JACKS v. CITY OF SANTA BARBARA

Amicus Curiae Brief of Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association and California Taxpayers Association

Cal.October 28, 2015

ra e rail “ds A.,3unvemeCourt Cop $225589 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA « FICED WITH PERMISSION ROLLAND JACKSand ROVE ENTERPRISES, INCSUPREMECOURT . Plaintiffs and Appellants, F HED v. OCT 28 2015 CITY OF SANTA BARBARA Frank A. McGuire Clerk Defendant and Respondent, Deputy HOWARD JARVIS TAXPAYERS ASSOCIATION AND CALIFORNIA TAXPAYERS ASSOCIATION’S JOINT APPLICATION FOR LEAVETO FILE BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE AND BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAEIN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS Review of a Published Decision of the Second Appellate District, Division Six, Case No. B253474 Reversing a Judgment of the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Santa Barbara, Case No. 1383959 Honorable ThomasP. Anderle, Judge Presiding Trevor A. Grimm, SBN 34258 Jonathan M. Coupal, SBN 107815 Timothy A. Bittle, SBN 112300 J. Ryan Cogdill, SBN 278270 Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Foundation 921 Eleventh Street, Suite 1201 Sacramento, CA 95814 Telephone: (916) 444-9950 Facsimile: (916) 444-9823 RECEIVED Counsel for Amicus OCF 22 cuié CLERK SUPREME COURT S225589 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA ROLLAND JACKSand ROVE ENTERPRISES,INC., Plaintiffs and Appellants, V. CITY OF SANTA BARBARA Defendant and Respondent, HOWARD JARVIS TAXPAYERS ASSOCIATION AND CALIFORNIA TAXPAYERS ASSOCIATION’S JOINT APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE AND BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS Review ofa Published Decision of the Second Appellate District, Division Six, Case No. B253474 Reversing a Judgmentof the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Santa Barbara, Case No. 1383959 Honorable ThomasP. Anderle, Judge Presiding Trevor A. Grimm, SBN 34258 Jonathan M. Coupal, SBN 107815 Timothy A. Bittle, SBN 112300 J. Ryan Cogdill, SBN 278270 Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Foundation 921 Eleventh Street, Suite 1201 Sacramento, CA 95814 Telephone: (916) 444-9950 Facsimile: (916) 444-9823 Counsel for Amicus TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS.... 0.0...eectet ene teen eee neae i TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .. 0... 0.2.0ceecece eee ii JOINT APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO FILE........ 0.0.0... eee eee ees 111 I. INTRODUCTION 2.00...cetteeee ees ] I. QUESTION PRESENTED .... 0...ceeens 2 III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PROPOSITIONS13, 218, & 26 ............. 3 IV. THE SURCHARGEIS A “TAX,” AND NOT A “FEE,” FOR CONSTITUTIONAL PURPOSES.. 2.0.0... coeccceee 6 A. Underthe “Primary Purpose Test” Enumerated in Sinclair, the Surcharge is a Tax, NotaFee...teeneee nes 6 B. The City’s Proposed Exception to Proposition 218 Would Swallow the Rule and Constitutes Bad Public Policy ........... 0... cece eens 9 V. PROPOSITION 26 IS INAPPOSITE TO THE CASE AT BAR ............. 11 VI. CONCLUSION ......0..0.0 00.0 c ccene e nen nee enes 12 WORD COUNT CERTIFICATION ........... 0... c cece tent eens 13 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES: PAGE(S) ApartmentAssn. ofLos Angeles County, Inc. v. City ofLos Angeles (2001) 24 Cal.4™ 830 0...ccceee n nett een e tenn eens 6 Brooktrails Township Community Services Dist. v. Bd. ofSupervisors ofMendocino County (2013) 218 Cal. App. 47195 0.0...eee eet eee e eee e ene nes 1] City ofSan Diego v. Shapiro (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 756 2...eeecece eens 3 Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City ofRoseville (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 637 2.0...eeeeee eee 4 Jacks v. City ofSanta Barbara (2015) 234 Cal. App. 4925 20.6.cccnett e eee 6, 7,9 Schmeer v. County ofLos Angeles (2013) 213 Cal. App. 47 1310 0.0...eettee eee 5 Silicon Valley Taxpayers Assn. v. Santa Clara County Open Space Authority (2008) 44 Cal. 47 431 00eeeeee nett e bene ene eees 4,6 Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Board ofEqualization (1997) 15 Cal. App. 4" 866 22...ceeeete eee ees 5,7 Town ofTiburon v. Bonander (2009) 180 Cal. App. 47 1057 00...ed3 STATUTES: California Constitution Article XIII A, Section 1(a) 2.0... 0.eeeect eee eens 3 Article XIII A, Section 1(e)(4) 00... 0...cece eee e ee ene 12 Article XIII C, Section 2(b) 2.0...teen ete e een eens 5 Article XIII C, Section 2(d) .... 0...ceeteen eee ener 5 il JOINT APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO FILE HowardJarvis Taxpayers Association (“HJTA”) is a California nonprofit public benefit corporation with over 200,000 members. The late HowardJarvis, founder of HJTA,utilized the People’s reserved powerof initiative to sponsor Proposition 13 in 1978. Proposition 13 was overwhelmingly approved by California voters, and addedarticle XIII A to the California Constitution. Proposition 13 has kept thousandsoffixed- income Californians in their homesby limiting the rate and annual escalation of property taxes. In 1996, HJTA authored and sponsored Proposition 218, the Right to Vote on Taxes Act. California voters passed Proposition 218, which added articles XIII C and XIII D to the California Constitution and placedstrict limitations on local governmentalentities’ authority to levy taxes, fees, and charges for property-related services. Asis specifically relevant to this case, Proposition 218 subjects tax hikes levied by local governments to a voter approval requirement. HJTA also participated in the drafting process of Proposition 26 prior to its passage in 2010. Since that time, HJTA has litigated dozens of Proposition 218 cases, some of whichare directly relevantto the caseatbar. The California Taxpayers Association (“CalTax”) is a nonprofit, ill nonpartisan research and advocacyassociation founded in 1926 with a dual mission: to guard against unnecessary taxes and promote government efficiency. CalTax represents the interests of its members, and the state's taxpayersat large, in the areas of income and franchise, property, sales and use, and otherstate and local taxes, assessments, fees and penalties. CalTax's membership includes individuals and many businessesacrossall industries, ranging from small firms to Fortune 500 companies. CalTax is dedicated to the uniform and equitable administration of taxes and minimizing the cost of tax administration and compliance. In 1996, CalTax signed the ballot arguments supporting Proposition 218 stating that the measure would give “taxpayers the right to vote on taxes, and stop politicians’ end-runs around Proposition 13.” In 2010, CalTax co-sponsored Proposition 26 and wrote ballot argumentsstating that the initiative will stop state and local policymakers from enacting hidden taxes on goods and services, such aselectricity. CalTax has a great interest in the Court's resolution of this matter, which will have a direct impact on CalTax, its members, and many other taxpayers across the state. Because of CalTax's broad-based membership and its expertise and experience, in addition to that of its members, concerning the legal and policy issues raised by this case, CalTax believes iv that its perspective on the relevant issues will be of assistance to this Court. Onthe general merits of this case, Amici HJTA and CalTax strongly support Plaintiffs and urge this Court to affirm the decision of the Second District, Division Six, Court of Appeal in every respect. The vast majority of issues herein are thoroughly and excellently briefed by Plaintiffs. Amici respectfully and jointly request leave from this Court to file the accompanying Brief of Amici Curiae in order to lend their expertise and perspective as tax- and ratepayer advocates. Specifically, Amici believe their involvement as authors and sponsors Propositions 13 and its progeny will be helpful to the Court, specifically regarding historical context and legislative intent of those ballot initiatives. Amicistaff attorneys authored the entirety of the proposed brief, and neither Amici madeor received any monetary contributions intended to fund the preparation or submission of the brief. H/ S E O R I O M R E ot e For these reasons, Amici respectfully requests this Court’s permission to file the accompanying Brief of Amicus Curiae. Dated: October 21, 2105 Respectfully submitted, TREVOR A. GRIMM JONATHAN M. COUPAL TIMOTHYA. BITTLE J. RYAN COGDILL (Daa J.RYANCOGDILL ” Counsel for Amici vi BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE I INTRODUCTION Amici Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association (“HJTA”) and California Taxpayers Association (“CalTax’”) strongly support Appellants Rolland Jacks and Rove Enterprises, LLC (hereafter, “Jacks”) and urge this Court to affirm the decision of the Second District, Division Six, Court of Appeal. While Appellant has more than sufficiently briefed the relevant issues presented, Amici write separately to share their expertise as taxpayer advocates concerned with public finance, particularly constitutional taxpayerprotections, throughout California at both state and locallevels. Moreover, Amicus HJTAseeksto share its expertise as drafter and sponsor of Propositions 13 and 218. Proposition 218 was a response by the People of California to the unfair tactics used by local governmental entities seeking to circumvent Proposition 13. Specifically, the voters sought to rein in the proliferation of tax hikes imposed by local governments that followed the enactment of Proposition 13. But local governments remain undeterred, and continued to chip awayat tax- and ratepayer protections even after the passage of Proposition 218. This often involves, as is the case here, mislabeling taxes as fees in order to circumvent voter approval requirements. Defendant / Respondent City of Santa Barbara (hereafter, the “City”’) engagedin precisely this sort of chicanery whenit adopted the 1999 Franchise Agreement. This agreement imposed a one percent surcharge on all electrical bills paid by ratepayers of Southern California Edison (hereafter, “SCE”’) within the City’s limits, in addition to the preexisting historical one percent franchise fee paid by SCEto the City. Because SCE merely serves as the tax collector and passes the surcharge directly onto the ratepayers, and because the surcharge is explicitly intended for general governmental revenue purposes, the surchargeis clearly a tax within the meaning of Proposition 218 and thus subject to our Constitution’s voter approval requirement. I QUESTION PRESENTED This Court certified the following question in this matter: “Is the City of Santa Barbara’s | percent increase onits electricity bills (i.e., the 1 percent surcharge) a tax subject to Proposition 218’s voter approval requirementor a franchise fee that may be imposedbythe City without voter consent?” As will be shown below,the answeris that the surcharge is a tax for Proposition 218 purposes. i LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PROPOSITIONS13 , 218, & 26 In 1978, California voters overwhelmingly passed Proposition 13, which wasauthored and sponsored by HJTA founder Howard Jarvis. In passing Proposition 13, the People of California intendedtostrictly limit the taxing authority of local governmentalentities. (City ofSan Diego v. Shapiro (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 756, 761-62.) One mechanism by which Proposition 13 accomplished this was to cap ad valorem propertytax rates. (Cal. Const., art. XIII A, sec. 1, subdiv.(a).)! In order to circumventthe restrictions imposed on their taxing authority by Proposition 13, many local governmententities began charging new or higher taxes, fees, charges, and assessments. (See Town ofTiburon v. Bonander (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1072-74.) To remedy these and other abuses, HJTA authored and sponsored Proposition 218, which added articles XIII C and XIII D to our State Constitution: “In adopting this measure, the people found and declared that Proposition 13 was intended to provide effective tax relief and to require voter approvaloftax increases. However,local governments have subjected taxpayers to 1 Unless otherwise stated, all future references to “articles” refer to our State Constitution. excessive tax, assessment, fee and charge increases that not only frustrate the purposes of voter approval for tax increases, but also threaten the economic securityofall Californians and the California economyitself. This measure protects taxpayers by limiting the methods by which local governments exact revenue from taxpayers without their consent.” (Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City ofRoseville (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 637, 640 (internal quotation marks omitted); citing Historical Notes, 2A West's Annotated California Constitution (2002 supp.) following article XIII C, section 1, page 38 [emphasis added].) Indeed, as this Court has noted, “Proposition 218 specifically states that ‘[t}he provisions of this act shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes of limiting local government revenue and enhancing taxpayer consent.’ (Ballot Pamp., supra, text of Prop. 218, § 5, p. 109; Historical Notes, supra, p. 85.) Also, as discussed above, the ballot materials explained to the voters that Proposition 218 was designedto: ... make it easier for taxpayers to win lawsuits; and limit the methods by which local governments exact revenue from taxpayers withouttheir consent.” (Silicon Valley Taxpayers Ass’n, Inc. v. Santa Clara County Open Space Authority (2008) 44 Cal.4th 431, 448 (Silicon Valley Taxpayers) [emphasis added].) Proposition 218 limits the authority of local governmentalentities to levy new taxes or increase existing taxes by subjecting such efforts to voter approval. It specifically provides: “No local government may impose, extend, or increase any general tax unless and until that tax is submitted to the electorate and approved by a majority vote. ...” (Art. XIII C, sec. 2, subdiv. (b).) The Constitution imposes a similar voter approval requirementfor special taxes, albeit with an even higher voter threshold. (Art. XIII C, sec. 2, subdiv. (d).) For the purposesofthis litigation, we need not determine whether the surcharge is a general or specific tax; we need only determine whether the surcharge is a tax or fee. In light of Proposition 218’s newrestrictions on taxes, fees, charges, and assessments, local governments again sought to circumvent constitutional restrictions on revenue generation and began broadening the scope of fees. The consequence ofthis trend, as well as this Court’s decision in Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Board ofEqualization (1997) 15 Cal.4th 866 (Sinclair), was that the voters enacted Proposition 26 in 2010. (Schmeer v. County ofLos Angeles (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1322.) “Proposition 26 expanded the definition of taxes so as to include fees and charges, with specified exceptions; required a two-thirds vote of the Legislature to approve laws increasing taxes on any taxpayers; and shifted to the state or local government the burden of demonstrating that any charge, levy or assessment is not a tax.” (/d.) 5 IV THE SURCHARGE JIS A “TAX,” AND NOTA “FEE,” FOR CONSTITUTIONAL PURPOSES The City is correct whenit notes that prior to Proposition 26 our Constitution did not expressly define “tax” as that term is used in Articles XIII C and D;instead, we relied on the common law interpretations. (Opening Brief at p. 22.) However, the common law must be considered in light of the fact that “Proposition 218 was designed to prevent a local legislative body from imposing a special tax disguised as an assessment.... The ballot arguments identify what was perhapsthe drafter's main concern: tax increases disguised via euphemistic relabeling as ‘fees,’ ‘charges,’ or ‘assessments *.” (Silicon Valley Taxpayers, supra, 44 Cal.4th 431, 449 [internal quotation marks andcitations omitted]; citing Apartment Assn. of Los Angeles County, Inc. v. City ofLos Angeles (2001) 24 Cal.4th 830, 839.) Underthis logic, such suspicion of “euphemistic relabeling” applies equally well to “illegal taxes masquerading as a franchise fee.” (Jacks v. City ofSanta Barbara (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 925, 927 (Jacks).) A. Underthe “Primary Purpose Test” Enunciated in Sinclair, the Surchargeis a Tax, Not a Fee. This Court summarized the legal distinction between taxes and fees in Sinclair: “The cases recognize that ‘tax’ has no fixed meaning, and that the distinction between taxes and fees is frequently ‘blurred,’ taking on different meanings in different contexts. In general, taxes are imposed for revenue purposes,rather than in return for a specific benefit conferred or privilege granted. Most taxes are compulsory rather than imposedin response to a voluntary decision to develop or to seek other government benefits or privileges. But compulsory fees may be deemedlegitimate fees rather than taxes.” (Sinclair, supra, 15 Cal.4th at 874.) In applying this analysis, the Second District referred to this as the “primary purposetest.” (Jacks, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at 931.) Underthis analysis, there are two primary questions: (1) whois paying the tax, and (2) what is that person receiving in return (i.e., for what purpose is the revenue used)? First, SCE’s duty to collect and remit the surcharge is purely ministerial. (Jacks, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at 935.) Indeed, the tax is passed directly on to the customer, as Ordinance 5135 expressly and directly obligates each and every ratepayer to pay the surcharge. Therefore, for the purposesof the primary purposetest, the utility consumers are most appropriately considered to be the taxpayer. Second, the record showsthat the City was quite explicit that the purpose of the surcharge was to raise “revenues for use by the City Council for general City governmental purposes.” (/d. at 932.) And neither the 7 ratepayersnorthe utility received any greater service than they did prior to the enactmentof the surcharge. Indeed, there have never been allegations that SCE presently imposes greater wear and tear on municipal property justifying the increased “franchise fee” revenue. Asbothtrial and appellate courts in this matter concluded, “[f]rom the perspective of the utility consumer, there is no functional difference between the [1% surcharge] and a utility user[] tax.” (/bid.) Any contrary conclusionplaces rigid formalism before common sense and unambiguous legislative intent. The conclusion of the Second District was entirely correct; under the primary purposetest, the surcharge is obviously a tax and not a fee for the purposes of Proposition 218. The City expressly and unabashedly soughtto increase its general revenue. It did so by enacting the functional equivalent of a utility user tax (hereafter, sometimes “UUT”). The resulting surcharge uses SCE as a meretax collector, as well as a cloak to accomplish that which it cannot do on its own: the imposition of a UUT without first submitting the matter to voter approval. Thelegislative intent of the People is clear: Proposition 218 should be broadly construed to enhance taxpayer consentandto eliminate “euphemistic relabeling” designed by local governments to evade constitutional tax- and ratepayer protections. This is precisely what the City urges this Court to accept here. For the reasons discussed herein, this Court shouldreject the City’s arguments and affirm the decision of the Court of Appealin its entirety. B. The City’s Proposed Exception to Proposition 218 Would Swallow the Rule and Constitutes Bad Public Policy. Asdiscussed herein,the legislative intent of Proposition 218 wasto enhance taxpayer consentand to eliminate euphemistic labels used by local government to circumvent taxpayer consent requirements. Asthe court of appeal noted, the surcharge “bearsall the hallmarks ofa utility user tax.” (Jacks, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at 933.) Nevertheless, the City argues that because the surcharge waspart of a negotiated contract and becauseit is SCE that directly remits the funds to the City (despite this surcharge clearly being a passthrough to the consumers), the surchargeis not a tax for Proposition 218 purposes. In essence, the City is arguing that while Proposition 218 does not permit it to imposea tax on its residents without voter approval, it does permit the City to impose the functional equivalent of a tax provided it does so with a third party accomplice who launders the tax into a franchise fee. Aside from exemplifying exactly the sort of behavior Proposition 218 was meantto stop in the first place, this proposed exception would provide an easily exploitable loophole. Local governments could outsource any 9 governmental function they desire packaged with franchise fee agreements in any amount. Under such a system, one wonders whya local government would ever seek taxpayer approval of a tax if they can just contract the work out and let the franchisees collect on its behalf. Finally, the result urged by the City constitutes terrible public policy. Theentire concept of privatization is premised on the notion that private entities are sometimesbe able to provide limited governmental services morecost efficiently than the public sector. (See generally Leonard Gilroy and Lisa Snell, Annual Privatization Report 2015, State Government Privatization (Reason Foundation, May 2015) [as of October 20, 2015].) The outcome desired by the City here inverts this paradigm:rather than providing electrical service at a lowerrate, the surcharge increases the cost of electrical service by artificially inflating rates. And that inflation was directly and intentionally caused by the City “negotiating” for a larger “franchise fee.” Sound public policy dictates that any increase of a “franchise fee” in excess of its historical amount and functionally indistinguishable from an otherwiseillegal tax must be subject to Proposition 218's voter approval. MI 10 Vv PROPOSITION 26 IS INAPPOSITE TO THE CASE AT BAR In its Opening Brief, the City argues that Proposition 26 broadens certain aspects of earlier definitions of “taxes” such that “what is a tax under Proposition 26 is not a tax underearlier law, though the reverse is not alwaystrue.” (Opening Brief at p. 33.) In subsequent briefing, the City claims that Jacks has no answerto its Proposition 26 arguments, and that Jacks’s silence on the matteris “telling.” (Reply Brief at p. 26.) Amici suggest that Jacks is silent on the matter because the City’s argumentis without merit. Even assuming the City’s characterization of Proposition 26's retroactivity is accurate,’ it adds nothingto the analysis. Specifically, the City notes that Proposition 26 excludes from its definition of taxes “a charge imposed for entrance to or use of local government property, or the purchase,rental, or lease of local government property.” 2 It should be noted that the City’s thesis that Proposition 26 may have transformed sometaxes into fees expressly contradicts the legislative intent that Proposition 26 be construed to inure to the benefit of the taxpayer and to limit the abusive practice of mislabeling taxes as fees. (Brooktrails Township Community Services District v. Board ofSupervisors of Mendocino County (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 195, 203 [“Proposition 26, which,as relevant here, expandedthe definition of what constituted a ‘tax’ for purposesofarticle XIII C. One of the declared purposes of Proposition 26 wasto halt evasions of Proposition 218.”][emphasis added].) 1] (Art. XIII A, sec. 1, subdiv. (e)(4).) In arguing the relevanceofthis passage, the City assumes whatit must prove: that the surcharge is a legitimate franchise fee intended to compensate the City for the use ofits infrastructure, rather than a poorly disguised UUT meantonly to generate general purpose revenue. If one accepts this characterization of the surcharge, it passes muster under Proposition 218. In other words,this is exactly the question this Court has certified for review. Therefore, the City’s Proposition 26 argumentis entirely superfluous. Jacks’s silence on this matter is not telling; it is appropriate. VI CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Amici respectfully request that this Court affirm the decision of the Court of Appealin its entirety. Dated: October 21, 2015 Respectfully submitted, TREVOR A. GRIMM JONATHANM. COUPAL TIMOTHYA. BITTLE J. RYAN COGDILL {BAA J. RYAN COGDILL Counsel for Amici 12 WORD COUNT CERTIFICATION I certify, pursuant to Rule 8.204(c) of the California Rules of Court, that the attached brief, including footnotes, but excluding the caption pages, tables, andthis certification, as measured by the word countofthe computer program usedto prepare the brief, contains 2,506 words. Dated: October 21, 2015 Respectfully submitted, TREVOR A. GRIMM JONATHAN M. COUPAL TIMOTHYA.BITTLE J. RYAN COGDILL 4 De) J. COGDILL Counsel for Amici 13 a D H W N S F W W N 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PROOFOF SERVICE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT I, Lorice Strem, declare: lam employed in the County of Sacramento, California. I am over the age of 18 years, and not a party to the within action. My business addressis: 921 1 1" Street, Suite 1201, Sacramento, California 95814. On October 21, 2015 I served the foregoing documentdescribed as: HOWARD JARVIS TAXPAYERS ASSOCIATION AND CALIFORNIA TAXPAYERS ASSOCIATION’S JOINT APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE AND BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTSontheinterested parties below,using the following means: SEE ATTACHED SERVICELIST x BY UNITED STATES MAILI enclosed the documentin sealed envelopes or packages addressed to the respective addresses of the parties stated below and placed the envelopes for collection and mailing, following our ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar with the firm’s practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondenceis placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course ofbusiness with the United States Postal Service, in a sealed envelope with postagefully prepaid at Sacramento, California. BY OVERNIGHT MAILI enclosed the documentin sealed Federal Express envelopes addressed to the respective addresses of the parties stated below and placed the envelopesat a Federal Express drop off location. x (STATE)I declare under penalty of perjury under the lawsof the State of California that the aboveis true and correct. Executed on October 21, 2015, at Sacramento, California. lerice Srrem Print NameofPerson Executing Proof ignéture S I N H W O F H W D NW N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 SERVICE LIST David Wayne Taft Brown Paul E. Heidenreich Huskinson Brown & Heidenreich LLP 1200 Aviation Boulevard, Suite 202 Redondo Beach, CA 90278 Attorneysfor Plaintiffs and Appellants: Rolland Jacks, etal. Michael G. Colantuono Ryan Thomas Dunn Leonard Perry Aslanian Colantuono, Highsmith & Whatley, PC 300 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2700 Los Angeles, CA 90071 Attorneysfor Defendant and Respondent: City ofSanta Barbara Ariel P. Calone, City Attorney Tom R.Shapiro, Asst. City Attorney City of Santa Barbara P.O. Box 1990 Santa Barbara, CA 93102 Attorneysfor Defendant and Respondent: City ofSanta Barbara Superior Court Clerk for Honorable Thomas P. Anderle 1100 AnacapaStreet Santa Barbara, CA 93121 Trial Court Judge Clerk of the Court of Appeal Second Appellate District, Division 6 200 East Santa Clara Street Ventura, CA 93001 Jan I. Goldsmith, City Attorney City of San Diego 1200 Third Avenue, Suite 1100 San Diego, CA 92101 Attorneysfor Amicus Curiae: City ofSan Diego Patrick Whitnell League of California Cities 1400 K Street, Suite 400 Sacramento, CA 95814 Attorneysfor Amicus Curiae: League ofCalifornia Cities SOS APSEto