TROESTER v. STARBUCKS CORPORATION

Respondent’s Response to Amicus Curiae Brief

Cal.July 12, 2017

S234969 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT DOUGLAS TROESTER, F | LE D PlaintiffandAppellant, JUL 19 2017 v. Jorge Navarrete Clerk STARBUCKS CORPORATION, _ Defendant and Respondent. Deputy ON A CERTIFIED QUESTION FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT CASE No. 14-55530 RESPONDENT’S CONSOLIDATED ANSWERTO BRIEFS OF AMICI CURIAE CONSUMERATTORNEYSOFCALIFORNIAAND CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT LAWYERSASSOCIATION; AND WOMEN’S EMPLOYMENTRIGHTS CLINIC OF GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY SCHOOLOF LAW, BET TZEDEK, CENTRO LEGAL DE LA RAZA, NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, AND LEGALAID AT WORK AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP *REX S. HEINKE (SBN 066163) RHEINKE@AKINGUMP.COM GREGORY W. KNopP (SBN 237615) GKNOPP@AKINGUMP.COM MARK R. CURIEL (SBN 222749) MCURIEL@AKINGUMP.COM JONATHANP. SLOWIK (SBN 287635) JPSLOWIK@AKINGUMP.COM 1999 AVENUE OF THESTARS, SUITE 600 Los ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90067 TELEPHONE: 310-229-1000 FACSIMILE: 310-229-1001 ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT STARBUCKS CORPORATION S$234969 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA DOUGLAS TROESTER, Plaintiffand Appellant, Vv. STARBUCKS CORPORATION, Defendant and Respondent. ON A CERTIFIED QUESTION FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT CASE No.14-55530 , RESPONDENT’S CONSOLIDATED ANSWERTO BRIEFS OF AMICI CURIAE CONSUMERATTORNEYSOF CALIFORNIAAND CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT LAWYERSASSOCIATION; AND WOMEN’S EMPLOYMENTRIGHTS CLINIC OF GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, BET TZEDEK, CENTRO LEGALDE LA RAZA, NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, AND LEGALAID AT WORK AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP *REX S. HEINKE (SBN 066163) RHEINKE@AKINGUMP.COM GREGORY W.Knopp (SBN 237615) GKNOPP@AKINGUMP.COM MARK R. CURIEL (SBN 222749) MCURIEL@AKINGUMP.COM JONATHANP. SLOWIK (SBN 287635) JPSLOWIK@AKINGUMP.COM 1999 AVENUE OF THE STARS, SUITE 600 Los ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90067 TELEPHONE: 310-229-1000 FACSIMILE: 310-229-1001 ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT STARBUCKS CORPORATION I. II. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION oo. cccccscccssssccscessesesseesseeseessessesseestaesenssesesesseeneees 5 ARGUMENT.....ccccccesecssesessesessssersesseesersesscessestesessaeeenseeensseasseseneenes 5 A. Applying The De Minimis Rule To California Wage Claims Would Not Nullify Statutory ODI]IgatiONS. 0...ec sesesesseceseeeceeteeeseeeaeeaecaeesaeeeeeeaeeaseaeeeeesees 5 B. Neither The Legislative, Regulatory, Nor Other Authorities Show That The De Minimis Rule Is Somehow Inapplicable to California Wage Cais, oo... ee eeeeeeeceseeeceneenseneesceseeneeeeaeecsacsenesesessecesaeetsesseaseeseess 8 C. Applying The De Minimis Rule To California Wage ClaimsIs Entirely Consistent With Principles Of California Law. .0....... cc ccccesesesseeeseestsesesssenseees 10 CONCLUSION....eee ectesssseeseseceeseeaseeceeaeeaesseesesseaestareneesensaeeseees 12 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) CASES Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. (1946) 328 U.S. 680 occ cccesecseseeeesseeecnsesaeessenessaeesaceaneeeesseteateneeegs 7,14 Armenta v. Osmose, Inc. (2005) 135 CalApp.4th 314occecccecesseteseseseseeceeseeeeseeseesaeeeteaseaee 13 Bickel v. City ofPiedmont (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1040occcecesesssceseeseeecsessceeceseeseaseseaseaseeseeseaeeetens 8 Building Material & Const. Teamsters Union, Local 216v. Farrell (1986) 41 Cal.3d 651ccecsesseeeeeesssecccensseereeteeesearseseeseesnesanenenearee 10 Corbin v. Time Warner Entertainment-Advance Newhouse Partnership (9th Cir. 2016) 821 F.3d 1069 oo...cee ecsecsecsesteerseceseesssereeseeeseeseeseeens 13 Costerisan v. Melendy (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 57 occ ccccccsccceesccssecseesersceeesarssetsnteesenseetecereterenees 9 Daveon, Inc. v. Roberts & Morgan (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1355eeeeeeseesseceseeseeseeseeessseeseseeseestaseeeeees 8 In re Garcia (2014) 58 Cal.4th 440ooceceeeeeceecreceecseseneesesenesecueseeneeesensssateaes 9 Hernandez v. Mendoza (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 721iceeeeeceeesseseeerersesesesereeseeerecesseeesassesessenes 12 Knoke v. Swan (1935) 2 Cal.2d 630 ou... ccsecscececeeeeeceseseeeeesesssceessasseserasseeseseeessesensassees 9 Lass v. Eliassen (1928) 94 Cal.App. 175 .cccccsssssceesssescnesceseeeserssessesesecesesnrssesseseansesesses 8 Lindow v. United States (9th Cir. 1984) 738 F.2d 1057 oo.eee eeseseesseeseeeeesesseneeneasesseseeses passim Martinez v. Combs (2010) 49 Cal4th 35oecesesersseeesssecesssssscssecesssessecssarssessaereeeseesers 13 3 Mendiola v. CPS Security Solutions, Inc. (2015) 60 Cal.4th 833 oooeeesescereseeeceseceeveesenenecneeveseenseneesevsneseenees 12 Moore Grocery Co. v. Los Angeles Nut House (1928) 90 Cal.App. 792 occceceseeesseeseeceeceseeeceneessesseesaeeseteasensesesntans 8 Moore v. Cal. State Bd. ofAccountancy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 999ooccssesseccssecterssseteesseseseeecsetscecseeseneseseneaesaesas 9 Morillion v. Royal Packing Co. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 575 ooceseeesecesseseesesssessaceeaeenseseesenecsuesessans 13, 14 People v. One 1940 Ford V-8 Coupe (1950) 36 Cal.2d 471 occcccscceteeceseceeseeeetecseeesscneecseeesseeseaeesessaeeeesenses 8 Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 785oceecccsseescecceseeseeteseesensessacessessserseseassaeesseasens 12 Roe v. Superior Court (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 138occesseseseceeseeeseeeseeseecseeesaetsaesnteetseeneaes 8 See ’s Candy Shops, Inc. v. Superior Court (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 889 oooeeeeeessseeeseeeseesesseeseesceeeeenersnees 13, 14 Walker v. Emerson (1891) 89 Cal. 456 oooeccseecseeesateeestrensssessesseeeecesneessessieesseessasenseeneees 9 STATUTES Civ. Code, § 3509.00... cccscessesesesscessessecseecscecsnseesesetecessaeseeeeaeseaeeaeseeeassenseease 8 Civ. Code, § 3533.0... cecccesessneseseeeessecececcseesetsceesanaeeeorseeecaeseosasensaseasenarens 8 I. INTRODUCTION In its AnswerBrief, Starbucks demonstrated that the de minimis rule has long been a central componentofCalifornia law (not simply an imported “federal”rule), the Court may look to Anderson and Lindow and other federal guidance because the de minimis rule does not conflict with California law, and the Legislature has effectively ratified the DLSE’s longstanding approval of the rule. Starbucks also demonstrated that the de minimis rule equally applies to statutory claims (not just equitable claims), the rule is no less relevant today, and it will neither lead to employer abuse nor employee harm. Now, amici curiae Consumer Attorneys of Californiaet al. (“Consumer Attorneys”) and Women’s Employment Rights Clinic of Golden Gate University School ofLaw et al. (“Women’s Employment”) question these conclusions by arguing that the de minimis rule would “nullify” Labor Code or Wage Order requirements, that California legislative intent or history is somehowinconsistent with applying the de minimis rule to wage claims,or that the rule otherwise cannot be squared with California law. As explained below, noneoftheir arguments can survive scrutiny, and many ofthem have already been addressed. Il ARGUMENT A. Applying The De Minimis Rule To California Wage Claims Would Not Nullify Statutory Obligations. Consumer Attorneys argue that a maxim cannot be used to “vitiate” or otherwise nullify a statute. (Consumer Attorneys Br. at 5.) But thatis not what the de minimis rule, as applied to wage and hour claims, seeks to do. Rather, as explained in Starbucks AnswerBrief, the de minimis rule simply provides a realistic and practical means of determining “all” hours worked without giving effect to minortrifles or other “split-second absurdities.” (Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. (1946) 328 U.S. 680, 692; Civ. Code, § 3533.) In other words, the rule merely “aids in the[] just application” of the Labor Code and Wage Order, and does not “qualify” a statute or regulation. (Civ. Code, § 3509 (“Intent and effect of maxims”).)! Thus, the issue is categorically different than the issues presented in Consumer Attorneys’ cited cases, where application of a maxim was sought to avoid or defeat statutory requirements altogether, or where a maxim was simply inapplicable. (People v. One 1940 Ford V-8 Coupe (1950) 36 Cal.2d 471, 472-476 [despite maxim that the law does not “require[] idle acts,” the relevant statute required the lienholder to conduct an investigation to secure its interest, and lienholder admittedly failed to conduct any investigation whatsoever]; Roe v. Superior Court (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 138, 147-148 [maxim that “Legislature intended similar statutory language covering similar subjects to be similarly construed” not applicable where the languagein thepriorstatute and the language in the subsequentstatute “appear dissimilar”]; Davcon, Inc. v. Roberts & Morgan (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1365 [maxim that “a person cannot take advantage ofhis or her own wrong”not applicable where no “wrong” occurred,rather, plaintiffs simply exercisedtheir “statutory right” to file a peremptory challenge]; Lass v. Eliassen (1928) 94 Cal.App. 175, 177-179 [maxim that “equity will consider that done which ought to have been done”not applicable where statute expressly requires court confirmation forsale to take effect, and such confirmation had not yet taken place]; Moore Grocery ' Bickel v. City ofPiedmont (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1040, cited by Consumer Attorneys, supports Starbucks position. Consumer Attorneys and Women’s Employmentessentially urge a strict construction of the word “all” that accounts for every minute, second, or even millisecond of work, despite the fact that such time is admittedly impracticable to capture. (See, e.g., Women’s Employment Br. at 11.) In Bickel, this Court expressly cautioned against such “literal construction” of a statute when it leads to unreasonable results. (Bickel, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1048,fn. 4.) 6 Co. v. Los Angeles Nut House (1928) 90 Cal.App. 792, 793-795 [where statute specifically required that reporter’s transcript be certified by the trial judge, requirement cannot be excusedas “an idle act’’].) Consumer Attorneys’ reliance on cases specifically involving the de minimis rule is equally misplaced. In Jn re Garcia (2014) 58 Cal.4th 440, the Court simply declined to decide whether the de minimis rule applied to the statutory languageat issue. (/d. at pp. 456-457 [“we need not determine the validity of the parties’ contentions with regard to the proper interpretation of [the statute]”].) And, as explained in Starbucks Answer Brief (at 29), Knoke v. Swan (1935) 2 Cal.2d 630, declined to apply the de minimis rule to a tax sale only because the Court’s prior decisions precluded it from doing so, and the Court would not “hesitate”to applyit had the issue been “newly presented.” (/d. at p. 631.) Nor can the application of the de minimis rule to wage claims be fairly comparedto this Court’s refusal to apply the rule to water right claims, where characterizing the monetary damage as de minimis would ignore the fact that the improper water use “will ripen into an easement. . . caus[ing] plaintiff great and irreparable injury.” (Walker v. Emerson (1891) 89 Cal. 456, 458-459.) Nor can it be compared to trespass claims, where “{djamages, even though nominal, are considered necessary to support a judgment in a trespass tort action sinceit is essentially an action for damages.” (Costerisan v. Melendy (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 57, 60-61.) Thus, Costerian madeclear that the de minimis rule could not be used to correct a judgmentof “no damages”to read “nominal damages.” (Jbid.) Thatsituation does notexisthere. Consumer Attorneys also cite several cases for the proposition that legislative intent must prevail over maxims. (Br. at 5-6 [citing, e.g., Moore v. Cal. State Bd. ofAccountancy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 999, 1012].) But as explained in Section II.B below, neither Consumer Attorneys nor Women’s 7 Employment can point to any legislative intent or history that precludes, or is inconsistent with, application of the de minimis rule. B. Neither The Legislative, Regulatory, Nor Other Authorities Show That The De Minimis Rule Is Somehow Inapplicable to California Wage Claims. Consumer Attorneys and Women’s Employmentgoto great lengths to describe the history, enactment, and reenactment of various Labor Code sections and Wage Orders. (Consumer AttorneysBr. at 7-26, Women’s EmploymentBr. at 6-20.) But the crux of their arguments essentially reveals only two things: (i) for years, California law, just like federal law, has required employers to record and pay for “any” and “all” time worked, and (ii) the Legislature and [WC simply remainedsilent in that they never expressly adopted or rejected the de minimis rule. (See generally id.; Starbucks AnswerBr. at 20-21.) That does not preclude application of the de minimis rule. To the contrary, given the similarity between California and federal law on paying for “all” time worked, the Court may properly look to federal authorities, including the Lindow test, on what it means to do so. (See, e.g., Building Material & Const. Teamsters Union, Local 216 v. Farrell (1986) 41 Cal.3d 651, 658; Starbucks AnswerBr. at 20-25 [citing additional authorities].)’ The fact that the IWC enacted a definition of “hours worked”(i.e., compensable time) to broadly include any time under the employer’s “control,” in response to the federal Portal-to-Portal Act’s exclusion of certain activities from compensable time, does nothing to changethis. (Consumer Attorneys Br. at 12-14; Women’s EmploymentBr. 2, 6-9.) As * The “employee-protecti[ve] purpose” of California wage lawsis not, as Consumers Attorneys and Women’s Employmentsuggest, a reason to depart from federal authorities such as Lindow. (ConsumerAttorneys Br. at 7; Women’s EmploymentBr. at 1.) As explained in Starbucks AnswerBrief, federal wage law is designed to protect employeestoo. (Starbucks AnswerBr. at 23-24 & fn. 5.) 8 explained in Starbucks AnswerBrief, the de minimis rule is not concerned with whether the time is compensable. Rather, the de minimis rule is concerned with whether short periods of compensable time mustbe paid. (Starbucks AnswerBr. at 21, 24.) Stated differently, the de minimis test starts with the assumption that the time does comprise “hours worked,” and then explores whether the time is too small and administratively difficult to capture. Thus,it is of no momentthat the definition of “hours worked” may be broader under California law than it is under the federal Portal-to- Portal Act.? Consumer Attorneys also argue that the [WC “wasted no time in signaling disagreement” with Lindow and the DLSE’s adoption ofthe de minimis rule but, again, Consumer Attorneys point to no action except the simple fact that the [WC continuedto include the word “all” in the Wage Orders. (Consumer AttorneysBr. at 17-18.) This hardly signals disagreement with the de minimis rule, especially when both California and federal law already required paymentfor “all” hours worked. Nor can the DLSE beaccused of disregarding this Court’s decisions by adopting the de minimis rule because, as explained in Starbucks Answer Brief, the cited authorities are readily distinguishable, the DLSE’s position is entitled to due consideration, and the Legislature has effectively ratified the position. (Starbucks AnswerBr. at 20-28.) Consumer Attorneys’ and 3 Consumer Attorneys’ observation that the Wage Orders adopted the FLSA definition of “hours worked”for health care industry workersis misplaced for the same reason. (ConsumerAttorneys’ Br. at 18, 20.) Again, it has nothing to do with the de minimis rule, and Consumer Attorneys misstate the law when they argue (without any legal support) that the IWC expressly “adopt[ed]” the de minimis rule for the health care industry to the exclusion ofall other industries. (/bid.) As explained in Starbucks AnswerBrief, the de minimis rule is not referenced in any of the wage orders—notsurprisingly given its fundamental nature. (Starbucks Answer Br. at 24.) Women’s Employment’s arguments to the contrary add nothing to these previously-briefed points. (See, e.g., Consumer Attorneys Br. at 19-21 & n.17 [arguing, for example, that the DLSE Manual comprises an “underground regulation”]; Women’s EmploymentBr. at 17-22 [arguing, for example, that the de minimis rule violates Mendiola v. CPS Security Solutions, Inc. (2015) 60 Cal.4th 833, Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 785, or other decisions of this Court].) Cc. Applying The De Minimis Rule To California Wage Claims Is Entirely Consistent With Principles Of California Law. Consumer Attorneys and Women’s Employmentraise a variety of arguments as to why the de minimis ruleis inconsistent with California wage law. None withstandsscrutiny. First, citing Hernandez v. Mendoza (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 721, ConsumerAttorneys argue that the obligation to record all hours worked falls on the employer, applying the de minimis rule would effectively shift this burden to employees, and an employer should not be permitted to take advantage of its own failure to records all hours worked. (Consumer Attorneys Br. at 26-28.) But Hernandez did not concern the de minimis + rule. And more importantly, unlike Hernandez, this is not a case where the employer has purposefully “made up”false time records. (Hernandez, supra, 199 Cal.App.3d at pp. 725, 727.) Noris it even a case where an employer failed to keep time records at all. Rather, the de minimis rule contemplates that employers should record and paytimeto the fullest extent practicable. Thus, it simply cannotbe said that the de minimisrule would somehow enable employers to take advantage of their own wrong. Consumer Attorneys respond by arguing that “concerns of ‘practicality’” can be read into wage obligations only where the impact on the employee is neutral and there is never any loss in pay. (Consumer 10 Attorneys Br. at 28-29.) But See’s Candy Shops, Inc. v. Superior Court (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 889, cited by Consumer Attorneys and which approved of time rounding for practical purposes, was concerned with avoiding policies that “systematically undercompensate employees.” (Jd. at p. 902, emphasis added.) Thus, practical concerns are relevant even where an otherwise neutral practice results in a particular employee not receiving pay for very small amounts of time. (Corbin v. Time Warner Entertainment-Advance Newhouse Partnership (9th Cir. 2016) 821 F.3d 1069, 1079 [neutral rounding practice lawful regardless of impact on particular employee].)* Consumer Attorneys also respond by arguing that it would be “just as ‘practical’ for the employerto pay for extra time” or to change its practices such that the timeis easier to record. (Consumer Attorneys Br.at 30-31 & fn. 23.) But the former point ignores the fact that the amount of extra time wouldstill be difficult to determine. And, the latter point simply bears on the merits of the de minimis defense in any given case(i.e., the administrative difficulty factor in Lindow), and not on whether the Lindow test may beutilized in California wage casesat all. Second, citing Morillion v. Royal Packing Co. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 575, Consumer Attorneys argue that California law already requires paymentfor “short, hard-to-record working periods” such as the time employees spend waiting for, and riding in, employer-provided shuttle buses. (Consumer Attorneys Br. at 27, 31-32.) But Morillion did not address the de minimis rule. Nor did it even address whether any of the time was difficult to record. Rather, the issue in Morillion was whetherthe * Consumer Attorneys’ reliance on Martinez v. Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35, and Armenta v. Osmose, Inc. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 314, is likewise misplaced and, for reasons previously briefed, pose no obstacle to applying the de minimisrule to California wage claims. (Consumer Attorneys Br. at 29-30; Starbucks AnswerBr.at 23-26.) 11 time was compensablein thefirst place. (Jd. at p. 578.) Again, the de minimis test assumesthe time is compensable. (Starbucks AnswerBr. at 21, 24.) Third, Consumer Attorneys argue that the de minimis rule is subject _ to abuse becauseit allows employers to avoid paymentfor certain work activities simply by viewing each activity in isolation. (Consumer Attorneys Br. at 33-34.) This argumentfails as well becauseit ignores the fact that, under the Lindowtest, courts muststill consider “the aggregate amount of compensable time.” (Lindow v. United States (9th Cir. 1984) 738 F.2d 1057, 1063, emphasis added.) Finally, Women’s Employment, muchlike Troester in his opening brief, speculates that adopting the de minimis rule would “harm” employees whoalready face “significant” wage violations. (Women’s Employment Br. at 23-24.) Again, as explained in Starbucks AnswerBrief, these arguments ignore the protective nature of the Lindow test. (Starbucks AnswerBr. at 33-35.)° Hl. CONCLUSION Forall the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons previously explained in Starbucks AnswerBrief, the de minimis test outlined in Anderson and Lindow equally applies to wage and hour claims underthe > Consumer Attorneys’ reliance on See’s for the proposition that ten- minute periods of time before and after shifts would be compensableifthe employees were working or under employer contro! (Consumer Attorneys Br. at 27, 32-33), is inapposite for similar reasons, namely, the court did not address whether the amountofwork time, if any, would be difficult to determine. (See’s, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 894 & fn. 2.) ° Noris there any basis to Women’s Employment’s unsupported assertion that the de minimis test is somehow “obsolete,” as already briefed and explained in Starbucks AnswerBrief. (Women’s EmploymentBr.at 16; Starbucks AnswerBr. at 30-33.) 12 California Labor Code, and Consumer Attorneys and Women’s Employmentfail to state any compelling reason to the contrary. Respectfully submitted, Dated: July 10, 2017 AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP » Leathe Rex S. Heinke Attorneys for Defendant and Respondent Starbucks Corporation 13 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE This brief consists of 2,555 words as counted by the Microsoft Word version 2010 word processing program usedto generate the brief. Dated: July 10, 2017 AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAVER & FELD LLP » Web hyible. Rex S. Heinke Attorneys for Defendant and Respondent Starbucks Corporation 14 PROOF OF SERVICE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES I am employed in the County ofLos Angeles, State of California. I am overthe age of 18 and not a party to the within action; my business address is: 1999 Avenueofthe Stars, Suite 600, Los Angeles, California 90067. On July 10, 2017, I served the foregoing document describedas: RESPONDENT’S CONSOLIDATED ANSWERTO BRIEFS OF AMICI CURIAE CONSUMER ATTORNEYS OF CALIFORNIAAND CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS ASSOCIATION; AND WOMEN’S EMPLOYMENTRIGHTS CLINIC OF GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, BET TZEDEK, CENTRO LEGAL DE LA RAZA, NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, AND LEGALAID AT WORK onthe interested parties below, using the following means: PLEASE SEE ATTACHEDSERVICELIST & BY UNITED STATES MAIL enclosed the documentin a sealed envelope or package addressed to the respective addresses ofthe parties stated above and placed the envelopes for collection and mailing, following our ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar with the firm’s practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondenceis placed for collection and mailing,it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service, in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid at Los Angeles, California. & (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the lawsofthe State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on July 10, 2017, at Los Angeles, California. Serena L. Steiner [Print Name of Person Executing Proof] [Signature] 15 SERVICE LIST Shaun Setareh ThomasAlistair Segal H. Scott Leviant Setareh Law Group 9454 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 907 Beverly Hills, CA 90212 [Counsel For Appellant Douglas Troester] Louis Max Benowitz Law Office OfLouis M. Benowitz 9454 Wilshire Blvd., Penthouse 3 Beverly Hills, CA 90212 [Counsel For Appellant Douglas Troester] David Glenn Spivak Spivak Law Firm 9454 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 303 Beverly Hills, CA 90212 [Counsel For Appellant Douglas Troester] Kimberly Ann Kralowec Kralowec Law Group 44 Montgomery Street, Suite 1210 San Francisco, CA 94104 [Counsel For Amicus Curiae Consumer Attorneys ofCalifornia] Ari J. Stiller-Shulman Kingsley & Kingsley 16133 Ventura Boulevard Suite 1200 Encino, CA 91436 [Counsel For Amicus Curiae California Employment Lawyers Association] Anna Helen Kirsch Hina B. Shah Women’s EmploymentRights Clinic of Golden Gate University School ofLaw 536 Mission Street San Francisco, CA 94105 [Counsel ForAmicus Curiae Women’s Employment Rights Clinic ofGolden Gate University Schoolof Law, Bet Tzedek, Centro Legal de la Raza, National Employment Law Project, and Legal AidAt Work] 16 LaceyL. Estudillo Robert Herring Wright Felix Shafir Horvitz & Levy LLP 3601 West Olive Avenue, 8th Floor Burbank, CA 91505 [Counsel For Amicus Curiae Association ofSouthern California Defense Counsel] David Ryan Carpenter Sonia Andrea Vucetic Sidley Austin LLP 555 West Sth Street, Suite 4000 Los Angeles, CA 90013 [Counsel For Amicus Curiae California Retailers Association] Karin Dougan Vogel Daniel Francisco De La Cruz Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP 501 West Broadway,19th Floor San Diego, CA 92101 [Counsel For Amicus Curiae Chamber ofCommerce ofthe United States ofAmerica] Richard J. Simmons Jason Wade Kearnaghan Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton, LLP 333 South Hope Street, 48th Floor | Los Angeles, CA 90071 [Counsel For Amicus Curiae Chamber ofCommerce ofthe United States ofAmerica] Emma Luevano Justine Lazarus Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp LLP 11377 West Olympic Boulevard Los Angeles, CA 90064 [Counsel For Amicus Curiae Employers Group and California Employment Law Council] 17