “supervised Plaintiff at various times” and that they Case 1:16-cv-02932-RDB Document 15-1 Filed 08/25/16 Page 6 of 13 7. “participated in the control of day-to-day operations of the business at Defendants’ facility on Magellan Road.” Id. at ¶ 3 (emphasis added). Glaringly absent from Plaintiff’s Complaint are any factual allegations showing which, if any, of the Defendants hired Plaintiff, and which were responsible for supervising her work,1 setting her work schedules and other terms and conditions of employment, paying her, or otherwise determining her rates and methods of payment. Both Iqbal and Twombly necessitate that Plaintiff provide “[f]actual allegations . . . enough to raise a right of relief above the speculative level,” and “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. Indeed, this Court has itself found that complaints attempting to attribute employer liability based solely on mere conclusions cannot withstand a motion to dismiss. See Everett v. PP&G, Inc., No. CIV.A. RDB-14-0102, 2014 WL 2548124, *3 (D. Md. June 5, 2014) (Bennett, J.) (dismissing the plaintiffs’ FLSA and MWHL claims against an individual defendant and holding that the plaintiffs’ “vague generalizations provide no actual factual allegations as to [the individual defendant’s] conduct from which it could be inferred that he is liable to the Plaintiffs.”). Where, as here, Plaintiff has not sufficiently pleaded “employer” or “joint employer” status for the Individual Defendants in the context of the economic reality factors, Plaintiff’s Complaint with respect to the Individual Defendants should be dismissed.2 See Joaquin v. 1 While Plaintiff does allege that Individual Defendants Cook, McKenna, and Smith “supervised Plaintiff at various times in the performance of her duties and participated in the control of day- to-day operations of the business at Defendants’ facility on Magellan Road” (see Compl. ¶ 3 (emphasis added)), this allegation does not establish that the Individual Defendants had ultimate authority over the supervision of, and control over, Plaintiff’s employment, and are insufficient to establish that any of them are her employers. 2 While some courts have found that certain plaintiffs have sufficiently pled employer status for individual defendants, those plaintiffs pled far more detail concerning the individuals’ duties and level of control with respect to the specific plaintiffs’ employment. See, e.g., Uche v. Montgomery Hospice, Inc., No. 13-CV-00878-AW, 2013 WL 11331378, *2 (D. Md. June 19, Case 1:16-cv-02932-RDB Document 15-1 Filed 08/25/16 Page 7 of 13 8. Coliseum, Inc., No. A-15-CV-787, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91265, **13-14 (W.D. Tex. July 13, 2016) (granting motion to dismiss a named individual defendant for failing to allege facts relevant to the economic reality factors); Murphy v. Ajinomoto Windsor, Inc., No. 1:15-CV-120, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55261, *18 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 26, 2016) (dismissing individual defendants where “Plaintiff’s complaint as submitted makes blanket, unspecific allegations with regard to these several Defendants, and there is no basis for the Court to find that any named individual Defendant had sufficient control over Plaintiff to qualify him or her as an ‘employer’ under the FLSA’s very particular use of that term.”); Attai v. Delivery Dudes, LLC, No. 15-CIV-62522, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27298, *14 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 2, 2016) (dismissing FLSA claims against corporate and individual defendants and noting, “Plaintiff promptly combines the eight Defendants into one collective term, ‘Defendants,’ without little explanation [sic] as to how the entities and individuals are associated.”); White v. Classic Dining Acquisition Corp., No. 1:11- cv-712-JMS-MJD, 2012 WL 1252589, **2-3 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 13, 2012) (dismissing claims against twenty-six of the twenty-eight defendants for failure to allege employment relationship). The Court should similarly dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint with respect to Defendant Owens & Minor, Inc. because Plaintiff does not allege facts sufficient to establish “employer” or “joint employer” status with respect to that defendant. Rather, the Complaint alleges only that Defendant OMDI is “a wholly owned subsidiary” of Defendant Owens & Minor, Inc. Compl. ¶ 2. Courts in this district have found that similarly pled Complaints are insufficient to establish 2013) (denying individual supervisor’s motion to dismiss because the plaintiff specifically alleged that the plaintiff’s supervisor: “(1) threatened disciplinary action against her, including possible termination; (2) directed Plaintiff to work off the clock; (3) was responsible for reviewing and approving timesheets; (4) had the authority to hire employees at the Hospice; (5) had the authority to terminate employees at the Hospice, and effectively terminated Plaintiff's employment; (6) had the power to create policies for the Hospice, including hours, scheduling, and other conditions of employment; and (7) conducted performance reviews of employees.”). Case 1:16-cv-02932-RDB Document 15-1 Filed 08/25/16 Page 8 of 13 9. FLSA or MWHL employer or joint employer status. See Gadson v. SuperShuttle Int'l, No. 10- CV-01057-AW, 2011 WL 1231311, *11 (D. Md. Mar. 30, 2011), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom., Muriithi v. Shuttle Exp., Inc., 712 F.3d 173 (4th Cir. 2013) (granting motion to dismiss various corporate entities where the plaintiffs failed to support their allegations that a parent company controlled the plaintiffs’ employment); Hall, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86892, at *7-9 (dismissing claims under the FLSA and MWHL because plaintiffs did not “allege[] facts that would show that DIRECTV has the power to hire and fire technicians, determine their rate and method of payment or maintain their employment records.” (emphasis added)); Roman, 970 F. Supp. 2d at 415-16 (granting motion to dismiss four corporate defendants for whom the plaintiff did not work); Quinteros v. Sparkle Cleaning, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 762, 775-76 (D. Md. 2008) (granting co-defendant’s motion to dismiss where plaintiffs failed to allege facts plausibly suggesting an employer-employee relationship, or that co- defendant had the power to hire or fire them or control their wages or working conditions); see also Ash v. Anderson Merchandisers, LLC, 799 F.3d 957, 961 (8th Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal of FLSA complaint because plaintiffs “did not allege any facts at all that would allow an inference that the defendants were their employer” and “a mere legal conclusion is not enough to allege an employee-employer relationship as required for an FLSA claim”); Nakahata v. New York-Presbyterian Healthcare Sys., Inc., 723 F.3d 192, 201 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting that a plaintiff’s “actual and direct employer is an essential element of notice pleading[.]”). As Plaintiff has failed to plead facts to support her legal conclusion that Defendant Owens & Minor, Inc. is her employer, the Court should likewise dismiss that entity from this action. Case 1:16-cv-02932-RDB Document 15-1 Filed 08/25/16 Page 9 of 13 10. 2. MWPCL In contrast to the FLSA and MWHL, the MWPCL defines “employer” as “any person who employs an individual in the State or a successor of the person.” Md. Code, Lab. & Empl., § 3-501(b). This definition of “employer” is thus even more restrictive than its FLSA and MWHL counterparts. See Watkins, 173 F. Supp. 2d at 416. Plaintiff’s MWPCL claim against the Individual Defendants must be dismissed based on a plain reading of the statute. Indeed, “[t]he MWPCL does not contain a ... provision that explicitly expands employer liability to those acting on behalf of the employer.” Id. As a result, “[c]ourts analyzing the MWPCL have rejected any interpretation that would encompass supervisors, officers, or other agents acting on behalf of the corporate employer.” Smith v. ABC Training Ctr. of Maryland, Inc., No. CIV. JFM-13-306, 2013 WL 3984630, *12 (D. Md. Aug. 1, 2013); Robinson v. Empire Equity Grp., Inc., No. CIV. WDQ-09-1603, 2014 WL 6698407, *8 (D. Md. Nov. 24, 2014) (“‘Employer’ does not include supervisors, officers, or other agents who act on behalf of a corporate employer.”). This, alone, is sufficient grounds to dismiss Plaintiff’s MWPCL claims against the Individual Defendants. Similar to her failure to present sufficient facts to establish that the Individual Defendants are her employer or joint employer under the FLSA and MWHL, Plaintiff’s MWPCL claim falls for the same reason. In this regard, Bouthner v. Cleveland Const. Inc., No. CIV.A. RDB-11-244, 2011 WL 2976868, **7-8 (D. Md. July 21, 2011) (Bennett, J.), is instructive. There, this Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ MWPCL and Maryland Wage Fraud Act claims against individual defendants because “[o]ther than naming the various titles of the Individual Defendants, Plaintiffs’ Complaint contains virtually nothing more than mere labels and conclusions, which are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” See also Munoz v. Baltimore Cty., Md., No. CIV.A. Case 1:16-cv-02932-RDB Document 15-1 Filed 08/25/16 Page 10 of 13 11. RDB-11-02693, 2012 WL 3038602, *12 (D. Md. July 25, 2012) (Bennett, J.) (stating, “in cases interpreting the statutory definition of an ‘employer’ in the [MWPCL], this Court has held that a supervisor is not an ‘employer.’” (internal citations omitted)). Together, these cases underscore the futility of Plaintiff’s MWPCL claim against the Individual Defendants, and the Court should, as it did in Bouthner and Munoz, dismiss the MWPCL claims asserted against the Individual Defendants. Plaintiff’s MWPCL claim must also be dismissed as to Defendant Owens & Minor, Inc. As discussed above, Plaintiff’s conclusory assertions that Owens & Minor, Inc. is her “employer” under the MWPCL is a fatal failure of pleading. See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 29. Indeed, Plaintiff fails to describe with any specificity how Defendant Owens & Minor, Inc. “failed or refused to compensate Plaintiff properly” and, instead, merely identifies Defendant Owens & Minor, Inc. as the parent company of her actual employer, Defendant Owens & Minor Distribution, Inc. Id. at ¶¶ 2, 30. Such bare conclusory statements are insufficient to establish the requisite employer-employee relationship under the MWPCL and, as such, Plaintiff’s MWPCL claim against Defendant Owens & Minor, Inc. should also be dismissed. See Hosack v. Utopian Wireless Corp., No. CIV.A. DKC 11-0420, 2011 WL 1743297, *5 (D. Md. May 6, 2011) (granting the corporate co-defendants motion to dismiss MWPCL claim and stating, “The fact that Hosack conclusorily alleges that all the corporate defendants employed him is not enough.”). Accordingly, because Plaintiff does not (and cannot) substantiate her assertion that any of the Moving Defendants are her “employer” under the MWPCL’s definition of “employer,” Plaintiff’s claims under that law against the Moving Defendants should be dismissed. Case 1:16-cv-02932-RDB Document 15-1 Filed 08/25/16 Page 11 of 13 12. III. CONCLUSION For all of the foregoing reasons, Defendants Owens & Minor, Inc., Mary Cook, Mary McKenna, and Bert Smith respectfully request that the Court issue an Order granting their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint and dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint with respect to each of them with prejudice, and grant any additional relief the Court deems just and proper. Dated: August 25, 2016 Respectfully submitted, /s/ Joshua B. Waxman Richard W. Black (Fed. Bar No. 15156) Joshua B. Waxman (Fed. Bar No. 17990) LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C. 815 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 400 Washington, DC 20006-4046 202.842.3400 Counsel for Defendants Owens & Minor, Inc., Mary Cook, Mary McKenna, and Bert Smith Case 1:16-cv-02932-RDB Document 15-1 Filed 08/25/16 Page 12 of 13 13. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that, on August 25, 2016, I electronically filed the foregoing MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANTS OWENS & MINOR, INC., MARY COOK, MARY MCKENNA, AND BERT SMITH IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF filing system, and that copies were served electronically via the Court’s ECF system, upon the following: Neil R. Lebowitz, Esq. Lebowitz Law Firm 10440 Little Patuxent Parkway, Suite 590 Columbia, Maryland 21044 /s/ Joshua B. Waxman Joshua B. Waxman Case 1:16-cv-02932-RDB Document 15-1 Filed 08/25/16 Page 13 of 13 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND JANET H. SNYDER, Plaintiff, v. OWENS & MINOR DISTRIBUTION, INC., et al., Defendants. Case No. 1:16-cv-02932-RDB Hon. Richard D. Bennett ORDER Upon consideration of Defendants Owens & Minor, Inc., Mary Cook, Mary McKenna, and Bert Smith’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Memorandum of Law in support thereof, and any Reply in support of their Motion, it is hereby: ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint is GRANTED; and ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed, with prejudice, with respect to Defendants Owens & Minor, Inc., Mary Cook, Mary McKenna, and Bert Smith. Date: __________________ HONORABLE RICHARD D. BENNETT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Case 1:16-cv-02932-RDB Document 15-2 Filed 08/25/16 Page 1 of 1