PEOPLE v. GONZALES

Respondent’s Opening Brief on the Merits

Cal.May 16, 2017

In the Supreme Court of the State of California THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CRAIG DANNY GONZALES, Defendant and Appellant. Third Appellate District Third, Case No. C078960 Sacramento County Superior Court, Case No. 03F07705 The Honorable Marjorie Koller, Judge Case No. 8240044 . SUPREME COURT FILED MAY 16 2017 Jorge Navarrete Clerk OPENING BRIEF ON THE MERITS er Baputy XAVIER BECERRA Attormey General of California GERALD A. ENGLER Chief Assistant Attorney General MICHAELP. FARRELL Senior Assistant Attorney General ERIC L. CHRISTOFFERSEN Supervising Deputy Attorney General RACHELLE A. NEWCOMB Deputy Attorney General IVAN P. MARRS Deputy Attorney General State Bar No. 260636 1300 I Street, Suite 125 P.O. Box 944255 Sacramento, CA 94244-2550 Telephone: (916) 324-0069 Fax: (916) 324-2960 af a m e OP Y a m ‘o ud Email: Ivan.Marrs@doj.ca.gov Attorneysfor Plaintiffand Respondent TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Tssue Presented..........ccccsccsssceccecersnecesseesseeeeeesssesessessescesssssseneeecnsatessenseesseeaeens 7 IntrOduction.....ccccccccccecessscescesssscesscceseessceeaeaesoeerecseeessecssserssessaseeseesesssenseseeoeees 7 Staternent of the Case .........ccscsccescesscessssseeessseseesecsnersssssseceneseesanteesereseseees 8 A. Original COnVICtiONS .........ccesses eeeeseeeneeeeeeseeenes 8 B. Proposition 47 Proceeding..........cssscseseseeseeseneesens9 C. The Court of Appeal’s Ruling...cseeeeeeeceees 9 Summary of Argument ........ccccccsecsecseececeeceseensecneenseseesseestesteseensstssnessesneenen‘10 ATQUMEMNL000.eee esssesceneesssesseseesaceseesseseneecnessenesesetaeesetensseceneessaneeeeraeteeneeets 11 I. Appellant’s Check Forgery Convictionsare Ineligible for Reduction Because He Was Concurrently Convicted of Forgery and Identity Theft...........cca11 A. Relevant Law.........ccccssssssressesesseseeseesseneecsseseseseseneesons 1] 1. Standard of Review ..........: essesaeeeeeeaeeeeees 11 2. Overview of Proposition 47 ........cscs 11 3. Principles of Statutory Construction............... 12 B. The Identity Theft Exception Established in Section 473, Subdivision (b), Applies to Offenders Concurrently Convicted of Forgery and Identity Theft, Regardless ofAny Transactional Relationship Between the OFFENSES ........ecceeececccccceceeeceseesneeenserscensussceseeesaseesssasenes 14 lL. The UnambiguousIdentity Theft Exception Requires Only Concurrent COMVICTIONS...........cccsesceeccocseseesceuseseecevscsssersveces 14 2. Extrinsic Evidence of Voter Intent Does Not Establish a Transactional Relationship Requirement ...........cececeeeeeees 17 Conclusion voccaucuueeeeseseccecescceeeeesseecccecsacuaecessesscsecseduensceceeseeeeseseueusesssrsseseneess 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page CASES California Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v. City ofLos Angeles (1995) 11 Cal.4th 342 ocesceseeeeeeeeseeeerseesesssseessronseuensssessessseveaes 14 Carman vy. Alvord (1982) 31 Cal.3d 318... cecseeseeseseessensenessessesessesssessesseeenessessesesseseees 15 Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379.eeeccscceesssscesssscsssssssssessenseecesesssseeessesneseenes 15 Garcia v. McCutchen (1997) 16 Cal.4th 469oecccssctscesssesssesessseeseeseessresseseesssseensenee 20 Inre. D.B. (2014) 58 Cal.4th 941 occcceesscreneseessrrensseeeeseeeeeens secevseeasenseaeeens 13 Inre Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873... csscsessssseesssecsrssesessssesssessecsesessesseesseseesssneseesees 18 Inre Reeves (2005) 35 Cal.4th 765 wie cscssssssssssessresesescesssessescssessssesseneessessssessenss 16 Inre Sonia G. (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 18.0... cc cccsesesseeeseteeeenenessstesessessescsseseseeeseses 16 In re Young (2004) 32 Cal.4th 900 oescccessesscssreseeeeseereeesseeeensentensssssesenesesseees 14 People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415 eeececscssseststssessstscesessesseessenseessssssenesesersees 12 People v. Arias (2008) 45 Cal.4th 169 oiccccsesssscssseteesesseeeseressenesssesenrssenssenessenenees 13 People v. Banks (1959) 53 Cal.2d 370... cecsesssssssssssesecssessesesseseeesesessensessensennssesssseseeets 16 People v. Bland (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991 occscsssetsnssseesesesseesseseesesseesessseeesesssesseees 18 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page People v. Canty (2004) 32 Cal4th 1266 occeeeceeseeescesssetsecsecesessascesessessesssnesessnesessas 13 People v. Clapp (1944) 67 Cal.App.2d 197... cei eesessecssessssessseesssesescneesesssrssiesssesesreeses 16 People v. Cordova (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 543...eeeeceeesseseneesessecnesnesneternessseees 14, 20 People v. Cornett (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1261eeeeeenessseeessessssseessessessssesessenescsssesasees 14 People v. Dieck (2009) 46 Cal.4th 934 oo.eecssscsssessctessenecsesssesessssensssssnessesesseasaeeasegs 14 People v. Eckard (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1241.ccscseesecesseeteeseneseeseeseresseeees 14 People v. Gilbert (1969) 1 Cal.3d 475... eeeesseeesecsssersssssssenscsssesseseeseenessesssseeeseeseeenses 17 People v. Goldstein (1867) 32 Cal. 432.eeeeeseesssscsssersssssssssssssesssssesesstesesesseessneeeetenenees 16 People v. Gonzales (December 19, 2016, CO78960).........csssssseseeseeeseesestesseneees 8,9, 10, 11 People v. Guzman (2005) 35 Cal.4th 577 oeccsccsssessesssscsssessescsssesesssessssesesssesssesessseeeeraes 14 People v. Hendrix (1997) 16 Cal4th 508 ooesccssecseeseteteeteetesesereeesreseeeseveeaeeaeeeeneess 13 People v. Kirk (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 715...cscsssssssscsssesssssssssesssssesessessensees 16 People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.2d 175.0esseessecsscseesessssrevsesssecsssessessessesseesesesseeessseeaes 15 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page People v.Loeun (1997) 17 Cal.4th 1 oeeeecssessecsesesseesessssearsreseecseasseeenees 13, 16, 20 People v. Maynarich (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 77... ccccccsssscsesssesessecsesesseneesseesesssnesenseneneees 19 People v. Moon (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1246.0...cecssssseseesereceeessesseeeeessasseeesaeneees 16 People v. Morales (2016) 63 Cal.4th 399icccccsessssssessseeseesessesseneeesessseersseeseseesneees 12 People v. Morris (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 527... csecssesessssssesessscessessseaseesesssasseesseneses 12 People v. Osuna (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1020.0... ccccsscesseseseeetesseteeessesenssssessssessesseeenees 18 People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891.ccsssseseseresetersesesessssensseneeesseneeseeentenetersesenens 13 People v. Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903, [215 CalRptr.3d 758) ......ccesseseeeeeerereeees 8 People v. Snook (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1210 oececseseeesesesereseerssesessesssseneneneeneeesaeerses 13 People v. Walker (2002) 29 Cal.4th 577 o.ecescssseserseseseesenseseeeessesseessnsessseeesneasenesnesensees 14 San Francisco Taxpayers Assn. v. Board ofSupervisors (1992) 2 Cal.4th S71cecceecssssseseseenessersssesseesssessesesssneneeesneseeseeneres 15 Silicon Valley Taxpayers Ass’n, Inc. v. Santa Clara County Open Space Authority (2008) 44 Cal.4th 431 oeecscsssessseserssscresesseesesseneesesseeeetensseeesessenes 14 Smith v. United States (1993) 508 U.S. 223 wee eeeesssssssersessssssnscestessesssasesseesseneesensserenseeseesneees 18 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page Wasatch Property Management v. Degrate (2005) 35 Cal.4th 111) eeecesecssssssesssesssssscnsensersesesseseseresees 17 STATUTES Penal Code e13 § 470, SUD. (DB)...eee eeeeseeseseetsssssesssesessssessssesseessestesenesrseeressneseesesseeees 9 § 470, SUD. (C)...eee eeeeeeeeeseeecsseetsesenssessarecsesesseceneassacsesesessesseessenessenres 9 SATB vo ecccscssesscceceeteteeeeseeetsrsseseeseescsassssssssssssscsseeesesseeaesseneeresssesseeeseeees 12, 17 § 473, SUD, (A) ..eeecccceseeteeeereeeesesseseecsssutesensesevsseeseeceresseesssensesessenesges 8, 13 § 473, SUDA. (D).....ce ceeeeeseesecsssssesenseeesessesersseseseseaecsesseenrsnsseteseeseeespassim § 475, SUD. (D) oo.eee eceesteessensesssesenscseneesecsessesseessesasesesesesseseneenneeasaeens 9 SATO. cccsccscesecsecseseteteeeeseessesessssssecssssssssevesecsesesecereseesesaenesasereesensensesensenenees 9 § 530.5 veccsceccceserescesssssesseesssessssesessessrsesensssssseecneseeesensneneoneenes 8, 13, 15, 20 § 530.5, SUD. (8)... escecseesesetsstsssesesenscsesessssesseeaseeseesnesssnenensnseeeneags 9, 20 § 532, SUD. (A)... eeccccesstssssssectsescaereseeseseneeseeessecssenesecseneneceeseeeteseneesseey 9 § L170 eee eecceseeseeseeeeeeteossssnssssessesesseecsesseesseenssecssseessensescesesassesassaeaes 21 § 1170.18, subds. (8), (f) .cccccsccceeesesesesensesesseseeecsreeessersesssaseneensteriees 12 —§ 12022, SUDA. (a) ....eccesscccscesecseeseeececereeessenseseenseaessaseseseaeeneseeseeseneeentes 17 Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act.......... 8, 12, 15, 19 Three Strikes Reform Act Of 2012 .......cccsscccccsesssseeesseessneeeresseseseseseseaaees 18 COURT RULES California Rules of Court . Rule 8.11 15(A)(1)...ccecccesccsceccsesseenesseseesessesseeresseessssnsensseseseeesseeneesnenss 14 OTHER AUTHORITIES Voter Information Guide, Gen. Election ............ccccccsseeeeseseseseeeesesneseeseseenees 19 ISSUE PRESENTED “Whatrelationship, if any, must exist between convictions for forgery _and identity theft in order to exclude a forgery conviction from sentencing as a misdemeanorunder Penal Codesection 473, subdivision (b)?” (Order Granting Petn. for Review.) INTRODUCTION In a single proceeding, appellant Craig Danny Gonzalespled guilty to multiple offenses stemming from three different cases, including four counts of check forgery committed in 2003 and one countofidentity theft committed in 2006. Forgery is a “wobbler”alternatively punishable as a felony or a misdemeanor. (Pen. Code, § 473, subd. (a).)! Proposition 47, which established the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (“the Act”), added section 473, subdivision (b). That subdivision now punishes as a misdemeanora “forgery relating to a check, bond, bank bill, note, cashier’s check, traveler’s check, or money order, where the valueof the [item] does not exceed nine hundredfifty dollars ($950).” (See People v. Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903, [215 Cal.Rptr.3d 758, 766-767].) Under section 473, subdivision (b), forgery remains a wobbler for “any person whois convicted both offorgery andofidentity theft, as defined in Section 530.5.” (§ 473, subd. (b).) Appellant petitioned to reduce his forgery convictions to misdemeanors under newly established section 473, subdivision (b), and to be resentenced accordingly. Thetrial court deniedthepetition, but the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that section 473, subdivision (b), requires an identity theft offense to be “transactionally related”to a forgery conviction in order to precluderelief. (People v. Gonzales (December 19, 1 Further unspecified statutory citations are to this code. 2016, CO78960) [nonpub. Opn.], at pp. 2-4.) As demonstrated below, no such transactional relationship is required. STATEMENTOF THE CASE A. Original Convictions The Sacramento District Attorney filed an amendedinformation charging appellant, in pertinent part, with four counts of check forgery (§ 470, subd. (d); counts 1, 3-5), obtaining property by fraud (§ 532, subd. (a); count 2), possessing blank checks with the intent to defraud (§ 475, subd. (b); count 6), possessing counterfeit bills (§ 476; count 7), and possessing counterfeit driver’s licenses with intent to assist a forgery (§ 470, subd. (b); count 8). The information consolidated a 2003 case stemming from a search of appellant and a van in which he had been a passenger and a 2005 case stemming from search ofa hotel room connected to appellant. (People v. Gonzales, supra, C078960, at pp. 6-7.) While those charges were pending, the District Attorney filed a second information charging appellant in pertinent part with identity theft (§ 530.5, subd. (a); counts 3-5) stemming from appellant’s jailhouse conspiracy to obtain unauthorized phoneservices under other people’s names. In a negotiated plea covering both charging documents, appellant pled no contestto all counts stemming from the 2003 and 2005 cases andto one countofidentity theft stemming from the 2006 case in exchange for a total maximum sentence of 20 years. In a single sentencing proceeding, the trial court imposed a term of 18 years four months on the 2003 and 2005 offenses and a consecutive term of one year four months on the 2006 identity theft offense. (Gonzales, supra, C078960,at pp. 2-4.) 2 The Court of Appeal derived the full proceduralhistory from appellant’s prior appeal of the 2008 judgment(Third District Court of Appeal, case no. C058340), which the court incorporated by reference into (continued...) B. Proposition 47 Proceeding In November 2014, the Electorate passed Proposition 47, which reducesspecific felonies and wobblers to misdemeanors,including certain acts of forgery, and created a retroactive petitioning procedure to provide sentencing relief to those serving terms on such felony convictions. (Gonzales, supra, C078960,at pp. 1,4.) In January 2015, appellantfiled a petition requesting resentencing on his forgery convictions, amongothers. The People opposed the motion, arguing that appellant’s forgery convictions were ineligible for reduction because, under section 473, subdivision (b), he had also been convicted ofidentify theft. (CT 5-6.) The trial court agreed, denying appellant’s petition based on his “current convictions.” (CT 7.) C. The Court of Appeal’s Ruling The Court ofAppeal reversedthetrial court’s ruling in part, holding that appellant’s identity theft offense committed in 2006 did not preclude the reduction of his forgery convictions committed in 2003 because they were not“transactionally related” to each other. While the court recognized that the statutory text does not impose a transactionalrelationship requirement onitsface, it found the word “both” preceding identity theft and forgery in section 473, subdivision (b), ambiguous becauseit does not clearly prescribe the necessary relationship between the twooffenses. Based on this perceived ambiguity, the court reviewed the ballot statement by the Legislative Analyst, which noted: “{u]nder this measure, forging a check worth $950 or less would always be a misdemeanor, exceptthat it would remain a wobbler crimeifthe offender commitsidentity theft in connection (...continued) the record ofthis Proposition 47 appeal. (Gonzales, supra, C078960,atp. 2, fn. 2.) with forging a check.” (Italics added.) The Court of Appeal interpreted this statement in the Voter Information Guide as a requirementthat the forgery and identity theft be “transactionally related.” (Gonzales, supra, C078960, at pp. 6-7.) This Court granted review on its own motion. (Order Granting Petn. for Review.) SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT Section 473, subdivision (b), reduces forgery under $950 to a misdemeanorunless the offender was also concurrently convicted of identity theft. By the plain terms of the statute, appellant, who was concurrently convicted of both forgery andidentity theft, is not eligible to have his forgery convictions reduced to misdemeanors. The Court of Appeal erred in requiring a transactionalrelationship between appellant’s forgery andidentity theft offenses. In doingso, the court determined that the word “both,” as used in section 473, subdivision (b), is ambiguous because “‘it does not clearly prescribe the necessary relationship betweenthe two offenses.” The court then relied on a statementby the Legislative Analyst in the Voter Information Guide to hold that an identity theft conviction must be “transactionally related” to a forgery conviction to precluderelief. But the statutory phrase “is convicted both of forgery and of identity theft” is not susceptible to more than one reasonableinterpretation. It requires that an offender only be concurrently convicted of both forgery and identity theft, and it imposes no transactional relationship between the two offenses. But evenifthe statute could be deemed ambiguous, extrinsic evidence of intent does not establish a transactional relationship requirement. The Legislative Analyst’s statement relied on by the Court of Appealis best viewedas a singular exampleofthe identity theft exception in practice rather than a transactionalrelationship requirement that is absent in the plain terms of section 473, subdivision (b). 10 ARGUMENT I. APPELLANT’S CHECK FORGERY CONVICTIONS ARE INELIGIBLE FOR REDUCTION BECAUSE HE WAS CONCURRENTLY CONVICTED OF FORGERY AND IDENTITY THEFT Section 473, subdivision (b), precludes the reduction of a forgery offense if an offender is concurrently convicted of both forgery and identity theft, which is precisely what occurred in this case. The unambiguous statutory text does not require a “transactional relationship” between the two offenses. A. Relevant Law 1. Standard of Review Issues ofstatutory construction are questions of law that are reviewed de novo on appeal. (People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 432; People v. Morris (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 527.) 2. Overview of Proposition 47 “On November4, 2014, the voters enacted Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act.” (People v. Morales (2016) 63 Cal.4th 399, 404.) The Act reduces certain drug- and theft-related offenses from felonies or wobblers (crimes that can be punishedaseither felonies or misdemeanors) to misdemeanors. (/bid.) Additionally, the Act establishes a retroactive petitioning procedure allowing for those serving sentences on such felony convictionsat the time the Act took effect to seek reduction and resentencing. (§ 1170.18, subds.(a),(f).) Pertinent to this case, the Act amendedsection 473, setting forth the punishmentfor forgery, by adding subdivision (b), which reads: Notwithstanding subdivision (a), any person whois guilty of forgery relating to a check, bond, bank bill, note, cashier’s check, traveler’s check, or money order, where the value of the check, bond, bank bill, note, cashier’s check, traveler’s check, or 1] money order does not exceed nine hundredfifty dollars ($950), shall be punishable by imprisonmentin a county jail for not more than one year, except that such person mayinstead be punished pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 if that person has one or more prior convictions for an offense specified in clause (iv) of subparagraph (C) ofparagraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 667 or for an offense requiring registration pursuantto subdivision (c) of Section 290. This . subdivision shall not be applicable to any person whois convicted both offorgery and ofidentity theft, as defined in Section 530.5. . (Voter Information Guide., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) text of Prop. 47, § 6, p. 71; see § 473, subd.(b),italics added.) In short, forgery remains punishable as either a misdemeanoror a felony if the value ofthe instrument exceeds $950, the offender has been convicted of a so-called “superstrike” offense or a crime requiring sex offenderregistration, or the offender “is convicted both of forgery and ofidentity theft, as defined in Section 530.5.” (§ 473, subds. (a), (b).) 3. Principles of Statutory Construction In interpreting a statute enacted through voterinitiative, courts apply the well-settled canonsofstatutory construction. (People v. Arias (2008) 45 Cal.4th 169, 177; People v. Canty (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1266, 1276.) The statute’s termsare first given their plain and ordinary meaning. If the language is clear and unambiguous,there is no need for further construction, and courts should notindulgein it. (People v. Snook (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1210, 1215; People v. Hendrix (1997) 16 Cal.4th 508; People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 895.) “Whenstatutory language is unambiguous, [courts] must follow its plain meaning ‘whatever may be thoughtofthe wisdom, expediency,or policy ofthe act, even if it appears probablethat a different object was in the mindofthe legislature.” (Jn re. D.B. (2014) 58 -Cal.4th 941, 948.) Courts should not “interpret away clear language in favor of an ambiguity that does not exist.” (People v. Loeun (1997) 17 12 Cal.4th 1, 9.) It is presumed the lawmakers meant whatthey said. (People v. Cornett (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1261, 1265; In re Young (2004) 32 Cal.4th 900, 906; People v. Walker (2002) 29 Cal.4th 577, 581.) Further, courts should not add provisions to a statute and are “not free to rewrite the law simply becausea literal interpretation may produce results of arguable utility.” (People v. Guzman (2005) 35 Cal.4th 577, 587; see also People v. Eckard (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1248.) “We may not, underthe guise of construction, rewrite the law or give the words an effect different from the plain and direct import of the terms used.” (California Fed. Savings & Loan Assn.v. City ofLos Angeles (1995) 11 Cal.4th 342, 349.) Butif a statute is indeed susceptible to two reasonable interpretations, courts “mayresort to extrinsic sources, including the ostensible objects to be achieved andthelegislative history.” (People v. Walker, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 581; People v. Dieck (2009) 46 Cal.4th 934, 940; Silicon Valley Taxpayers Ass'n, Inc. v. Santa Clara County Open Space Authority (2008) 44 Cal.4th 431, 444-445.) Specifically, a summary authored by the office of the Legislative Analyst sets forth information the average voter needs to adequately understand a measureonthe ballot. (People V. Cordova (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 543, 559.)? But the summary is not responsible for providing voters a complete understanding of the pending measure. (/bid.) Instead, the summary reflects a rational judgment about whateffects are most likely to matter to voters and describes them in a fair and intelligible way. (/bid.) And “[t]he meaning of a statute may not be determined from a single word or sentence; the words must be construed in 3 This Court granted review of People v. Cordova on August 31, 2016, in case number $236179. Respondentcites to the case as persuasive authority. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(d)(1).) 13 context, and provisionsrelating to the same subject matter must be harmonized to the extent possible.” (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & HousingCom. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1386-1387.) While the summery and other extrinsic aids may be helpful in interpreting an initiative, the language of an enactmentitself is always more indicativeofintent. (Carmanv. Alvord (1982) 31 Cal.3d 318, 330-331; see also San Francisco Taxpayers Assn. v. Board ofSupervisors (1992) 2 Cal.4th 571, 580; People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.2d 175, 182-183.) B. The Identity Theft Exception Established in Section 473, Subdivision (b), Applies to Offenders Concurrently Convicted of Forgery and Identity Theft, Regardless of Any Transactional Relationship Between the Offenses 1. The Unambiguous Identity Theft Exception Requires Only Concurrent Convictions Section 473, subdivision (b), states in relevant part that “any person whois guilty of forgery relating to a. . . check, bond, bank bill, note, cashier’s check, traveler’s check, or money order, where the value . . . does not exceed .. . $950... shall be punishable by imprisonmentin the county jail for not more than one year.” But the statute also specifies that it does not apply “to any person whois convicted both of forgery and ofidentity theft, as defined in Section 530.5.” (Italics added.) By its plain terms, section 473, subdivision (b), does not apply to an offender, such as appellant, who is concurrently convicted of both check forgery and identity theft. First, section 473, subdivision (b), uses the present tense (“is convicted”) to describethe identity theft exception. Contrasted with the past-tense language used to describe separate disqualifying factors in the second-to-last sentence of subdivision (b), (“has ... prior convictions”) and disqualifying factors in other sections of the Act, such as section 476a(“has 14 previously been convicted”), the statute’s use of the present tense signals that the forgery and identity theft offenses must be current or presently occurring. (People v. Loeun, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 11 [verbtenseis generally significantin interpreting statutes]; Jn re Reeves (2005) 35 Cal.4th 765, 771-772 [the past perfect tense (‘has been convicted’ or ‘previously has been convicted’) is generally used instead of the present tense (‘is convicted’) to impose a continuing disability based on criminal history.].) Further, the term “is convicted,” as used in section 473, subdivision (b), refers solely to the establishmentof guilt. A person is convicted when his or her guilt is ascertained, whether by plea or by verdict. (People v. Goldstein (1867) 32 Cal. 432, 433; see also People v. Banks (1959) 53 Cal.2d 370, 386-387; People v. Clapp (1944) 67 Cal.App.2d 197, 200 (“Thejury, or the court where a jury has been waived, convicts the accused. Conviction does not mean the judgment based upon the verdict, but it is the verdictitself. It is the ascertainmentof guilt by the trial court”(citations omitted)].) Although in other contexts such as the termination ofcivil liberties and parentalrights, the terms “convicted” and “conviction” have been construed to mean when guilt has been determined and judgmenthas been pronounced(see, e.g., People v. Kirk (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 715, 721; In re Sonia G. (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 18, 24), “in criminalcases, courts have held an admissionor finding of guilt is sufficient to establish a ‘conviction’”(Kirk, at p. 721). “As a general matter,it has been settled law for over 250 yearsthat a person stands ‘convicted’ upon the return of a guilty verdict by the jury or by entry of a plea admitting guilt. (Citation.] An exceptionto this general rule has been recognized where . . . a civil penalty follows as a consequenceofthe conviction.” (People v. Moon (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1252, someinternal quotation and edit marks omitted.) 15 Second, the word “both”in section 473, subdivision (b), is used as a conjunctionto “indicate and stress the inclusion of each of two or more things specified by coordinated words, phrases,or clauses.” (Webster’s 3d NewInternat. Dict. (2002) p. 258; Wasatch Property Managementv. Degrate (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1111, 1121-1122 [“When attempting to ascertain the ordinary, usual meaning of a word, courts appropriately refer to the dictionary definition of that word”].) The word “both” placed immediately after the term “is convicted” to stress the inclusion of “forgery” as well as “identity theft” demonstrates that the ascertainmentof the offender’s guilt of both crimes must occur in the same proceeding. Otherwise, there would have been no needto include the reference to “forgery” in the exception, as the entirety of section 473 is devoted to establishing the punishment for forgery and therefore presupposes a forgery conviction. A contrary construction would render the reference to “forgery” surplusage, violating the rules of construction. (People v. Gilbert (1969) 1 Cal.3d 475, 480.) Accordingly, the plain language ofsection 473, subdivision(b), indicates that a forgery conviction is not eligible to be reduced to a misdemeanorif the offender was also concurrently convicted of identity theft. The statutory language makes no indication that the two offenses needto be transactionally related. Had the Electorate intended to imposea transactional relationship requirement, it could have easily specified so in the statutory text, just as lawmakers have similarly done before. For example, section 12022, subdivision (a), states that a person whois armed with a firearm in the commission of a felony or attempted felony shall be punished by an additional term of imprisonment. The “in commission” language establishes a facilitative nexus between the arming andthe felony, requiring the firearm to serve some purpose towards commissionofthe crime. Its involvement cannot be the result of accident or coincidence. 16 Se em aa t g s s a Fa gi n (People v. Bland (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, 1002-1003; see also Smith v. United States (1993) 508 U.S. 223, 238-239 [facilitative nexus also required in federal enhancementfor using or carrying a firearm “during and in relation to” an offense].) Similarly, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, also enacted by the voters through Proposition 36, disqualifies a petitioner from sentencing relief if the petitioner was armed with a firearm during commission ofthe current offense. (§§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iii), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(iii); People v. Osuna (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1032,italics added.) Unlike the facilitative nexus required by the firearm enhancement, the “during commission” language establishes a temporal nexus requiring the petitioner to be armed with the firearm only while committing the underlying offense, regardless of whetherit is used towardsits commission. (Ibid.) Inboth examples, law makers established a specific relationship between the two acts and specified that relationship in the statutory text. Here, the Electorate could havealso specified a transactional nexus requirement between forgery andidentity theft in the statutory text. (/n re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 890 fn. 11 [electorate presumedto be aware of existing laws andtheir judicial construction].) But it did not. And the Court of Appeal wasnotfree to rewrite the statute to impose such a requirement. Byits plain and unambiguousterms, section 473, subdivision (b), precludes the reduction of a forgery conviction to a misdemeanorifthe offender was also concurrently convicted ofidentity theft, whichis precisely what occurredin this case. | 2. Extrinsic Evidence of Voter Intent Does Not Establish a Transactional Relationship Requirement Thestatute is unambiguous, and extrinsic aids are unnecessary to determineits intent. But if the statute is deemed ambiguous,extrinsic 17 evidence of intent does not establish a transactional relationship requirement. The official summary of Proposition 47 stated that the Act “TrJequires [a] misdemeanorsentenceinstead of felony for the following crimes when[the] amountinvolved is $950orless: petty theft, receiving stolen property, and forging/writing bad checks.” (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra,off. tit. and summary by the Attorney General, p. 34.) And the Legislative Analyst provided a statement thatlisted “check forgery” as a reducible offense and stated: “Undercurrentlaw,it is a wobblercrimeto forge a check of any amount. Under this measure, forging a check worth $950 or less would always be a misdemeanor, except that it would remain a wobbler crimeifthe offender commitsidentity theft in connection with forging a check.” (Voter Guide, supra, Analysis of Prop. 47 by the Legislative Analyst, p. 35, italics added.) The analyst’s statementis best viewed as an example ofthe identity theft exception in practice rather than a narrow construction of the exception. First, the analyst’s statement references only forged checks. But the Actalso applies to forged bonds, bankbills, notes, cashier’s checks, traveler’s checks, and money orders. Because the statement does not address six of the seven types of forgcrics cnumcratedin the statute,it should not be read to narrow the identity theft exception in relation to all forgeries. There is no indication that the single reference to one type of forged instrumentwas intended to narrow theplain language ofa statute applicableto all listed acts of forgery. Second, forgery of currency (a bank bill or note) requires no identifying information,anditis difficult to imagine how one would commit identity theft “in connection” with the offense. (People v. Maynarich (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 77, 80-81 [forged United States Currencyis a forged bankbill or note under the Act].) Imposing such a requirement could negate the identity theft exception to specific acts of 18 forgery listed in section 473, subdivision (b). But when the Legislative Analyst’s statement is viewed as a practical example ofthe identity theft exception,instead ofan exclusivelimitation, the lone reference to checks becomesa usefulillustration rather than an incomplete rule and maintains the exception’s applicability to all forgeries listed in section 473, subdivision (b). (People v. Cordova, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 559 [Legislative Analysts summary reflects a rational judgment about what effects are most likely to matter to voters and describes them in a fair and intelligible way].) Third, section 530.5 defines several types of identity theft, only one of which involves an offender’s obtainment and use of someoneelse’s personal identifying information (§ 530.5, subd. (a)). The remaining provisions either protect the victim or criminalize the acquisition, retention, or sale of personal identifying information with the intent to defraud and mail theft (§ 530.5, subds.(b)-(e)). If the Electorate intended to limit the exception to forgeries that were facilitated by identity thefts, it would have restricted the exception to persons convictedof identity theft as defined in Penal Codesection 530.5, subdivision (a). (Garcia v. McCutchen (1997) 16 Cal.4th 469, 476 [courts “presumethat the [drafters] intended every word, phraseand provision . . . in a statute . . . to have meaning and to perform a useful function.”; Loeun, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 9 [statutory “{i]nterpretations that lead to absurd results or render words surplusage are to be avoided”(internal quotation marks omitted)].) But again,it did not. In sum, section 473, subdivision (b), unambiguously states that a forgery conviction under $950 is noteligible to be reduced to a misdemeanorifthe offender was concurrently convicted of forgery and identity theft. This language does not imposea transactionalrelationship between the two offenses, and further interpretation of intent is unnecessary. But even if the language isdeemed ambiguous, extrinsic aids do not reveal 19 an intent to require a transactional relationship. Because appellant was concurrently convicted of both checkforgery and identity theft, section 473, subdivision (b), precludes the reduction of his forgery convictions. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, Respondent respectfully asks this Court to vacate the Court of Appeal’s opinion with instructions to reinstate the trial court’s order denying appellant’s section 1170.18 petition. Dated: May 15, 2017 Respectfully submitted, XAVIER BECERRA Attorney General of California GERALD A. ENGLER Chief Assistant Attorney General MICHAELP. FARRELL Senior Assistant Attorney General ERIC L. CHRISTOFFERSEN Supervising Deputy Attorney General RACHELLE A. NEWCOMB Deputy Attorney General IVAN P. MARRS Deputy Attorney General Attorneysfor Plaintiffand Respondent SA2015300582 32788947doc 20 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I certify that the attached OPENING BRIEF ON THE MERITS uses a 13 point Times New Romanfont and contains 4,079 words. Dated: May 15, 2017 XAVIER BECERRA Attorney General of California IVAN P. MARRS ~ Deputy Attorney General Attorneysfor Plaintiffand Respondent 21 DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY U.S. MAIL Case Name: People v. Gonzales No.: C078960 / S240044 I declare: 1 am employedin the Office of the Attorney General, which is the office of a memberofthe California State Bar, at which member's direction this service is made. I am 18 years of age or older and nota party to this matter. I am familiar with the business practice at the Office ofthe Attorney General for collection and processing of correspondencefor mailing with the United States Postal Service. In accordance with that practice, correspondenceplaced in the internal mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney Generalis deposited with the UnitedStates Postal Service with postage thereon fully prepaid that same day in the ordinary course of business. On May 15, 2017,I served the attached RESPONDENT’S OPENING BRIEF ON THE MERITSbyplacinga true copythereof enclosed in a sealed envelopein the internal mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney Generalat 1300 I Street, Suite 125, P.O. Box 944255, Sacramento, CA 94244-2550, addressed asfollows: County of Sacramento Elizabeth Campbell Gordon D. 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