SAN BUENAVENTURA, CITY OF v. UNITED WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT

Appellants, United Water Conservation District and Board of Directors of United Water Conservation District, Answer to Petition for Review

Cal.May 19, 2015

COPY [Service on Attorney General required by Rule 8.29(c)(1)] 2%” Civil No. ‘Exempt From Filing xempt From Filing Fee S226036 Government Code § 6103] INTHE SUPREMECOURT (“EYER OF CALIFORNIA | MAY 19 2015 CITY OF SAN BUENAVENTURA, Respondent and Cross-Appellant, vs. UNITED WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT AND BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF UNITED WATER CONSERVATIONDISTRICT, Appellants and Cross-Respondents, On Appeal of Published Decision of the Second Appellate District, Division 6, Case No. B251810 Reversing a Judgment of the Superior Court of Santa Barbara County Case Nos. VENCI-00401714 and 1414739 Honorable Thomas P. Anderle APPELLANTS AND CROSS-RESPONDENTS’ ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REVIEW MUSICK, PEELER & GARRETT LLP ANTHONY H. TREMBLEY (STATE BAR No. 110029) JANE ELLISON USHER (STATE BAR NO.93783) CHERYL A. ORR (STATE BAR NO. 132379) 2801 TOWNSGATE ROAD,SUITE 200 WESTLAKEVILLAGE, CALIFORNIA 91361 TELEPHONE:805-418-3100 FACSIMILE: 805-418-3101 Attorneysfor Appellants and Cross-Respondents UNITED WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT and BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF UNITED WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT [Service on Attorney General required by Rule 8.29(c)(1)] 2%? Civil No. rom Fil S226036 GovernmentCode§6103] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA CITY OF SAN BUENAVENTURA, Respondent and Cross-Appellant, VS. UNITED WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT AND BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF UNITED WATER CONSERVATIONDISTRICT, Appellants and Cross-Respondents, On Appeal of Published Decision of the Second Appellate District, Division 6, Case No. B251810 Reversing a Judgmentofthe Superior Court of Santa Barbara County Case Nos. VENCI-00401714 and 1414739 Honorable Thomas P. Anderle APPELLANTS AND CROSS-RESPONDENTS’ ANSWERTO PETITION FOR REVIEW MUSICK, PEELER & GARRETT LLP ANTHONYH. TREMBLEY (STATE BAR No.110029) JANE ELLISON USHER(STATE BAR No.93783) CHERYL A. ORR (STATE BAR No.132379) 2801 TOWNSGATE ROAD,SUITE 200 WESTLAKE VILLAGE, CALIFORNIA 91361 TELEPHONE: 805-418-3100 FACSIMILE: 805-418-3101 Attorneysfor Appellants and Cross-Respondents UNITED WATER CONSERVATIONDISTRICT and BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF UNITED WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT II. Ill. IV. VI. 945398.1 TABLE OF CONTENTS QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW... cccesccsssesesssesesseceeescneseescenenssesessssecsessensaees 1 INTRODUCTIONucecccsssssessssesesereesesesensseseceeerscseseesenesesscssaescesessnessensaees 2 STATEMENT OF FACTS0.0. cccescsesssstssesereseeseeesesseeeesesesensseesensnensesenes 4 PROCEDURALHISTORYuw... cecceeessseessceseseeeeseseraesessecsevecseeeesssseeeeesnesess 5 LEGAL ARGUMENT 0.ceecessesesseceseneseecsesesassecseeneneensnsssnseesseasseseeaees 6 A. The Opinion Applies the Correct Standards of Review.............006 6 B. Review is not Needed to Secure Uniformity of Decision............. 10 1. The Opinion is Consistent with Controlling AUthOsityocceceeccsssceeeseeceeccsensessetseesneceeceessesesatsrsessarsnes 10 2. The Opinion Properly Distinguishes Pajaro uu... 12 3. The Opinion and the Jacks Decision are Consistent......... 15 C. Review is not Needed to Resolve an Important Question Of LAW... eeeessesseeessseeeeceeeseetersscneesesesaeseeaesaeasseesaeenseasuceesecaseneaesases 17 D. Review to Address Dissimilar Trial Court Casesis Unwarranted 00... eecsessenserscscrssscsecnssessteneeseeneessusseneacsseatacereeees 20 CONCLUSIONoo.ecescsscesctectessssereecseasscsevsesesecseseseesesseesesarasasereeaeateeeases 23 ¥ TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) CASES Apartment Association ofLos Angeles County, Inc. v. City ofLos Angeles (2001) 24 Cal.4th 830 occecsssssssseseesssssesseeseessesseessesessesecsesesseeesssnees 10, 11 Bighorn-Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil (2006) 39 Cal4th 205 oo ccccesssscsesesscssssssssscsesessssesessesesseessessssesesersesesnss 14, 15 Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal3d 130 oesesssseeessesesseeseecsessssssesesecsesecsesecsssceeessessseusecacanees 9 California Farm Bureau Federation v. State Water Resources Control Board (2011) 51 Cal4th 421cccccsesseeessessseeseesssetseseseessssesssesssseaseeees 17, 18, 19 Capistrano Taxpayers Ass’n v. City ofSan Juan Capistrano (Apr. 20,2015) Cal.App.4th —, 2015 WL 1798898... cesseeeteseeseees 22 City ofPalmdale v. Palmdale Water Dist. (2011) 198 CalApp.4th 926 0... ccecsecesssesesssessessesssssssssseeeserssesrsesaesscsessesess 22 Great Oaks Water Co. vy. Santa Clara Valley Water District (2015), 235 CalApp.4th 523 oo. eeesccsscssesssesesscesssssseeesessseasensssseeess 3, 12, 22 Griffith v. City ofSanta Cruz (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 982 0... cecsscesccsseesesscsscsseseeessensesessessesseessseseeseentsss 18 Griffith v. Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 586 oo. csesescessecsseeessesesseessssssssssessssseseseereaes 10, 12 Jacks v. City ofSanta Barbara (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 925 ooieecsesseesecsstsceteesssrsssseeesees 10, 15, 16, 20, 22 Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma County Union HighsSchoolDist. (2003) 29 Cal4th 911 oeeececssesecsecssscsessssesessessesesssssessesscssssesscetsesssrssersesaes 9 McWilliams v. City ofLong Beach (2013) 56 Cal.4th 613 oececcesscsseececssssccsssscessssssesesscsssesaecsesssaessssesecessssenseseas 9 Morgan y. Imperial Irrigation District (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 892 oo. cccccccsscsssssessseessescesesssssesesecsseasassssevstes 7, 8,9 Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency v. Amrhein (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1364 ooccccscsesseseessetsessereees 3, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15 945398.1 ii Professional Engineers in California Government v. Kempton (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1016...escsscsssesessssesssetssssesesecsssesseesseseeseesescsessssseseeses 9 Richmond v. Shasta Community Services District (2004) 32 Cal.4th 409 occcccssscssssssssescscessssssseeecsssecseseessssesessssereees 11,15 San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego County Air Pollution Control Dist. (1988) 203 CalApp.3d 1132, 1145-1146... cescsseseseesesesseeeetesesssestsceeenes 18 Silicon Valley Taxpayers’ Assn., Inc. v. Santa Clara County Open Space Authority (2008) 44 Cal.4th 431iccsscscseesecsseeessestsseesesecseeseesssessesessssesescsneseseeesseasees 7 Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Board ofEqualization (1977) 15 Cal.4th 866... ecessesetesssssssssessesssessessssessesseasees 1, 16, 17, 18, 19 RULES California Rules of Court, rule 8.268(d)........ccccsccsssesessssscssesesecsesscsssssssecsvacscasnvanes 3 California Rules of Court, rule 8.500 ooo... cccccccesecscccesecccessececssscssvsusssssessceasensees 7 California Rules of Court, rule 8.500(C)(1) ..c.ccessessessesscsseseeesecsscsessssesssssesssveeaeses 1 California Rules of Court, rule 8.504(b)(1)....ccccecscsseessssssesessssssesevscseessscsesonssssenees 1 STATUTES Code of Civil Procedure section 526a.......sccssssssesstsseessssesessccessassseesseesesssescseersnes 17 Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 oceccsssssssssessescssisseesesssssscseetstsesesssssneees 9 Water Code sections 74000-76501... ccsesssssescsesesesssecsesssscsesesseseasasscstssscsrssenessens 1 Water Code section 75591... csseseseseesesctereteestenseerseseessesseseessesessssssesesesseseesesers 12 Water Code section 755940... ssesesssessssesenscesssssesssssssessssseeceesseassessecsssssecesessseses 4 Water Code section 77594... .cccsssssssessstetsesssesesesseseessensSseeeeeceessesnensserseaeerersaeenes 20 OTHER AUTHORITIES California Constitution,article XTIT A, section 3 .......ccccecssssesccssecssscsssceceesaeenees 17 California Constitution,article XUCo.cceeeesceccccescessssseeceseeeens 14. 15, 16, 17 California Constitution,article XIII C, section 1 oo... .cccecccssesccesscestescscesceseseeenss 17 945398.1 iii California Constitution, article XTII D wo...eeeseceessseeeceeseees 10, 11, 14, 15, 16 ‘Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (Stats. 2014, chs. 346, 347, 348) oo... cccccscseccscsscssssesescsesseseessesesssesssscsevscsessssees 6 945398.1 iv To the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the California Supreme Court: Appellants and Cross-Respondents United Water Conservation District and Board of Directors of United Water Conservation District (collectively, the District) respectfully submit this Answerto the Petition for Review filed by Respondent and Cross-Appellant City of San Buenaventura(the City). I. QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW The District does not raise additional issues for review. The District notes, however, that the City’s questions for review are not framedin terms of the facts of this case. This failure to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 8.504(b)(1) impedes the Court’s understanding ofhow, whether andifthe City’s questions apply to this matter, or whether review is needed to secure uniformity of decision orto settle an important question of law. The appropriatelensfor the City’s questionsis a traditional mandamus proceeding, tried without extra-record evidence, but with fiercely disputed issues of material fact. The City challenged pumping fees levied by the District, which is neither a public utility nor a water retailer. The District exists instead to perform the functions ofgroundwaterprotection, conservation and enhancement. (Water Code sections 74000-76501.) Its mission is to accomplishthese regulatory tasks for eight Ventura County basinsin the most cost effective and environmentally balanced manner. To recoverits costs, the District imposes statutorily controlled and reasonable charge on the City’s voluntary choice to pump groundwater from metered wells located in the basins protected by the District. The City’s fifth proposed question asks whetherthe regulatory feetest of Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Bd. ofEqualization survives Proposition 26. This issue was notraised in the Court of Appeal. It may be refused for consideration under California Rules of Court, rule 8.500(c)(1). 945398. 1 ] II. INTRODUCTION California’s drought, now in its fourth year, has appropriately pushed the topics of water supply, conservation andtiered rates to the front pages of our newspapers. The issues, science and solutions are complex. Each branch ofgovernmenthas a centralrole to play, most especially this Court in cases of merit and consequence. This is not such case. Simply stated, the City wants to pay less for waterthat it uses, delivers and sells to 30,000 residences. The City has chosento obtain this water by pumping from the basins that the District exists to protect. The District is a water conservation agency. It manages, protects, sustains, and enhances the eight local basins, which suffer from subsidence and salt water intrusion arising out of over pumping by welloperators, like the City. The District’s mitigation efforts center on its artificial recharge of the local basins by spreading diverted river water over the ground. As an additional conservation strategy, the District augments the available groundwatersupply by delivering water through pipelines to coastal users -- where seawater intrusion is most acute — to forestall any attempts to meet their water needs by pumping. The Court of Appeal rejected the City’s legal efforts to obtain the District’s compromised water resources at a cheaper price. Relying upon precedentfrom this Court, the Opinion concluded thatthe District’s pumping charges are valid regulatory fees. The charges are not imposed solely by virtue ofproperty ownership, which wouldbring them within Proposition 218. Rather, they are imposed on the voluntary act ofpumping by well operators. The Court ofAppealalso analyzed the District’s fees under Proposition 26, concluding that the pumping charges are not a tax. The District provides payor-specific benefits to the City at fees that do not exceed the District’s resource management costs. The chargesare in fair proportion to the City’s burden on andbenefit from the District’s groundwater resource. The Opinion harmonizedthese findings with the 3:1 fee ratio between non-agricultural and 945398.1 2 agricultural uses mandated by the Water Code, determiningthatthis additional rate setting obligation was, and remains, within the Legislature’s policy discretion to dictate. The City now turns to this Court. The Petition offers a jumble of grievances and a crazy quilt oftrial court matters that do not warrant review. The City’s lead theory is that the Opinion conflicts with another published decision. The sense of conflict, however, has been created by the City, and not by incompatible case law. The Petition buries the distinctive facts that compelled different outcomes in Pajaro Valley Water ManagementAgency v. Amrhein (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1364 (Pajaro) and this matter.! As a consequence,the Petition similarly obscures the decisional law that correctly distinguishes the two cases. Notably, the wells in Pajaro were the only source of water for the large majority of residential property owners who paid pumping charges. The fees underscrutiny in Pajaro did not serve a regulatory purpose. Armed with these troubling facts, the Pajaro court felt bound by residential water service case law. Pajaro treated the agency’s extraction chargesjustlike those for delivering water to homeownersthrougha pipeline, and therefore subject to Proposition 218. This case and Pajaro properly co-exist side-by-side. To magnify the impression of conflict, the City improperly directs this Court to a recentruling that attempted to apply Pajaro. That decision, Great Oaks Water Co. v. Santa Clara Valley Water District (2015), 235 Cal.App.4th 523, has been vacated and cannotbe cited. Rehearing, not depublication, was grantedin that matter. California Rules of Court, rule 8.268(d). Review by this Court is not needed to secure uniformity of decision or to settle an unresolved important question of law. Review should be denied. ' The Petition refers to this case as AmRhein. Asthe Opinion refers to the case as Pajaro, this Answer doesas well. 945398.1 3 Il. STATEMENT OF FACTS The City continues to retry the facts of this case in the Petition. The facts are accurately set forth in the Opinion. Here are their highlights: TheDistrict is a water conservation agency. Its purposeis to “manage, protect, conserve and enhancethe water resourcesofthe Santa Clara River, its tributaries and associated aquifers, in the most cost effective and environmentally balanced manner.” (Opn.at pp.2, 3.) TheDistrict sustains eight basins in central Ventura County (Opn.at p. 3.) The basins are hydrogeologically interconnected. (Opn. at p. 26.) This meansthat the action of pumping water from oneof the basins affects all of the other basins in complex ways and varying degrees. (Opn.at p. 26.) The District addsto the natural recharge of the basins throughartificial recharge, which is critical to minimize “overdraft.” This is the amount by which pumping bythe City and others exceeds recharge. (Opn.at p. 3.) Despite the District’s mitigation efforts, pumping by well operators exceeds the natural andartificial recharge of the basins. (Opn.at p. 4.) To fund its mitigation efforts, the District charges a fee on the act of pumping. (Opn. at p. 4.) The Water Code authorizes these pump charges,not by customerclass, but by geographic zone. Within any zone, the charges must be “fixed and uniform”for two separate wateruses: water used for agricultural purposes and water usedfor all other purposes. (Opn. at p. 4.) Water Code section 75594 prohibits the District from equalizing the rates for these two uses. Therate for non-agricultural use must be threeto five times higher than for agricultural use. The District has alwaysset the rate differential between agricultural and non-agriculturaluse at the minimum 3:1 ratio. (Opn.atp.4.) There are at most 840 parcels with wells in the District. The record does not disclose the exact numberofresidential pumpers but makesit clear that this numberis insubstantial comparedto the numberofresidences within the District that receive delivered water from utilities located in the District. 945398.1 4 The City delivers water that it pumps from its wells to approximately 30,000 City residences and itselfuses pumped water for commercial purposes. (Opn. at p. 19.) The District’s Zone A includesthe entire district; its revenues fund District-wide conservation efforts. (Opn. at p. 4.) The District’s Zone B includes the area that receives the principal benefit from the Freeman Diversion project. (Opn.at pp. 4, 5.) The District correctly accounts and pays for its groundwater conservation efforts and for its authorized recreation activities. The District’s costs associated with State and surface water are proper conservation costs because these actions ease the overall burden on the District’s water resources. (Opn.at p. 27.) A 1987 settlement agreement with the City over the Zone A and B charges led to creation of a Zone C and to lower pump chargesfor the City. The agreement expired at the end of the 2010-2011 water year, leading to higher pumpchargesfor the City and to this litigation. (Opn.at pp. 4, 5.) IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY The Petition omits the following key trial court rulings: (a) the trial court denied administrative mandamusrelief (Opn.at p. 11); (b) the District’s pumping charges were valid regulatory fees that bore a reasonable relationship to the City’s burdens on andbenefits from the District’s regulatory activity;(c) the charges did not exceed the reasonable cost of the District’s activity and were reasonable, fair, and equitable; and (d) the chargesin the aggregate were reasonably proportionalto the District’s costs (Opn.at p. 10). The Opinion’s fundamental rulings bear repeating without the Petition’s misleading characterizations that are nowhere to be foundin the decision. The Court of Appeal held “that the pump charges paid by the City are neither property-related fees nor taxes, that they do not exceed the District’s reasonable costs ofmaintaining the groundwater supply, and that the 945398.| 5 District allocates these costs in a fair or reasonable relationship to the City’s burdenson this resource.” (Opn.at p. 11.) The pumpingfees servethe valid regulatory purpose of conserving water resources. (Opn. at p. 19.) Pumpers like the City receive an “obvious benefit” in their ability to extract groundwater from a managed basin. (Opn.at p. 25.) By imposing fees based upon the volumeofwaterextracted, the District charges individual pumpersin proportion to their received benefits. (Opn.at p. 26.) The Opinion bolstered its conclusions by referencing the recently enacted Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (Stats. 2014, chs. 346, 347, 348) which requires fees for the “[s]upply, production, treatment or distribution of water” to be adopted in accordance with Proposition 218, but which excludes fees “to fund the costs of a groundwater sustainability program”from that requirement. (Opn. at p. 23.) As for the Water Code’s required rate ratio, the Court of Appeal ruled that the statute does not discriminate between personsor parcels, but between typesofuse, and further that Proposition 218 applies to charges imposed by local agencies, not to policy decisions of the Legislature. (Opn.at p. 24.) V. LEGAL ARGUMENT A. The Opinion Applies the Correct Standards of Review” The City urges two interrelated issues regarding the appropriate standard of review; namely, (1) whether the City’s purported “constitutional facts” are reviewed de novoin a Proposition 218 or 26 case; and (2) whether the substantial evidence standard appliesonlyto trial court determinations of * The District’s Answer addresses the same points raised in the City’s Petition for Review, but has reordered them to discuss the proper standards ofreview at the outset. 945398.1 6 factual issues that were based on “extra record” evidence not presentedin the underlying administrative proceeding. The City claims confusionin the proper standard ofreview because the Opinioncites both the de novo and substantial evidence standardsofreview. (Petition at p. 28.) The City argues that a single de novo standard of review applies to this case. The City is wrong. More importantly, neither of the City’s questions warrants consideration by this Court under California Rules of Court, rule 8.500. Supreme Court review is not necessary to secure uniformity of decision or to resolve important questions of law on the applicable standards of review, which are well settled. The Opinion correctly reviewed de novo the trial court’s legal determinationsin this case, including whetherthe District’s conduct violated the state constitution. (Opn.at p. 12. Silicon Valley Taxpayers’ Assn., Inc. v. Santa Clara County Open Space Authority (2008) 44 Cal.4th 431, 448-450.) However, regarding the factual conflicts, which were decided in the first instanceby thetrial court, the Court ofAppeal properly declined to engagein fact-finding or re-deciding those disputes. (Opn.at p. 12. Morgan v. Imperial Irrigation District (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 892, 912 (Morgan).) The Court of Appeal reviewedthe trial court’s findings under the substantial evidence standard of review, which is less deferential than the standard applied to review of administrative agency findings, but nonetheless highly deferential. (Opn.at p. 12. Morgan, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 916.) There were many sharply contested questions of fact at trial in this matter. Crucial findings in favor of the District included: (1) the District’s groundwater pumping charges bore a reasonable relation to the City’s burdens on and benefits from the regulatory activity; (2) the pumping charges did not exceed the reasonable cost to the District of providing its services and were reasonable, fair and equitable;(3) the pumpingfees served the District’s valid regulatory purpose of conserving water resources; and (4) the District’s eight 945398.1 7 basins are hydrogeologically interconnected, such that the actions of one pumperin the District affects every other pumper to some degree. (Opn.at pp. 10, 19 and 26.) For the City to claim that there were no disputed facts (Petition at p. 29) is disingenuous. Indeed, the Petition belies the City’s claim. The City continues to dispute the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the interconnectivity of the District’s basins (Petition at pp. 5-6), the benefits received by groundwaterusers in the District like the City (Petition at pp. 29- 30 and 33) and whether the District improperly used funds obtained from imposition of groundwater extraction charges for purposes other than groundwater conservation and management(Petition at pp. 34-35). Despite its ongoing factual quarrel, the City nonetheless contends that the Opinion improperlyrelied on Morgan,also a Proposition 218 rate making case, by applying the substantial evidence standard of review, instead of addressing these factual determinations de novo. Like our Court of Appeal, the Morgan court applied its independentjudgment in reviewing whetherthe rate increases were constitutional. (/d. at p.912.) The Morganruling stressed that even when exercising independent review, an appellate court does not take new evidence or decide disputed issues of fact. (/bid.) Morgan noted that the adequacy of the data to support the contested cost of service study “was a vehemently disputed factual issue at trial.” (Jd. at 915.) Thetrial court found the data wasreliable. (/d. at 916.) Asa result, on appeal, the Morgan court applied the well-established substantial evidence standard ofreview to the trial court’s resolution of that factual dispute. (Ibid.) Morgan criticized the rate protesters for failing to articulate on appeal why the evidence was insufficient to support thetrial court’s findings, for merely citing to evidence in favoroftheir attack on the underlying data and for erroneously asking the appellate court to reweigh the evidence. (/d. at pp. 916-917.) The City argues that Morganis inapplicable here becausethe agencyin Morgan “waived the protection of the Western States rule limiting the 945398.1 8 evidence on mandate review oflegislative action to the administrative record and allowed the trial court to consider extra-record evidence, triggering substantial evidence review.” (Petition at p. 28). This argument is made from whole cloth. Aside from a footnote indicating that a copy ofthe 2003 Bureau ofReclamation Part 417 Decision cited by the rate protestors in the appellate brief did not appear in the record, there was no discussion whatsoever in Morganthat the substantial evidence standard ofreview wasapplicable -- as opposed to de novo review -- because thetrial court had considered “extra record” evidence in the mandate proceeding. “It is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not considered.” (McWilliams v. City ofLong Beach (2013) 56 Cal.4th 613, 626, quoting In re Marriage ofCornejo (1996) 13 Cal.4th 381, 388.) Citing Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130 (Bixby), the City next proposesthat there are special “constitutional facts” at issue that require de novo review. Bixby does not stand for that proposition. In Bixby, this Court concludedthatthe trial court had properly reviewed the agency determination underthe substantial evidence standard, because the administrative decision did notaffect the loss ofa fundamental vested right challenged under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. (Ud. at 148.) Like Bixby,this case does not involve an agency’s determination substantially affecting an individual’s vested fundamental right. Moreover, the City’s cause of action undersection 1094.5 was denied by thetrial court. (Opn.at p. 11, fn 6.) Thus,the statutory language contained in section 1094.5 that allows for independent review in those fundamental vestedrights cases where the court is authorized by law to exercise independent judgmenton the evidence cannot possibly apply. (See, Bixby, supra, 4 Cal.3d at 137.) The City also improperly relies on Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma County Union High School Dist. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 911, 916 and Professional Engineers in California Government v. Kempton (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1016, 945398.1 9 1032, where thetrial court’s decision did not turn on disputed facts. However, distilled to its essence,the City is merely complainingthat the Court ofAppeal reviewed the trial court’s findings of disputed fact under the substantial evidence standard. The City’s claim that the Court of Appeal applied the wrong standard ofreview and should have applied a de novostandard not only with respect to the legal issues decided by thetrial court, but also regarding the trial court’s factual determinations, is contrary to the law. B. Review is not Needed to Secure Uniformity of Decision This case was properly decided. With careful deliberation, the Opinion evaluated Propositions 13, 218 and 26, and the relevant case authority. The Court ofAppeal concluded,onthespecific facts ofthis case, that the District’s pumping charges are most aptly classified as regulatory fees, not as property- related services. The Opinion distinguished one groundwater case, Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency v. Amrhein (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1364 (Pajaro), and by extension that samecase in its seconditeration, Griffith v. Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 586 (Griffith), which added nothing to Pajaro of relevance here. The third case that the City cites as its predicate for conflict, Jacks v. City ofSanta Barbara (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 925, has absolutely no bearing on this matter. 1. The Opinion is Consistent with Controlling Authority Two Proposition 218 rulings of this Court govern the outcomein this case. In Apartment Association ofLos Angeles County, Inc. v. City ofLos Angeles (2001) 24 Cal.4th 830 (ApartmentAssociation), the Court concluded that an annual housing inspection fee was not a property-related fee within the meaning of Proposition 218. The Court reached this outcomeby refusing to rewrite article XIII D ofthe California Constitution to extend to fees imposed on an incident of property ownership. The Court confined the reach of 945398.1 10 Proposition 218 to its plain language: charges levied “on a parcel or a person as an incident of property ownership.” This one-worddistinction was and remains pivotal. As explained in Apartment Association, the hallmarkofarticle XIII D is thatit “applies only to exactions leviedsolely by virtue of property ownership.” (Jd. at p. 842.) For this reason, the inspection fee levied onresidential property ownersdid notfall within Proposition 218. The fee was “not imposed solely because a person ownsproperty.” It was imposed“on those landowners who chooseto engage in the residential rental business, and only while they are operating the business.” The fee “ceases along with the business operation, whetheror not ownership remains in the same hands.” (Jd. at p. 838.) The successorcase to Apartment Association adoptedits analysis. In Richmond v. Shasta Community Services District (2004) 32 Cal.4th 409 (Richmond), this Court confirmed that supplying waterto residences through a pipelineis a “property-related service” within the meaningofarticle XIII D, but rejected the broader argument “that all water service charges are necessarily subject to the restrictions that article XIII D imposes on fees and charges.” (/d. at pp. 426-427.) The Court proceeded to distinguish an ongoing domestic water delivery fee from “a fee for making a new connectionto the system.” (/d. at p. 427.) The former “requires nothing other than normal ownership and use of property” whereasthelatter “results from the owner’s voluntary decision to apply for the connection.” (/bid.) The charge on the voluntary decision to seek a service connection was not subject to Proposition 218. (Id. at p. 428.) The Opinioncorrectly followed ApartmentAssociation and Richmond. TheDistrict’s regulatory fees are not imposed because the payor owns a parcel 3 All references to roman numeral-numberedarticles are to the California Constitution. 945398.1 11 of land; the fees are not assessed “as an incident ofproperty ownership.” The record does not even assert that all pumpers own the land on which they operate. Instead, the charges are levied on the voluntary activity of payors who choose to pump groundwater.’ The fees end with the cessation of pumping. They fall outside the ambit of Proposition 218. 2. The Opinion Properly Distinguishes Pajaro The Petition misstates the reach and rule of Pajaro, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th 1364.° Throughselective quotations from Pajaro and the Opinion, the City stretches both rulings to argue that: (1) all groundwater charges are subject to Proposition 218 as a result of Pajaro; (2) the Opinion erroneously turned ona distinction, rejected in Pajaro, between business and domestic water uses; (3) the Opinion improperly “seized” on regulatory fee dicta in Pajaro to distinguish that case; and (4) no evidence exists of the factual disparities that separate Pajaro from this case. None ofthe City’s contentions are accurate. The Opinion properly distinguished Pajaro based on the distinctively different records in the two matters. Pajaro mostassuredly did not announcethat all groundwater charges fall within Proposition 218. The Pajaro ruling was profoundly influenced and limited by its record ofprimarily residential, rather than business, customers who were charged for groundwater augmentation in that case. What appeared * Groundwaterfees are not imposed on property owners, but on operators of ground water-producing facilities (Water Code section 75591); these are not necessarily the same population. > This Answerdoesnot separately address Pajaro ’s progeny, Griffith, because that second case added nothing new ofrelevance here. The Answeralso does not addressthe vacated appellate ruling that the City improperly offers as the basis for conflict with the Opinion,but reserves the right to do so in briefing on the merits should a new published opinion issue in that case. (Great Oaks Water Co. v. Santa Clara Valley Water District (2015), 235 Cal.App.4th 523.) 945398.1 12 dispositive to the Pajaro court was the presence of approximately 3,000 residential wells used for domestic purposes, contrasted with 660 non- residential wells used for farming, and that the domestic users were charged based onestimates, rather than on actual consumption. (Pajaro, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1374, 1390.) As Justice Bamattre-Manoukian explained in her concurrence: It appeared from the record herethat the vast majority of property ownersin the Pajaro Valley obtained their water from wells, and that alternative sources were not practically feasible. In these circumstances, I was concerned whetherthe continued use ofthis water should be characterized as part of the “normal ownership and use of property.” (/d. at p. 1397.) In addition to being responsive to its unique factual record, Pajaro expressly acknowledgedthe possibility of a correct, but contrary, conclusion underdifferent circumstances. According to Pajaro,“ifnot for the prohibitive cost ofmetering smaller wells, which necessitates charging those extractors on the basis of estimated usage, the fee might well be justified on regulatory grounds.” (Jd. at p. 1381, emphasis added.) The court in Pajaro even recognized “that delivery of water for irrigation or other nonresidential purposes is not a property-based service, and that charges for it are not incidental to the ownership of property.” (/d. at p. 1389.) The contrasting facts anticipated by Pajaro are precisely the facts in this case. As the Opinion identified, there exist at most 840 parcels with wells in the District and the number of residential customers within the District receiving water from wells is “insubstantial” compared to the number of residential customersreceiving delivered water. (Opn.at pp. 18-19.)° In the © The City itself misstates the Opinion by claiming that the Court found “no evidence”in the record to support its finding. The Court in fact determined that while the record did not disclose the “exact number” of residential 945398.1 13 main, the District’s charges are based on the actual amounts pumped. The District exclusively uses its pumping fees to support its regulatory water conservation mandate. Contrary to the City’s insistence, the Opinion did not rely upon evidence outside the recordto reach these conclusions. (Ibid.) These significant factual differences aside, the Court ofAppealnot only did notrely upon,but essentially rejected, the Pajaro commercial/residential distinction as a relevant consideration in deciding the Proposition 218 issue: “Even if there were no factual record regarding the relative number of residential versus commercial well ownersand a clear regulatory purpose, we wouldstill concludethat a charge on groundwater extraction is not imposed as an incident of property ownership.” (Opn. at p. 20, citing Orange County Water Dist. v. Farnsworth, supra, 138 Cal.App.2d 518 [holding that a pump fee is morein the nature of a levy on the activity of producing ground water than by reason ofproperty ownership].) “Nor do wethink it overly important that pumping maynot alwaysbe a “business operation.” (Opn.at p. 21.) With respect to the few households that pump water, the Opinion further offered: “Voluntarily generating one's ownutilities arguably is not a normal use of property” and is in any event a “business operation” that affects the demand for municipal services. (Ibid., citing Richmond.) Pajaro merits twofinal notes. First, Pajaro arrivedat its conclusion by rough analogy to this Court’s ruling in Bighorn-Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil (2006) 39 Cal.4th 205 (Bighorn). Citing Richmondforthe proposition that a public water agency’s charges for ongoing residential water delivery throughpipes are charges within the meaningofarticle XIII D, Bighorn held that residential water delivery charges are also fees within article XIII C, customers pumping waterin lieu of connecting to an existing water delivery network, it was “evident” -- based on information in the record -- that the number was insubstantial. 945398.1 14 whethercalculated on the basis ofconsumptionor imposedas a fixed monthly fee. (Bighorn, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 216, 217.) In the absence of a regulatory purpose, and troubled that the large majority of the pump charges were imposed on homeownersandbased onestimatesrather than actualuse, Pajaro equated Bighorn’s fees for ongoing residential water delivery to the Pajaro chargesfor residential groundwater extraction. A similar analogy to Bighornis not possible under the contrasting facts ofthis case. Second, in addition to distinguishing Pajaro, the Opinion did take exception to one strand ofPajaro’s reasoning. The Pajaro court dismissedthe Proposition 218 requirement that property-related fees must be for “service.” (Pajaro, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th 1389.) The Opinion disagreed: “That is simply an untenable construction ofthe constitutionaltext, particularly taken in context.” (Opn. at p. 21.) The Opinion then listed the many provisions of article XIII D that expressly refer to services and recited the inability of the Pajaro pumpchargeto meet such article XIII D service tests as: actual use by the property owner, immediately available, and not involving potential or future use. (Opn. at pp. 22-23.) The City does not contest the Opinion’s analysis on this important Proposition 218 point. There is nothing about Pajaro or the Opinion’s treatment ofPajarothat warrants review by this Court. The two cases stand on their unique facts for their reconcilable conclusions. 3. The Opinion and the Jacks Decision are Consistent The City asserts that the Opinion contradicts an earlier opinionofthe same appellate district in Jacks v. City of Santa Barbara (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 925 (Jacks), rehearing denied (March 27, 2015), petition for review filed (April 7, 2015). The assertion is wrong. Jacksis both legally and factually distinguishable. Its bearing onthis case is illusory. While Jacks is a Proposition 218 case,it involvedarticle XIII 945398.1 15 C relating to voter approval of local government taxes, andnotarticle XIII D relating to property-related fees and charges. (Jd. at p. 931). Further, the specific question in Jacks was whether a 1% surcharge onelectrical utilities wasa tax that required voter approval underarticle XIII C, or a franchise fee that did not. (Jacks, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 932.) Relying upon the “primary purpose” test enunciated by this Court in Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Board ofEqualization (1977) 15 Cal.4th 866, the Jacks court found that the surcharge boreall the hallmarks of a tax and, in fact, its primary purpose was to generate revenue from electrical users for general spending purposes. Accordingly, Jacks held that the surcharge was a tax that required voter approval under Proposition 218. (Jacks, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 933.) Jacks further concludedthat the surcharge wasan“illegal tax masqueradingas a franchise fee.” (/d. at p. 927). The pump charges here bear no resemblanceto the issues orthe taxes described in Jacks. The City tries in vain to draw a parallel by noting that the illegal fees in Jacks were “passed along” by theutility, Southern California Edison, to its customers for payment, much as the City passes along the District’s pumping chargesto the City’s water customers. Yet, this tangential similarity was nota factor in the Jacks analysis ofwhetheror not Proposition 218 wasapplicable to the charges. The Jacks ruling simply recognizedthat the general revenue purposeofa utility user tax could not be hidden through the device of using Southern California Edison as the City’s middleman for tax collection. (/d. at 934.) Jacks did not establish an “economic incidence” test replacing or supplementing the primary purposetest for adjudicating a fee to be a tax under Proposition 218. There is no contradiction between the Opinion and Jacks. 945398.1 16 The City’s contention that either of these cases turns on a “legal versus economic incidence”testis an artifice,’ C. Review is not Needed to Resolve an Important Question of Law The City also contendsthat review is necessary to address whetherthis Court’s decision in Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Bd. ofEqualization (1997) 15 Cal.4th 866 (Sinclair Paint), as subsequently applied in California Farm Bureau Federation v. State Water Resources ControlBoard(2011) 51 Cal.4th 421 (Farm Bureau), survives the passage of Proposition 26. Thevitality of these rulings wasnotraised in the Court ofAppeal, where the City, as recently as its Petition for Rehearing, referenced both cases and the propositions for which they stand with approval. The City’s newfound vacillation aside, review by this Court is unnecessary to confirm that Sinclair Paint and Farm Bureau are alive and well. These precedents provide essential, relevant direction for judicial evaluation ofwhether a government measureis a tax or a regulatory fee. To those who would challenge their currency, the District notes that Proposition 37 was rejected by the voters in November 2000. It would have overruled Sinclair Paint. And althoughneither Sinclair Paint nor Farm Bureau directly address Proposition 26, as that initiative was not adopted by the voters until November 2010, Proposition 26 borrowed, rather than negated, their controlling wisdom. In addition to broadeningthearticle XIII C definition of “tax,” Proposition 26 turned a passage constraining regulatory fees excerpted from Sinclair Paint into the present constitutional mandate. (Cal. Const., ’ The City asserts thatits “legal versus economic incidence”test is also pending before the Court in Wheatherford v. City of San Rafael (review granted September 10, 2014). However, that case asks another question entirely; namely whetheronly taxes assessed directly upon a taxpayersuffice to trigger standing under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a. 945398.1 17 articles XIII A, § 3 and XIIIC, § 1; Sinclair Paint, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 878, citing San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego County Air Pollution Control Dist. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1132, 1145-1146; Griffith v. City of Santa Cruz (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 982, 996.)° Farm Bureau providesthe instruction that the City seeks. It analyzes the Sinclair Paint |anguagethat the drafters of Proposition 26 adopted. The question in Farm Bureau was whetherthe annuallicense and permits fees of the State Water Resources Control Board were valid regulatory feesorillegal taxes. The Court first concluded that the fees were regulatory, charged only for specific functions costs linked to issuing, monitoring, enforcing and administering licenses and permits, and not for general revenue purposes. The Court then examined whether the state had produced evidence to show the estimated costs of the regulatory activity, and the basis for determining the manner in whichthe costs are apportioned,so that chargesallocated to a payor beara fair or reasonable relationship to the payor's burdensonor benefits from the regulatory activity. The Opinionin the instant case rested on, and recited largely verbatim, Farm Bureau’s guiding answer: A regulatory fee does not become a tax simply because the fee may be disproportionate to the service rendered to individual payors. ([Citation.] The question of proportionality is not measured on an individual basis. Rather, it is measured collectively, considering all rate payors. [Citation.] [§] Thus, permissible fees must be related to the overall cost ofthe governmentalregulation. They need notbe finely calibrated to the precise benefit each individual fee payor might derive. What a fee cannot do is exceed the reasonable cost of regulation with the generated surplus used for general revenue ® The City bristles that Proposition 26 was a reaction to Sinclair Paint and intendedtoalterits rule. (Petition at p. 23.) The impact ofProposition 26is its broadeningofthe constitutionaldefinition of “tax” (Opn.at pp. 7-8), whichit accomplished even as it copied Sinclair Paint’s words. 945398.1 18 collection. An excessive fee that is used to generate general revenue becomes a tax. (Opn.at p. 26,citing Farm Bureau, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 438.) The Petition works overtime to ignore Farm Bureau’s teaching. Noting that remand wasrequiredin that case, the Petition insists that the agency was ordered to provide proof ofthe proportionality ofthe charges to the benefits or burdensofeach “customerclass.” (Petition at p. 24.) Not true. Asto this so- called “second prong”test, the factual issues on remand wereinsteadstatedas: “whether the fees are reasonably related to the total budgeted cost of the Division's ‘activity,’ keeping in mind that a government agency should be accorded someflexibility in calculating the amount and distribution of a regulatory fee.” (Farm Bureau, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 442.) The City similarly cites in vain to Sinclair Paint for a purported requirementthat the proportionality of a regulatory fee be “fair in toto and as to each class of ratepayers”(Petition at p. 24). Sinclair Paint establishes no such standard. The City’s complaint is not with the continued relevance of Sinclair Paint or Farm Bureau. Instead, it is with the outcomethat these controlling California Supreme Court authorities require. The Opinion correctly applied Farm Bureau, holding that substantial record evidence supported the interconnectivity ofthe District’s basins, the impact ofeach pumper’s activity on the others and the reasonable proportionality ofthe District’s fees. “Yet, by imposing fees based upon the volumeofwater extracted, the District largely does charge individual pumpersin proportionto the benefit they receive from the District’s conservation activities. The District ensures wateravailability District-wide. Large-scale users suchas the City receive a far greater benefit from individual landowners who pumpwaterfor personal consumption. That is more than is required.” (Opn.at p. 26.) The City remains unwilling to acknowledge that the District’s pumpers are charged in lawful proportionto the regulatory benefit that they receive and 945398.1 19 to harmonize this Proposition 26 finding with the companion 3:1 fee ratio prescribed by Water Code section 77594. The Opinion properly reconciles both mandates to conclude that the District’s groundwater pumping fee is a valid regulatory fee and not an excessive “tax.” D. Review to Address Dissimilar Trial Court Cases is Unwarranted The City argues that review shouldbe granted because Proposition 218 and 26 issues are currently underconsiderationin ninetrial courts. (Petition at pp. 35-37.) This argumentleaps overthe orderly and essential progression of cases from trial through appeal. It plays fast and loose with the proper predicates for review by this Court. It presupposes that the legal determinations of the Court of Appeal on the Proposition 218 and 26 issues based onthe record evidencein this case will somehow be dispositive of or inform the decision-making in those other cases. The City’s argument is fundamentally flawed. Proposition 218 cases necessarily turn on their unique facts. For example, water delivery charges for services provided to property owners by municipalities or by water agencies acting as purveyors of water are a far different creature than water extraction fees that do not depend on property ownership. The camouflaged electricity surcharge in the Jacks case is an entirely different animal; the issue in that case also addressed a different portion ofProposition 218 than addressed by the Court ofAppealin this case. The very nature of the agency, municipality or water district responsible for imposing the fee or charge in dispute in a given case may warrant a different analysis and different outcome. There are myriad different types of water districts in the State of California with different mandates, including: e water conservation districts; e flood control and water conservationdistricts; 945398.1 20 e municipal waterdistricts; e county waterdistricts; e water storagedistricts; e irrigation districts; e water replenishmentdistricts; ¢ community servicesdistricts; e supply and conservation agencies; e water quality departments; e recreation and conservation districts; e water resources departments; e water managementdistricts; and e reclamation districts. There are over a thousand special water districts in California, with a great diversity ofpurposes, governance structures and financing mechanisms. Some are governed by a county board of supervisors or city council while others, like the District, are independent with governing boards directly elected by the public. Someprovideutility services, such as waterservices, and waste disposal(sanitation), while others serve safety needs, such as flood control. Still others provide important regulatory functions, such as water conservation or replenishment of depleted or deficient water supplies. Finally, the nature of the underlying administrative proceeding and evidencein the record may very welldictate different results in the trial court based onthe standard ofreview applicable to administrative decision-making, and hencedifferent results on appeal. The City’s “one size fits all” approach to Proposition 218 and Proposition 26 issues is overly simplistic. This is reason enough for this Court to decide that the cases referenced in the Petition do not present a need for California Supreme Court direction. That conclusion is only amplified by a 945398.1 21 case-by-case consideration of the nine cases. Thoseninetrial courts will not be lookingat this case, the Jacks case, or the now vacated Great Oaks case for direction as the City claims. (Petition at pp. 36-39.) The two groundwaterfee cases cited in the Petition are resolved. North San Joaquin Water Conservation District v. All Persons Interested in the Matter of the Resolution Imposing Groundwater Charge was a validation action. Judgment wasissued in that case nearly seven years ago, on July 1, 2008. As the City even admits, the appeal was dismissed and the case was rendered mootby the repeal of the dispute charge. (Petition at p. 36, fn. 20.) Ashas been widely reported, the one case with at least a passing similarity to this case, City ofCerritos, et al., vy. Water ReplenishmentDistrict ofSouthern California (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. BS128136) has settled. The three matters glibly lumped together in the Petition as “cost of service” cases, Glendale Coalitionfor Better Governmentv. City ofGlendale, Sweetwater Authority Ratepayers Ass’n, Inc. v. Sweetwater Authority, and Plata v. City ofSan Jose, concern municipalentities or publicly owned water agencies that are purveyors of waters to residential and business customers. Like recently decided Capistrano Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of San Juan Capistrano (Apr. 20, 2015) Cal.App.4th _, 2015 WL 1798898,the first two ofthose cases involve tiered water rates and are governed by the holding in City ofPalmdale v. Palmdale Water Dist. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 926. The Plata action challenges the transfer ofwater revenues to the municipal general fund. None of these issues were discussed or decided in the Opinion. The City’s four San Diego trial court matters are described as impinging on the same “economic or legal incidence” question that the Petition never competently raises. But even if that underlying issue were clearly identified for this Court, it is not possible to equate the four San Diego cases with this case. Each of the San Diego matters concerns, on demurrer, whetherthe plaintiff had standing to challenge such disparate charges as a 945398.1 22 tourism marketing assessment, business improvement district fees and a maintenance assessmentcharge. Neitherthe facts required to achieve taxpayer standingor the legal threshold for pleading sufficiencyare at issue here. The City’s implicationthat the issues in the nine referencedtrial court cases are identical or similar to the questions addressed in the Opinion does not hold water. The City’s patchworkofcases involving different Proposition 218 and Proposition 26 issues donot provide grounds for review by this Court and mustbe rejected. VI. CONCLUSION The District respectfully submits that this Court should decline to review the Opinion, whichcorrectly applies the facts and the controlling law to the District’s regulatory pumping charges, which are vital and appropriate to the decades belated efforts of us all to sustain our groundwater. DATED: May18, 2015 MUSICK, PEELER & GARRETTLLP By: /s/ Jane Ellison Usher Jane Ellison Usher Attorneys for Appellants and Cross- Respondents UNITED WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT AND BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF UNITED WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT 945398.1 23 CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL I, Jane Ellison Usher, hereby certify pursuantto rules 8.268(b)(2) and (3) and 8.204 ofthe California Rules of Court that this Appellants and Cross- Respondents’ Answerto Petition for Review was produced on a computer, and that it contains 7,070 words, exclusive of tables, the verification, this Certificate, and the proof ofservice, but including footnotes, as calculated by the word count of the computer program usedto preparethis brief. DATED: May 18, 2015 MUSICK, PEELER & GARRETT LLP By: /s/ Jane Ellison Usher Jane Ellison Usher Attorneys for Appellants and Cross- Respondents UNITED WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT AND BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF UNITED WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT 945398. ] PROOF OF SERVICE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. | am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. My business address is One Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2000, Los Angeles, California 90017. On May 18, 2015, I served true copies ofthe following document(s) described as APPELLANTS AND CROSS-RESPONDENTS’ ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REVIEWonthe interested parties in this action as follows: SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST Ol BY E-MAIL OR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION:I caused a copy of the document(s) to be sent from e-mail address c.staley@mpglaw.com tothe personsat the e-mail addresses listed in the Service List. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any electronic messageor other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful. 1 BY MAIL:J enclosed the document(s) in a sealed envelope or package addressedto the personsat the addresseslisted in the Service List and placed the envelope for collection and mailing, following our ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar with Musick, Peeler & Garrett LLP's practice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that the correspondenceis placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in - the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service, in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid. x} BY FEDEX: I enclosed said document(s) in an envelope or package provided by FedEx and addressedto the personsat the addresseslisted in the Service List. I placed the envelope or package for collection and overnight delivery at an office or a regularly utilized drop box of FedEx or delivered such document(s) to a courieror driver authorized by FedExto receive documents. I declare under penalty of perjury underthe laws of the State of California that the foregoingis true and correct. Executed on May 18, 2015, at Los Angeles, California. /s/_ Cindy L. Staley CindyL.Staley 945398.1 1 SERVICE LIST United Water Conservation District, et al. v. City ofSan Buenaventura Santa Barbara County Superior Court Case Nos. VENCI 00401714 and 1414739 Court of Appeal Case No. B251810 Counsel Gregory G. Diaz, Esq. Assistant City Attorney City of San Buenaventura P.O. Box 99 Ventura, CA 93002-0099 Telephone: (805) 654-7818 Facsimile: (805) 641-0253 Email: gdiaz@ci.ventura.ca.us gdiaz@cityofventura.net Michael G. Colantuono, Esq. David J. Ruderman, Esq. Michael R. Cobden, Esq. Colantuono, Highsmith & Whatley, PC 300 South Grand Ave., Suite 2700 Los Angeles, CA 90071-3137 Telephone: (213) 542-5700 Facsimile: (213) 542-5710 Email: mcolantuono@chwlaw.us druderman@chwlaw.us mcobden@chwlaw.us alloyd@chwlaw.us Dennis LaRochelle, Esq. Susan McCarthy, Esq. Arnold, Bleuel, LaRochelle, Mathews & Zirbel, LLP 300 Esplanade Drive, Suite 2100 Oxnard, CA 93036 Telephone: (805) 988-9886 Facsimile: (805) 988-1937 Email: dlarochelle@atozlaw.com smecarthy@atozlaw.com jmathews@atozlaw.com jmahan@atozlaw.com 945398.1 2 Representing Attorney for Respondent and Cross-Appellant City of San Buenaventura Via U.S. Mail Attorneys for Respondent and Cross-Appellant City of San Buenaventura Via U.S. Mail Attorneys for Intervener Pleasant Valley County Water District Via U.S. Mail 945398. 1 Nancy N. McDonough,Esq. Christian C. Scheuring, Esq. Associate Counsel California Farm Bureau Federation 2300 River Plaza Drive Sacramento, CA 95833 Telephone: (916) 561-5500 Facsimile: (916) 561-5699 Email: nmedonough@cfbf.com cscheuring@cfbf.com dchasteen@cfbf.com Paul N. Singarella, Esq. Kathryn M. Wagner, Esq. Latham & Watkins LLP 650 Town Center Drive, 20"Floor Costa Mesa, CA 92626-1925 Telephone: (714) 540-1235 Facsimile: (714) 755-8290 E-mail: paul.singarella@lw.com kate.wagner@lw.com Patricia J. Quilizapa, Esq. Aleshire & Wynder, LLP 18881 Von Karman Avenue Suite 1700 Irvine, CA 92612 Telephone: (949) 223-1170 Facsimile: (848) 223-1180 E-mail: pquilizapa@awattorneys.com Clerk of the Court of Appeal Division 6 200 E. Santa Clara Street Ventura, CA 93001 Clerk of the California Supreme Court 350 McAllister Street San Francisco, CA 94102-7303 Office of the Attorney General Consumer Law Section 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 San Francisco, CA 94102 Attomeys for Interveners California Farm Bureau Federation and Farm Bureau of Ventura County Via U.S. Mail Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Water ReplenishmentDistrict of Southern California Via U.S. Mail Attorneys for Amici Curiae City of Cerritos, City of Downeyand City of Signal Hill Via U.S. Mail 1 copy Via U.S. Mail Filed Electronically and served Via Federal Express, 8 copies Pursuant to Rule of Court, Rule 8.25, subd. (b)(3) 1 copy Via U.S. Mail