Opposition_plaintiff_flagships_opposition_to_defendants_motion_to_tax_costsMotionCal. Super. - 2nd Dist.July 26, 2006Electronically FILED by S| A N nn W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 23 26 27 28 Thomas L. Boeder, Admitted Pro Hac Vice TBoeder @perkinscoie.com Elvira Castillo, Admitted Pro Hac Vice ECastillo@perkinscoie.com Cara Wallace, Admitted Pro Hac Vice CWallace @perkinscoie.com PERKINS COIE LLP 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900 Seattle, WA 98101-3099 Telephone: 206.359.8000 Facsimile: 206.359.9000 Donald J. Kula, Bar No. 144342 DKula@perkinscoie.com Donna Strain, Bar No. 305599 DStrain @perkinscoie.com PERKINS COIE LLP 1888 Century Park East, Suite 1700 Los Angeles, CA 90067 Telephone: 310.788.9900 Facsimile: 319.788.3399 Attorneys for Plaintiff Flagship Theatres of Palm Desert, LLC dba Cinémas Palme d’Or FLAGSHIP THEATRES OF PALM DESERT, LLC dba CINEMAS PALME D’OR, Plaintiff, V. CENTURY THEATRES, INC. and CINEMARK USA, INC,, Defendants. iperior Court of California, County of Los Angeles on 02/20/2019 01:26 PM Sherri R. Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court, by M. Mariscal,Deputy Clerk SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES Case No. SC090481 Assigned for all purposes to the Honorable Lisa Hart Cole PLAINTIFF FLAGSHIP THEATRES OF PALM DESERT, LLC’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO TAX COSTS Date: March 5, 2019 Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept.: O Complaint filed: July 26, 2006 Trial date: April 2, 2018 Reservation ID: 180712330586 143299094.2 FLAGSHIP’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO TAX COSTS CASE NO. SC090481 AN Un Bs W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page L IN TR CIRC TTIRENIN ccs somes AR RE EAS 4 II. ARGUMENT coi ct eters a ee settee estes snes sane eee nee 5 A. Cinemark is Mistaken—Flagship is Not Seeking Double-Recovery for its E ’A885 SS SAO RASA AS SRA S50% 9 1. Fee for Filing Notice of Appeal in Superior Court Has Not Been RECOVETEA......couiiiiiiiiiiiiic cc 5 2 Pro Hac Vice Fees Flagship Paid to Superior Court Have Not Been RECOVETE css swans sn xamsmas amon ss aussi aauis 42.45 8551058 458355 08 4505540 S558 55.45 S58 SHH 08. 5 5 B. Flagship is Entitled to Recover Deposition Costs Regardless of Whether the Deponents Testified at Trial or are Listed on Trial Witness List...................... 6 1. Flagship’s Deposition Travel Costs are Recoverable and Not EXCESSIVE... ee 8 C. CCP § 1033.5, as Amended in 2017, Explicitly Provides for Recovery of Costs for Trial Technology—which is Not Cutting Edge, but COMMONPLACE «convicts eects sree sere cece sare cece ee sree eee 9 III. CONCLUSION otters eects sre ect estes sree sabe cette sees sane eases nee saee sane ensees 11 FLAGSHIP’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ De MOTION TO TAX COSTS 143299094.2 CASE NO. SC090481 AN Un Bs W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) CASES Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, 06 Cal. App. 4th 1017 (2002)...ccueieiieeiie eee eters ete seats rt ee sbbe sabe e sees tee ssae sabe enneas 11 Bender v. County of Los Angeles, 217 Cal. AGP: BU FEB (HOLT Yu ssn suns swans sessmsnsn oss 255555045 555555550555 55.30 5455558 SH85 355-49 M5535 SH5HH5H 3855 11 Chaaban v. Wet Seal, Inc., 203 Cal. APP. 4th 49 (2012) ...ceiiiieiie ects eee estes sate eee sees t ee sbae sabe e neers 7 Crib Retaining Walls, Inc. v. NBS/Lowry, Inc., 47 Cal. APP. 4th 886 (1996)....cueeeeeiieiiitiete eects et teste erases saa eebe es e ee ee se eene 5 Culbertson v. R. D. Werner Co., Inc., 190 (Cal. Ap. Sl TE {1B coer cusses oon oom ss mss 5s A SSH 0% 7 Green v. County. of Riverside, 238 Cal. APP. 4th 1363 (2015). cueieiiieiie eee eters ees sees sb ae sabe e ease ee eaee eens 11 Henderson v. J.M. Smucker Co., No. CV 10-4524-GHK, 2014 WL 2723876 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2014) ......cccevveeereeeereeerreenn 10 Lindy v. McChesney, 141 Cal. 351 (1903) «eevee eee eee ects estes esterase aes stares sane ae ssbe ee ssse ae esse ae ssseeessseeennes 7,8 Nelson v. Anderson, 72 Cal. APP. 4th T11 (1999)... eee ee eee este ste sabe sees t ee eae seve enaeas 5 Okada v. Whitehead, No. 8:15-cv-01449-JLS-KES, 2017 WL 2626990 (C.D. Cal. June 12, 2017)....ccccceevveeerrennee. 11 STATUTES CIV. PTOC. COE § 1032 eee eee eee eet eee eee eevee esse este teases esse se ae assesses sere ssananeseeseeenens 6 Civ. Proc. Code § 1032(D)...cccieiiiiiiiieee ieee eects eee eect eee ee eeetar eee sees ee etas bese ae se seen snarseaeseees 5 CIV. Proc. Code § T0833. 5 eae e area esse ete e seen sees esses seen en en anes enan 10 Civ. Proc. Code § 1033.5(2)(1) courreeeeiiiiie eis ee etie ee ette eesti ee ee star eee esate ae ee bae esas sansae ae sansae ee ensseeeas 5 Civ. Proc. Code § 1033.5(2)(3) ccoeeerrrrieeieee ieee eee ee eeecitre eee ee eeeesvaeae ee ae ee eeeentasbese ae se seen snsasseaeseses 5 Civ. Proc. Code § 1033.5(2)(13) cuuiiiiiieeiiieeieie cies eetee cites etree sires sete eeeaae ee save ee ssae ee ssse ee ssseeessseans 5,10 FLAGSHIP’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ -3- MOTION TO TAX COSTS 143299094.2 CASE NO. SC090481 AN Un Bs W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22, 23 24 25 26 27 28 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page(s) RULES California Rule of Court 8:2 TR(N(LY us sss sn somsnus susumas.so mmmnssn swans in ssmsn swnmsss.o sss 55555 5h 5655550 5555505 53 5555 6 FLAGSHIP REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR -4- ATTORNEY'S FEES 143299094.2 CASE NO. SC090481 A N nn W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 23 26 27 28 I. INTRODUCTION As the prevailing party, Plaintiff Flagship is entitled to recover its costs. After 12 years of litigation and a full trial on the merits, Flagship obtained a favorable jury verdict awarding $1.25 million in damages, which was trebled to $3.75 million. Flagship filed its Memorandum of Costs on July 3, 2018 to recover a total of $251,892.96 in costs. Defendant Cinemark does not contest that Flagship is the prevailing party and is entitled to recover its costs. But, Cinemark—without factual or legal support—contends Flagship should not recover certain of its requested costs (totaling $63,772.37) and requests the Court strike certain costs and reduce the costs award accordingly. Specifically, Cinemark moves to strike items from three categories, all of which are expressly listed as allowable costs by statute: e filing and motion fees [see Civ. Proc. Code § 1033.5(a)(1)]; e deposition costs [see Civ. Proc. Code § 1033.5(a)(3)]; and e trial technology for electronic presentation [see Civ. Proc. Code § 1033.5(a)(13)]. There are no items in Flagship’s Memorandum of Costs that are facially improper. Thus, Flagship’s “verified memorandum is prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses and services therein listed were necessarily incurred by [Flagship], and the burden of showing that an item is not properly chargeable or is unreasonable is upon the objecting party [Cinemark].” Nelson v. Anderson, 72 Cal. App. 4th 111, 131 (1999) (burden was on objecting party to show that claimed costs for taking, video recording, and transcribing depositions, which were expressly allowed by Civ. Proc. Code § 1033.5(a)(3), were unnecessary or unreasonable). The Court should deny Cinemark’s motion to strike and award the full amount of costs requested, which were necessarily incurred in this case, because Flagship has a statutory right to recover its costs as a matter of law and Cinemark has not met its burden to show that any costs were unreasonable or unnecessary. See Civ. Proc. Code § 1032(b); Nelson v. Anderson, 72 Cal. App. 4th 111, 128-129 (1999) (“the prevailing party is entitled to all of his costs unless another statute provides otherwise . . . [a]bsent such statutory authority, the court has no discretion to deny costs to the prevailing party”) (citing Crib Retaining Walls, Inc. v. NBS/Lowry, Inc., 47 Cal. FLAGSHIP’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ =5- MOTION TO TAX COSTS 143299094.2 CASE NO. SC090481 A N nn W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 23 26 27 28 App. 4th 886, 890-91 (1996) (reversing trial court’s grant of motion of tax costs with directions to enter order denying motion to tax costs)). II. ARGUMENT A. Cinemark is Mistaken—Flagship is Not Seeking Double-Recovery for its Costs Cinemark confuses Flagship’s costs on appeal—which Flagship already recovered pursuant to California Rule of Court 8.278(d)(1) “Costs on Appeal”—with the costs Flagship incurred in the Superior Court, and for which Flagship now properly seeks recovery under section 1032 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. 1. Fee for Filing Notice of Appeal in Superior Court Has Not Been Recovered Cinemark has confused the filing fees paid on appeal (to the Court of Appeal) and the Notice of Appeal that Flagship filed in the superior court. The filing fee of $100 incurred on June 9, 2014, for which Flagship has not yet recovered, is the fee for filing the Notice of Appeal in the superior court. The $775 that Flagship already recovered was the $775 filing fee it paid to the Court of Appeal on July 10, 2014 (Check No. 207492). See Court’s Order, Apr. 26, 2017 (denying Cinemark’s Motion to Tax Costs and awarding Flagship $6,798.08 as recovery for its costs on appeal). Cinemark’s insinuation that Flagship may not be appropriately accounting for its costs is inappropriate and unsupported by the facts, as would be readily apparent upon a review of the superior court’s register of actions and the Court of Appeal’s docket for this case. 2. Pro Hac Vice Fees Flagship Paid to Superior Court Have Not Been Recovered Similarly, Cinemark confuses the $150 in pro hac vice fees that Flagship paid to the Court of Appeal, which Flagship recovered, with the $2,580 in pro hac vice fees in the superior court for which Flagship now seeks recovery. A brief review of the Court of Appeal’s docket shows that pro hac vice applications were filed on January 9, 2015 and granted on January 13, 2015 for Flagship’s attorneys: Thomas Boeder, Elvira Castillo, and Katherine Galipeau. The $2,580 that Flagship now seeks for pro hac vice application fees in the superior court are for seven of Flagship’s attorneys: Thomas Boeder, Jessica Eiting, Elvira Castillo, Katherine Galipeau, Katherine Bennett, Shylah Alfonso, and Cara Wallace. The fact that three attorneys applied pro hac vice in both courts does not change the fact that there were three applications filed in the FLAGSHIP’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ -6- MOTION TO TAX COSTS 143299094.2 CASE NO. SC090481 A N nn W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 23 26 27 28 Court of Appeal, and seven applications filed in the superior court. Flagship recovered for three applications as part of its costs on appeal, but Flagship has not yet recovered for fees paid to the superior court for those seven applications. Cinemark also asserts, without citing any authority, that Flagship should not recover the $500 costs for the pro hac vice application of Shylah Alfonso filed on April 9, 2014 because she never appeared in court or at a deposition and her name has not been used on any of Flagship’s filings. As reflected in the billing statements submitted in Flagship’s related Attorney’s Fees Motion being heard concurrently with this motion, Ms. Alfonso was reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation and her work contributed to Flagship’s opposition to summary judgment in 2014 and to trial preparation, including motions in limine, oppositions to motions in limine, jury verdict and jury instructions. (See Exhibit A, pp. 47-56, 58-59, 62, 138, 140-145, 147-151, to the Thomas L. Boeder Declaration filed on October 16, 2018 in support of Flagship’s Attorney’s Fees Motion.) B. Flagship is Entitled to Recover Deposition Costs Regardless of Whether the Deponents Testified at Trial or are Listed on Trial Witness List Of the 35 deponents in this case, Cinemark now takes issue with the depositions of six of them, three of which Cinemark noticed, and contends Flagship should not be able to recover for the costs associated with these depositions. Cinemark argues that because these witnesses did not testify at trial, or were not listed on the trial witnesses list, it follows that these depositions were not necessary at the time they were taken. This is not factually accurate and not the applicable legal standard. “The recovery of deposition costs does not depend on whether the deponent ultimately testifies at trial.” Chaaban v. Wet Seal, Inc., 203 Cal. App. 4th 49, 57 (2012). “It is frequently proper and necessary for a party to have depositions taken, although afterwards the case may take such course as to make it unnecessary to use them.” Lindy v. McChesney, 141 Cal. 351, 353 (1903). All six of these depositions were proper and necessary in light of the allegations in Flagship’s complaint. See Culbertson v. R. D. Werner Co., Inc., 190 Cal. App. 3d 704, 711 (1987) (emphasizing that the nature of plaintiff’s complaint determines the necessity of FLAGSHIP’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ o. MOTION TO TAX COSTS 143299094.2 CASE NO. SC090481 A N nn W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 23 26 27 28 discovery). The four deponents who were not listed on the joint witness list for trial (Clark Woods, Darlene Blair, Scott Wallace, and David Magedman) were witnesses who Flagship reasonably anticipated would provide relevant information. See Declaration of Donald J. Kula filed concurrently in support of Flagship’s Opposition to Cinemark’s Motion to Tax Costs (“Kula Costs Decl.”) { 3. Clark Woods was a Paramount executive during the early phase of the case—and prior to the time Paramount changed its policy under Don Harris to allow films to be licensed day-and-date to both the Palme theatre and the River Theater); Mr. Woods was deposed regarding Paramount’s refusal to license films to the Palme theatre prior to the change in policy invoked by Mr. Harris; (See Kula Costs Decl. 14.) Darlene Blair was designated by Cinemark as its person most knowledgeable, and thus deposed by Flagship; (See Kula Costs Decl. 5.) Scott Wallace was an experienced industry executive and designated at one point as an expert for Flagship; he was deposed in regard to his industry knowledge of the practices at issue in the case; (See Kula Costs Decl. { 6.) David Magedman was an executive with CBS films and was deposed as to numerous attempts by Flagship to license CBS films; At trial, Mr. Tabor testified as to one or more admissions made by Mr. Magedman including his statement that Flagship would need “another 40 screens” to license a particular film. (See Kula Costs Decl. 7.) Flagship decided that these witnesses were not needed at trial. That does not mean Flagship cannot recover the costs associated with these depositions. See Lindy v. McChesney, 141 Cal. at 353. Flagship is entitled to recover the $8,032.21 in costs for these four depositions. To recover the costs incurred in deposing a witness, a party need not call that witness at trial. Indeed, the Court would hardly allow all witnesses deposed in a matter to testify at trial, otherwise the 5-week trial would have been a 10 or even 20-week trial. 143299094.2 FLAGSHIP’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ -8- MOTION TO TAX COSTS CASE NO. SC090481 A N nn W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 23 26 27 28 Cinemark also contends that Flagship should not recover deposition costs for two deponents, Denice Hilts and Susie Peat, who Flagship listed as witnesses for trial and but for the Court’s unwillingness to allow their testimony, who would have testified at trial. The Court’s determination that it would not hear from these witnesses is not the same as a determination that these witnesses’ depositions were not reasonably necessary. It was Cinemark that noticed and took Ms. Hilts’s and Ms. Peat’s depositions. Flagship is entitled to recover its $1,794.06 in costs for these two depositions. 1. Flagship’s Deposition Travel Costs are Recoverable and Not Excessive Cinemark’s assertions that Flagship’s aggregation of travel costs is improper and Flagship should not be permitted to recover for the costs of more than one attorney’s attendance at depositions could not ring more hollow. In Cinemark’s memorandum of costs dated July 28, 2014, which Cinemark submitted after the court entered its termination order, Cinemark aggregated its travel costs by “lump[ing] together the gross travel expenses for each deposition”, which is exactly what Cinemark now asserts is improper for Flagship to do here. (See Kula Costs Decl. {2, Ex. A.) The reasonableness of travel expenses can be assessed in this aggregated form. Cinemark’s emphasis on the range of travel expenses from $94 to $4,259 as being some sort of indicator of impropriety or excessiveness is misguided: Cinemark’s sought recovery for its aggregated travel expenses ranging from $26 to $3,879. Further, Cinemark asserts that because the travel expenses for two depositions that occurred on the same day and were attended by the same attorney were identical totals, that renders Flagship’s request duplicative. Cinemark is not only mistaken, as the total cost for travel for that one day was divided in half (with half of the travel expenses attributed to each of the depositions that were attended that day), (see Kula Costs Decl. 8), but Cinemark also sought recovery for two depositions that occurred on the same day listing identical travel expense amounts for each ($836 for Darlene Blair and Douglas Fay depositions on October 11, 2012). Cinemark also takes issue with Flagship seeking recovery for costs of two attorneys to attend some depositions (usually a local attorney and an out-of-state attorney). But, Cinemark sought recovery for having multiple out-of-state attorneys attend depositions and cited authority FLAGSHIP’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ -9- MOTION TO TAX COSTS 143299094.2 CASE NO. SC090481 A N nn W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 23 26 27 28 for that position. As Cinemark noted then, and as remains good law, two attorneys attending a deposition is not unreasonable. See Henderson v. J.M. Smucker Co., No. CV 10-4524-GHK (VBKXx), 2014 WL 2723876, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2014) (disagreeing “with Defendants assertion that having two attorneys attend the depositions was unnecessary” and noting “[s]ending two attorneys to a deposition is the common practice of many law firms, and we will not second- guess counsel’s staffing choice.”). Cinemark has no basis for seeking to tax the travel costs associated with the depositions in this case. Flagship is entitled to recover for all of its deposition travel costs. CG CCP § 1033.5, as Amended in 2017, Explicitly Provides for Recovery of Costs for Trial Technology—which is Not Cutting Edge, but Commonplace Cinemark relies on outdated case law and ignores the recently amended statutory basis for Flagship to recover its costs for trial technology. Section 1033.5 of the California Code of Civil Procedure specifically lists as an allowable cost “Models, the enlargements of exhibits and photocopies of exhibits, and the electronic presentation of exhibits, including costs of rental equipment and electronic formatting, may be allowed if they were reasonably helpful to aid the trier of fact.” Civ. Proc. Code § 1033.5(a)(13) (emphasis added). Flagship is entitled by statute to recover its costs for trial technology, which was reasonably helpful to the jury and Court. Using electronic exhibits that can be flashed on a monitor is not only the norm for large, complex document intensive cases, it is the only efficient way to try these cases. Given the number of exhibits marked for trial and then actually used during trial and then admitted, arguably the trial would have taken twice as long if the entire courtroom had to wait for the witness to find the correct binder, and turn to the current tab, every time a new exhibit was used. Further large, multipage exhibits can be gone through in seconds, instead of minutes or hours. The trial technology for which Flagship seeks recovery (and which was employed by both sides) was not only reasonably helpful to the jury and Court, it was necessary for efficiency. Flagship’s position is entirely consistent with the law: While admittedly ‘high-tech,’ the methods defendants used to display documents to the jury were specifically approved by the trial court, which found them to be highly effective, efficient, and commensurate with the nature of the case. FLAGSHIP’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ -10- MOTION TO TAX COSTS 143299094.2 CASE NO. SC090481 A N nn W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 23 26 27 28 Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, 96 Cal. App. 4th 1017, 1057 (2002) (finding no abuse of discretion in awarding $19,307.33 as costs for imaging documents and deposition transcripts, and for display equipment rental). In contrast, the case Cinemark cites is a “relatively simple breach of contract and fraud trial” in which the main evidence was the two parties’ testimony and documents, i.e. the testimony of two men and the agreements that were breached. See Okada v. Whitehead, No. 8:15-cv-01449-JLS-KES, 2017 WL 2626990, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 12, 2017). Unlike Okada, Flagship’s use of technology was not for mere convenience. Cinemark attacks each of Flagship’s trial technology costs and points to cases from the 1990’s to support its contention that Flagship should not be able to pass off the high cost of cutting edge technology to Cinemark and should have read deposition testimony aloud (instead of designing, producing, and editing deposition video for courtroom presentation). This is a misrepresentation of the current state of the law and the types of trial technology costs courts regularly award these days. Even one of the two modern cases Cinemark cites makes this point and distinguishes the past cases. See Bender v. County of Los Angeles, 217 Cal. App. 4th 968, 990-91 (2013) (affirming trial court properly awarded costs for trial technology used in courtroom presentations, including trial video computer, PowerPoint presentation, videotape synchronizing, and trial technician; concluding the technology enhanced attorneys’ advocacy and was necessary to conduct of litigation; and distinguishing Science Applications Int. Corp. v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. App. 4th 1095 (1995), because use of technology has become commonplace and cheaper since case was decided). Cinemark also asserts that the “most egregious[]” of Flagship’s requests is for the services of its trial technician. Cinemark is flatly wrong and conspicuously fails to cite any supporting authority. To the contrary, “[u]se of such technology, including a technician to monitor the equipment and quickly resolve any glitches, has become commonplace, if not expected by jurors.” Green v. County. of Riverside, 238 Cal. App. 4th 1363, 1373-74 (2015) (allowing over $40,000 in “‘paralegal’ costs . . . incurred for preparation and presentation of electronic evidence, FLAGSHIP’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ -11- MOTION TO TAX COSTS 143299094.2 CASE NO. SC090481 ro c o ~ ] aN wD > e | including videos of deposition testimony, exhibits and excerpts from audio recordings, at trial”, “including a technician to monitor the equipment and quickly resolve any fix glitches.™). III. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, Cinemark’s motion to tax costs should be denied in its entirety and Flagship should be awarded its costs in the amount of $251,892.96. DATED: February 20, 2019 PERKINS COIE LLP = By: THomas L. Boeder Donald J. Kula Cara Wallace Donna Strain Attorneys for Plaintiff Flagship Theatres of Palm Desert, LLC dba Cinémas Palme d’Or FLAGSHIP’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ sa] Ps MOTION TO TAX COSTS 143299094.2 CASE NO. SC090481 A N nn W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 23 26 27 28 PROOF OF SERVICE I, Yolanda Mendez, declare: I am a citizen of the United States and employed in Los Angeles, California. I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within-entitled action. My business address is 1888 Century Park East, Suite 1700 Los Angeles, CA 90067. On February 20, 2019, I served a copy of the within document(s): PLAINTIFF FLAGSHIP THEATRES OF PALM DESERT, LLC’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO TAX COSTS by placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, the United States mail at Los Angeles, California addressed as set forth below. by transmitting via e-mail or electronic transmission the document(s) listed above to the person(s) at the e-mail address(es) set forth below. Peter H. Mason, Esq. Lesley Holmes, Esq. Kelsey A. Maher, Esq. NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP 555 South Flower Street, 41° Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071 Tel: 213.892.9200 / Fax: 213.892.9494 Email: peter.mason@nortonrosefulbright.com lesley.swanson.holmes @nortonrosefulbright.com kelsey.maher@nortonrosefulbright.com Michael A. Swartzendruber, Pro Hac Vice Barton W. Cox, Pro Hac Vice Nathan Baum, Pro Hac Vice NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP 2200 Ross Avenue, Suite 3600 Dallas, TX 75201 Tel: 214.855.8000 / Fax: 214.855.8200 Email: michael.swartzendruber@nortonrosefulbright.com beau.cox @nortonrosefulbright.com Nathan.baum @nortonrosefulbright.com I am readily familiar with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on PROOF OF SERVICE ~13- CASE NO. SC090481 143299094.2 motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit. I declare under penalty of perjury under the Jaws of the State of California that the above 1s true and correct. Executed on February 20, 2019, at Los Angeles/ California. hd va 7 J’ Yolanda Mendez PROOF OF SERVICE -14- CASE NO. SC090481 143299094.2
