M., BIANKA v. S.C.

Petitioner’s Petition for Review

Cal.April 12, 2016

Ne S )3 37 5" SUPREME COURT FILED ST APR 12 2046 Frank A. McGuire Clerk EK Aa. IN TH Demy ae SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 8.25(b) BIANKA M., Petitioner, Vv THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent; GLADYSM.., Real Party in Interest. AFTERA PUBLISHED DECISION BY THE COURT OF APPEAL, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION THREE ° CASE NO. B267454 PETITION FOR REVIEW IRELL & MANELLA LLP PUBLIC COUNSEL *Joshua C. Lee (SB# 268606) Judith London (SB# 149431) jclee@irell.com jlondon@publiccounsel.org 1800 Avenueofthe Stars, Suite 900 610 South Ardmore Avenue Los Angeles, CA 90067 Los Angeles, CA 90005 Telephone: (310) 277-1010 Telephone: (213) 385-2977 Facsimile: (310) 203-7199 Facsimile: (213) 385-9089 IMMIGRANT DEFENDERS LAW CENTER Nickole G. Miller (SB# 287435) Nickole@ImmDef.org 634 South Spring Street, Third Floor Los Angeles, CA 90014 Telephone: (213) 438-9021 Facsimile: (213) 634-0999 ATTORNEYSFOR PETITIONER, BIANKA M. 7711754.18 01 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA BIANKA M., Petitioner, vy. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent; GLADYSM., Real Party in Interest. AFTER A PUBLISHED DECISION BY THE COURT OF APPEAL, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION THREE - CASE NO. B267454 PETITION FOR REVIEW IRELL & MANELLA LLP PUBLIC COUNSEL *Joshua C. Lee (SB# 268606) Judith London (SB# 149431) jclee @irell.com jlondon@publiccounsel.org 1800 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 900 610 South Ardmore Avenue Los Angeles, CA 90067 Los Angeles, CA 90005 Telephone: (310) 277-1010 Telephone: (213) 385-2977 Facsimile: (310) 203-7199 Facsimile: (213) 385-9089 IMMIGRANT DEFENDERS LAW CENTER Nickole G. Miller (SB# 287435) Nickole@ImmDef.org 634 South Spring Street, Third Floor Los Angeles, CA 90014 Telephone: (213) 438-9021 Facsimile: (213) 634-0999 ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER, BIANKA M. 7711754.18 01 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE ISSUES PRESENTED...ceecceccseseeceneceeeseneeeseesceseeeeeecessenseessesesseesensesens 1 REASONS FOR GRANTING THEPETITION..........ccecsesecsessessessesnessees 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE...cece cseseseseecssescseeessseesseesseesessessenensaes 6 I. Congress Created the SIJS Framework with a Clear Division of Authority Between the Federal Government and State Courts. .........ccccccccsssesssecersesetsssesesens 6 I. The Court of Appeal Affirmed the Superior Court’s Refusal to Make SIJS Findings on the Groundsthat the Proceeding Below WasNot “Bona Fide” and a Parentage Determination Had Not Been — and Could Not Be — Made.oecseseseeseeesssesseeessesssssersesssenes 7 LEGAL ARGUMENT0cecesceessecseseetseeesseseeeseeeeeseeeeseseesatecseasas 10 I. Review is Required to Decide If California Courts Improperly Usurp The Authority Of The Federal Government By Denying A Child’s Request for Special Immigrant Juvenile Status Findings Based On A Conclusion That The Proceeding Is Not “BONG Fide.”.o..ccccscccccesscssceseesesecsseeseeeessesseeesenessaesaeseesseeneens 10 A. Prior to Bianka M., California’s Courts Recognized They Had No Role In Determining The Motivation or Worthiness of Children Seeking Special Immigrant Juvenile Status Findings. .............ccccccessesscscesseseaes 10 B. By Authorizing California Courts to Determine Whether a Child’s Request for SIJS Findingsis “Bona Fide,” Bianka M. Creates a Conflict with Prior Court of Appeal DeCiSIONS.000...eee eeeeceseeeesceseeesseessseessssseessseeessseress 12 Il. By Requiring California Family Courts to Condition the Issuance of SIJS Findings on a Parentage Determination, Bianka M. Creates a Conflict with Other Appellate Decisions. ...........:cccccssseessseseeeecseseesessenes 13 TTIV754.18 Ot -1- PAGE CONCLUSION00...eceeeeccesseesccccccecececessscececsnsuscseuscssasseeaaasssssccesseresscavecs 16 CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT(CAL. RULES OF COURT, RULE 8.204(C)(1))scccccsccscessecsessesessecssecsssessuessseessassesssseceeses 17 7711754.18 O1 -il- TABLE OF AUTHORITIES PAGE(S) Cases B.F. v. Superior Court (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 621 oo... ccececssesssecesssseecsssssesssesssssessesesens 7 Bianka M. v. Superior Court (2016) 245 CalApp.4th 406 0.0... ccc cccccesscessescessssssssssesseseaes passim BryanS. v. Superior Court (Feb. 24, 2015, B267454), unpublished [judicially noticed by Court of Appeal] ........cccceccsscsscssssssssesseesssseeesssesesenss 4,5, 14,15 Cty. ofSan Diego v. Gorham (2010) 186 CalApp.4th 1215 ooo. eccecsecsscessesesscssssessessecssessessanes 4 Eddie E. v. Superior Court (2013) 223 CalApp.4th 622 oo... cscsessecsseesseccesscssesecesressecseeesees 6 Eddie E. v. Superior Court (2015) 234 CalApp.4th 319 occcccecssccssccsseecessesssssessssessase passim Elder O. v. Superior Court (Sept. 3, 2015, B266546), unpublished [judicially noticed by Court of Appeal] 0.0...cceccccsesssssessssessessseeeeeseeseeseeesenses 4,5, 15 Global Packaging, Inc. v. Superior Court (2011) 196 CalApp.4th 1623 00... ccccecccsccssecsseecssscsesecssecssesssecessees 4 In re Erick M. (2012) 284 Neb. 340 [820 N.W.2d 639] uu...eeeeeeseceeessesessessenes 11 In re Israel O. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 279 ooo. eeceesccsssssssscesseeeeseessessseseeses passim In re J.C. (C068667, Feb. 6, 2015) 2015 WL 513399 [Third Dist., MONPUD.OPN.] uu... eecccccsscessssecssecesseeseeeeeeessesseseceeesseessssssssessesens 12, 13 In re Mario S. (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2012) 38 Misc.3d 444 [954 N.Y.S.2d 843] oo... ccc cccseesssssssetssseerees 10, 11 TIN1754.18 O1 - ill - PAGE(S) In re Marriage ofShaban (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 398 as modified on denialofreh’g (May 9, 2001)...eceeecsesssssrscsscssceseeessceseesesssecssscssssecsesessaseeseaeeens 5 In re Y.M. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 892 ooo...ccc cccsesssscecessssessssssecssssesseceeneceess 6 Leslie H. v. Superior Court (2014) 224 CalApp.4th 340 occccecseecssssssscssssseseeeeases passim Marcelina M.-G. v. Israel S. (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) 112 A.D.3d 100, [973 N.Y.S.2d TAA] cece cccceccssesecseseseseeseeseseaeesaesssesessensecsesaeessescseessessessessensssssessenees 6 Strathvale Holdings v. E.B.H (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1241 ooo. cccccccsccsssccsseseesecsssssccsesssseasesees 4 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson (1980) 444 U.S. 286.0eececssscetsesssessesaeesssecsessesscussnscsssesssasenees 4 Statutes 8 CFR. § 204.11) woeeeeccecseseccsseessessesseseeessesecessecesscseessessssssesecsessesasens 7 8 ULS.C. § LIOL(AQT)DT).ee ccccccsscsseessessseessecsssseesseessecsrcsessscasecnsees passim Civ. Proc. Code § 155 occcccecsscsssssscssessesscseecssssesessssssucssssessaveseensees passim Gov. Code, § 68081 oo... eeccccccesessssecsssnceccecsssesececausecsenssssessttuceuesesssueeess 9 Rules California Rules of Court, Rule 5.24oocccccsscessssecccseaesnseesSavusecseseeeucceeecasscseensaaaveseeceeccecs 14 7711754.18 O1 -1vV - IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA BIANKA M., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent; GLADYS M., RealParty in Interest. PETITION FOR REVIEW ISSUES PRESENTED In ruling on a child’s request under Code of Civil Procedure section 155 for findings necessary to enable the child to petition the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services for classification as a Special Immigrant Juvenile: . 1. Does a California court improperly usurp the authority of the federal government by denying the child’s request based on a conclusion that the proceeding in which the request is madeis not “bona fide’’? 2. Maya California family court deny the child’s request on the groundthat the parentage of the child’s non-custodial alleged parent has not been adjudicated? 7711754.18 O1 REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION The Court should grant review of the published decision of the Court of Appealto resolve a conflict in the appellate courts and settle important questions of law regarding the respective roles of California’s courts and the U.S. governmentin implementing legislation designed to protect abandoned,abused, and neglected children seeking immigration relief. This petition squarely presents an issue that has vexed the superior courts of this State and has now openeda schism within the California Courts of Appeal: Whatis the proper role of the State’s courts in effectuating the immigration policy behind the federal Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (“SIJS”) framework (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J))? Prior to the decision below, the Courts of Appeal had repeatedly held that the role of California’s courts was limited to the fact-finding procedure codified in section 155 of the Code of Civil Procedure (“section 155’’). The State’s courts were not permitted to decide whether a child should ultimately | receive SIJS relief; that decision was reserved to the federal government. In three prior decisions, different panels of the Court of Appeal rebuked superior courts for usurping the federal government’s exclusive authority over immigration policy by refusing to make SIJS findings on the basis of immigration policy concerns or speculation about the motives of a child seeking SIJS relief. (See Eddie E. v. Superior Court (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 319, 329 [Fourth Dist., Div. Three] (“Eddie E. IT’); Leslie H. v. Superior Court (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 340, 351 [Fourth Dist., Div. Three] (“Leslie H.”); In re Israel O. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 279, 289 [First Dist., Div. Five] (“Israel O.”).) The appellate courts explained that such reasoning transgressed the bright line dividing federal and state responsibilities within the SIJS framework. (See,e.g., Leslie H., supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 351 [“[T]he SIJ statute and accompanying regulations 7711754.18 O1 . 2 > 6 a e e e e ‘commit... specific and limited issues to state juvenile courts’” which “need not determine any other issues, such as what the motivation of the juvenile in making application for the required findings might be’’].) Bycontrast, the Court of Appeal’s decision in Bianka M.not only allows but encourages California courts to inquire into the motives of a child seeking SIJS relief and to refuse to make SIJS findings if the court believes those motives are not “bonafide.” (Bianka M. v. Superior Court (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 406 (“Bianka M.”), at **7 [It appears, therefore, Congress and the USCISrely upon ourstate courts to issue orders containing the findings required to support an SIJ petition in the context of ongoing, bona fide proceedings”]; see also id. at **10 [“[T]he proceeding below wasnot a bonafide custody proceeding under the [Uniform Parentage Act].”].) Yet nothing in the current federal SIJS statute or state law expressly permits the State’s courts to do this. The Court of Appeal erroneously inferred such authority from thelegislative history of a previous version of the SIJS statute, a proposed (but never adopted) federal regulation, and an agency memorandum interpreting factors thefederal government may considerin exercising its discretion to grant or deny SIJS relief. (Id. at **6.) These sources makeclear that only the federal government(if anyone) may consider the bonafides of a child’s request for SIJS relief. Nonetheless, the Bianka M. decision allows California courts to usurp this federal prerogative. In addition, the Court of Appeal’s opinion in Bianka M.creates a clear conflict with two recent unpublished appellate court decisions that rejected family courts’ attempts to condition SIJS findings on an adjudication of parentage (paternity or maternity). In both decisions, the Court of Appeal held that adjudicating parentage was not a prerequisite to making SJJS findings that were supported by the evidence. (See Dkt. No. 7711754.18 O1 ° 3 - 10, Request for Judicial Notice, Exhibit A, Bryan S. v. Superior Court (Feb. 24, 2015, B267454), unpublished [Second Dist., Div. Five] (“Bryan S.”); id., Exhibit B, Elder O. v. Superior Court (Sept. 3, 2015, B266546), unpublished [Second Dist., Div. Eight] (“Elder O.’’); see also B267454, Dkt. No. 14, Order Granting Request for Judicial Notice.) Bianka M., by contrast, requires family courts to adjudicate parentage before making SIJS findings. (/d. at **1 [““By requesting these orders, Bianka necessitates consideration of [her alleged father’s] parentage and parental rights.”’].) The problem is that a binding parentage determination — even by way of default — requires personal jurisdiction over the subject parent. (Cty. ofSan Diego v. Gorham (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1227, 1234; see also Strathvale Holdings v. E.B.H (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1250 [default parentage judgment void even if foreign defendant does not move to quash].) Personal jurisdiction, however,is something the State’s courts cannot obtain compulsorily over a foreign citizen with no contacts to California. (World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.v. Woodson (1980) 444 U.S. 286, 294 [“[T]he Due Process Clause ‘does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgmentin personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, 999 ties, or relations.’”’], citation omitted; see also Global Packaging,Inc. v. Superior Court (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1623, 1630 [State court’s “power ultimately endsatthe state line.”].) The requirementtherefore is virtually impossible to fulfill for an entire class of children eligible for SIJSrelief: those abandoned by one parent whocontinuesto reside in a foreign country. (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) [SIJS relief available to a child whose * 6 - Israel O., supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at pp. 284-285,citing 8 U.S.C.§ 1101(a)(27)(J)Git); 8 C-F.R. § 204.11(d) (2014).) Section 155 enumerates the three SIJS findings” and describes the procedure for requesting and issuing them. Itstates: If an order is requested from the superior court making the necessary findings regarding special immigrant juvenile status pursuant to Section 1101(a)(27)(J) of Title 8 of the United States Code, andthere is evidence to support those findings, which mayconsistof, but is not limited to, a declaration by the child whois the subject of the petition, the court shall issue the order, which shall include all of the following [SUS] findings. ... (Code Civ. Proc., § 155, subd. (b)(1), emphasis added.) Pursuantto section 155, therefore, a court with jurisdiction to make child custody determinations under California law “has the authority and duty to make [SIJS] findings” if the evidence before it supports those findings. (B.F. v. Superior Court (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 621, 630, emphasis added.) Section 155 does not contain any other conditions on making SIJS findings. II. The Court of Appeal Affirmed the Superior Court’s Refusal to MakeSIJS Findings on the Groundsthat the Proceeding Below WasNot “Bona Fide” and a Parentage Determination Had Not Been — and Could Not Be - Made. Petitioner Bianka M.is a 13-year old child whose father abandoned her before birth and has never provided for or communicated with her ? The findings arethat (1) the minoris “dependent” upon a juvenile courtor “committed to, or placed under the custodyof,” a state entity or other court-appointed individual or entity; (2) the minor cannotbe reunified with one or both parents “due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found underState law,” and (3)it is not in the minor’s “best interest” to be “returned”to his or her country of origin. (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)()); see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c) (2014).) 7T11754.18 01 -7- since. (See Dkt. No. 3, Petitioner’s Appendix of Exhibits, Vol. 1 (“1 AE”) 2-3; 1 AE 9.) Biankafled to the United States in 2013 to escape rampant violence in Honduras where she previously lived with her older sister. (1 AE 3; 1 AE 9-10.) After being detained by federal immigration authorities, Bianka wasreunited with her mother, Gladys M., who had previously come to the U.S.to find a job that would allow her to provide for Bianka. (1 AE 3; 1 AE9.) In 2014, Bianka initiated a parentage action in Los Angeles County family court seeking to have her mother awardedsole legal and physical custody over her. (1 AE 11.) In that proceeding, Bianka asked the family court to make SIJS findings, which she supported with evidence including declarations andlive testimony. (1 AE 1-5; 1 AE 8-10; 1 AE 105-06, 109; see also Dkt. No. 3, Petitioner’s Appendix of Exhibits, Vol. 2 (“2 AE”) 313-43.) This evidence was uncontradicted and wasnot subject to any adverse credibility finding. The family court found that Bianka’s “situation in Honduras, both the overall violence of her city and the lack of available relatives to care for her, is untenable, and supports a finding that it would not be in the best interests of [Bianka] to be returned to Honduras.” (2 AE311, emphasisin original.) The family court nevertheless refused to make the requested custody and SIJS findings. (2 AE 311-12.) The family court believed it needed first to determine Bianka’s alleged father’s paternity, necessitating his joinder. (2 AE 308 [“Parentage determinations implicate the fundamental rights of a person”); see also 2 AE 309 [Adjudication of alleged father’s paternity required because “[o]nly a parent under SIJS can ‘abandon’ or ‘neglect’ his or her child.”].) The family court concluded, however,that even if Bianka wereto join heralleged father,it still could not make the custody order or SIJS findings she sought becauseit appeared her alleged father, who resides in Honduras, wasnot subject to personal jurisdiction. 7711754.18 01 ~ 8 ~ (2 AE 305 [“Personaljurisdiction over[...] Child’s alleged fatheris required for this Court to make the determinations sought by Child, and no evidence has been presented that this Court has personaljurisdiction over {him].”].) The family court thus denied Bianka’s request “without prejudice to further application after [Bianka’s alleged father] has been properly joined, personal jurisdiction issues have been resolved and a determination of parentage is made.” (Jbid.) Bianka petitioned the Court of Appeal for writ relief. The Court of Appeal issued a published decision denying Bianka’s unopposedwrit petition. It held that “the proceeding below was not a bona fide custody proceeding under the UPA”(Bianka M., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th 406, at **10), and that the family court “did not abuseits discretion by requiring Bianka to join [her alleged father] to the pending action” (id. at **2), because SIJS findings and the sole custody orderthat is prerequisite to such findings required a determination of his parentage. (Id. at **4 [“{A] requestfor sole legal and physical custody in a parentage action necessarily requires a court to consider the parentage of both parents.”]; see also id. at **8 [“SIJ[S] findingsat the pretrial stage” — before determining Bianka’s alleged father’s paternity — “was premature.”’].) Bianka timely petitioned for rehearing pursuant to Government Code section 68081 because the Court of Appeal denied her writ petition on groundsnotbriefed or argued bythe parties, including whether a State court as opposedto the federal government wasthe appropriate entity to determine whether a request for SIJS findings was “bonafide.” (Dkt. No. 28, Petition for Rehearing.) The Court of Appeal denied Bianka’s petition for rehearing. (Dkt No. 29, Order Denying Petition for Rehearing.) 7711754.18 01 - 9 - LEGAL ARGUMENT I. Review is Required to Decide If California Courts Improperly Usurp The Authority Of The Federal Government By Denying A Child’s Request for Special Immigrant Juvenile Status Findings Based On A Conclusion That The Proceeding Is Not “Bona Fide.” A. Prior to Bianka M., California’s Courts Recognized They Had NoRole In Determining The Motivation or Worthiness of Children Seeking Special Immigrant Juvenile Status Findings. Until the Court of Appeal’s decision in this case, it was well established in California that “[i]t is not the state court’s role to weed out [SIJS] applications based on a court’s perception of the lack of good faith of a particular applicant.” (Eddie E. I, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 329.) That task “falls to USCIS, which engages in a much broaderinquiry than state courts.” ([bid.; see Leslie H., supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 351 [nothing in federal statute or regulations “indicates that the Congress intended that state juvenile courts pre-screen potential SIJ applicants for possible abuse on behalf of the USCIS’”], quoting In re Mario S. (N.Y. Fam.Ct. 2012) 38 Misc.3d 444, 456 [954 N.Y.S.2d 843, 853] (“Mario S.”).) California courts also recognized that federal enactments concerning special immigrantjuvenile status “commit[ ] to a juvenile court only the limited, fact-findingrole of identifying abused, neglected, or abandoned alien children underits jurisdiction who cannot reunify with a parent or be safely returned to their home country.” (Leslie H., supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 344.) State courts had no responsibility to “determine any other issues, such as what the motivationofthe juvenile in making application for 7711754.18 01 > 10 - the requiredfindings might be [citations] . . . and whether the USCIS,the federal administrative agency charged with enforcing the immigration laws, may or may notgranta particular application for adjustment of status as a 399[Special Immigrant Juvenile].’” (Jd. at p. 351, emphasis added, quoting Mario S., supra, 954 N.Y.S.2d at pp. 852-853.) Accordingly, in Israel O., the Court of Appeal rejected an interpretation of 8 U.S.C. section 1101(a)(27)(J) “to the extent that it appears to contemplate a state courtrole, through the SJJ statute, in effectuating federal immigration policy.” (Israel O., supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 289.) Section 1101(a)(27)(J) requires an immigrant child seeking SIJS findings to prove that reunification with “one] or both” parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment. (Jd. at pp. 283- 284.) The Nebraska Supreme Court had construed the “[one] or both” language to prohibit SYS status if the child’s return to a custodial parent remains feasible, based on the court’s reasoning that “Congress intended that SIJ status be available to only those juveniles whoare seekingrelief from parental abuse, neglect, or abandonment, not those seeking immigration advantage.” (Id. at p. 287, emphasis added,citing In re Erick M.(2012) 284 Neb. 340, 349 [820 N.W.2d 639, 647] (“Erick M.”).) In “depart[ing] from [Erick M.’s] view[,]” Israel O. reaffirmed the eos principle that ““‘[a] state court’s role in the SIJ processis not to determine worthy candidates for citizenship, but simply to identify abused, neglected, or abandonedalien children underits jurisdiction who cannot reunify with a parentor be safely returned in their best interests to their home country.’” (Israel O., supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 287, quoting Leslie H., supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 351.) Applying these principles, the Court of Appeal in Eddie E. IT observedthat the state courts are not responsible for implementing a 2009 _ USCIS memorandumthat defines a “bonafide” SIJS request as one that 7711754.18 01 - 11 - was “not “sought primarily for the purpose of obtaining the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanentresidence, rather than for the purpose of obtaining relief from abuse or neglect or abandonment.’” (Eddie E. II, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 329;see id. at p. 330 [it is “not the state court’s role” to “assess whetherthe petition for SIJ status was brought for the right reasons”); id. at p. 331 [it is “not the state court’s role” to “determine whetherthe petitioner has applied for SIJ status primarily for the purposeof obtaining relief from abuse, neglect, or abandonment”); Jn re J.C. (C068667, Feb. 6, 2015) 2015 WL 513399, *4 [Third Dist., nonpub. opn.] (“In re J.C.”) [“The juvenile court, however, is not tasked with determining whetherJ.C. deserves SIJ status; SIJ status is a federal question for immigration authorities to decide”].) B. By Authorizing California Courts to Determine Whether a Child’s Request for SIJS Findings is “Bona Fide,” Bianka M.Creates a Conflict with Prior Court of Appeal Decisions. The Court of Appeal’s decision in Bianka M. throwsthese previously unquestionedprinciples into doubt, creating conflict and confusion forlitigants and California’s courts. Despite recognizing that ““[a] state court’s role in the SIJ processis not to determine worthy candidatesfor citizenship’” (Bianka M., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th 406, at **6), the Court of Appeal directed California courts to do exactly that: “As a practical matter, however, our courts, as well as immigrant children seeking our assistance, should bear in mind the factors considered by the USCIS whenit reviewsa petition for SIJ status.” (Ibid., emphasis added.) Specifically, California courts, in adjudicating requests for SIS findings, should “bear in mind” whether “the request for SIJ classification is bona fide” — i.e., whether “‘the SIJ benefit was not ‘sought primarily for the purposeof obtaining the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent 7T11754.18 01 -12- ip ho ne “ a A residence, rather than for the purpose of obtainingrelief from abuse or neglect or abandonment.’” (/d. at **6, quoting H.R.Rep. No. 105-405,Ist Sess., p. 130 (Nov. 13, 1997).) Emphasizing its break from prior California decisions limiting the role of state courts in the SIJS process, the Court of Appeal in Bianka M. concludedthat state courts are expected “‘to issue orders containing the findings required to support an SIJ petition in the context of ongoing, bona fide proceedingsrelating to child welfare, rather than through specially constructed proceedings designed mainly for the purpose of issuing orders containing SIJ[S] findings.” ( Bianka M., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th 406,at **7.) The Court of Appeal overlooked the fact that the proceedings it disparaged as “specially constructed”are precisely the ones prescribed by the Legislature in Code of Civil Procedure section 155. Indeed, the Court of Appeal wenton to determine, for the first time on appeal, that the family court proceeding in this case “was not... bona fide.” (Id. at **10; see Dkt. No.28, Petition for Rehearingat pp. 9-11.) In short, under Bianka M., California courts would bein the business of screening immigrant children for worthinessto obtain SIJS status. By contrast, Eddie E. II, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at page 329, Leslie H., supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at page 351, Israel O., supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at page 298, and In re J.C., supra, 2015 WL 513399, at *4 hold that this is an impermissible intrusion on the federal government’s exclusivejurisdiction over immigration. Review by this Court is warranted to resolvethis conflict. II. By Requiring California Family Courts to Condition the Issuance of SIJS Findings on a Parentage Determination, Bianka M.Creates a Conflict with Other Appellate Decisions. In affirming a family court’s refusal to make SIJS findings without first joining and determining the parentage of the absent parent — even 7711754.18 O1 - 13 ~ whentheparentis not subject to personaljurisdiction * — the Courtof Appealin this case created striking conflict with two previous unpublished appellate court decisions. In Bryan S., an immigrant child abandonedbyhis father asked the family court to award his mother sole custody and to make SIJS findings. (Bryan S., supra, Dkt. No. 10, Exhibit A at pp. 1-2.) The family court refused both requests because the father had not been joined andhis paternity had not been determined. (/d. at pp. 2-3.) The child petitioned for writ relief. The Court of Appeal issued an injunction compelling the family court to make the requested custody order and SIJS findings. (Jd. at p. 3.) It held that the “[family] court did not possess the judicial discretion to rule that the father is a necessary party in denying petitioner’s requestthat mother be awardedsole custody,or to fail to exercise its discretion to make SUS findings.” ([bid.; see also id. at p. 2 [“[T]he issue here is not father’s parentage.”].) It also specifically held that joinder of the child’s non- custodial father was “not required by any. . . legal principle.” (Ibid.) > Althoughthe family court ruled that joinder of Bianka’s alleged father was required under the mandatory joinder provision of the California Rules of Court, the Court of Appeal held the family court “did not abuse its discretion” by requiring joinder “under the permissive joinder provision of the California Rules of Court, rule 5.24.” (Bianka M., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th 406, at **11.) The Court of Appeal limited the reach ofits joinder holdingto cases in which “the identity and whereabouts of the child’s absent parent are known.” (Id. at **12; see ibid. [“In other circumstances, includingsituations in whichthe child’s absent parent cannotbe located or identified, joinder would be inappropriate.”].) As a result, children seeking SIJS findings in family court based on abuse, neglect, or abandonmentbyan absentparentwill be divided into two groups with potentially different outcomes based on a fact beyondtheir control — whether they know the identity and whereabouts of their absent parent. T111754.18 01 . 14 - In Elder O., the family court also refused to make SIJS findings withoutfirst adjudicating paternity of the father who abandonedthe child. (Elder O., supra, Dkt. No. 10, Exhibit B at pp. 1,3.) As in Bryan S., the child petitioned for writ relief. The Court of Appeal issued an Order and Notice of Intention to Grant Peremptory Writ in the First Instance, stating that “[s]ection 155 does not require a paternity adjudication before a court can make SJJS findings, as long as a proper declaration or other evidence identifies the person the child claimsto be his father.” (Jd. at pp. 4-5.) In contrast to these recent decisions, Bianka M. requires family courts to adjudicate the parentage of the absent parent before making SIJS findings. (See, e.g., Bianka M., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th 406, at **2 [“By requesting these orders [making custody award and SIJS findings], Bianka necessitates consideration of [her alleged father’s] parentage and parental rights.”].) Yet parentage determinations require personal jurisdiction over the absent parent, something a California court cannot obtain over an unwilling foreign resident. The Court of Appeal acknowledgedthat, in these cases, children abandoned, abused or neglected by a parent who resides in a foreign country cannot obtain SIJS findings. (/d. at **12 [“We recognize Biankawill not only need to join [her alleged father] to the action but mustalso establish a basis for personal jurisdiction over him, and we appreciate that process may provedifficult for Bianka and othersimilarly situated children seeking SIJ status.”].) Under Bianka M., such children’s sole recourse would be to persuade “the nonresident parent[to] stipulate[] to parentage.” (Ibid. [noting parentage stipulation “constitutes a general appearance, and establishes personal jurisdiction, in the lawsuit.”]; see also id. at **3 [“If obtaining personal jurisdiction over [her alleged father] is problematic, Bianka may attempt to obtain therelief she seeks by entering into a stipulated judgmentof paternity with [him]”].) This means, ironically, that children victimized by abandonment, abuseor neglect 7711754.18 01 - 15 ~ cannotobtain relief without appealing to the benevolence of the very person responsible for victimizing them. This Court should grant review to resolve the conflict between these appellate decisions and ensure California courts correctly apply laws that directly affect the health and safety of numerous abandoned,neglected, and abused immigrant children throughout our State. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner Bianka M.respectfully requests that the Court grant review and decide the merits of the petition. Dated: April 11, 2016 Respectfully submitted, IRELL & MANELLA, LLP ddAeLY. HUA C. LEE PUBLIC COUNSEL iaLONDON IMMIGRANT DEFENDERS NICKOLE G. MILLER LAW CENTER ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER BIANKA M. 771175418 01 -16- CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT (CAL. RULES OF COURT, RULE 8.204(C)(1)) I hereby certify that pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 8.204(c)(1), the attached brief contains 4,593 words, as counted by the Word 2010 word-processing program used to generate thebrief. Dated: April 11, 2016 By: 7111754.18 01 - 17 - Bianka M. v. Superior Court, 245 Cal.App.4th 406 (2016) 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 849, 2016 WL 816525, 16 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2392... 245 Cal.App.4th 406 Court ofAppeal, SecondDistrict, Division 3, California. BIANKAM., a Minor,etc., Petitioner, Vv. The SUPERIOR COURTof Los Angeles County, Respondent; Gladys M., RealParty in Interest. B267454 | Filed March 2, 2016 Synopsis Background: Child, who was an undocumented immigrant, initiated parentage action under Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), naming her mother as respondent, and filed pretrial request for order asking to be placed in mother's sole legal and physical custody and to make additional findings as necessary to allow child to petition for special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) status. The Superior Court, Los Angeles County, No. BF052072, Holly J. Fujie, J., denied request for orders placing child in mother's custody, declined to make requested findings, and required child to join her father to pending action. Child filed petition for writ of mandate. Holdings: The Court of Appeal, Lavin, J., held that: [1] as a matter of apparentfirst impression, abandonment, as used under SJJ statute, meant leaving a child without provision for reasonable and necessary care or supervision; [2] as a matter of apparentfirst impression, SIJ findings were to be madeafter or in connection with a judicial custody determination after a full and fair evidentiary hearing; [3] as a matter of apparent first impression, parentage action was not a bona fide custody proceeding, as required fortrial court to make SJ findings; [4] trial court did not abuseits discretion by requiring father's joinder; [5] trial court did not abuse its discretion by considering due process in making joinderdecision; WESTLAW © Bianka M. v. Superior Court, 245 Cal.App.4th 406 (2016) 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 849, 2016 WL 815525, 16 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2392... [6] fact that trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over child custody proceeding did not indicate that court necessarily had authority to issue custody order; and [7] child was required to provide father with notice of specific SJ findings she sought. Petition denied. *853 ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGSin mandate. Holly J. Fujie, Judge. Petition denied. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BF052072) Attorneys and Law Firms Irell & Manella, Joshua C. Lee, Los Angeles, Stephen A. Rossi, Newport Beach and Meigiang Cui, Los Angeles; Public Counsel and Nickole G. Miller, for Petitioner, Bianka M. Noappearance for Respondent. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, Julian W. Poon, Eric A. Westlund, Nathaniel P. Johnson, Los Angeles, Victor Lee, Alameda, Lali Madduri, Los Angeles, Jennifer Rho, Los Angeles and Sarah G. Reisman, as Amicus Curiae on behalfofthe Immigrant Legal Resource Center, the Los Angeles Center for Law and Justice, and the Immigrant Defenders Law Center. LAVIN,J. INTRODUCTION **1 Petitioner Bianka M.! is a 13-yearold girl from Honduras whoentered the United States without documentation in 2013. After a brief detention by federal immigration authorities, Bianka resettled in Los Angeles where she now lives with her mother. Bianka's mother and her alleged biological father, Jorge, never married. Jorge currently resides in Honduras. Bianka hopes to avoid deportation by obtaining “special immigrant juvenile” (SI) status—a classification created by Congress to provide special immigration protection to undocumented, unaccompanied children entering the United States who have beenthe victims of parental abuse, neglect, abandonment or some similar circumstance. (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (SIJ statute).) Whenapplying for SIJ status, a child must attach an order from a state court containing three specific factual findings: (1) the child is in the custody of a court appointed agency, guardian or other individual; (2) the child cannot reunify with one or both parents due to abuse, neglect, abandonment or other similar basis under state law; and (3)it is not in the child's best interest to Bianka M. v. Superior Court, 245 Cal.App.4th 406 (2016) 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 849, 2016 WL 815525, 16 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2392... return to her home country or her parents' home country. Ud; 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(d)(2) (July 6, 2009).) In California, any trial court called upon to adjudicate issues of child custody or welfare, including the probate, family andjuvenile divisions ofthe superior courts, has jurisdiction to make the findings necessary to allow thechild to apply for SIJ status. (Code Civ. Proc., § 155, subd. (a).) In manycases, a child whoseeksSIJJ status will be involved in proceedingsin thejuvenile court (for foster home placement)or the probate court (for the appointmentof a legal guardian). However, wherethe child has reunited with one parent in the United States, it is more likely the child will be the subject of a custody proceeding in the family court. In this case, Bianka initiated a parentage action under the Uniform Parentage Act (Fam.Code, § 7600 et seq.) naming her mother as the respondent. Although Bianka's mother did not file a response to the petition, it appears maternity is uncontested. Biankaalso filed a pretrial request for *854 order asking the court to place her in the sole legal and physical custody of her mother and to make the additional findings necessary to allow herto petition for SIJ status, namely that she cannot reunify with her father because he abandonedheranditis not in her best interest to return to Honduras. The court declined to make the requested findings primarily because it concluded Bianka's request for an awardofsole custody to her mother in an action under the UPAnecessarily implicated paternity and parental rights (if any), which in turn made Jorge an indispensible party to the parentage action. **2 The trial court was particularly concerned, as we are, about the unusual procedural posture and the nonadversarial nature of this case. As we will explain, the UPA is the exclusive means by which unmarried adults may resolve disputes relating to rights and obligations arising out of the parent-child relationship, including child custody,visitation and support. In an action between natural, alleged and/or presumed parents, the parentage of each party to the action is squarely at issue and is adjudicated before issues of custody, visitation and support are considered. Here, because Bianka only named her mother as respondent, she contends only her mother's parentage is at issue in this action. However, Bianka does not simply seek to establish a parent-child relationship with her mother. She also asserts her father, Jorge, abandonedherat birth, physically abused her mother, and on that basis seeks an order from the court placing her in her mother's sole legal and physical custody, withoutvisitation rights for Jorge. Further, Bianka asked the court to issue an order explicitly finding that her father, who she contends is Jorge, abandoned her. By requesting these orders, Bianka necessitates consideration ofJorge's parentage and parentalrights. While we are sympathetic to Bianka's plight, we cannot endorse the approach she pursueshere. The UPA simply does not provide a mechanism for the court to issue sole legal and physical custody orders in a vacuum, nor doesit authorize a court to make factual findings concerning parental abuse, neglect or abandonmentin the absenceofa finding ofparentage. Further, were weto follow the course suggested by Biankain this case, we would erode the substantial protections afforded to parents involved in international custody disputes understate, federal and international law. WESTLAW © 2046 Thomaan Re iat Bianka M. v. Superior Court, 245 CalApp.4th 406 (2016) 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 849, 2016 WL 815525, 16 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2392... We conclude that under the circumstances present here, where Bianka's father's identity and whereabouts are known,the court did not abuseits discretion by requiring Biankato join Jorge to the pending action. To the extent Bianka continues to seek a custody order and/or SIJ findings in a parentage action based on Jorge's abuse, neglect or abandonment, she should amendherpetition to name Jorge as a respondent andstate all the pertinent facts relating to Jorge's paternity and his alleged abuse, neglect or abandonment; she should then properly serve him with a summons and a copy of the petition. Should Jorge fail to respond—the most likely outcomeif, as Bianka alleges, he has no interest in her welfare—Bianka may then attempt to proceed by way of default and obtain the relief she seeks. If obtaining personal jurisdiction over Jorge is problematic, Bianka may attemptto obtain the relief she seeks by entering into a stipulated judgmentofpaternity with her father. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURE A. Bianka's Background Bianka, now 13 years old, is a native of Honduras. Like an increasing number of *855 minors fleeing rampant violence and poverty in their home countries, Bianka arrived in the United States in late 2013, alone and undocumented. After a brief detention by the Department of Homeland Security, Bianka reunited with her mother, Gladys, who wasalready living in the United States. Biankais currently enrolled in school and by all accounts is residing happily with her motherin Los Angeles. Gladys is also a native of Honduras. She cameto the United States in 2005, leaving Bianka (who would have been 2 or 3 years old at the time) in the care of an older daughter. After leaving Honduras, Gladys kept in close contact with Bianka by telephone and frequently sent money to her older daughter for Bianka's care. Gladys believes Jorge is Bianka's father. Gladys and Jorge never married, but were in a relationship for about 15 years and had four children together, including Bianka. Gladys reported that Jorge left her while she was pregnant with Bianka, and never contacted Biankaor provided any financial support for her. Jorge apparently still resides in Honduras. B. Request For SIJ findings Bianka is the subject of removal (deportation) proceedings and apparently intends to file an application for SIJ status. In order to obtain a state court order containing the factual findings required under federal law, Bianka and Gladys turned to the family law division of the superior court. WESTLAW (2079 Thomeon Reuters. No cleimto original UG. Ssovernmnert ¥ Bianka M. v. Superior Court, 245 Cal.App.4th 406 (2016) 199 Cal. Rptr.3d 849, 2016 WL 815525, 16 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2392... 1. Gladys's parentage action **3 Initially, Gladys filed a petition under the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) naming Jorge as the respondent. Gladysfiled a proof of service indicating personalservice ofthe petition on Jorge. Jorge never responded; however, no default was ever entered against him. Apparently, Gladys later dismissed that petition without prejudice because she believed the court lacked personal jurisdiction over Jorge and would therefore be unwilling to enter a default judgmentofpaternity against him. 2 2. Bianka's parentageaction On December12, 2014, Biankafiled a petition under the UPA naming Gladys as the respondent. 3 The petition alleges Gladys is Bianka’s mother and requests a court order awarding sole legal and physical custody to Gladys. Both Bianka and Gladys submitted declarations in support of the petition. As the basis of her custody request, Bianka asserted her biological father, Jorge, abandonedher physically, emotionally, and financially before her birth. Bianka asked the court to find that her father abandonedher within the meaning ofFamily Code section 7822, subdivision (a) (3), 4 and place her in her mother's sole custody. In addition, Bianka asserted Jorge had beaten her mother while she was pregnant. Bianka cited Jorge's domestic violence as anotherfactor relevant to the court's custody determination and argued his conduct constituted abuse within the meaning ofthe Family Code. Bianka wenton to argue that Jorge's abandonmentalso provideda factual basis for an order containing SI findings. Both Bianka and Gladys submitted declarations in support of the petition, in which they recounted Jorge's abuse and abandonment. *856 Bianka's counsel personally served Gladys with a summonsand a copyofthe petition. Gladys neverfiled a response to the petition, and her default has not been entered. Jorge was not namedor otherwise identified in the petition and there is no evidence in the record indicating Jorge was served or provided with a copyofthe petition at the timeoffiling. Asrequired by section 7635, Bianka requested the appointment of a guardian ad litem to assist her in the parentage action. Biankafiled proofs of service indicating her counsel sent copies of the guardian ad litem application to both Gladys and Jorge via regular U.S. mail. Bianka's counsel submitted a declaration indicating she notified Jorge by telephone of the application to appoint a guardian ad litem. On April 23, 2015, Biankafiled a pretrial request for order (RFO), seeking a custody order and an order containing SIJ findings, both predicated on her representation that her father abandoned WESTLAW > 2076 Thomean & Bianka M. v. Superior Court, 245 Cal.App.4th 406 (2016} 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 849, 2016 WL 815525, 16 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2392... her before she was born and physically abused her mother during her pregnancy with Bianka. The RFOindicated a hearing would take place on July 14, 2015. On June 3, 2015, Biankafiled a proofofservice indicating her counsel sent Jorge conformed copies of the petition and RFO,together with the supporting documents, via regular U.S. mail. Bianka's counsel advised Jorge by telephone ofthe hearing on the RFO. On June 24, 2015, Biankafiled another proofofservice, this time representing that Stefany Fabiola Montoya Martinez personally served Jorge with copies of the petition, the RFO and the supporting documents. There is no indication in the record these legal documents were translated from English into Spanish. The court held a hearing on July 14, 2015, at which Bianka and Gladys both testified, and took the matter under submission. C. Trial Court's Order Denying Request For Sole Custody and SIJ Findings; Bianka's Writ Petition **4 On August 24, 2015, the court issued a 15—page order summarizingthe basis ofits decision to deny Bianka's request for orders placing her in her mother's sole legal and physical custody and making SIJ findings under Code of Civil Procedure section 155. The court noted the unusual procedural posture of the case and expressed concern that Bianka had not namedheralleged biological father as a party in the parentage action and, further, the court had no basis to assert personaljurisdiction over him. Although Bianka's mother stated in a sworn declaration that Jorge is the only man who could be Bianka's father, the court observed none of the evidence before the court contained an acknowledgmentof paternity by Jorge. Thebirth certificate produced by Gladys listed Jorge as Bianka's father but was not signed by Jorge, and Jorge apparently did not provide a voluntary declaration of paternity. The court concluded Bianka's request for an order placing her in her mother's sole custody required it to determine Jorge's paternity. Further, the court found an award ofsole legal and physical custody to Gladys would implicate Jorge's fundamentalrights, namely the right to determine how a child is raised. In addition, the court noted a determination of parentage and custody could form the basis of an order for child support. The court declined to “speculate that [Jorge] has no interest in these issues, particularly where there is no evidence of properservice. [Jorge] has the right to participate as a party in a proceeding that seeks to adjudicate his rights in this regard.” The court observed Jorge's right to participate in the proceeding wasespecially important given the serious nature of the allegations (abandonment, *857 neglect, domestic violence) put forward by Bianka. Accordingly, the court found Jorge's joinder to the parentage action was required. The court denied the request for orders regarding custody and making SIJ findings, without prejudice to further application after Jorge had been properly joined, personal jurisdiction issues had been resolved, and a determination of parentage had been made. Geeregy ghpay By PS oe Ptemeoie, Dh tee RE edestees ba eapdimimend GE OE SereWESTLAW © 2010 Thomson Meuters. No claim to ordinal LLG. Gevernn Bianka M. v. Superior Court, 245 Cal.App.4th 406 (2016) 199 Cal. Rptr.3d 849, 2016 WL 815525, 16 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2392... Biankainitiated this original proceeding in October 2015. On January 26, 2016, Bianka's counsel informedthis court that Bianka's removal proceeding has been administratively closed. However, counsel also advised administrative closure does notfinally resolve a case, but rather temporarily removesit from the immigration court's calendar. Because it appears Bianka's removal proceeding may bereactivated at any time, her case is not moot. ISSUES PRESENTED In this writ proceeding, we are presented with the following issues: In a parentage action between a child and her mother, in whichthe child seeks an order awardingsole legal and physical custody to her mother predicated upon theallegation that her father abandoned her, may the court make the requested custody order withoutfirst determining parentage and presumed parentstatus (if any) with respect to the father? Where the father's identity and whereabouts are known,is it an abuse of discretion for the trial court to require father's joinder as an indispensible party to the parentage action? Weconcludethat a request for sole legal and physical custody in a parentage action necessarily requires a court to consider the parentage of both parents. Where the identity and whereabouts of the alleged father are known,it is not an abuse ofthe court's discretion to require his joinder to the parentage action. Further, joinder permits a parent residing outside California to appear specially to litigate custody issues in the proceeding, an option wholly consistent with applicable due process requirements. Wetherefore deny the petition for writ of mandate. DISCUSSION 1. Standard of Review The applicable standard ofreview is well established. We independently review questions of law, including the construction andapplication ofa statute. (See, e.g., Charisma R. v. Kristina S. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 361, 370, 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 26 [interpreting provision of the UPA], disapproved on another point by Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 532, 113 Cal.Rptr.3d 327, 235 P.3d 988.) Wereview trial court's factual findings for substantial evidence.(Id. at pp. 368-369, 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 26.) **5 [1] Further, “ ‘[t]he determination of whether a party is necessary or indispensable is one in which the court “weighs ‘factors of practical realities and other considerations.’ ” [Citation.] In view of that standard, we reviewthetrial court's ruling for abuse of discretion. [Citation.]' [Citations.]” (Dreamweaver Andalusians, LLC v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1173, 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 735.) ieEE Bee OS, PE PRs Ebene Bis elealer de ardesieend EOE Sstaeeeene WESTLAW (2 2070 Thomeon Flauters. No claim to original LLS. Geverwner Bianka M. v. Superior Court, 245 Cal_App.4th 406 (2016) 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 849, 2016 WL 815525, 16 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2392... 2. Federal Law Regarding Special Immigrant Juvenile Status In 1990, Congress enacted the SIJ statute to open a path for abused, neglected, and abandoned undocumented minors to become lawful permanentresidents. 5 ( *858 In re ¥.M. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 892, 910, 144 Cal.Rptr.3d 54.) “ ‘SIJ status allows a juvenile immigrant to remain in the United States and seek lawful permanentresident status if federal authorities conclude that [certain] statutory conditions are met.’ [Citation.]” (Leslie H. v. Superior Court (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 340, 344, 168 Cal.Rptr.3d 729 (Leslie H.).) A minor whoobtains SIJ status may apply after five years to becomea naturalized citizen. ([bid.) “ ‘While the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction with respect to immigration [citations] ..., state juvenile courts play an important and indispensable role in the SIJ application process.” [Citation.]” (Leslie H., supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 348, 168 Cal.Rptr.3d 729,first omission in original.) “[F]ederal courts have long recognized that state courts have jurisdiction over child welfare determinations, including matters pertaining to undocumented minors, absent an express federal provision to the contrary. Federal law imposes requirements on state dependencyplans and recognizes ‘the institutional competence of state courts as the appropriate forum for child welfare determinations regarding abuse, neglect, or abandonment, and child's best interests.” [Citations.]” in re ¥.M., supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 908, 144 Cal.Rptr.3d 54.) Accordingly, federal regulations require a child applying for SIJ status to obtain an order from a state court making several factual findings as a predicate for SIJ eligibility. (8 C.F.R. § 204.11(d) (2) July 6, 2009).) **6 Specifically, the child must obtain a state court order finding the child has been declared a dependent of a juvenile court in accordance with state law or has been legally committed to, or placed under the custody of, an agency or departmentofastate, or an individual or entity appointed by a state or juvenile court located in the United States. (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(i).) In addition, the court must find reunification with one or both of the immigrant's parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found understate law. (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27) (ii).) Finally, the state court mustalso find it would not be in the child's bestinterest to be returned to his or her country, or the parents' country, of nationality or last habitual residence. (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(iii).) ° [2] [3] *859 Althoughthestate court order is a necessary componentofthe child's application for SIJ status, the order does not guarantee or determine whether particular child qualifies for relief. Our courts recognize “[a] state court's role in the SIJ process is not to determine worthy candidates for citizenship, but simply to identify abused, neglected, or abandonedalien children underits jurisdiction who cannot reunify with a parent or be safely returned in their best interests to their home country.” (Leslie H., supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 351, 168 Cal-Rptr.3d 729.) It is WESTLAW 2201S Thomeon Neutere, No clair to o Bianka M. v. Superior Court, 245 Cal_App.4th 406 (2016) 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 849, 2016 WL 815525, 16 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2392... the federal government, through the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), which makes the determination to grant (or deny) the child's petition for adjustment of status. (Ibid.) Asa practical matter, however, our courts, as well as immigrant children seeking ourassistance, should bear in mind the factors considered by the USCIS whenit reviewsa petition for SIJ status. In 1998, Congress modified the SIJ statute to require the Attorney General's express consent to the dependencyorder serving asthe basis of the SIJ petition. (H.R.Rep. No. 105-405,Ist Sess., pp. 22-23 (Nov. 13, 1997).) According to the legislative history, Congress modified the SIJ statute “in order to limit the beneficiaries of this provision to those juveniles for whom it was created, namely abandoned, neglected, or abused children, by requiring the Attorney General to determine that neither the dependency order nor the administrative or judicial determination of the alien's best interest was sought primarily for the purpose of obtaining the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, rather than for the purpose of obtaining relief from abuse or neglect.” (H.R.Rep. No. 105—405,Ist Sess., p. 130 (Nov. 13, 1997).) Although Congresshas since modified the SIJ statute to require the consent of the Secretary ofHomeland Security (rather than the Attorney General) to the grant of SIJ status (rather than the underlying dependencyorder), see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)Giii), the agency's concern remains the same: “The consent determination by the Secretary, through the USCIS District Director, is an acknowledgmentthat the request for SIJ classification is bona fide. This means that the SIJ benefit was not ‘sought primarily for the purpose of obtaining the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, rather than for the purpose ofobtaining relieffrom abuseor neglect or abandonment.’ (See H.R.Rep. No. 105— 405, at p. 130 (1997).) An approval of an SIJ petition itself shall be evidence of the Secretary's consent.” (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Memorandum (Mar. 24, 2009) Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008: Special Immigrant Juvenile Status Provisions, by Donald Neufeld & Pearl Chang, available at https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/ Laws/Memoranda/Static_Files_Memoranda/2009/TVPRA_SIJ.pdf.) The proposed federal rule designed to implement the 2008 amendments to the SIJ statute, if adopted, will authorize the USCIS to “consider, among other permissible discretionary factors, whether the alien has established, based on the evidence of record, that the State court order was sought primarily to obtain relief from abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis under State law and not primarily for the purpose of obtaining lawful immigration status; and that the evidence otherwise demonstrates that there is a bona fide *860 basis for granting special immigrant juvenile status.” (76 Fed.Reg. 54985 (Sept. 6, 2011) [proposed 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(i) ].) **7 It appears, therefore, Congress and the USCIS rely upon our state courts to issue orders containing the findings required to support an SIJ petition in the context of ongoing, bona fide proceedingsrelating to child welfare, rather than through specially constructed proceedings designed mainly for the purposeof issuing orders containing SIJ findings. WESTLAW © 2076 Thorac Bianka M. v. Superior Court, 245 CalApp.4th 406 (2016) 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 849, 2016 WL 815525, 16 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2392... 3. Special Immigrant Juvenile Findings Under Code of Civil Procedure Section 155 The SIJ statute refers to orders madeby “juvenile” courts. As a result, our courts questioned which divisions of the superior court could or should make SIJ findings. (See, e.g., B.F. v. Superior Court (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 621, 143 Cal-Rptr.3d 730 [probate]; Eddie E. v. Superior Court (2013) 223 Cal.App.4th 622, 167 Cal.Rptr.3d 435 [juvenile delinquency].) In 2014, the legislature adopted Code ofCivil Proceduresection 155, which confirmed anydivision ofthe superior court presented with a case involving child welfare (including, but notlimited to, juvenile, probate and family law divisions) may makeSIJ findings. (Code Civ. Proc., § 155, subd.(a).)’ In addition, subdivision (b)(1) of that section specifies the three factual findings required under federal immigration law: “If an order is requested from the superior court making the necessary findings regarding special immigrantjuvenile status pursuant to Section 1101(a)(27)(J) ofTitle 8 of the United States Code, and there is evidence to support those findings, which may consistof, but is not limited to, a declaration by the child whois the subject of the petition, the court shall issue the order, which shallincludeall of the following findings: (A) The child waseitherof the following: (i) Declared a dependentofthe court. (ii) Legally committed to, or placed under the custody of, a state agency or department,or an individual or entity appointed by the court. The court shall indicate the date on which the dependency, commitment, or custody wasordered. (B) That reunification of the child with one or both of the child's parents was determined not to be viable because of abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis pursuant to California law. The court shall indicate the date on which reunification was determined not to be viable. (C) Thatit is not in the best interest of the child to be returned to the child's, or his or her parent's, previous country ofnationality or country oflast habitual residence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 155, subd. (b)(1).) Weconsider two issues related to the construction of Code of Civil Procedure section 155, subdivision (b). To that end, we note the well established principle that “ ‘{t]he fundamental purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citations.] In order to determine this intent, we begin by examining the languageofthestatute. [Citations.]’ *861 [Citation.]” (In re Marriage ofHarris (2004) 34 Cal.4th 210, 221, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 842, 96 P.3d 141.) **8 [4] First, neither the SIJ statute nor Code of Civil Procedure section 155 defines abandonment. However, the Family Code contains two definitions of abandonment. Under section 3402, abandonmentoccurs when parent leaves a child without provision for reasonable and necessary care or supervision. (§ 3402, subd. (a).) Under section 7822, which applies in proceedings to terminate parental rights prior to a child's adoption, the same showingis required with the additional requirementof proof that the parent intended to abandonthechild. (§ 7822, subd.(a).) Bianka arguesthe section 3402 definition should apply. Although no published decision has expressly decided which definition applies, the court in Eddie E. v. Superior Court (2015) 234 WESTLAW © 2070 Th Bianka M. v. Superior Court, 245 Cal.App.4th 406 (2016) 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 849, 2016 WL 815525, 16 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2392... Cal.App.4th 319, 183 Cal.Rptr.3d 773, assumed, without any discussion or analysis, the definition of abandonment found in section 7822 applies. Ud. at p. 332, 183 Cal.Rptr.3d 773.) Bearing in mind the intent behind Code of Civil Procedure section 155, we conclude the definition of abandonment found in section 3402 should apply. The SIJ statute focuses on the child's current ability to reunify with one or both parents; whether the parents' abandonment wasintentional or unintentional, its impact on the child's welfare and ability to be cared for in her home country is the same. Forthat reason, we do not require proofof intentional abandonmentas required under section 7822, subdivision(a). [5] Second, Code of Civil Procedure section 155 is silent on an issue that has caused some consternation in the superior courts (and possibly also among our colleagues), namely, when SIJ findings should be made. No published California case has addressed the issue and we have no meaningful legislative history on this point to guide usin our interpretation ofthe statute. Bianka suggests the court is required to make SIJ findings at any time, upon request. In the proceedings below, Bianka requested a custody order and an order making SIJ findings in a pretrial request for order (RFO). At that time, Bianka's mother had notfiled any responseto the petition, her default had not been taken, and the court had not yet made a parentage determination. The court expressed concern that issuance of SIJ findings at the pretrial stage was premature. Weagree. The Judicial Council has not yet adopted rules regarding SIJ findings made by courtsin the family law division. However, the Judicial Council forms ® developed for use in family law matters contemplate SIJ findings may be requested in the following proceedings: petition for dissolution of amarriage or domestic partnership;petition to establish a parentalrelationship;petition for custody and support of minorchild(ren); and a petition for a domestic violence restraining order. (Judicial Council Forms, form FL-356.) In all cases, the petitions must request sole physical custody of the child. (Ibid.) Courts may also make SJJ findings in connection with an adoption request or other proceeding in whichsole custody of the child is requested. (Ibid.) [6] Under Code of Civil Procedure section 155, subdivision (b)(1)(A), an order containing SIJ findings confirmsa custody order has been made. To support a petition for SIJ statuseffectively, that custody *862 order mustbe in effect not only at the time thepetition is filed, but also at the timethe petition is adjudicated by the UCJIS. (Cf. 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(5) (July 6, 2009) [requiring continuing eligibility for long-term foster care, under prior version of SIJ statute]; and see 76 Fed.Reg. 54985 (Sept. 6, 2011) [proposed 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(b)(iv)].) In light of ourlegislature's intentto facilitate access to federal immigration relief, we construe Code ofCivil Procedure section 155 to mean SJJ findings must be madeafter or in connection with ajudicial custody determination after a full and fair evidentiary hearing. And, in an action brought under the UPA,the court must determine parentage ofthe proposedcustodial parent(s) before making a custody order. (See Scott v. Superior Court (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 540, 544, 89 Cal.Rptr.3d 843.) As for whenthecustodial determination may be made—i.e., pretrial or after trial—we hold that so long as notice and a WESTLAN © 204 Bianka M. v. Superior Court, 245 Cal.App.4th 406 (2016} 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 849, 2016 WL 815525, 16 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2392... meaningful opportunity to be heard are provided, a custodial order may be madeat any pointin the proceedings. (See § 3022 [authority to issue custody order at any time].) However, we emphasize that the custody order must be in effect when the petition for adjustment ofthe child's status is heard by federal immigration authorities. We also note federal immigration authorities have discretion to place removal proceedings on hold during the pendencyofstate child welfare proceedings, as is the case here. **9 Accordingly, we could deny the petition for writ ofmandate becausethe court properly found the RFO in this case was premature. However, because the record appears to contain sufficient evidence to establish Gladys is Bianka's natural mother, the question of her parentageis unlikely to present a significant obstacle in this case. Rather than remandfor a determination ofparentage without answeringthe additional questions posed by the petition, and in the interest of providing guidancethat has been requested by the lower courts and the bar, we address the substantive issues presented in this case concerning the interplay between parentage, custody, jurisdiction, and SIJ findings. 4. Parties to a Parentage Action Asdiscussed, ante, the court found that Jorge is an indispensible party who must be joinedto the pending parentage action. Although we disagree with someportionsofthe court's analysis, we see no abuse of discretion in the court's conclusion that Jorge should be joined as party in this case. A. The UPAgenerally [7] “ “The Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), Family Code section 7600 et seq., providesthe statutory framework for judicial determinations of parentage, and governs private adoptions, paternity and custody disputes, and dependency proceedings.’ ” (In re D.A. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 811, 824, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 222.) The UPAis “the procedural vehicle by which unmarried parents establish their rights vis-a-vis each other andtheir children.” (Erika K. v. Brett D. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1259, 1267, 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 152.) [8] [9] [10] Under the UPA,a parentage action may beinitiated by a child, the child's natural mother, a presumed parent, a prospective adoptive parent or, in specific circumstances, other interested parties. (§ 7630.) With regard to paternity, the UPA distinguishes between“alleged,” “biological,” and “presumed”fathers. (See Francisco G. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 586, 595-596, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 679.) “A man who maybe the father of a child, but whose biological paternity has not been established, or, in the alternative, *863 has not achieved presumed father status, is an ‘alleged’ father. [Citation.]” (In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 449, fn. 15, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 862 P.2d 751.) “A biological or natural father is one WESTLAW & Bianka M. v. Superior Court, 245 CalApp.4th 406 (2016) 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 849, 2016 WL 815525, 16 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2392... whose biological paternity has been established, but who has not achieved presumed father status...” (/bid.) The UPA contains specific provisions relating to presumed parent status. For example, a man married to the natural mother is presumedto be the natural father of a child born during the marriage or within 300 days after the marriageis terminated. (§ 7611, subd.(a).) Further, a man whoreceives a child into his home and openly holds the child out as his natural child is presumedto be the child's natural father. (§ 7611, subd. (d).) Presumed fathers are vested with greater parental rights than alleged or biological fathers. Un re Zacharia D., supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 448-449, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 862 P.2d 751.) Parentage actions arise most commonly in two circumstances.First, the natural mother, the child, or the state may wantto establish a parent-child relationship between the child and the child's alleged biological father, or another person whois a presumedparent within the meaningofsection 7611, as a predicate for an order of child support. (See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Court (2005) 37 Cal.4th 108, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 46, 117 P.3d 660.) The second commonsituation is where an alleged or presumed parent wantsto establish a parent-child relationship under the UPA in order to secure rights to custody andvisitation. (See, e.g., Adoption ofKelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 615, 823 P.2d 1216.) In both circumstances,issues of parentage and custody are resolved in the context of a proceedingthatis, at least to some extent, adversarial. **10 [11] The present case, however, does not fall into either of these two commonscenarios. Here, Bianka initiated the parentage action naming her natural mother as the only respondent and it appears maternity is uncontested. In our search of California law, we foundrelatively few published cases in which maternity was at issue and none involving an uncontested parentage action between child and her natural mother. Although such a parentage action is not expressly prohibited underthe UPAorthe applicable rules ofcourt,it is certainly a noveluseofthat statutory scheme.Further, as the court observed and as Bianka concedes,the pending parentage action seeks to preserve the status quo even though nothing threatens to disrupt the status quo—a matterthat, in our view, does not appear to require any intervention by the court. Moreover, with respect to Jorge, Bianka does notseek to enforce any obligation arising out of the parent-child relationship and instead seeks a custody order tantamountto a termination of his parental rights as well as an order finding Jorge abandoned her. Those determinations would be more appropriately made in an action to declare Bianka free from Jorge's custody and control under section 7800 et seq. In any event, the essential problem presented in this case is this: By requesting an order giving her mother sole legal and physical custody predicated on Jorge's abuse and abandonment, Bianka is impliedly asking the court to adjudicate Jorge's custody rights (if any) but she has presented the issue in a case in whichJorge is not a party. The court was understandablyreluctant to permit the action to proceedin that fashion, particularly where Jorge was namedas a respondentin the dismissed action, Gladys(the petitioner in the dismissed action) personally served him,Jorge never responded but wasnot defaulted, and no evidence waspresented *864 that Jorge was unwilling WESTLAWY © 2070 7) Bianka M. v. Superior Court, 245 Cal.App.4th 406 (2016} 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 849, 2016 WL 815525, 16 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 23972... to enter into a stipulation concerning parentage or custody. Simply put, an uncontested action under theUPA betweena child and oneparent is not an appropriate means by whichto adjudicate both parents’ custody rights. Further, in an action under the UPA,it would be inappropriate for a court to find that Bianka's father abandoned her without first determining paternity. While we understand Bianka's desire to obtain immigration relief under federal law, we are constrained by existing state law. We are also mindful, as discussed ante, that an order containing SIJ findings will not be useful to Bianka unlessit is issued in the context of a bona fide custody proceeding. Because Bianka's parentage action against Gladys appears to have been brought only to obtain SIJ findings, the proceeding below wasnot a bonafide custody proceeding under the UPA.Indeed,as noted by the trial court, Bianka haslived with her mother for many months in Los Angeles and her mother has had nodifficulty obtaining health care, education or anything else for her daughter. B. Joinder under the UPA [12] Bianka contends the court erred as a matter of law by requiring Jorge's joinderin this case. Wedisagree. Biankacorrectly notes that, as a general matter, the UPA does not require both alleged biological parents to be namedas parties in every parentage action. Indeed, under section 7635, only one person must be madea party to a parentage action: the child whois the subject ofthe action, if the child is 12 years of age or older. (§ 7635, subd. (a).) Any other interested party may be named as a party. For example, section 7635, subdivision (a), provides that if the child whois the subject of the parentage action is younger than 12 years of age, the child may be made party. (Jbid.) Other interested persons, including “[t]he natural parent, each person presumed to be a parent under Section 7611, and each man allegedto bethe natural father, may be madeparties and shall be given notice of the action in the mannerprescribed in Section 7666 and an opportunity to be heard.” ? (§ 7635, subd. (b), emphasis added.) Wetherefore agree, as a general matter, Bianka wasnot required to name Jorge as a respondentin heraction to establish a parental relationship with Gladys. **11 [13] Nevertheless, there are circumstances in which joinder may be appropriate, as in the present case in which Bianka requests an order giving her mother sole legal and physical custody. “The requirements of due process of law are metin a child custody proceeding when, in a court having subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute, the out-of-state parent is given notice and an opportunity to be heard.” (In re Marriage of Torres (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1378, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 344.) While joinder of an alleged parent who lives outside California may not be required in every case in which sole custody is requested, we are hard pressed to think of a circumstance in which it would not be prudent and consistent with principles of due process. WESTLAW © Bianka M. v. Superior Court, 245 CalApp.4th 406 (2016) 199 Cal. Rptr.3d 849, 2016 WL 815525, 16 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2392... *865 Here, the court applied the mandatory joinder provision found in California Rules of Court, rule 5.24(e), whichstates: “The court must orderthat a person be joinedasaparty to the proceeding if any person the court discovers has physical custody or claims custody or visitation rights with respect to any minor child of the marriage, domestic partnership, or to any minorchild of the relationship.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.24(e)(1)(A).) Bianka argues joinder is unnecessary because Jorge does not claim custody or visitation rights. Bianka's contention is without merit becausethere is no admissible evidence '° in the record before us which establishes whether Jorge does or does not wish to claim any custody orvisitation rights in this case. Although the court could have inferred, as Bianka urges,Jorge does not claim any interest in Bianka's custody because he has not taken anyactionto establish his parentage orright to custody in the pending proceeding, it was not required to do so. In any event, we need not decide whether joinderof an alleged parent is required in every case in whichsole custody is requested because the court's joinder order was appropriate in this case under the permissive joinder provision of California Rules of Court, rule 5.24. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.24(e)(2).) That section of the rule states in pertinentpart: “The court mayorderthat a person be joined as a party to the proceedingifthe court finds that it would be appropriate to determine the particular issue in the proceeding andthatthe person to be joinedas a party is either indispensable for the court to make an order aboutthat issue or is necessary to the enforcement of any judgment rendered onthat issue.” (/bid.) For at least two reasons, the court did not abuseits discretion by requiring Jorge's joinderin this case. First, although Bianka maintains Jorge's paternity is irrelevant because she brought an action to establish only maternity, the fact remains that she has placed Jorge's paternity squarely at issue by requesting an order containing a factual finding that herfather abandonedher. Further, in the context of a custody proceeding, a court properly considers a wide range of factors bearing on a child's best interests, including in this case Jorge's paternity and presumedfatherstatus, if any, as well as his ability and desire to have a relationship with Bianka,if any. (See § 3020, subd. (b) [noting the importance of frequent and continuing contact between a child and both parents]; § 3010 [noting a child's natural mother and father, if the father is a presumed father under section 7611, are equally entitled to custody of their child].) Although the declarations from Bianka and Gladys indicate Jorge has not fostered a relationship with Bianka andhas no interest in doing so in the future, it was within the court's discretion to attempt to give Jorge a meaningful opportunity to refute those allegations before making the orders requested by Biankain this case. **12 Second, although Bianka's petition does not expressly seek to terminate Jorge's parental rights, the order she seeks would have a similar effect. Bianka asked the court to place her in her mother's sole legal and physical custody. Ordinarily, a sole custody order does not deprive the noncustodial parentof all parental rights. (See In re Marriage ofBrown & Yana (2006) 37 Cal.4th 947, 958, 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 610, 127 P.3d 28.) But here, although Bianka's petition takes no WESTLAW ©2078 T ty EG pay phen pers Neei Peters, Mo Bianka M. v. Superior Court, 245 Cal.App.4th 406 (2016) 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 849, 2016 WL 815525, 16 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2392... position on visitation, *866 as a practical matter she would haveto oppose anyvisitation rights for Jorge, as visitation is incompatible with the requested SIJ finding that reunification is not viable. Substantial geographic separation, which will often (if not always) be present in cases in which SIJ findings are requested, further exacerbates the effect of a sole custody orderin this case. In our view, the court was reasonably concerned about making such an order in a nonadversarial proceeding to which the noncustodial parent is not a party, as is the case here. Bianka asserts joining Jorge to the pending action will unnecessarily delay the proceedings, confuse the issues, complicate matters and/or interfere with effective disposition of the case, all factors which may impact a court's decision regarding joinder. u (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.24(e).) Such concerns are misplaced here since Bianka is aware of her father's identity andhis whereabouts and, in fact, has provided him with copies of her petition and related documents. She has therefore already demonstrated that she has the ability to comply with the procedural requirements for joinder. 12 (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.24(e)(3).) [14] We recognize Bianka will not only need to join Jorge to the action but must also establish a basis for personal jurisdiction over him, and we appreciate that process may prove difficult for Bianka and other similarly situated children seeking SIJ status. We note, however, that if the nonresident parent stipulates to parentage, that stipulation constitutes a general appearance, and establishes personal jurisdiction, in the lawsuit. (See Adoption of Matthew B. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1239, 1270, 284 Cal.Rptr. 18 [challengeto stipulated judgmentofpaternity for lack of personaljurisdiction rejected].) The record before us does not establish whether Jorge was willing or unwilling to stipulate to a judgment of paternity. However, if the court were to proceed in the absence of personaljurisdiction over Jorge, any order regarding his parentage and any default judgment would necessarily be void and subject to a motion to vacate in the future. (See County of San Diego v. Gorham (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1227, 113 Cal.Rptr.3d 147 [holdingjudgment ofpaternity void in the absenceofpersonal jurisdiction over father].) This alternative is untenable. We emphasize our narrow holdingthat joinder is appropriate underthe circumstancespresent in this case—namely, wherethe identity and whereabouts ofthe child's absent parent are known. In other circumstances, including situations in which the child's absent parent cannot be located or identified, joinder would be inappropriate. *867 (See § 7635 [UPA notice must comply with § 7666]; § 7666 [notice not required wherealleged biological father cannotbe locatedorhis identity cannot be ascertained].) 5. Notice and the Opportunity to Be Heard A. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act WESTLAW © Bianka M. v. Superior Court, 245 Cal.App.4th 406 (2016} 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 849, 2016 WL 815525, 16 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2392... (i) Special appearancebya party to a child custody matter **13 The provisions ofthe Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) relating to personal jurisdiction provide additional support for the trial court's view that Jorge should be madea party to the pending parentage action. The exclusive method of determining subject matter jurisdiction (i.e., proper jurisdictional situs) in multi-jurisdictional child custody cases is the UCCJEA.(§ 3400 et seq.) “ ‘The UCCJEAtakes a strict “first in time” approachtojurisdiction. Basically, subject to exceptionsnot applicable here [citations], once the court of an appropriate state (Fam.Code, § 3421, subd. (a)) has made a “child custody determination,” that court obtains “exclusive, continuing jurisdiction...” (Fam.Code, § 3422, subd. (a).) The court of anotherstate: [{] (a) Cannot modify the child custody determination (Fam.Code, §§ 3421, subd. (b), 3422, subd. (a), 3423, 3446, subd. (b)); [and] [{] (b) Must enforce the child custody determination (Fam.Code, §§ 3443, 3445, 3446, 3448, 3453)...’ [Citation.]” (in re Marriage ofNurie (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 478, 491, 98 Cal_Rptr.3d 200.) Under the UCCJEA, a California court must “treat a foreign country as if it were a state of the United States for the purpose of” determining jurisdiction. (§ 3405, subd. (a); In re Marriage of Nurie, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 490, 98 Cal.Rptr.3d 200.) [15] In some cases, it may be appropriate to litigate the existence of jurisdiction under the UCCIJEAinthe first instance. (§ 3407.) The UCCJEA contemplates that jurisdictional issues will be raised by a party to the custody proceeding. (§ 3407 [if there is a question about jurisdiction, “the question, upon request of a party, must be given priority on the calendar and handled expeditiously”], emphasis added.) However, as a nonparty, Jorge could not contest the court's subject matterjurisdiction in this case by, for example, bringing a motion to quash serviceof the summons. Further, the UCCJEAallowsa parentto participate in pending child custody proceedings without submitting to personaljurisdiction in this state. (§ 3409, subd.(a).) This is an important protection afforded to out-of-state parents,asit affords parents the opportunity to participate in proceedings relating to child custody without subjecting themselves to the general jurisdiction of the court with respect to other issues, such asliability for child support. However, the special appearance provision applies only to “[a] party to a child custody proceeding, including a modification proceeding, or a petitioner or respondent in a proceeding to enforce or register a child custody determination.” (§ 3409, subd. (a), emphasis added.) Notably, Jorge currently cannot appear specially under § 3409 because heis not a party to the action. Conceivably, Jorge could appear specially in the pending proceeding and waiveall rights to custody. WESTLAW ©2071S Th Bianka M. v. Superior Court, 245 Cal.App.4th 406 (2016) 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 849, 2016 WL 815525, 16 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2392... In our view,joining Jorge as a party to the parentage action and giving him the opportunity to make a special appearancein the action is wholly consistent with the court's obligation to ensure that he receives both notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. At aminimum,the court did not abuseits discretion by considering *868 due process in making its determination regarding joinder. (ii) Subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA **14 [16] Ona separate point, Bianka arguesin herpetition, as she did below, that because the court has subject matter jurisdiction over her custody proceeding under the UCCJEA,the court necessarily had the authority under section 3020 to issue any custody orderit deemed to be in Bianka’'s bestinterest, notwithstanding other substantive issues which mightbear on that question, such as paternity. This is not the correct analysis. The question of subject matter jurisdiction is a preliminary, necessary step thatrelates purely to the proper forum as between California and other possible jurisdictions. The substantive decision—i.e., whether placing Bianka in her mother's sole legal and physical custody is in her best interest—is made with reference to the applicable family law statutes including, in this case, the UPA. (See Inre Marriage ofNurie, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 492, 98 Cal.Rptr.3d 200 [noting the UCCJEA “‘eliminates the term “best interests” from the statutory language to clearly distinguish between the jurisdictional standards and the substantive standardsrelating to child custody andvisitation’ ”].) Stated differently, the fact that the court had jurisdiction to make a custody order does not dispense with the need to issue a custody orderin accordance with applicable law. B. SLJ findings in legal guardianship proceedings Because it appears to us Bianka's primary goal in bringing her parentage action was to obtain an order containing SIJ findings, we consider the extent to which parents in Jorge's circumstance might receive notice and the opportunity to be heard prior to the issuance of SIJ findings in other contexts. Specifically, where an undocumented child does not reunite with a parent in the United States, a child may need a legal guardian. To a large degree, parents of a proposed ward in a guardianship proceedingare similarly situated to a parent such as Jorge,as the effect of the appointmentofa legal guardian haslargely the same effect as the award ofsole legal and physical custody,i.e., suspension ofthe parents' ability to exercise legal rights and make decisions aboutthe child. (See Guardianship ofAnn S. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1110, 1123-1124, 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 701, 202 P.3d 1089 [“When the court appoints a guardian, the authority of the parent ‘ceases.’ [Citation.] The court has discretion to grant visitation [citation], but otherwise parental rights are completely suspendedfor the duration ofa probate guardianship[citation.]”].) Although parents are notparties in a guardianship proceeding, wefind it helpful to consider to what extent they have the right to WESTLAW (2 2010 Thomac Bianka M. v. Superior Court, 245 Cal.App.4th 406 (2016) 199 Cal. Rptr.3d 849, 2016 WL 815525, 16 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2392... notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard regarding both the appointmentofa guardian and a request for SIJ findings. In a guardianship proceeding,a proposed ward's parents must receive actualnotice of the hearing on a petition for the appointmentof a guardian. Proofofthat notice mustbe presented to the court before the appointment of a guardian may be made. (Prob.Code, § 1511, subds.(a), (b)(3), (hh); see Guardianship ofDebbie V. (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 781, 785-786, 227 Cal.Rptr. 554 [noting parents ofproposed ward must be served under CodeofCivil Procedure section 415.10 or 415.30 and confirming that “[uJndereither of these methods, actual receipt of the notice is assured,i.e., the subject of the notice will either be personally served or will acknowledgereceipt of a mailed notice”].) A parent whoobjects to guardianshipis entitled to a hearing. (See *869 Guardianship ofAnn S., supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1122, 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 701, 202 P.3d 1089.) With respect to SIJ findings, California Rules of Court, rule 7.1020 provides any person authorized to bring a petition for the appointmentofa guardian, including a proposed wardoverthe age of 12 years old, may file a request for an order making SIJ findings in a guardianship proceeding. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 7.1020(b)(1).) The proposed ward's parents are entitled to receive a copy of the request for SIJ findings and notice by mail, at least 15 days prior to the hearing, ofthe time and date of the hearing on the request. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 7.1020(c); Prob.Code, § 1406 [requiring notice by mail 15 days prior to hearing].) Importantly for our purposes, rule 7.1020 also expressly provides that any person entitled to notice of the request for SIJ findings,i-e., the proposed ward's parents, “mayfile an objection or other opposition to the request.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 7.1020(d).) **15 Under this rule, the proposed ward's parents receive actual notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard regarding SIJ findings, which necessarily includes a finding of parental abandonment. No less due process should be required in an action brought under the UPA in which a party requests SIJ findings. 1B C. Due process in default proceedings Although we have held it was not an abuse ofdiscretion for the court to require Jorge's joinder in this case, we are awareofthe distinct possibility that Jorge will not oppose or respond to the petition. Indeed,if it is true, as Bianka alleges, that Jorge has no interest in her well being, his default—assuming personal jurisdiction is established or not contested—seems the mostlikely outcome. However,for the reasonsthat follow, in addition to adding Jorge as a party, Bianka must provide Jorge with notice of the specific findings of abuse, neglect or abandonmentshe seeks. WESTLAW & Bianka M. v. Superior Court, 245 CalApp.4th 406 (2016) 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 849, 2016 WL 815525, 16 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2392... [17] [18] “It is fundamental to the concept of due process that a defendant be given notice of the existence of a lawsuit andnoticeofthe specific relief which is sought in the complaint served upon him. The logic underlying this principle is simple: a defendant who has been served with a lawsuit has the right, in view of the relief which the complainant is seeking from him,to decide not to appear and defend. However, a defendantis not in a position to make such a decision if he or she has not been given full notice.” (In re Marriage ofLippel (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1160, 1166, 276 Cal.Rptr. 290, 801 P.2d 1041 (Lippel ); see also Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2015) § 12:3, p. 12-2 [Asin civil actions generally, a family law default judgment may only be granted for the specific reliefrequested in the petition served on respondent...”].) Thus, in an action for marital dissolution, a court may not issue a default judgment imposing an obligation of child *870 support where such relief was not requested in the petition for dissolution. (See, e.g., Lippel, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 1167-1171, 276 Cal.Rptr. 290, 801 P.2d 1041.) Similarly, in a marital dissolution proceeding in which oneparty defaults, a court cannot dispose ofproperty notlisted in the petition for dissolution.(See, e.g., In re Marriage ofAndresen (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 873, 879-880, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 147.) [19] Here, Bianka's parentage petition indicates she is seeking a sole custody order as well as an order containing SIJ findings. Although the petition cites the SIJ statute as well as Code of Civil Procedure section 155, the petition does not indicate Bianka seeks an order specifically finding that Jorge abandoned her and/or committed acts of domestic violence against Gladys. Consistent with the due process principles discussed above, we hold that in a default proceeding under the UPA,a court may only issue an order containing SIJ findings regarding parental abuse, neglect, abandonmentor othersimilar actions if those factual allegations were contained in the original petitionor in a requestfor order served together with the summonsand a copy ofthe petition. Only in such circumstances would a parent be on notice of the potential for a negative factual finding of abuse, neglect or abandonment. **16 Wealso require disclosure of allegations regarding parental abuse, neglect, abandonment, or similar actions because those findings carry significant consequences in future family law proceedings. For example, under section 3044, subdivision(a), there is “a rebuttable presumption that an awardofsole or joint physical or legal custody of a child to a person whohasperpetrated domestic violence is detrimental to the best interest of the child...” (See also In re Marriage ofFajota (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1497, 1499, 179 Cal.Rptr.3d 569 [noting section 3044 “presumption applies wheneverthere is a finding that one parent committed an act of domestic violence against anotherparent, a child, or a child's siblings within the past five years,” even in the absenceofa restraining order].) It would be extremely problematic for our courts to make a factual finding of abuse in a default proceeding, thereby triggering the rebuttable presumption against custody, where the alleged abuser did not havenotice ofand an opportunity to rebutthe allegation. WESTLAW & eb Bianka M. v. Superior Court, 245 Cal.App.4th 406 (2016) 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 849, 2016 WL 815525, 16 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2392... Further, a finding of abuse or similar conduct has the potential to defeat a parent's claim for return of a child to the child's country of habitual residence under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (Hague Convention). (See Noergaardy. Noergaard (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 76, 87-88, 197 Cal.Rptr.3d 546 [‘First, it is true that ‘the [Hague] Convention prohibits courts in countries other than that of the child's habitual residence from “adjudicating the merits of the underlying custody dispute.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] But it is necessarily also true that a Hague Convention court must considerin the first instance the respondent's allegations of grave risk that postdate earlier foreign custody orders. [Citation.] Courts must consider these issues in deciding whether to impose undertaking requirementsif the court orders the child's return, or to deny the child's return’”].) We note that in the context of cases brought under the Hague Convention, courts have held due process requires an opportunity for a parentto be heard, at a full evidentiary hearing, on claims that would prevent a child's return under the Hague Convention. (/d. at p. 87, 197 Cal.Rptr.3d 546.) And although there is no evidence here that Gladys removed Bianka from Jorge's custody or that Hondurasis a signatory to the Hague *871 Convention, the procedure usedin this case and therelief requested under the UPA could allow a parent to circumvent and undermine the Hague Convention and other mechanisms designedto effectuate the prompt return of a child taken by oneparent across international borders in violation of a right of custody. (See Abbott v. Abbott (2010) 560 U.S. 1, 20, 130 S.Ct. 1983, 176 L.Ed.2d 789 [noting the Hague Convention's main purposeis “deterring child abductions by parents who attemptto find a friendlier forum for deciding custodial disputes”].) In short, in light of the significant consequences which flow from findings of abuse, neglect, abandonment or somesimilar conduct by a parent, such findings should not be made in a default proceeding without adequate and specific notice. DISPOSITION Thepetition is denied. We Concur: EDMON,P.J. ALDRICH,J. WESTLAQY © 2016 Thomson Reuters Mo cle ve in as eh ay E i T R , A E R A A R R e S Bianka M. v. Superior Court, 245 Cal.App.4th 406 (2016) 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 849, 2016 WL 815525, 16 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2392... All Citations 245 Cal.App.4th 406, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 849, 2016 WL 815525, 16 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2392, 2016 Daily Journal D.A.R. 2171 Footnotes ] w m W N 10 11 12 Because this writ proceeding arises out of a parentage action and all court filings are deemed confidential to protect the privacy of the child, we will refer to the minor and herparents by theirfirst names. Wewill refer to this parentage action between Gladys and Jorgeas the dismissed action. Unless otherwise noted, all further references to a parentage action are to the second action in which Bianka is the petitioner and her mother, Gladys,is the respondent. All further undesignated code section references are to the Family Code. The SIJ statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)Q), provides: “as used in this chapter... [J [t]he term “special immigrant” means... (1) an immigrant who 1s present in the United States—{i) who has been declared dependent on a juvenile court located in the United States or whomsuch a court has legally committed to, or placed under the custody of, an agency or department ofa State, or an individual or entity appointed by a State or juvenile court located in the United States, and whose reunification with 1 or both ofthe immigrant's parentsis not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found underState law; [4] (ii) for whom it has been determined in administrative or judicial proceedings that it would notbein the alien's best interest to be returned to thealien's or parent's previous country ofnationality or country oflast habitual residence; and[{] (iii) in whose case the Secretary ofHomeland Security consents to the grant of special immigrantjuvenile status, except that—[4] (I) no juvenile court has jurisdiction to determine the custody status or placement ofan alien in the custody of the Secretary of Health and Human Services unless the Secretary of Health and Human Services specifically consents to such jurisdiction; and [4] (II) no natural parentor prior adoptive parent of any alien provided special immigrantstatus underthis subparagraph shall thereafter, by virtue of such parentage, be accorded any right, privilege, or status under this chapter...” The current federal regulation requires the orderto state the child is eligible for long term foster placement. (8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c) (4), (5) July 6, 2009).) That portion of the regulation is out of date, as it does not reflect the 2008 amendmentto the SIJ statute which eliminated the foster placementeligibility requirement and replaced it with a requirement regarding parental reunification. (See Leslie H., supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 349, 168 Cal.Rptr.3d 729.) The full text of Code of Civil Procedure section 155, subdivision (a), reads: “A superior court has jurisdiction under California law to make judicial determinations regarding the custody and care of children within the meaning of the federal Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. Sec. 1101(a)(27)(J) and 8 C.F.R. Sec. 204.11) (uly 6, 2009), which includes, but is not limited to, the juvenile, probate, and family court divisionsofthe superior court. These courts may make the findings necessary to enable a child to petition the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service for classification as a special immigrant juvenile pursuant to Section 1101(a)(27)DofTitle 8 of the United States Code.” Forms adopted bythe Judicial Council are adopted as rules of court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.7(a).) Section 7666, which appears in the chapter of the Family Code addressing termination of parental rights in an adoption proceeding,° provides in pertinent part: “notice of the proceeding shall be given to every person identified as the biological father or a possible biological father in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure for the service of process in a civil action in this state at least 10 days before the date of the proceeding... Proof of giving the notice shall be filed with the court before the petition is heard.” (§ 7666, subd. (a).) Weagree with thetrial court that statements purportedly made by Jorge during a telephonecall with Bianka's counsel, as relayed in a declaration submitted to the court by Bianka's counsel, are inadmissible hearsay. California Rules of Court, rule 5.24(e) states in pertinent part: “In deciding whetherit is appropriate to determine the particular issue in the proceeding,the court must considerits effect upon the proceeding, including: [¥] (A) Whether resolving that issue will unduly delay the disposition ofthe proceeding; [{] (B) Whether other parties would need to be joined to make an effective judgment between the parties; [{] (C) Whether resolving that issue will confuse other issues in the proceeding; and [{] (D) Whetherthe joinder of a party to determinetheparticular issue will complicate, delay, or otherwise interfere with the effective disposition ofthe proceeding.” Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.24(e)(3), provides: “If the court orders that a person be joined as a party to the proceeding underthis rule, the court mustdirect that a summonsbe issued on Summons (Joinder) (form FL—375) andthat the claimantbe served with a copy of Bianka M. v. Superior Court, 245 CalApp.4th 406 (2016) 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 849, 2016 WL 815525, 16 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2392... Notice ofMotion and Declarationfor Joinder (form FL—371),the pleading attached thereto, the order ofjoinder, and the summons The claimant has 30 days after service to file an appropriate response.” 13 Wealso note that the Judicial Council's proposed rule 5.130 regarding SIJ findings in family law custody proceedings would not, as drafted, provide a nonparty with notice and the opportunity to be heard before SIJ findings are made. Proposed rule 5.130(c), provides only that “[a] person entitled to notice of a Request for Order (FL-300) under rule 5.92 mayfile an objection or other opposition to a request” for SIJ findings. (Judicial Council of California, Invitation to Comment W16-11, Family Law: Special Immigrant Juvenile Findings, available online at http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/W 16-1 1.pdf.) California Rules of Court, rule 5.92 requires only that notice be given to the opposing party in the action. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.92(a)(6) [“The moving party mustfile the documents with the court to obtain a court date and then serve a copy on the responding party”].) Kad of Decement :O94 2016 Thenson Reuters. No clare io original LS. Governmen Works IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE BIANKA M., a Minor, B267454 Petitioner, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC052072) Vv. SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent; GLADYS M., Real Party inInterest. BY THE COURT: ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING GOUTGFWHEL - acoawe oir FY i, RAR 22 2018 A ANE V.GRay Clark Deputy Clerk Petitioner Bianka M. contendsshe had no opportunity to brief the appropriate timing for requesting special immigrant juvenile status (SIJS) findings, no opportunity to brief whether her unopposedparentage action against her mother was a bona fide custody proceeding under the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), and her alleged biological father, Jorge, is entitled to limited due process rights under the UPA. Bianka’s first contention concerningthe timing for seeking SUS findingsis without merit. In its order denying Bianka’s request for SIJS findings, the trial court noted on page 3 that the issue of paternity remained an unresolved question of fact for trial in a matter to which Bianka’s alleged father is a proper party. Thetrial court also noted, on pages 6 and 8 ofits order, that it could not, absent a stipulation of the parents, adjudicate parentage on a pretrial request for order, and a finding of parentage is a necessary predicate to making SIJS findings. In addition, both Bianka andamici curiae argued in their appellate briefs that the trial court erred by finding that paternity had to be determined beforeit could make a custody order and SIJS findings. Bianka’s secondcontention concerning whether the underlying parentage action is a bonafide dispute is also without merit. The trial court expressly addressed the issue by noting on page 12 ofits order that there “does not appear to bea justiciable controversy as to parentage or as to custody” because Bianka’s mother’s parentageis uncontested and she has nothad anydifficulty obtaining health care or an education for her daughter. This issue wasalso explicitly addressed by Bianka at pages 31, 32, and 33 of her writ papers. Finally, while we agree with Biankathat alleged fathers are accorded fewer rights than presumedfathers, the trial court was not required to accept statements by Bianka and her motherthat Jorge hasnot fostered a relationship with Bianka and has nointerest in doing so in the future. That is, Jorge’s status as an alleged father or a presumed father has not been established. The petition is denied. "EDMON,P.J. ALDRICH,J. LAVIN,J. Joshua Christopher Lee Trell & Manella LLP 1800 Avenue of the Stars Ste 900 Los Angeles, CA 90067 Case Number B267454 Division 3 Bianka M. Petitioner, Vv. S.C.L.A. Respondent Gladys M. Real Partyin Interest. PROOF OF SERVICE I am employedin the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am overthe age of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is 1800 Avenueofthe Stars, Suite 900, Los Angeles, California 90067-4276. On April 11, 2016, I served the foregoing document described as Petition for Review on each interested party, as stated on the attached servicelist. [x] (BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY SERVICE) I served the foregoing document by FedEx, an express service carrier which provides overnight delivery, as follows. I placeda true copy of the foregoing document in sealed envelopes or packages designated by the express service carrier, addressed, as stated on the attachedservice list, with fees for overnight delivery paid or providedfor. (BOX DEPOSIT) I deposited such envelopes or packagesin a box or otherfacility regularly maintained by the express service carrier. LC] (CARRIER PICK-UP) I delivered such envelopes or packages to an authorized carrier or driver authorized by the express service carrier to receive documents. Executed on April 11, 2016, at Los Angeles, California. I declare under penalty of perjury underthe laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true andcorrect. Kent B.\ones Kent: bon— (Type orprint name) (Signature) 8478874.1 01 merhei Bhcgthn Oa ROE ba, & oO o O o S I D A W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 SERVICE Bianka M., Petitioner, v. The Superior Court of Californiafor the County ofLos Angeles, Respondent; Gladys M., Real Party in Interest Gladys M. 760 East 50th Street Los Angeles, CA 90011 Jose Wilfredo Montoya Lazo Colonia tres de Abril Segunda Etapa Calle Colondrina El Progreso, Yoro Honduras, C.A. Honorable Holly J. Fujie c/o Frederick R. Bennett, Esq., Court Counsel Superior Court of California for County of Los Angeles 111 North Hill Street, Suite 546 Los Angeles, CA 90012 Ms.Sherri R. Carter Clerk of the Los Angeles Superior Court 111 North Hill Street Los Angeles, CA 90012 Ms.Zaida Clayton Clerk, Division Three Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District 300 South Spring Street Los Angeles, CA 90013 Eric Westlund, Esq. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP 333 South Grand Avenue Los Angeles, CA 90071-3197 8478874.1 01