Shelton v. Brennan

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM And in the Alternative Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement

N.D. Fla.March 30, 2017

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TALLAHASSEE DIVISION FRED SHELTON, JR., Plaintiff, v. MEGAN J. BRENNAN, in her official capacity as POSTMASTER GENERAL, UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, Defendant. No. 4:16-cv-00764-RH-CAS DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT AND IN THE ALTERNATIVE MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREMEEMENT AND INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW This is an employment-discrimination case. It is the second such case that the plaintiff, a letter carrier for the Postal Service, has filed against his employer in the last 3 years. Both cases arise from the same core set of facts, with the gist being the plaintiff’s contention that since he was injured in a work-related accident on July 28, 2012, the Postal Service has not provided him suitable work assignments.1 1 Meanwhile, during much of this time period, in addition to whatever pay that the Postal Service has provided him, the plaintiff has received worker’s compensation benefits. (Shelton v. Donahue (“Shelton I”), 4:14-cv-0100-RH-CAS, ECF No. 18, at ECF p. 8). Case 4:16-cv-00764-RH-CAS Document 13 Filed 03/30/17 Page 1 of 19 2 The plaintiff acknowledges, however, that since his accident, he is no longer able to perform the duties of a full-time letter carrier position, even with an accommodation. Simply put, the plaintiff acknowledges that he can no longer perform the job that he was hired to do. If that is true, it is unfortunate. But it is neither discriminatory nor retaliatory. In Shelton I, the plaintiff asserted claims for disability discrimination, race discrimination, and retaliation. (Shelton I, ECF No. 1). After the Postal Service filed a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff’s counsel expressed a desire to settle the case. (Shelton I, ECF No. 24, at ECF p. 2). Following extensive discussions,2 the settlement agreement was executed by the plaintiff on August 27, 2015, and by counsel for both parties on September 10, 2015. (See Settlement Agreement, attached hereto as Exhibit 1). Under the terms of the settlement agreement, its effective date is August 27, 2015. The case was settled for $6,000, with the Postal Service insisting upon a general release and other provisions to ensure that litigation between the parties would be brought to a close. In other 2 The negotiations and discussions concerning the settlement dragged on for months, culminating in the Postal Service’s filing of a motion to enforce. The Postal Service’s previous-filed motion to enforce details the history of the negotiations. (See Shelton I, ECF No. 24). Case 4:16-cv-00764-RH-CAS Document 13 Filed 03/30/17 Page 2 of 19 3 words, to avoid the expense and time associated with additional litigation, the Postal Service “bought peace” with the plaintiff. Or at least it thought it had. On December 9, 2016, the plaintiff filed the present suit against the Postal Service, asserting claims for disability discrimination, race discrimination, retaliation, and age discrimination. With the exception of a conclusory reference to an alleged “forced retirement” in November 2016-that the plaintiff admits has not been administratively exhausted-all of the allegations pre-date the effective date of the settlement agreement in Shelton I. And just like Shelton I, the essence of Shelton II is that the plaintiff continues to be unhappy with the work assignments that the Postal Service has provided him since his July 2012 accident. The unambiguous terms of the settlement agreement in Shelton I bar Shelton II. Settling a case is supposed to conserve the resources of the parties and the Court. It is also supposed to bring finality to the dispute between the parties. None of this has happened here. As the ink was drying on the settlement agreement in Shelton I, the plaintiff was apparently in the process of teeing up his next federal lawsuit. This case should be dismissed on two grounds: (1) with the exception of the plaintiff’s age discrimination claim, the terms of the 2015 settlement agreement, Case 4:16-cv-00764-RH-CAS Document 13 Filed 03/30/17 Page 3 of 19 4 along with principles of res judicata, bar the plaintiff’s claims; and (2) the Complaint otherwise fails to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).3 I. “SHELTON I” A. Overview of Shelton I On February 27, 2014, the plaintiff filed his first employment discrimination case against the Postal Service, asserting claims for disability discrimination, race discrimination, and retaliation. See Shelton v. Donahue, 4:14-cv-00100-RH-CAS, ECF No. 1. Shelton I proceeded into discovery, and after about 8 months of litigation, on January 28, 2015, the Postal Service moved for summary judgment. (Shelton I, ECF No. 18). The gist of the case was the plaintiff’s contention that following a July 28, 2012 accident in his postal vehicle, he suffered injuries, and the Postal Service failed to provide him suitable work assignments. (See Shelton I, ECF Nos. 1 & 18). The case settled, and after extensive discussions, the settlement agreement was signed by the plaintiff on August 27, 2015, and by counsel for both 3 In moving to dismiss, the Postal Service references documents that were filed with the Court in Shelton I, and attaches the 2015 settlement agreement as Exhibit 1. These materials may be considered on a motion to dismiss because the Court may take judicial notice of court records, and it can consider materials such as the settlement agreement that are central to the Complaint and undisputed. See Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799, 802 n.2 (11th Cir. 1999). Case 4:16-cv-00764-RH-CAS Document 13 Filed 03/30/17 Page 4 of 19 5 parties on September 10, 2015. (See Exhibit 1). The effective date of the agreement is August 27, 2015. (See Exhibit 1). B. Settlement Agreement Contains Broad General Release and Other Key Provisions The settlement agreement contains a broad general release and an acknowledgement by the plaintiff that he was “currently unable to perform the position of a letter carrier on a full-time basis with or with or without a reasonable accommodation.” (Ex. 1, at p. 3) (emphasis added). The agreement contains several provisions reinforcing the parties’ intent concerning the broad nature of the general release: 1a. Plaintiff and Defendant agree that completion of the previously described actions on the part of the United States Postal Service shall be in full settlement and satisfaction of any and all claims, demands, rights, and causes of action of whatsoever kind and nature which Plaintiff . . . now ha[s] or may hereafter acquire against . . . the United States Postal Service . . . on account of and caused by the circumstances giving rise to the cause of action alleged by Plaintiff in his federal district court complaint, NDFL case number 4:14-cv-100-RH/CAS in the above-styled case . . . . This payment recompenses Plaintiff for all damages incurred by him in this matter and compromises all remaining claims arising out of the subject matter of this lawsuit . . . 1b. Except as set forth above, Plaintiff . . . agree[s] to accept the actions listed in Paragraph 1(a) above by the . . . United States Postal Service, in full satisfaction and settlement of any and all claims and demands of any kind, whether by statute or law, which they may have or may hereafter acquire against the Case 4:16-cv-00764-RH-CAS Document 13 Filed 03/30/17 Page 5 of 19 6 United States Postal Service . . . based upon, or derived from the causes of action asserted by Plaintiff in this civil action, including but not limited to any and all claims related to the reduction in Plaintiff’s work hours, and Plaintiff agrees to release any and all such claims and demands. 1c. In consideration for the promises actions to be made as set out above in Paragraph 1(a), Plaintiff . . . agree[s] to reimburse, indemnify and hold harmless . . . the United States Postal Service . . . from any and all claims, actions or proceedings which hereafter may be asserted or brought by or on [his] behalf to recover for any causes of action against . . . the United States Postal Service . . . based on, or derived from the facts and circumstances giving rise to this civil action as stated in the pleadings filed herein, including any subrogation and indemnity claims, including any liens by any entity, or any other claims related to the circumstances giving rise to the claims in the complaint and any amendment thereto brought in this case except as set forth above. . . . . 4. . . . The parties acknowledge that this Stipulation fully and completely resolves all disputes and claims between them, whether known or unknown, administrative or judicial, except as set forth above. (Ex. 1, at pp. 1-4) (emphasis added). II. “SHELTON II” On December 9, 2016, the plaintiff filed Shelton II. And just like that, the parties are now back to where they started. The first four-and-a-half pages of the Shelton II Complaint, along with most of pages 8-12, are virtually identical to the Case 4:16-cv-00764-RH-CAS Document 13 Filed 03/30/17 Page 6 of 19 7 Shelton I Complaint. The “new” facts alleged in Shelton II, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and assumed to be true, are these. The plaintiff alleges that on April 21, 2015, Tammy Hearn, a supervisor, told him that she had no work for him at the Lake Jackson post office, and assigned him to a 6-hour collection route at the main post office. (Shelton II, ECF No. 1, at ¶¶ 18-21). The plaintiff alleges that his union advised him to sign the paperwork for this position “under duress.” (Id. at ¶ 20). The plaintiff alleges that he reluctantly signed the paperwork, and objected that the 6-hour collection route was not within his medical restrictions. (Id. at ¶¶ 20- 21). According to the plaintiff, as a result of the work associated with the collection route, he suffered “an acute aggravation of his condition.” (Id. at ¶ 21). The plaintiff goes on to allege that that Kim Crawford, a supervisor at the main post office, “attempted to allow Plaintiff to work a limited schedule to accommodate his limitations and in May 2015, Plaintiff began working a modified assignment since he was unable to perform the six (6) hour collection.” (Id. at ¶ 22). In August 2015, the plaintiff says that he stopped receiving his worker’s compensation paycheck from the Department of Labor, and was informed by the Department of Labor that he would not be receiving it because his supervisors had reported him as “walking off the job,” which the plaintiff alleges is incorrect. (Id. at ¶ 23). According to the plaintiff, Mr. Tidwell, a branch manager at the main post Case 4:16-cv-00764-RH-CAS Document 13 Filed 03/30/17 Page 7 of 19 8 office and Ms. Crawford’s supervisor, claimed that Ruby Smith of the Gulf Atlanta Safety Office determined that the plaintiff was able to work a full 6-hour shift without issue and provided a letter from Ms. Smith for the plaintiff to sign that offered him a 6-hour collection route as his sole option for employment. (Id. at ¶ 24). The plaintiff refused to sign the letter and contacted his union. (Id.). The plaintiff alleges that his union filed a grievance on his behalf “wherein the parties agreed that management did not conduct a work search in accordance with the Defendant’s rules and procedures.” (Id. at ¶ 25). According to the plaintiff, the settlement stated that the Postal Service would make him whole for any lost wages and benefits from April 21, 2015, until he was returned to a modified assignment within his work restrictions. (Id. at ¶ 25). The plaintiff alleges, however, that the Postal Service did not honor the terms of the settlement, instead assigning him to a position that required him to work in the afternoon instead of the morning, which aggravated his condition. (Id. at ¶ 26). According to the plaintiff, “[d]ue to the damage done to Plaintiff’s body as a result of working outside of his restrictions, Plaintiff had to take leave without pay,” and was “forced to resign from his employment on November 30, 2016.” (Id.). However, the plaintiff acknowledges that he has not administratively exhausted any constructive termination claim. (Id. at p. 7 n.1). Case 4:16-cv-00764-RH-CAS Document 13 Filed 03/30/17 Page 8 of 19 9 III. LEGAL ARGUMENT A. The Settlement Agreement and Principles of Res Judicata Bar The Plaintiff’s Claims For Disability Discrimination, Race Discrimination, and Retaliation With the exception of the plaintiff’s age discrimination claim,4 the general release provisions in the settlement agreement and principles of res judicata bar the plaintiff’s claims. The seminal Eleventh Circuit case on the res judicata effect of a dismissal with prejudice5 in the context of a settlement agreement is Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 371 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2004). There, the Eleventh Circuit held that “[w]here the parties consent to such a dismissal based on a settlement agreement,” the ‘principles of res judicata apply (in a somewhat 4 Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the general release does not bar the plaintiff’s age discrimination claim. In 1990, Congress amended the ADEA by passing the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (“the OWBPA”). See Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422, 426 (1998). The OWBPA imposes specific requirements for waivers and releases of ADEA claims. Id. Among other things, it requires that the waiver specifically refer to rights or claims arising under the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1); see also Santana v. TGI Friday’s, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-512-FtM-38CM, 2015 WL 7293655, at *3-4 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 2015). Although the Postal Service intended for there to be a waiver of all potential claims (as evidenced by the broad general release provisions), the settlement agreement does not specifically reference the ADEA. In Shelton I, the plaintiff did not claim age discrimination (even though he was over 40 at that time). The plaintiff’s age discrimination claim fails for other reasons, however, as discussed below. 5 On March 3, 2015, the Court directed the Clerk to enter judgment, ordering the parties to comply with their settlement agreement and voluntarily dismissing all claims in the case with prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41. (Shelton I, ECF No. 22). Case 4:16-cv-00764-RH-CAS Document 13 Filed 03/30/17 Page 9 of 19 10 modified form) to the matters specified in the settlement agreement, rather than the original complaint.’” Id. at 1288. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned: A judgment dismissing an action with prejudice based upon the parties’ stipulation, unlike a judgment imposed at the end of an adversarial proceeding, receives its legitimating force from the fact that the parties consented to it . . . . In determining the res judicata effect of an order of dismissal based upon a settlement agreement, we should also attempt to effectuate the parties’ intent. The best evidence of that intent is, of course, the settlement agreement itself. Consequently, the scope of the preclusive effect of the . . . [d]ismissal should not be determined by the claims specified in the original complaint, but instead by the terms of the Settlement Agreement, as interpreted according to traditional principles of contract law. Id. at 1288-89. Thus, preclusion extends to all matters the parties intended to be covered by the settlement agreement, even if the matters were not formally alleged in the complaint that initiated the suit. See W.J. Perryman & Co. v. Penn Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 324 F.2d 791, 793 (5th Cir. 1963). To determine whether the plaintiff’s claims in this case are barred by Shelton I, this Court must therefore look to the terms of the settlement agreement to determine what claims it precluded from future litigation. The interpretation of the settlement agreement is governed by Florida contract law, under which the interpretation of the agreement is a question of law for the court. Somerset Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Kimball, 49 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1339 (M.D. Fla. 1999). The words in the settlement agreement “are to be given their plain and ordinary Case 4:16-cv-00764-RH-CAS Document 13 Filed 03/30/17 Page 10 of 19 11 meaning.” Schwartz v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 807 F.2d 901, 905 (11th Cir. 1987). Settlements are “highly favored and will be enforced whenever possible.” Robbie v. City of Miami, 469 So.2d 1384, 1385 (Fla. 1985). However, it is important to note that the general rule is that an employee may not prospectively waive an employment-discrimination claim. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1974); Schwartz, 807 F.2d at 906. Here, it is undisputed that the effective date of the settlement agreement is August 27, 2015. (Exhibit 1, at p. 5). Thus, under the plain and unambiguous language of the agreement, at a minimum any claims (other than for age discrimination) asserted in this case that are based upon alleged acts arising on or before August 27, 2015 are expressly barred. (See Exhibit 1, at p. 4 (“The parties acknowledge that this Stipulation fully and completely resolves all disputes and claims between them, whether known or unknown, administrative or judicial . . . .”) (emphasis added). A review of the Complaint in Shelton II reveals that, with the exception of a conclusory reference to an unexhausted “constructive termination” that purportedly occurred on November 30, 2016, all of the facts pertaining to the plaintiff’s current claims are based upon events that allegedly occurred in April 2015 and August 2015. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claims are barred by the settlement agreement. Case 4:16-cv-00764-RH-CAS Document 13 Filed 03/30/17 Page 11 of 19 12 Moreover, in signing the agreement, the plaintiff voluntarily and knowingly waived “any and all claims” that he “now [has] . . .” against the Postal Service “on account of and caused by the circumstances giving rise” to Shelton I; “any and all claims” “based upon, or derived from the causes of action asserted” in Shelton I; and “any and all claims” “based on, or derived from the facts and circumstances giving rise” to Shelton I. (See Ex. 1). A comparison of the complaints in Shelton I and Shelton II demonstrates that they both arise out of the same operative nucleus of facts, and Shelton II is merely a continuation of the alleged events that gave rise to Shelton I. In Shelton I, the essence of the plaintiff’s complaint was that the Postal Service failed to provide him appropriate job assignments after he had a work-related accident in July 2012. In Shelton II, the plaintiff continues with that same theme. The “new” allegations in Shelton II are not substantively new at all. They are “based upon” and/or “derived from” the facts and circumstances that gave rise to Shelton I. This case is squarely foreclosed by the terms of the settlement agreement in Shelton I. Indeed, as the plaintiff himself appears to recognize in his Complaint in Shelton II, “[t]he instant action stems from the continuing and systemic discrimination, retaliation and violations of Plaintiff civil rights by the Defendant in a pervasive and on going pattern . . . .” (emphasis added). Thus, the settlement Case 4:16-cv-00764-RH-CAS Document 13 Filed 03/30/17 Page 12 of 19 13 agreement bars the plaintiff’s disability discrimination, race discrimination, and retaliation claims. B. Under Rule 12(b)(6), the Complaint Should Be Dismissed For Failure To State a Claim Additionally, all of the plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(6) requires dismissal of a complaint if a plaintiff fails “to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the Supreme Court clarified the standard of pleading that a plaintiff must meet in order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Although “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, to provide the “grounds” of “entitle[ment] to relief,” a plaintiff must furnish “more than labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A complaint must include “allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)” the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. Id. at 557. While the complaint is to be construed liberally in plaintiff’s favor, the Court need not accept inferences drawn by the plaintiff if those inferences are unsupported by facts alleged in the complaint; nor must the Court accept plaintiff's legal conclusions. See Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). A district court thus should grant a motion to dismiss unless “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the Case 4:16-cv-00764-RH-CAS Document 13 Filed 03/30/17 Page 13 of 19 14 court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The allegations of the Complaint, when read in conjunction with the terms of the settlement agreement, fail to state a claim. In addition to the broad general release provisions, the Postal Service bargained for another key provision when it agreed to settle Shelton I. Specifically, as part of the settlement, the plaintiff acknowledged and agreed that he was “currently unable to perform the position of a letter carrier on a full-time basis with or without a reasonable accommodation.”6 (Ex. 1, at p. 3). Because the plaintiff admitted that as of August 27, 2015-the effective date of the agreement-he was unable to perform the essential functions of his job, i.e., he is “not a qualified individual,” and his age discrimination, disability discrimination, and race discrimination claims all fail as a matter of law. See Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2001) (to establish a prima facie case under the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must show that he could perform the essential functions of the job with or without a reasonable accommodation); Maynard v. Bd. of Regents of Div. of Univs. Of Fla. Dep’t of Educ., 342 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir. 2003) (to establish a prima facie case under Title VII, a plaintiff 6 Notably, in Shelton I, the plaintiff also admitted that since his accident in July 2013, he was not able to perform the essential functions of a letter carrier. (Shelton I, ECF No. 18, at ECF p. 13). Case 4:16-cv-00764-RH-CAS Document 13 Filed 03/30/17 Page 14 of 19 15 must, among other things, show that he was qualified for the job in question); Anderson v. Embarq/Sprint, 379 Fed. App’x 924, 929 (11th Cir. 2010) (same for an ADEA claim); see also Shannon v. U.S. Postal Service, 335 Fed. App’x 21, 25 (11th Cir. 2009) (the plaintiff was not a qualified individual where he admitted that he could not perform the heavy lifting duties required of his position). The Postal Service is not required to create a position specifically for the plaintiff. See Rio v. Runyon, 972 F. Supp. 1446, 1458 (S.D. Fla. 1997). The Complaint fails to contain sufficient factual allegations plausibly suggesting that the Postal Service unlawfully discriminated or retaliated against him. As a threshold matter, it is unclear what allegedly actionable adverse actions form the basis of his claims since the plaintiff admits that he has not administratively exhausted his constructive termination claim. And most glaring, the plaintiff’s age discrimination claim is entirely conclusory. The plaintiff merely alleges that he was treated differently “than similarly situated younger employees of Defendant” without specifying when, how, or by whom, and without identifying any of these alleged comparators. Similarly, the plaintiff’s retaliation claim fails to identify who allegedly retaliated against the plaintiff, when the alleged retaliation took place, what the timing of the alleged retaliation was in relation to any purported protected activity, and whether the plaintiff seeks to pursue a participation clause or opposition Case 4:16-cv-00764-RH-CAS Document 13 Filed 03/30/17 Page 15 of 19 16 clause theory of retaliation (or both). And although the plaintiff alleges that he “voiced opposition” to “unlawful employment practices,” those are legal conclusions that are devoid of facts. This does not pass muster after Twombly. There are other fundamental problems with the Complaint. First, paragraph 26 reveals that one of the plaintiff’s “new” contentions in Shelton II is that the Postal Service allegedly did not honor the terms of a separate settlement agreement that the union entered into on his behalf concerning his work restrictions. (Shelton II, ECF No. 1, at ¶¶ 25-26). But an alleged breach of a union settlement agreement has nothing to do with discrimination or retaliation. This has become an all too common theme in employment discrimination cases brought by postal workers in this District, where the Postal Service is forced to litigate a federal court case that is in reality “a union grievance masquerading as a Title VII case.” Burke v. Brennan, No. 5:16-cv-90-RH-CAS, 2017 WL 487021, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 6, 2017). Second, bubbling beneath the surface of the Complaint is a suggestion that the Postal Service mishandled the plaintiff’s worker’s compensation benefits and purportedly did not comply with unspecified regulations in the handling of the plaintiff’s work restrictions. (See Shelton II, ECF No. 1, at ¶ 23). But that is not a Title VII or age discrimination claim. Rather, any such claim would fall under the Federal Employees Compensation Act (“FECA”), 5 U.S.C. § 8101, under which the Case 4:16-cv-00764-RH-CAS Document 13 Filed 03/30/17 Page 16 of 19 17 Postal Service has certain duties to employees with job-related injuries. And this Court does not have jurisdiction over a FECA claim, as such claims are within the province of the Department of Labor. Gilmore v. Director, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Office of Workers Compensation, 455 Fed. App’x. 934, 936 (11th Cir. 2012). In seeking dismissal, the Postal Service recognizes that there may be cases where it makes sense to use the discovery process and the mechanism of summary judgment to weed out unmeritorious claims. Respectfully, this is not one of them.7 Weeding out a patently meritless case like this one at the earliest possible stage spares the litigants and this Court unnecessary expense and effort, and avoids the burden, distraction, and interference that will be imparted on the Postal Service if this litigation proceeds into discovery. See Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U.L. Rev. 635, 638 (1989) (“Judges can do little about impositional discovery when parties control the legal claims to be presented and conduct the discovery themselves”). The plaintiff is not the only party in this case with interests at stake. The Postal Service, as the defendant in two federal lawsuits brought by the plaintiff, has a right of protection from vexatious and repetitious litigation arising from the 7 Notably, unlike many other types of civil cases, in employment cases against federal agencies such as this one, the plaintiff has the benefit of a lengthy administrative process, through which the employee gains the benefit of extensive informal discovery. So there is no excuse for why a plaintiff cannot provide facts that support the legal claims that he advances. Case 4:16-cv-00764-RH-CAS Document 13 Filed 03/30/17 Page 17 of 19 18 same set of facts. In Twombly, the Supreme Court imposed the “plausibility” standard to reinforce the trial court’s gatekeeping function. And the guiding principle of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to “secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. With all of these principles in mind, this case should be dismissed, both pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See Horne v. Potter, 392 Fed. App’x. 800, 802-03 (11th Cir. 2010) (affirming district court’s dismissal of a plaintiff’s employment-discrimination claims on res judicata and Twombly grounds that were based upon same factual predicate as claims in earlier case). Respectfully submitted, CHRISTOPHER P. CANOVA Acting United States Attorney /s/ Jonathan D. Letzring JONATHAN D. LETZRING Assistant United States Attorney Georgia Bar No. 141651 111 N. Adams Street, 4th Floor Tallahassee, FL 32301 Telephone: 850-942-8430 Fax: 850-942-8448 Email: jonathan.letzring@usdoj.gov Case 4:16-cv-00764-RH-CAS Document 13 Filed 03/30/17 Page 18 of 19 19 LOCAL RULE 7.1(F) CERTIFICATE I certify that this memorandum contains 4,310 words, per Microsoft Word’s word count, which complies with the word limit requirements set forth in Local Rule 7.1(F). /s/ Jonathan D. Letzring JONATHAN D. LETZRING Assistant United States Attorney CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on March 30, 2017, the foregoing was filed electronically with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF filing system, which will cause it to be served upon counsel for Plaintiff. /s/ Jonathan D. Letzring JONATHAN D. LETZRING Assistant United States Attorney Case 4:16-cv-00764-RH-CAS Document 13 Filed 03/30/17 Page 19 of 19 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TALLAHASSEE DIVISION FRED SHELTON, JR., Plaintiff, v. Case No. 4:14-CV-100-RH-CAS PATRICK DONAHUE, in his official Capacity as POSTMASTER GENERAL, UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, Defendant. ____________________________________/ STIPULATION FOR COMPROMISE SETTLEMENT AND RELEASE OF CLAIMS Plaintiff, FRED SHELTON, J.R., an individual, and Defendant, PATRICK DONAHUE, in his official capacity as POSTMASTER GENERAL, UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, through undersigned counsel, hereby enter into this Stipulation for Compromise Settlement and Release and hereby stipulate and aver as follows: 1. The parties hereby agree to settle and compromise the above-captioned action by Plaintiff against Defendant, as follows. The parties stipulate and agree to the terms and conditions set forth below, as follows: a. Defendant will pay to Plaintiff’s attorney, Marie Mattox, the sum of Six Thousand Dollars ($6,000.00). Plaintiff and Defendant agree that completion of the previously described actions on the part of the United States Postal Service shall be in full settlement and satisfaction of any and all claims, demands, rights, and causes of action of whatsoever kind and nature which Plaintiff, his guardians, heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns, now have or may hereafter acquire against Patrick Donahue, Postmaster General of the United Case 4:16-cv-00764-RH-CAS Document 13-1 Filed 03/30/17 Page 1 of 6 Case 4:16-cv-00764-RH-CAS Document 13-1 Filed 03/30/17 Page 2 of 6 Case 4:16-cv-00764-RH-CAS Document 13-1 Filed 03/30/17 Page 3 of 6 Case 4:16-cv-00764-RH-CAS Document 13-1 Filed 03/30/17 Page 4 of 6 Case 4:16-cv-00764-RH-CAS Document 13-1 Filed 03/30/17 Page 5 of 6 Case 4:16-cv-00764-RH-CAS Document 13-1 Filed 03/30/17 Page 6 of 6