LOS ANGELES, COUNTY OF v. FINANCIAL CASUALTY & SURETY

Appellant’s Petition for Review

Cal.October 28, 2015

S23 09 1 3 F ILED. B257660 OCT 28 2015 (LASC No. $J3898) Frank A. McGuire Clerk Deputy IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FILED WITH PERMISSION COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff-Appellant, Vv. FINANCIAL CASUALTY & SURETY,INC., Defendant-Respondent. Afier a decision by the Court of Appeal Second Appellate District, Division Four Case No. B257660 (LASC No. SJ3898) PETITION FOR REVIEW OFFICE OF THE COUNTY COUNSEL RUBEN BAEZA,JR., Assistant County Counsel LINDSAY YOSHIYAMA,Deputy County Counsel JOANNE NIELSEN,Principal Deputy County Counsel State Bar No. 181698 648 Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street Los Angeles, California 90012-2713 Tel: (213) 974-1876 Vax: (213) 687-8822 Attorneys for the County of Los Angeles HOA. 1303435.1 So B257660 (LASC No. $J3898) IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff-Appellant, Vv. FINANCIAL CASUALTY & SURETY,INC., Defendant-Respondent. After a decision by the Court of Appeal Second Appellate District, Division Four Case No. B257660 (LASC No.SJ3898) PETITION FOR REVIEW OFFICE OF THE COUNTY COUNSEL RUBEN BAEZA,JR., Assistant County Counsel LINDSAY YOSHIYAMA,Deputy County Counsel JOANNE NIELSEN,Principal Deputy County Counsel State Bar No. 181698 648 Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street Los Angeles, California 90012-2713 Tel: (213) 974-1876 Fax: (213) 687-8822 Attorneys for the County of Los Angeles HOA.1309743.1 Table of Contents Page TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............. 0. ceceeee ii INTRODUCTION ....... 0.00.ceeeee ene 1 QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW .............. 00002 eee 2 GROUNDSFOR REVIEW......... 0.000. c eee eee tenes 3 PETITION FOR REHEARING ....... 2.0... cece ce eee eee 6 STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...... 0.0... ccc eee eee 7 ARGUMENT ......0... 0. ceceeee een een ene 9 A. A DEFENDANTIS LAWFULLY REQUIRED TO APPEAR ON THE DATE SHOWN ON THE BOND PURSUANT TO PENAL CODE §1269B .. 0...ecene e eens 9 B. A DEFENDANT MAY BE LAWFULLY REQUIRED TO APPEAR IN COURT WITHOUT THE COURT HAVING USED CERTAIN "MAGIC WORDS" ORDERING THE DEFENDANT TO RETURN ..... 0. 2c cece ne een teen een eens 21 C. A DEFENDANT CHARGED WITH A FELONY WHO HAS NOT EXECUTED A WAIVER IS LAWFULLY REQUIRED TO APPEAR PURSUANTTO PENAL CODE§977 . 2.0.0.0... 6. cee eee. 22 CONCLUSION 2.0.0... occceee ene n ene 30 CERTIFICATE OF WORD COURT PURSUANT TO RULE8.204(c) . 31 HOA.1309750.1 i TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page CASES County ofLos Angeles v. Fairmont Specialty Group (2008)..... 17, 18, 19 164 Cal.App.4th 1018 County ofLos Angeles v. Ranger Ins. Co. (1999)... 6... eee eee eee ee 22 70 Cal.App.4th 10 Day v. City ofFontana (2001)...cenceeee 22 25 Cal.4th 268 In re Marriage ofHarris (2004) 2.0... 0c c cece eee eens 22 34 Cal.4th 210 Inre Romeo C. (1995) 0... ceeeeetnt nes 21 33 Cal.App.4™ 1838 People v. Adammes (1997) 0... ccc ceceete nen eens 23 54 Cal.App.4th 198 People v. American Bankers Ins. Co. (1990)... 0.6.0.0 ee eee ee eens 29 225 Cal.App.3d 1378 People v. American Bankers Ins. Co. (1987)... 000.0 esse eee eens 25 191 Cal.App.3d 742 People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2014) (review granted) . . 5 226 Cal.App.4" 1059 People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004)......--.++50555 8 33 Cal.4th 653 People v. American Surety Insurance Co. (2009) .........+- 5, 13, 15, 16 178 Cal.App.4" 1437 People v. Ault (2004)... 0... ccceee ee ee teens 13 33 Cal.4th 1250 People v. Avila (2012) 0... ccc cccteen eens 13 38 Cal.4th 491 HOA. 1309743.1 il People v. Classified Ins. Corp.1985) 0.0.0.6 6 0 cece eee eee 28, 29, 30 164 Cal.App.3d 341. People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2015) beesbeeen eee 13 239 Cal.App.4th 440 People v. Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Ins. Co. (2011) .......-+.- 26, 27 194 Cal.App.4th 45 People v. Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Ins. Co. (2010) ........++++4 22 49 Cal.4th 301 People v. International Fidelity Ins. Co. (2012) ........+--. 6, 24, 25, 26 212 Cal.App.4" 1556 Peoplev. Jimenez,(1995)eeeee eee eee nents 27, 28, 29 38 Cal.App.4th 795 People v. Maxwell 1981)... ccceeeetna 21 115 Cal.App.3d 807 People v. National Automobile Insurance Company (1977) ......-++++- 12 77 Cal.App.3d Supp.7 People v. North Beach Bonding Co. (1974) .... 600s eee eee eee 28, 29, 30 36 Cal.App.3d 663 People v. Ranger Insurance Company (2006) Lecce eee 5, 6, 13, 14, 15, 16 145 Cal.App.4" 23 People v. Sacramento Bail Bonds (1989) ..........eee e eens 25, 26 210 Cal.App.3d 118 People v. Safety National Casualty Ins. Co. (2014) (review granted) ..... 5 225 Cal.App.4" 438 People v. United Bond Insurance Co. (1971) «1.2... cee eee 6, 22 5 Cal.3d 898 STATUTES Civil Code §3541 00... ceeeee eee tenet ne nes 23 HOA.1309743.1 ili Penal Code §977 ... 0. ceceeentre tet ene passim Penal Code §978.5 2.0... cece cc ee een e een tenes 12 Penal Code §1269b.. 0... eeeeee eens passim Penal Code §1305 2.2...eceee teen eee passim Penal Code §1306 ....... coc u ee eueene cut eeeeeeteneens 4,10, 11, 18 CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT Rule 8.500(D)(1) oo. cccecccceceeeee teen n enn e eee 3 Rule 8.512(d)(2) . 0. ccc e cece ence eee ees Lee neeeeeeneeeas 5 HOA.1309743.1 iv INTRODUCTION On November29, 2012,a felony defendant was present, in custody, for arraignment whenherpretrial conference wasset for January 3, 2013. At the conclusion ofthe hearing, the court stated, "So that will be the order, then. We'll see you all back here on January 3rd." The defendant, who had not executed a §977, subd.(b) waiver, was remandedto custody. Prior to January 3, the defendantwasreleased on bail. In accordance with Penal Code! §1269b, subd.(a), the jailer approved and accepted bail, and upon the defendant's release from custody, set the defendant's next court appearance for January 3, 2013. The defendant failed to appear on January 3rd, withoutsufficient excuse, and bail was forfeited. The first question is whether the authority grantedto a jailer in §1269b, subd.(a) "to set the time and place for the appearance of the arrested person before the appropriate court and give notice thereof," made the defendant's appearance in court lawfully required on January 3, 2013. The answer must be "yes." . The next question is whether the court's statement, "So that will be the order, then. We'll see youall back here on January 3rd," was an order for the defendant to return. The answer againis "yes." ' All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified. HOA.1309743.1 -l- Thefinal question is whether §977, subd.(b)'s mandate, that felony defendants who have not executed a waiver be personally presentatall proceedings, lawfully required the defendant to appearat the next scheduled hearing. Once again,the answeris "yes." QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW l. Penal Code §1269b, subd. (a) authorizes a jailer to approve and accept bail "and to set the time and place for the appearance ofthe arrested person before the appropriate court and give notice thereof." "Ifa defendantor arrested person soreleased fails to appearat the time andin the court so ordered uponhisor her release from custody, Sections 1305 and 1306 apply." (§1269b, subd. (h).) Section 1305, subd. (a)(4) requires a court to forfeit bail if, without sufficient excuse, a defendantfails to appear when "the defendant's presence in court is lawfully required." Is a defendant lawfully required to appear on the date set by the jailor pursuant to §1269b,such that a failure to appear should result in bail forfeiture under §1305(a)(4)? 2. At the conclusion of a criminal proceeding at which the defendantand her counsel were present, and after setting the next hearing on January 3, 2013, the court stated, "So that will be the order, then. We'll see youall back here on January 3" Was the court’s statement an order for the defendant to appear at the next court date? HOA.1309743.1 -2- 3. Section 977, subd. (b) requires a defendant charged with a felony to be personally presentat certain specified hearings andatall other proceedings unless the defendanthas executed a waiver. Section 1305, subd.(a)(4) requires a court to forfeit bail if, without sufficient excuse,a defendantfails to appear when "the defendant's presence in court is lawfully required." Is a felony defendant lawfully required to appear at the next scheduled court proceeding pursuant to §977(b), such bail should be forfeited under §1305(a)(4)if the defendantfails to appear? GROUNDS FOR REVIEW California Rules of Court, rule 8.500 subd.(b)(1) states that the Supreme Court mayorder review of a Court ofAppeal decision “[w]hen necessary to secure uniformity of decision or to settle an important question of law.” (CRC,rule 8.500(b)(1).) Here, review is necessary for both reasons. Whetherbail forfeiture is appropriate when a defendantfails to appear as required by §1269bis an important question of law. Section 1305, subd.(a) requires a court to forfeit bail upon a defendant’s first unexcused non-appearance. Section 1269b, subd.(a) grants jailors the authority to approve and acceptbail, to issue and sign an order for the release of the defendant, and to “set the time and place for the appearance of the arrested person.” Section 1269b, subd.(h) then providesthat “[i]fa HOA.1309743.1 -3- defendant ...so released fails to appear at the time and in the court so ordered upon his or her release from custody, Sections 1305 and 1306 apply.” The opinionin this case (“the Opinion”) holds that the authority granted upder §1269b, subd.(a) is insufficient to “lawfully require” a defendant’s appearance. In so holding, the Opinion ignores the plain language andlegislative history of both §§1269b and 1305. The Opinion states “[Section 1269b] does not address forfeiture of bail, which undisputedly is governed by section 1305.” (Opinion, page 7.) But subdivision (h) of §1269b explicitly cites §1305 as a consequence for the defendant’s failure to appear as ordered under subdivision (a). The Opinion’s holding renders §1269b, subd.(h) void, and it ignores principles of statutory construction as well as the statute’s legislative intent. Further, the Opinion creates an unworkable system by “[rlequiring the court to order the defendant to appear at a hearing”in orderfor the defendant’s appearance to be lawfully required. (See Opinion,page 8.) The appellate court failed to consider situations when a defendantbails out of custody withoutthe trial court having had the chanceto order the defendant's return. Thus, the Opinion cannot stand and review is necessary. Review is also appropriate to ensure uniformity of decision. The Opinion not only represents a departure from existing authority, but it supports its holding by misinterpreting case law. (Opinion,pages 6-8.) HOA.1309743.1 -4- Thecasescited, People v. American Surety (“American Surety”) (2009) 178 Cal.App.4" 1437 and People v. Ranger Insurance Company (“Ranger”) (2006) 145 Cal.App.4" 23, support the position that bail must be forfeited whena defendantfails to appear on the date set by the jailor as reflected on the bond. However, the Opinioninterprets their holdings to stand for the opposite — that §1269bis inapplicable to bail forfeiture. Thus, review is required. Also, whether §977, subd.(b) applies to bail forfeiture proceedingsis currently pending before this Court. (Peoplev. Safety National Casualty Ins. Co. (“Safety National’) (2014) 225 Cal.App.4” 438, review granted July 23, 2014, S218712; People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4” 1059, review granted August 13, 2014, $219842; and People v. Lexington National Insurance Corporation (unpublished opinion filed January 21, 2015) review granted April 29, 2015, 8224774) In granting review, the Court deferred action in the latter two cases pending consideration and disposition of Safety National because the issues are related (See CRC,rule 8.512, subd. (d)(2).) One of the issueshereis also related, and review is appropriate.” ? While the appellate court did not analyze the applicability of §977, subd.(b) becausethe court claimedthat the County abandoned the issue on appeal, review is appropriate. The County did not abandon the argument; rather, it argued it was not necessary to address the unsettled §977, subd.(b) issue because §1269b wasdispositive. But the facts here HOA.1309743.1 -5- Whether §1269b and §977, subd.(b) are relevant to bail forfeiture present important questions of law. The statutes governing bail forfeiture do not address “non-essential” or "non-mandatory" hearings; the statutes require a court to forfeit bail at a defendant’s first unexecused non- appearanceorthe court loses jurisdiction to do so later. (Ranger, supra, 48 Cal.App.4” at 995 [citing People v. United Bond Insurance Co.(1971) 5 Cal.3d 898, 907].) Butif a court forfeits bail when a defendant’s appearance wasnotlawfully required, the forfeiture is void and cannot stand. (People v. International Fidelity Ins. Co. (“International F.idelity’’) (2012) 212 Cal.App.4" 1556, 1561-64.) In order for the bail forfeiture process to work as the Legislature intended, the law mustclearly and unambiguously define when a defendant’s appearanceis “lawfully required.” PETITION FOR REHEARING The Countyfiled a Petition for Rehearing on October 1, 2015, which the Court of Appeal denied without comment on October 7, 2015. A copy of the Court of Appeal's order denying the County's Petition for Rehearing is attached hereto as Exhibit 2. (...continued) plainly raise the issue of whether the defendant’s presence was “lawfully required" pursuant to §977. HOA.1309743.1 -6- STATEMENT OF THE CASE On November15, 2012, the People of the State of California filed a felony complaint against Sandra Chavezgarcia ("Chavezgarcia"). (Clerk's Transcript ("CT") 82.) On November 29, 2012, Chavezgarcia appeared in court, in custody, for arraignment. (CT 82-83.) The next court date wasset for a pretrial conference on January 3, 2013. (CT 102.) At the end of the hearing, the court stated, "So that will be the order, then. We'll see you all back here on January 3rd." (CT 102.) Chavezgarcia was remanded to custody. (CT 83.) On December 29, 2013, the surety, Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. ("the surety" or "Financial"), through its agent Bail Now Bail Bonds, posted a bail bond to secure Chavezgarcia's release from custody. (CT 4.) Pursuant to the termsofthe bail bond, Financial undertook that Chavezgarcia would appearin court on January 3, 2013, or it would be subject to forfeiture of the bond andthe entry of summary judgment. (CT 5.) On January 3, 2013, Chavezgarcia failed to appear in court, without sufficient excuse, and the court forfeited bail. (CT 83.) The court issued a bench warrant and sentnotices of forfeiture to the surety and its agent. (CT 83.) HOA.1309743.1 -7- The appearance period’ was extended twiceandultimately expired without the forfeiture having been set aside. (CT 83-85.) The court entered summary judgmenton the forfeited bond and sent notice. (CT 22.) On February 20, 2014, the surety filed a motionto set aside summary judgment, discharge forfeiture, and exonerate the bond (the "Motion"), on the basis that Chavezgarcia's appearance wasnot "lawfully required" on January 3, 2013. (CT 32-68 and 86.) The County opposed the motion and argued that Chavezgarcia's appearance was "lawfully required." (CT 71-80.) On May16, 2014, the court granted the Motion. (CT 124.) The County timely appealedthetrial court's order granting the Motion. (CT 127.) The County contended that Chavezgarcia's appearance was "lawfully required" pursuant to both §§977, subd. (b) and §1269b, and that she had been ordered to return. (Appellant's Reply Brief, pages 5 and 10; Appellant’s Opening Brief, page 6.) Following oral argument, the Court of Appeal filed the Opinion affirming the lowercourt's order. (Exhibit 1.) On October 1, 2015, the Countyfiled its petition for rehearing which was denied without comment on October 7, 2015. (Exhibit 2.) 3 "The 185 daysafter the date the clerk of the court mails a notice of forfeiture (180 daysplus five days for mailing) to the appropriate parties is knownas the “appearanceperiod. “ (§1305, subd.(b).)" (People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 653, 658.) HOA.1309743.1 -8- ARGUMENT A. A DEFENDANTIS LAWFULLY REQUIRED TO APPEAR ON THE DATE SHOWNON THE BOND PURSUANT TO PENAL CODE §1269b 1. Theplain languageandlegislative history The Opinion's holding that §1269b is irrelevant in determining whether a defendant's presence is "lawfully required" under §1305 disregards the plain language of §1269b. (§1269b, subds.(a) and(h); see Opinion, page 5.) Section 1269b provides in pertinentpart: (a) The officer in charge of a jail in which an arrested person is held in custody...may approve and acceptbail...to issue and sign an order for the release of the arrested person, andto set a time andplace for the appearanceofthe arrested person before the appropriate court and to give notice thereof. (h) If a defendant or arrested person so released fails to appear at the time andin the court so ordered uponhis or her release from custody, Sections 1305 and 1306 apply. (§1269b, subds.(a) and (h).) And as the Opinioncorrectly states, bail forfeiture "undisputedly is governed" by §1305. (Opinion, page 7.) S R W o e UnderSection 1305, subd.(a): e A court shall in open court declare forfeited the undertaking ofbail...if, without sufficient excuse, a defendant fails to appear for any of the following: (1) Arraignment. (2) Trial. (3) Judgment. HOA.1309743.1 -9- (4) Any other occasionpriorto the pronouncementofjudgmentifthe defendant's presence in court is lawfully required. (5) To surrender himself or herself in execution of the judgmentafter appeal. (§1305, subd.(a), emphasis added.) Section 1306 then governsentry of summary judgmenton bail bonds. The plain language of §1269b is clear and unambiguous: A jailer hasthe authority to approve andacceptbail, to issue and sign an orderfor the release of an arrested person, andto set the time andplace for the appearanceofthe arrested person. If the arrested person fails to appearat the time andplace set by the jailer, without sufficient excuse, bail shall be forfeited. In addition to the plain language, a historical review of the statute supports the County's position andreveals the Legislature's original intent behind the statute: To empowerothers besides a judge to compel a defendant's appearancein court, without a specific court order to appear, ‘ whena defendant bails out. If a defendantfails to appear at the hearingset by the jailor, without sufficient excuse, bail forfeiture is appropriate. In its original 1945 version, the statute read, "In a justice's court of Class A, the clerk of the court shall, in the absenceofa judge of said court, have authority to accept bail for the appearancebefore said court....[{] The authority to acceptbail as in this section provided shall include authority to approve the same,to issue andsign an orderfor the release of the HOA.1309743.1 -10- defendant, and to set a time and place for the appearance of the defendant before the appropriate division or judge of such court and give the defendantnotice thereof." (Stats. 1945, ch. 363, §1.) From the time it was enacted, §1269b wasintended to serve as a mechanism for defendants to bail out ofjail without having to first go before a judge, and to ensure their appearanceat the next court hearing. While the statute has undergone a numberofrevisions, including giving jailers the same authority as court clerks, it serves the same purpose today. The reference to §§1305 and 1306 in §1269b, subd.(h) imposes the penalty of forfeiture if the defendant fails to appear at the hearing ordered by the jailer. In 1959, a numberofprovisions were added, and among them | wasthe following: "Ifa defendantor arrested person soreleased fails to appearat the time andin the court so ordered uponhis release from custody, the court...may forfeit the cash bail or surety bond...andifthe bail is a surety bond the surety companyis obligated as provided by Section 1306 ofthe Penal Code, subject to the right of the court to set aside the forfeiture as provided by law." (Stats. 1959, ch. 1396, §1.) Thus, the Legislature intendedclerks and jailers be given the authority to set the time and place for the defendant's appearance — without a court order — and the defendant would be "lawfully required" to appear at the time and place so set. HOA.1309743.1 -I1- Further, the language of §978.5, a statute dictating when a bench warrant may be issued for a defendant's failure to appear, confirmsthat personsidentified in §1269b have the authority to make a defendant's appearance lawfully required. Section 978.5, subd. (a) states: A bench warrant of arrest may be issued whenever a defendant fails to appear in court as required by law including,but not limited to the following situations: (1) Ifthe defendantis ordered by a judge or magistrate to personally appear in court at a specified time and place. (2) Ifthe defendantis releasedfrom custody on bail and is ordered by a judge or magistrate, or other person authorized to accept bail, to personally appearin court at a specific time andplace. (§978.5, subd. (a), emphasis added.) There seemsto be no doubtthat a defendant's appearanceis lawfully required for the purposesofissuing a bench warrantif she fails to appear when so ordered by a person authorized — to accept bail. Likewise, there should be no doubt that a defendant's appearanceis lawfully required for purposesofforfeiting bail if she fails to appear when soorderedby a person authorized to accept bail. 2. The Opinioncreates a conflict within the case law. Prior to the Opinion, case law consistently held that a defendant's presence was lawfully required under §1269b.* The contrary holding ofthe * Although People v. National Automobile Insurance Company (1977) 77 Cal.App.3d Supp.7, foundthat the defendant was not required to HOA.1309743.1 -12- Opinion andits misinterpretations of the casesit cites creates a conflict of authority on an important question of law. "In reliance on" American Surety, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th 1437 and Ranger, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th 23, the Court of Appeal concludedthat "a notation on the bail bond form that the defendant was ordered to appearin court on a certain date does not mean the defendant was ‘lawfully required’ to appear for purposesofbail forfeiture under section 1305." (Opinion, page 6.) The appellate court analogizes American Surety and Rangerto the facts here because those cases foundthat letters notifying a defendantto appearin court mailed bythe district attorney and the police department, respectively, were insufficient to compel a defendant's appearance for bail forfeiture purposes. (Opinion, pages 6-7.) However, the Opinion fails to distinguish situations where a personorentity not authorizedto set the time and place for the defendant's appearance under §1269b(¢.g., the district attorney), from the situation here where Chavezgarcia's presence on January 3, 2013, was set and noticed by the jailer, who is authorized to do so bystatute. (...continued) appear in court on the date reflected on the bail bond,it does not appear that the appellate court was presented with, and the opinion doesnot address, the issue of whether the defendant had a duty to appear pursuant to §1269b. (Id. at p.9.) “It is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not considered.” (People v. Avila (2012) 38 Cal.4th 491, 566,citing People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250, 1268, fn. 10; see also People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc, (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 440, 453.) HOA. 1309743.1 -13- In Ranger, the issue was whether the bond was exonerated by operation of law when no complaint wasfiled within 15 days of theoriginal arraignment date. (Ranger, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at 26.) The People argued the 15 days began to run from the actualdate of arraignment — not from the original arraignment date. (Jd at 28.) The Ranger Court agreed with the surety. But the Ranger decision does not — as the Opinion contends — support the conclusion that the bond is meaningless in terms of a defendant being required to appear. "Ranger Insurance Companyposted a $20,000bail bond for [the defenant}'s release, and [the defendant] was ordered by the jailor and notified by the bond to appear in court." (/d. at 25, emphasis added.) Before the date shown on the bond, the defendant receiveda letter from the police departmenttelling her the arraignmentdate had been changed (because no complaint had beenfiled), so she should not appear on the date on the bond but on a different date. Before that new date, the defendant received anotherletter from the police department again telling her the arraignmentdate had been continued (because no complaint had been filed), and to appear on a different date. The defendant appeared for arraignmenton the date stated in the secondletter, but failed to appearas ordered on the next date. The court forfeited bail when the defendantfailed to appearfor the preliminary hearing. (/bid.) HOA.1309743.1 -14- Asstated above, the surety argued that the court lost jurisdiction over the bond because no complaint was filed within 15 days of the date set by the jailor — the original arraignment date. The Ranger Court analyzed the 15-day provision of §1305 and determined the original arraignment date wasthe date that mattered. (/d. at 30.) In fact, the court stated: [The defendant] was ordered by the jailor to appear on January 22, and thus was lawfully required to appear for arraignmenton the date. (§ 1269b, subds.(a), (h). (Ranger, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at 30, emphasis added.) Contrary to the Opinion's conclusion, Ranger does not support the position that a defendant need not appear onthe date shownonthe bail bond. Ranger supports the County's position that a bail bond, under the authority of §1269b, lawfully requires a defendant to appear. The Opinionstates, "Similar to the prosecutor's letter in American Surety and the police departmentletter notifying the accused ofher arraignmentin Ranger, a bail bond form with the date ofthe hearing filled in simply is not a court order." (Opinion, page 7.) Yet, the Ranger Court did not rely on a court order to compel the defendant's appearance. Instead, it held that the defendant's appearance was lawfully required because she was ordered to appearby the jailer. (Ranger, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at 30.) Here Chavezgarcia was ordered to appear by the jailer on January 3, 2013. The distinguishing fact, which resulted in the exoneration of the HOA.1309743.1 -15- bond in Ranger,is that in Ranger the complaint wasnotfiled within 15 days from the date of the arraignment. (/bid.) Butthe filing of the complaint is a non-issue here. Thus, Ranger supports the County's argument because Rangertakes for granted that if a complaint had been filed prior to the date shown onthe bond, the defendant's appearance would have been required under §1305, subd.(a)(4). American Surety, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th 1437, also supports the County's position. American Surety's facts are similar to Ranger's in that the original arraignment date was purportedly continued by an informal, out-of-court process — a letter — not from the police departmentasin Ranger, but from the prosecutor's office. (/d. at 1439.) And as in Ranger, the surety in American Surety argued that the defendantwasrequired to appear on the date set by the jailor when the defendant wasreleased on bond. The surety argued: {T]he trial court lost jurisdiction to forfeit bail whenthe case wasnotcalled on the date set for arraignmentbythe jailer, and there was no jurisdiction on a later arraignmentdate set by the district attorney. (Id. at 1438.) The appellate court agreed, concluding that there "was no court order continuing the appearancedate set by the jailor, and the district attorney's notice to appear was not a substitute." (Id. at 1440.) As in Ranger, the American Surety decision is premised on the assumption that the jailer has authority to lawfully require a defendant's HOA.1309743.1 -16- appearance. (American Surety, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at 1339.) However, the American Surety Court found that the defendant's appearance wasnot lawfully required at the continued arraignmenthearing, and that the 15-day limitation was calculated from theoriginal arraignment date, based onits facts: (1) no complaint was filed by the original appearance date set by the jailer; (2) no hearing took place on the original appearance date; and (3) bail was forfeited at the continued hearing date, which had not been continued by a court order but rather by an arraignmentletter (and there was no evidencethat the letter was sent or received by the defendant). (ld. at 1439-1440.) By contrast, here, (1) the complaint wasfiled before the date set by thejailer, (2) a court hearing did take place on the date set by the jailer; and (3) the court forfeited bail on the original appearance date set pursuant to §1269b. Thus, American Surety does not support the Opinion's holding. County ofLos Angeles v. Fairmont Specialty Group ("Fairmont") (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1018, also supports the County's position because just as Ranger and American Surety, its reasoning rests upon the assumption that §1269b compels a defendant's appearancefor bail forfeiture purposes. In Fairmont, defendant Vasquez did not appear on March3, 2006, the date reflected on the bond. (Jd. at 1021.) There is no record of any hearing taking place on that date. (Jbid.) Also, no complaint had been filed HOA1309743.1 -17- as of that date. (Ibid.) On March 7, 2006, a complaint wasfiled, and arraignment wasset for March 21, 2006. (/bid.) Vasquez appeared on March 21, 2006, and at several hearings thereafter until he failed to appear for sentencing on August 24, 2006, when bail was forfeited. (Ud. at 1021- 1022.) In seekingto set asidethe forfeiture, the surety argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over the bond on August 24, because pursuantto §1269b, Vasquez was required to be present on March3, the date on the bond. (/d.at 1024.) The Court of Appeal explicitly agreedwith the surety's assertion that §1269b, subd.(a) gives jailers the authority to set the time and place ofa defendant's initial appearance upon release from custody onbail andthat in the event of the defendant's nonappearance, the statutes governingbail forfeiture and entry of summary judgment against a bondsman apply. (/d. at 1024; see §§1305 and 1306.) Yet, it pointed out that §1305, subd.(a) also provides that"the court shall not have jurisdiction to declare a forfeiture andthe bail shall be releasedofall obligations under the bondifthe caseis dismissed or if no complaintis filed within 15 days from the date of arraignment." (Jd. at 1025.) It further explained that the 15-day provision was added in 1987 to eliminate the need for the defendant to appear in court on the first date specified following the posting of the bail if no charges had yet been filed. (/bid.) It went on to holdthat, "As a practical matter, what the 15-day provision meansis, if no criminal complaint has beenfiled by HOA. 1309743.1 -18- the date set by the jailer for the first court appearance/arraignment,bail can neither be exonerated nor forfeited on that date." (Ibid.) It follows that had | the complaint been filed by the date on the bond, the defendant's appearance would havebeen legally required. The Fairmontholding does not divest jailers of the authority to order and notice an appearancedate at which bail will be forfeited if the defendantfails to appear. Rather, Fairmontdiscusses an exceptionto this general rule based on circumstancesnot present here. 3. The Opinion creates an impractical and unworkable criminal system This Petition presents an important question of law because the Opinion's holding(that a defendantis not lawfully required to appear on the date set by the jailor pursuant to §1269b, subd.(a) and reflected on the bail bond), is that some defendantswill be lost to the courts forever. The Opinionfails to address the situation where a defendantis arrested and released on bail before appearing in court, and wherethe next court hearing is one at which the defendant's appearanceis not otherwise required. Consider a scenario where a defendantis released on his own recognizanceand, after making several appearances,fails to appear at trial. The court issues a bench warrantand sets bail. Thereafter, the defendantis arrested on the bench warrant and posts bail before appearing in court. Uponhisrelease, the jailer sets the time and placefor the defendant's next HOA.1309743.1 -19- appearancefor a bench warrant hearing. In this situation, a bench warrant hearingis not a hearing specifically identified in §1305, subd.(a). There was no opportunity for the court to order the defendantto appear.’ If the date on the bondis ineffective to "lawfully require" the defendant's appearance, how doesthe court get him backto standtrial? Or, consider a defendant who remainsin custody for several months, and whois convicted and given probation (and obviously released from custody). The court sets a date for the defendant to provide proof of compliance with the conditions of his probation, but he fails to appear. The court issues a bench warrant and sets bail. The defendantis picked up on the bench warrant and posts bail, so the warrantis recalled, and the court sets a new hearing. If the date shown onthe bondis not sufficient to "lawfully require" the defendant's appearance at that new hearing, how does the court get the defendant back to ensure compliance with probation? As these hypotheticals illustrate, the bail bond mustbesufficient to lawfully require a defendant to appear in court. If not, courts will lose their ability tocompel a defendant's appearancein court, which is the main purposeofbail. > Unless it is acceptable to deny bail until the defendant has been brought to court in custody (so he can be ordered back), or to always issue no-bail bench warrants, the date on the bail bond must compel the defendant's appearance. HOA.1309743.1 -20- B. A DEFENDANT MAYBE LAWFULLY REQUIRED TO APPEAR IN COURT WITHOUT THE COURT HAVING USED CERTAIN "MAGIC WORDS" ORDERING THE DEFENDANT TO RETURN So that will be the order, then. We'll see you all back here on January 3rd. (CT 102.) Bythis language,the trial court ordered Chavezgarcia to appear at the January 3, 2013 hearing. The Court explicitly mentions "the order" in the first sentence, followed by "[w]e'll see you all back here on January 3rd." The use of the words "you all" signifies that the trial court was referring to everyonepresentat this hearing, including the defendant. Itis undisputed that Chavezgarcia was present in court for the November29, 2012 hearing. (CT 101.) The close proximity of these two sentences demonstrates that the trial court ordered Chavezgarcia to appearat the January 3, 2013 pre-trial conference. "Magic words"are not necessary whena trial court has otherwise madeits intent clear. (Jn re Romeo C. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4™ 1838 [finding it sufficient that the record manifested thetrial court's exercise of discretion in balancing the probative value of evidence againstits prejudicial effect]; People v. Maxwell (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 807[findingthetrial court did not haveto utter magic words in determining a defendant's mental competency].) Similarly, there are no "magic words" that must be used in order to require a defendant to return to court. Here, Chavezgarcia was HOA.1309743.1 -21- present whenthe court stated the date for the pre-trial conference and said "that will be the order." Chavezgarcia was ordered to return to court for January 3, 2013. C. A DEFENDANT CHARGED WITH A FELONY WHO HAS NOT EXECUTED A WAIVER IS LAWFULLY REQUIRED TO APPEAR PURSUANTTO PENAL CODE§977 1. Rules of statutory construction dictate that §977 applies to bail forfeiture proceedings under §1305 The guiding principles behind bail forfeiture are settled. "The law traditionally disfavors forfeitures and this disfavor extends to the forfeiture of bail." (People v. Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Ins. Co. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 301, 307 [citing United Bonding, supra 5 Cal.3d at p. 906].) Section 1305, therefore, must be strictly construed in favor of the surety to avoid the harsh results of a forfeiture. (County ofLos Angeles v. Ranger Ins. Co. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 10, 16.) However, "[t]he policy disfavoring forfeiture cannot overcometheplainly intended meaningofthe statute." (People v. Indiana Lumbermens MutualIns. Co., supra, 49 Cal.4th at 308.) The fundamental purpose ofstatutory constructionis to ascertain the intent of the lawmakersso as to effectuate the purpose of the law. (Jn re Marriage ofHarris (2004) 34 Cal.4th 210, 221.) "We begin by examining the statutory language, giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning. If there is no ambiguity, then we presume the lawmakers meant what they said, and the plain meaningofthe language governs." (Day v. City of HOA.1309743.1 -22- Fontana (2001) 25 Cal.4th 268, 272, internal citations omitted.) Further, an "interpretation which gives effect is preferred to one that makes void." (Civil Code §3541.) And "[t]o the extent that uncertainty remainsin interpreting statutory language, consideration should be given to the consequencesthat will flow from particular interpretation. Accordingly, [the court should] notparse eachliteral phrase of a statute if doing so contravenes the obvious underlying intent, or leads to absurd or anomalous results." (People v. Adames (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 198, 212,internal citations omitted.) The issue here is whether the mandatory appearance requirements of §977, subd.(b) are applicable to bail forfeiture provisions under §1305, subd.(a). Under §1305, subd.(a), "[a] court shall in open court declare forfeited the undertaking ofbail . . . if, without sufficient excuse, a defendantfails to appear for any ofthe following: (1) Arraignment; (2) Trial; (3) Judgment; (4) Any other occasion prior to the pronouncement of judgmentifthe defendant's presence in courtis lawfully required; (5) To surrender himself or herself in execution of the judgmentafter appeal." (§1305, subd.(a), emphasis added.) Thus, if the defendant's presence is lawfully required, the court must forfeit bail for the defendant's unexcused absenceat the hearing. Under §977, subd.(b)(1), in all cases in which a felony is charged, the accused shall be present at arraignment,at the time ofplea, during the HOA.1309743.1 -23- preliminary hearing, during those portionsofthe trial when evidence is taken before thetrier of fact, and at the time of sentencing. Further, "[t]he accusedshall be personally presentatall other proceedings unless he or she shall, with leave of court, execute in open court, a written waiverof his or her right to be personally present." (§977, subd.(b)(1), emphasis added.) Theplain wording ofthis statute compels a defendant charged with a felony to be presentat arraignment, timeofplea, during the preliminary hearing, during trial where evidenceis presented, and sentencing. (/bid.) And, unless the defendant has signed a written waiver, the defendant must appear "at all other proceedings." (Jbid.) 2. Case law supports §977's relevance to bail forfeiture proceedings ° A lineage of case law supports the position that §977 is relevant to bail forfeiture. In International Fidelity, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th 1556,the appellate court discussedthe relationship between whether a defendant's appearanceis required under §977, and whether a defendant's appearance is "lawfully required"for bail forfeiture purposes. (See, §§977 and 1305.) In InternationalFidelity, the surety posted two bondsto secure the release of defendant Contreras in two misdemeanorcases. (/d. at 1558-59.) When Contreras's defense counsel appeared and informed the court he had lost contact with his client, the court forfeited bail. (Zbid.) The surety then filed motions to vacate the forfeitures which were denied. (/d. at 1559-60.) The HOA.1309743.1 -24- InternationalFidelity Court reversed, holding that absent a factual showing that Contreras terminated counsel's authority to represent him, §977 allowed his attorney to appear and excused the defendant's nonappearance. (Ud. at 1561.) The International Fidelity Court began its analysis by stating, "The bail statutes at issue in this case are Penal Code sections 977 and 1305." (Id. at 1561.) It goes on to explain that because §977, subd.(a) allows a defendant to appear throughhis attorney, Contreras was not "lawfully required" to personally appear at the hearings at which bail was forfeited because counsel appeared onhis behalf. (/d. at 1561-63.) Thus, the International Fidelity Court founda direct correlation between whether a defendant's appearance was required under §977, and when a court must forfeit bail under §1305. In support ofits holding, InternationalFidelitycites Peoplev. American Bankers Ins. Co., which held that "[s]ince the defendant may appear through counselunder section 977, subd.(a), he or she will have sufficient excuse for not appearing [under Penal Code § 1305] so long as counsel appears andis authorized to proceed in the defendant's absence." (International Fidelity, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th 1556, 1562 [quoting People vy. American Bankers Ins. Co. (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 742, 747-748].) The International Fidelity Court also discussed People v. Sacramento Bail Bonds ("Sacramento") (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 118, which HOA.1309743.1 -25- “held that a defendant charged with a felony was "lawfully required"to be present at a status conference where the defendant was present when the date and time of the hearing were set and a rule of court required his presence despite the fact that he was not specifically ordered to be present. (Internationa Fidelity, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at 1563-64 [citing Sacramento, supra, 210 Cal.App.3d 118].) The Sacramento Court did not address whether §977 alone wassufficient to compel the defendant's presence In Sacramento, a rule of court required the defendant's presence at a trial readiness conference, and [International Fidelity indicated that even absent the rule of court, §977 wassufficient.bid.) It stated, "In | [Sacramento] the defendant was charged with a felony; consequently there wasno statutory authorization for his attorney to appear in his absence; on the contrary, subdivision (b) of section 977 compelled his personal attendance, unless he executed a written waiver of his presence, with leave of court." (/bid.) People v. Indiana Lumbermens MutualIns. Co.("Indiana") (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 45 also supports §977's relevanceto bail forfeiture proceedings. The Jndiana Court took for granted that §977 applies to bail forfeiture. In Indiana, the defendant executed a waiver of appearance. (/d. at 47.) Thereafter, he did not appear on December4, 2007, the date the preliminary hearing wasset , but did appear through counsel. (Id. at p. 48.) However, the matter was continued and the defendant appearedat the HOA.1309743.1 -26- continued date. (Jbid.) When bail was subsequently forfeited, the surety argued that because a §977 waiver cannot excuse a felony defendant's appearanceat the preliminary hearing, the court lost jurisdiction to forfeit bail whenit failed to do so on December4, 2007. (Id. at 49.) The appellate court rejected this argument, reasoning that the matter wasnot called for preliminary hearing on December4, 2007,but rather only for a continuance. ([bid.) The Indiana Court found that because a §977 waiver wasin place,thetrial court properly did not forfeit bail when the defendant did not appearfor the continuance. (Id. at 50-52.) Thus,ifthere had not been a waiver, the Jndiana Court would have found the defendant was required to appear and wouldhave had to forfeit bail when the defendant first failed to appear. The relationship between §977 and §1305 wasalso addressed in People v. Jimenez,(1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 795. The Jimenez Court explained that although §977 was "adopted to protect the defendant's due process rights, it nonetheless mandateshis or her presence." (/d. at 800, fn 8.) It went on to state that "[t]here is no danger [section 977] would be used unfairly against a defendant who wasignorant ofthe court date because section 1305 only allowsbail forfeiture if the defendantfails to appear withoutsufficient excuse." ([bid.) In Jimenez, the defendant failed to appear for execution ofjudgment following appeal; thus his appearance was required under §1305, HOA.1309743.1 -27- subd.(a)(5). Accordingly, the Jimenez Court did not have to determine whether his presence would also have been required under §977, subd.(b). (Ibid.) Although the Jimenez Court did not make a specific holding,it agreed with the People's position therein that §977 required the defendant to appear. (bid.) | People v. North Beach Bonding Co. ("North Beach") (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 663 and People v. Classified Ins. Corp. ("Classified") (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 341 do not compela different result. The situation here is completely distinguishable from North Beach and Classified: In both those cases, the issue was whetherthe court could forfeit bail at a hearing for which the defendant had no notice. Here, Chavezgarcia had notice; she was present in court whenthe January 3,2013 hearing wasset. In North Beach, the defendant was to appear on March 24, 1972 at 5:00 p.m. to surrender himself for execution ofjudgment. (North Beach, supra, 26 Cal.App.3d at 667.) On March 24, 1972 at 3:30 p.m., his attorney appeared in court without him and applied for a stay of execution ofjudgment and bail pending appeal, which was denied. (Jd. at 667-68.) The appellate court rejected the surety's argument that §977 compelled the court to declare a forfeiture when the defendant did not appear at the 3:30 p.m. hearing onthe application. (/d. at 668.) It reasoned, "It is absurd to contend that an attorney by appearing without his clientan hour and one- HOA.1309743.1 -28- half before the latter was directed to appear could place his client in default." (/d. at 669.) Classified relied on North Beachto find that a defendant was not "lawfully required" to appear at a hearing on a motion to set aside the information pursuant to §995 for which he had no notice. (Classified, supra, 164 Cal.App.3d 341, 343.) In Classified, the defendant was to appear atthetrial confirmation hearing set on May 2, 1983. (/bid.) On March 25, 1983, the defendant's attorney movedto set aside the information and informedthe court that he had lost touch with the defendant. (Jbid.) The court (improperly) forfeited bail. (Jbid.) As in North Beach,the Classified Court's concern wasthe inequitable result of allowing the court to forfeit bail for a defendant's nonappearance when the defendant had no notice: Asin [North Beach],[the People's] construction of section 1305, by reference to section 977, would lead to an absurd result here. The construction urged by [the People] would permit[the defendant's] trial counselto place [the defendant] in default without notice of the motion or date of appearance. Such a construction would clearly be inconsistent with the purpose of section 977 as abovestated. (Id. at 346, emphasis added; see also People v. American Bankers Ins. Co. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1378, 1382.) The North Beach and Classified Courts did not address, noris there any indication they intended their opinions to apply to, situations where the HOA.1309743.1 -29- defendant was present whenthe next hearing (at which bail was forfeited) wasset. As the Jimenez court discussed, finding that the mandatory language of §977 can make a defendant's appearance "lawfully required" does not run afoul of the Legislative intent of the statute. (Jimenez, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at 800, fn. 8.) Had Classified and North Beach considered that the defendant's nonappearance was "excused" under §1305, the potentially “absurd results" would have been avoided. (See §§1305 and 1305.1.) In this case, there was no excuse for Chavezgarcia's non- appearance, and she waslawfully required to appear under §977. CONCLUSION Petitioner County respectfully requests this Court grant review and clarify the issues of: whether a defendant is lawfully required to appear pursuant to §1269b; whether a defendant may be lawfully required to ‘ appear if a court has not used the exact words "you are ordered to appear"; and whether a defendantis lawfully required to appear pursuant to §977. DATED:October 26, 2015 Respectfully submitted, MARYC. WICKHAM a)LAY By a NNE NIELSEN Principal Deputy County Counsel Attorneys for the County of Los Angeles HOA.1309743.1 -30- CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT PURSUANT TO RULE8.204(c) The text of this documentconsists of 8,650 words as counted by the Microsoft Office Word 20010 program used to generate this document. DATED:October 26, 2015 Respectfully submitted, MARY C. WICKHAM Interim County Counsel GO2AL- JOANNE NIBYSEN The court therefore granted Financial Casualty’s motionto set aside the summary judgment, vacate the forfeiture, and exonerate the bond. The County timely appealed. DISCUSSION The County contendsthat the trial court erred in granting Financial Casualty’s motion to set aside the summary judgment. Although in the trial court the County relied on section 977, it no longer makes that argument. On appealthe County argues only that the defendant’s presence waslawfully required under section 1305 because the date of the hearing appeared on the face ofthe bond. We are not persuaded. Theparties do not dispute the facts. Becauseonly legal issues are involved, we conduct an independent review. (People v. Accredited Surety & Casualty Co. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 617, 621 (Accredited Surety).) “““The law traditionally disfavors forfeitures and this disfavor extendsto forfeiture of bail. [Citations.] ..” [§] The standard of review, therefore, compels us to protect the surety, and appear wasa proceeding at which the defendant was‘lawfully required’ to appear for purposesofforfeiting bail under. . . section 1305, subdivision (a)(4).” (See http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov, site last visited on Sept. 2, 2015.) 5 California Rules of Court, rule 4.112 provides that in felony cases, the court may hold a readiness conference at which “[t]he defendant must be present in court.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.112(a)(3).) more importantly the individual citizens who pledgeto the surety their property on behalf ofpersons seeking release from custody, in order to obtain the corporate bond.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Western Ins. Co. (2013) 213 Cal-App.4th 316, 321 (Western).) “A jailer may acceptbail from an arrestee and set the time andplaceforhis appearance. (... § 1269b, subd.(a).) If an arrestee ‘fails to appearat the time and in the court so ordered uponhisor her release from custody, Sections 1305 and 1306 apply.’ (§ 1269b, subd.(h).)” (People v. American Surety Ins. Co. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1437, 1439 (American Surety), fn. omitted.) “Section 1305, subdivision (a) provides, in pertinent part: ‘A court shall in _ open court declare forfeited the undertaking ofbail or the money orproperty deposited asbail if, withoutsufficient excuse, a defendant fails to appear for any of the following: [§] (1) Arraignment. [{] (2) Trial. [§] (3) Judgment. [4] (4) Any other occasionpriorto the pronouncementofjudgmentifthe defendant’s presence in court is lawfully required. .. .’” (People v. Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Ins. Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 45, 48.) “[T]here must be a court order to appear. Without such an order, the court lacks jurisdiction to forfeit bail for failure to appear. [Citation.]” (Accredited Surety, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 622.) | Thus, ““[wJhen a person for whom a bail bond has beenpostedfails without sufficient excuse to appear as required,thetrial court must declare a forfeiture of the bond. [Citation.] The surety that posted the bond then hasa statutory “appearance” period in which either to produce the accused in court and have the forfeiture set aside, or to demonstrate other circumstances requiring the court to vacate the forfeiture. If the forfeiture is not set aside by the end of the appearance period, the court is required to enter summary judgment against the surety. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Western, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 322.) 5 The County contendsthat the defendant was lawfully required to appear on January 3, 2013, because“[i]t was the date that had been set by the court at her arraignment, and whenshe wasreleased from custody, it was the date that appeared on her bond.” The County cites no authority to support its position that filling in the date in the designated space on the bond form meansa defendant’s presencein court is “lawfully required” within the meaning of section 1305. Although we have found no authority addressing this exact question, we find American Surety, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th 1437 and People v. Ranger Ins. Co. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 23 (Ranger) analogous. In reliance on these cases, we concludethat a notation on the bail bond form that the defendant wasordered to appearin court on a certain date does not mean the defendant was“lawfully required” to appear for purposesofbail forfeiture under section 1305. In American Surety, the surety posted bond for the release of an accused. Thedistrict attorney filed a complaint and an arraignmentletter addressedto the accused, stating that “a complaint had been filed and ‘youare hereby notified to appear’ to enter a plea” on a certain date, but there was no evidencetheletter was mailed or received. (American Surety, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 1439.) When the accusedfailed to appear, the trial court declared bail forfeited and denied a motion to vacate the forfeiture. On appeal, the surety argued the court lacked jurisdiction to order forfeiture of bail because no court order directed the accused to appear,and the districtattorney’s letter was not a substitute. The appellate court agreed, stating that “[t]here was no court order... and the district attorney’s notice to appear was not a substitute.” (/d. at p. 1440.) The court therefore reversed, noting that the People had offered no authority for the proposition the prosecutor’s letter wassufficient. (/d. at p. 1441.) In Ranger, the court rejected the People’s argumentthat notices from the police department advising the accused of her arraignment date were court orders requiring the defendant’s presence within the meaningofthe bail forfeiture statute. (Ranger, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 30.) The court stated “that is not what they are, and no sleight of hand can transform them into something they are not.” (Ibid.) Similar to the prosecutor’s letter in American Surety and the police departmentletter notifying the accusedofher arraignment in Ranger, a bail bond form with the date of the hearing filled in simply is not a court order. The County cites section 1269b, subdivision (a) to argue, without explanation, that “a defendant is lawfully required to appear on the date shown on the bond.”® Thestatute does not address forfeiture of bail, which undisputedly is governedby section 1305. Nor doesthe statute state that the defendant is lawfully required to appear in court on the date appearing on the bondorheorsherisks forfeitureofthe bond. Section 1269b does not address the question we face here. The County arguesthat it would be “burdensome and unnecessary”to require a court to advise a defendant, “‘in the event that you are released on bond 399 between now andthe next hearing, you are ordered to return.”” Yet there are 6 Section 1269b, subdivision (a) providesin full: “The officer in charge ofa jail in which anarrested personis held in custody, an officer of a sheriffs department orpolice departmentofa city whois in chargeofajail or is employedat a fixedpoliceor sheriff's facility and is acting under an agreement with the agency that keepsthejail in which an arrested personis held in custody, an employeeof a sheriff's departmentor police departmentofa city who is assigned by the departmentto collect bail, the clerk of the superior court of the county in which the offense was alleged to have been committed, and the clerk of the superior court in which the case against the defendant is pending may approve andacceptbail in the amount fixed by the warrantofarrest, schedule ofbail, or order admitting to bail in cash or surety bond executed bya certified, admitted surety insurer as provided in the Insurance Code, to issue and sign an orderforthe release of the arrested person, and to set a time and place for the appearance of the arrested person before the appropriate court and givenotice thereof.” 7 numerous advisementstrial courts are required to give criminal defendantsin order to protect their rights. (See, e.g., People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164, 170 {when a criminal defendantenters a guilty plea, “the court must inform the defendantofthree constitutional rights — the privilege against compulsory self- incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers,” and “the same requirements of advisement and waiver apply when a defendant admits the truth of a prior conviction allegation that subjects him to increased punishment”]; People v. Davis (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1367, fn. 4 [“Section 1016.5 imposes an obligation ontrial courts to advise criminal defendantsofthe immigration consequencesofpleading guilty or nolo contendere.”].) Werecognize that, “[w]hile bail bond proceedings occur in connection with criminal prosecutions, they are independentfrom andcollateral to the prosecutions and are civil in nature. [Citation.]” (People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 653, 657.) Nonetheless, “[t]he object of bail andits forfeiture is to insure the defendant’s attendance andhis or her obedienceto the orders and judgmentofthe court. [Citation.] The purposeis notto either provide revenueto the state or punish the surety. [Citation.] ... Thus, the statutes dealing with forfeiture of bail bonds must bestrictly construed in favorofthe surety to avoid the harsh results of forfeiture. [Citation.]” (Accredited Surety, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 621.) Requiring the court to order the defendant to appearat a hearing in compliance with the bail forfeiture scheme is consistent with these principles and is not unnecessarily burdensome. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the superior court setting aside summary judgment, vacating forfeiture and exonerating bail. DISPOSITION The judgmentis affirmed. Financial Casualty is entitled to costs on appeal. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION WILLHITE,J. Weconcur: EPSTEIN,P.J. MANELLA,J. Une EXHIBIT 2 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION 4 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and Appellant, V. FINANCIAL CASUALTY & SURETYINC., Defendant and Respondent. B257660 Los Angeles County No. $J3898, BA404239 THE COURT: Petition for rehearing is denied. cc: File Joanne K Nielsen John M. Rorabaugh DECLARATION OF SERVICE B257660/SJ3898 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, County of Los Angeles: I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California, over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within action. My business address is 648 Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration, 500 West Temple Street, Los Angeles, California 90012-2713. That on October 26, 2015, I served the attached PETITION FOR REVIEW upon Interested Party(ies) by placing 01 the original a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope addressed UO as follows as stated on the attached mailinglist: (BY MAIL)bysealing and placingthe envelope for collection and mailing on the date and at the place shown above following our ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar with this office’s practice of collection and processing correspondencefor mailing. Underthat practice the correspondence would be deposited with the United States Postal Service that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid. I declare under penalty of perjury under the lawsofthe State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on October 26, 2015, at Los Angeles, California. Type or Print Nameof Declarant 4 and, for personal service by a MessengerService, N include the name of the Messenger Service Anna Pacheco ||I\ ge \ Signature HOA.1144675.1 J Service List Re: County of Los Angeles v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc., B257660/SJ3898 County of Los Angeles c/o Joanne Nielsen 500 West Temple Street, Room 606 Los Angeles. California 90012 John M. Rorabaugh,Esq. E. Alan Nunez Esq. Attorneys At Law 801 Park Center Drive, Suite 205 Santa Ana, CA 92705 Supreme Court of California (Electronic Service + Original + 8 copies) 350 McAllister Street San Francisco, California 94102-7303 (Overnight mail) c/o Honorable Kerry Bensinger Honorable Lia Martin Judge, Superior Court 210 West Temple Street, Department 54 Los Angeles, California 90012 Second AppellateDistrict, Division Four 300 Spring Street Los Angeles, California 90113 (Electronic Service + 4 copies) HOA.1144675.1 2